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CONTEXTUALISING CLIMATE BEHAVIOUR: 
AN INTRODUCTION
The need for enhanced action to deal with climate change in the European 
Union (EU) and its Member States was in the air when I started writing 
this book. While writing it, developments such as higher aspirational targets 
agreed to by signatories to the United Nations Framework Convention for 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) by way of the Paris Agreement,1 and judgments 
such as Urgenda v. The Netherlands2 where the Hague District Court required 
the Dutch government to adopt and implement higher targets, formalised 
this impetus. The important question is how the desire to take more climate 
action could be put into effect while balancing different interests. One of the 
options in this regard is to include households, and effecting a change in the 
‘dirty’ activities of individuals. A proposal that had been mooted sometime 
back – and is an ongoing research project in some parts of the world – is 
1 Decision of the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change to adopt the Paris Agreement. UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of 
the Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (2015).
2 Stichting Urgenda v Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment), 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145, Rechtbank Den Haag, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13–1396 
(Urgenda),
 English translation available at http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id= 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196
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2
to involve individuals in an incentive-based carbon trading scheme.3 The 
centrality of individuals in a proposed regulatory innovation brought to 
mind another fairly recent development – the emergence of Behavioural Law 
and Economics (BLE) as a dominant way of analysing regulatory choices.4 
BLE, therefore, seemed to easily lend itself to analysing the feasibility of a 
carbon trading scheme for individuals, or a collection of individuals in a 
household unit. It is this line of inquiry that was initially pursued in writing 
this book. It was hoped that such an inquiry would provide insight into how 
a carbon trading scheme for households could be implemented successfully 
by understanding how to engage individuals better. However, the book took 
a very different turn once I started to examine the foundations of such a 
regulatory scheme, as well as the BLE lenses through which the scheme was 
examined. Rather than find evidence to implement a feasible carbon trading 
scheme for individuals, the focus shifted onto how an individual may be 
thought about with respect to climate regulation. To a great extent, what 
brought about this shift was interrogating the BLE lenses themselves that 
were used to view such regulation. Further, given the uneasy relationship 
between opinion and behaviour, and the importance of respecting both, I 
have tried to maintain a deliberative hold on how opinion and behaviour on 
climate change is situated;5 an exercise that kicks off in the paragraphs below.
3 For a collection, see Yael Parag and Tina Fawcett (eds.), Personal Carbon Trading (Oxford: 
Earthscan Climate Policy Series 2010).
4 The articles that were critical in defining the field are Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, 
‘Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70 University of Chicago Law Review 
1159; Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471. The profileration of BLE into 
regulatory decision-making is a relatively recent phenomenon, with the establishment of 
dedicated departments as well as the reliance on BLE for decision-making. Suryapratim Roy, 
‘Behavioural Axiology and Public Reason’, Paper presented at Law and Society Association 
Annual Conference, Mexico, 2017. 
5 This is admittedly a marked departure from the position of the detached observer prevalent 
in legal and social science scholarship, and one which I too adopt frequently. For this book, 
I was motivated to use a deliberative-narration approach as I felt the need to clearly keep 
a finger on the process of identifying and translating the scientific into the normative; 
something that demands a deliberative approach. See for instance, Ole Pedersen, ‘The Limits 
of Interdisciplinarity ad the Practice of Environmental Law Scholarship’ (2014) 26 Journal 
of Environmental Law 423. I have been inspired in my approach by Miranda Fricker who 
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If I were asked whether climate change features in my list of priorities, I 
would say no. If I were asked to provide reasons for it, I would come up with 
arguments such as free-riding, and that I (and the world) have greater problems 
to handle. In fact, I might go a step further and suggest that a concentration 
on climate change is an excuse to ignore immediate injustices that I must deal 
with every day. If the hypothetical interrogator was zealous and asked whether 
I care about food prices, displaced refugees, grandchildren, and storms, I 
would probably still say no, but would be forced to reason differently. At 
this point, behavioural (now almost folk)6 psychology would indicate that the 
way questions are asked and the requirement to provide reasons might shape 
my answers. Further, the person (or organisation or party) that asks me such 
questions may affect the way I answer. Oddly, stepping out of the shoes of a 
citizen-respondent and putting on my professional shoes would reveal that I 
have been dealing with climate change issues in different capacities for most 
of my working life. I will try and say the reason behind this is that I find 
it interesting from different scholarly perspectives, but psychologists might 
argue that I’m bluffing to myself – I work on climate change issues only to feel 
involved and assuage my guilt. None of this makes me any wiser but mires me 
in doubt about my convictions and feelings towards climate change. There are 
clearly complications in the causal relationship between my preferences and 
my behaviour; and an argument could be made for considering behaviour 
sans opinion in relation to climate action. Having said that, surely what I 
think and feel should have some value. At the same time, I am aware that it is 
not possible for me to know all there is to know, and even if I did, I am not 
moves away from the traditional philosophical practice of providing a genealogical account 
of blame, and ‘imagines her way’ into a paradigmatic ‘portrait of the practice of blame.’ 
This allows her to arrive at a conception of ‘Communicative Blame’ that is not restricted to 
whether blame is good or bad, but one that serves an instrumental function of increasing 
‘the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer’s moral understandings.’ Miranda Fricker, 
‘What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation’ (2014) 9 NOÛS 1. Similarly, I 
try to imagine my way into how climate behaviour and responsibility may be situated, and 
factors that inform such behaviour. 
6 The translation of academic psychology into folk psychology is not an obvious process. See 
Martin Kusch, Psychological Knowledge: A social history and philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1999), pp. 202 – 270. There is no social history of BLE yet; for a preliminary attempt. see 
Roy, ‘Behavioural Axiology and Public Reason’, supra.
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an island. Whether I like it or not, my thoughts and actions operate within 
bodies of knowledge and political negotiation that I must learn to trust or 
contest. 
The body of knowledge that I must trust largely because neither I nor most 
people in the world have any way of knowing better is the science of climate 
change. But what science and by whom? Judges in different jurisdictions have 
faced a similar question,7 and the reasoning has been to defer to the epistemic 
authority of a small group of scientists who know what’s going on. In Urgenda, 
The Hague District Court relied on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report.8 The scientific authority of the 
IPCC was not challenged by the parties to the dispute. The IPCC, backed 
by a sizable majority of scientists is convinced of hazardous climate change, 
the disruption of natural cycles due to human contribution, and of the need 
to respond quickly.9 But this is where my trust in secondary literature ends. 
There is a problem, yes. And there is a human contribution. What to do with 
this problem and how I choose to look at the human contribution are issues 
that do not flow from the expertise of climate scientists. Let us take the IPCC 
Report and its discussion in Urgenda. The Report states that Annex 1 countries 
should reduce their carbon emissions by the recommended target of 25–40 
per cent reductions by the end of the decade.10 It is not clear whether the 
target of 25–40 per cent is for individual countries, or for Annex 1 countries 
as a group. Thus, the question as to whether the Netherlands is an appropriate 
unit for unilateral 25-40 percent reductions – as the Court in Urgenda felt – 
is a matter of interpretation. This interpretation is just the tip of the iceberg. 
7 New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and Atmospheric 
Research Limited [2012] NZHC 2297 (7 September 2012); Stuart Dimmock v. Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills, [2007] EWHC 2288.
8 Urgenda, para 2.15.
9 William Anderegg et. Al., Expert Credibility in Climate Change, PNAS 2010 : 
1003187107v1-201003187, June 2010. Available at: http://www.pnas.org/content/
early/2010/06/04/1003187107.full.pdf+html [Accessed: August 5, 2010]
10 Sujata Gupta, Dennis A. Tirpak and others, ‘Policies, Instruments and Co-operative 
Arrangements’ in Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change, IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report, p. 776. Available at: www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-
wg3-chapter13.pdf.
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The entire idea of Annex 1 countries or even the recognition of countries as 
the units under consideration or the choice of 25 – 40 percent reductions 
are all interpretative choices. This chain of interpretation arguably comes 
down to the role of the individual in responding to climate change. While 
there is consensus on the science of climate change, there is no corresponding 
agreement on how to respond to climate change. Mike Hulme, a distinguished 
geologist and founder of the Tyndall Centre of Climate Change Research, 
puts it bluntly when he says there is no economic and scientific consensus 
about dealing with climate change11, thus rendering responses susceptible to 
being shaped by popular media12 and social ties.13 If I’m asked whether I make 
efforts to change my behaviour to respond to climate change, I will sincerely 
wonder in addition to the obvious why me and will it make a difference, other 
mysteries, primarily who decides the relevance of what behaviour, compared to 
whom, and will such change take a lot of effort and skill if I want to do it properly? 
And this does not even cover what I might wonder if I were to step in the 
shoes of a policy-maker, or a judge. Then would my opinion –or the opinion 
of people in general– matter at all? 
In the introduction to this book, I attempt to situate the individual within 
climate regulation. My intention with this narrative exercise is to provide a 
contextual framework that informs the more specific issues explored. Secondly, 
I describe the BLE lenses that I utilise to describe the subject. Following this, 
I provide an outline of the book. 
i.  Situating the Individual within Climate 
Regulation
Whether an individual considers or responds to the phenomenon of climate 
change, the assumption is that she is capable of independent deliberation and 
behaving as she deems fit. My endeavour in this section is to show why this 
11 Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction 
and Opportunity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2009)
12 Ibid, pp. 211-247
13 Ibid, pp. 1-35
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may not be the case, and how we might contextualise the individual or the 
household within the context of climate change. 
A. Voluntary Action and its Discontents
In the documentary film No Impact Man,14 Colin Beavan, a middle-income 
writer residing in Manhattan convinces his wife and two year-old daughter 
to undertake an experiment (commissioned on tape and print) to become 
carbon-free, or change their lifestyle in a manner that has no impact on the 
climate. This endeavour starts slowly, with buying organic locally grown food, 
biking rather than driving, to removing the television, electricity, elevators and 
public transport. Along the way, the film captures the substantial emotional 
turmoil and in-family conflicts undergone by the members, primarily the 
wife and the son. The project was undertaken for a year, after which the 
family transitioned to a more moderate lifestyle. The website of the film’s 
protagonist, Colin Beavan, declares that he “was named one of MSN’s Ten 
Most Influential Men of 2007…and [he] sits on the board of directors of New 
York City’s Transportation Alternatives and on the advisory council of Just Food.”15 
When I watched this film, I felt quite disconcerted. I reasoned that perhaps 
it is because responding to climate change does not feature on my list of 
priorities16 that I was somewhat guilt-tripping; but I had strongly felt that 
perhaps the son and the wife were unwarrantedly subjected to one person’s 
project. Even if it isn’t my priority, I wondered whether it is fine to assume 
that everyone has time, energy, a professional cameraman and a book deal 
to become carbon-neutral. Further, I found it inconsistent that while the 
Beavan residence would not be allowed electricity and the subway was a no-
go, day-care centres for the kid and Mr. Beavan’s office would have electricity. 
I think I now have the words to retrospectively reconstruct my issue with 
14 No Impact Man: The Documentary (Eden Wurmfeld and Laura Gabbert Productions 2009), 
15 http://noimpactman.typepad.com/blog/about-colin-beavan.html
16 There was jumble of second guesses that bothered me retrospectively: why did I watch the 
documentary if I don’t care about climate change (instead of cat videos on YouTube for 
example)? Am I just upset I don’t have the energy and the time to be Colin Beavan? Was this 
another instance of the disconnect between opinion and behaviour? The relationship between 
opinions, preferences and behaviour is explored in Chapters 4 and 5.
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the film: the household’s engagement with climate change was mediated by 
Beavan’s private desire17 to write a book and make a documentary film about 
it. Climate-friendly behaviour was informed by the camera, intra-household 
hierarchy and privately processed information regarding appropriate responses 
to climate change. What was missing is whether this camera-friendly episode 
had a desirable impact on emissions reduction; the viewers were certainly 
not privy to (i) the validity of the information on which Beavan’s choices were 
made, (ii) the effectiveness of changes in behaviour over time and space beyond 
the experiment given that the period chosen was a caption-friendly period of 
one year with a single family as protagonists, and (iii) whether such behavioural 
changes were warranted at all, given the theoretical and collective-action 
complexities18 of climate responsiveness behaviour, and the other difficulties 
of everyday life that people have to deal with. If installing smart-meters inside 
homes seem intrusive,19 then should people be required to imitate Mr. Beavan? 
Importantly, it is doubtful whether Mr. Beavan’s private actions should be 
encouraged at all: there is a possibility that Beavan’s family might go on an 
emissions binge to recover from the one-year-trauma, or even unintentionally 
emit more than usual in their no-impact state.20 Should the solution therefore 
17 I confess that I was socialised into social psychological literature on the self-concept, where 
acting environmentally friendly sends a self-signal that the actor is a good person. Economic 
theory identifies this as the ‘warm glow’ benefit. In a recent study, Taufik, Bolderdijk and Steg 
have shown that this could lead to a literal warm glow; i.e. those acting in an environmentally 
friendly fashion may perceive the temperature to be higher. Danny Taufik, Jan Willem 
Bolderdijk and Linda Steg, ‘Acting Green Elicits a Literal Warm Glow’ (2015) 5 Nature: 
Climate Change 37. If this is extended to a collective, then the desire to be a good person may 
be imposed; intra-family decisions are discussed later in this chapter. 
18 In his voluminous treatise, Gardiner identifies the tragedy of the commons, inter-generational 
equity and theoretical conflicts as the central issues of climate change. Stephen M. Gardiner, 
A Perfect Moral Storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), pp. 6-7. 
19 See Colette Cuijpers  and Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘Smart Metering and Privacy in Europe: Lessons 
from the Dutch Case’ in Serge Gutwirth et. al. (eds) European Data Protection: Coming of Age 
(Maastricht: Springer 2013), pp. 269-293. 
20 Unintentional maladaptive and malmitigative practices are quite common even with 
considerable informational sophistication. See, for instance, Lesley K. Mcallister, ‘Adaptive 
Mitigation in the Electric Power Sector’ (2011) 6 Brigham Young University Law Review 2115. 
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be to discourage people like Mr. Beavan from imposing his vanity on his 
family and the ozone layer, for fear of it being misdirected? 
It may appear that if Mr. Beavan had perfect information, then he would 
be able to privately negotiate the other issues of effectiveness and desirability. 
But information by itself is not enough. Take for instance greywater re-use, or 
eating organic food. Recycling of waste water seems like an admirable activity, 
if only we found the motivation to do it. However, it has been found that 
greywater re-use has the potential to have a deleterious effect on the climate, 
alter soil properties, damage plants and contaminate groundwater.21 The 
solution offered in some legal systems has been to amend plumbing codes 
and issue licenses permitting households to engage in greywater use, once 
the possible impacts have been assessed.22 Such detailed regulation may be 
impractical, but it is also reveals the need for more than mere information. 
Let us consider organic farming. Although there appears to be evidence that 
organic farming has the potential to drastically cut emissions,23 currently 
the ‘cradle-to-farmgate’ emissions are higher for some organically farming 
techniques than others; and the emissions from converting conventional 
farming systems to organic farming systems are substantial.24 Thus it appears 
that what is needed is expensive and comprehensive regulation rather than 
informational guides to facilitate effective individual engagement with 
climate change. But surely anyone who has glanced at any material in Law 
& Economics (L&E) would know that expensive and enhanced regulation is 
not always a good thing.25 What then? I want to come back to Mr. Beavan’s 
camera and book deal. 
21 Michael Snodgrass, ‘Greywater-the Reuse of Household Water: A Small Step Towards 
Sustainability and Climate Change’ (2010) 22 Georgetown Environmental Law Review 591. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Rodale Institute, Regenerative Organic Agriculture and Climate Change, 2014. 
24 Kumar Venkat, ‘Comparison of Twelve Organic and Conventional Farming Systems: A Life 
Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Perspective’ (2012) 36 Journal of Sustainable Agriculture 
620. 
25 We will discuss the works of Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi – the pioneers of L&E – in 
the course of this book. For an overview of the field, see Daniel Cole and Peter Grossman, 
Principles of Law and Economics (New York: Aspen, 2nd edition, 2011). 
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B. Associative Incentives and Situated Motivation 
Irrespective of whether we like Mr. Beavan’s experiment, we cannot take 
away two simple facts: the first is that Mr. Beavan was a writer in search of 
a new project; he had discussions about No Impact Man with his agent, and 
he added to a budding industry of popular eco-austerity literature.26 During 
the experiment, there was a camera hovering over the household chronicling 
the process that had the potential to a turn into a successful film. In the 
language of economics, the camera and the book deal appear to behave as 
external incentives. In the language of psychology, it could have been internal 
motivation that pushed the Beavan family: they were predisposed towards 
doing something for the planet.27 Adopting a sociological slant might tell us 
Mr. Beavan belongs to a certain class of people for whom such actions are 
relationally important, this wouldn’t have happened if he did not have the 
cultural capital of being a popular writer or the social capital of enjoying a 
contemporary middle-class New York lifestyle.28 All of these speculations may 
be correct, and sophisticated investigation of their influence and predictability 
may possibly be difficult to reconcile.29 What cannot be ignored, however, is 
the fact of the book deal and camera.30 Thus external interventions are a good 
place to begin. The way in which they work to influence and result in (desirable 
26 For a critical but detailed account of the experiment, see Elizabeth Kolbert, ‘Green Like Me’, 
The New Yorker, August 31, 2009. 
27 There could well be a ‘motivation crowding-out’ by an external incentive. Bruno S. Frey and 
Felix Oberholzer-Gee, ‘The Cost of Price Incentives: An empirical analysis of motivation 
crowding-out’ (1997) 87:4 American Economic Review 746. 
28 It is important to distinguish the study of such relational factors from how such factors are 
translated into and perceived as individual motives and desires. For a recent and extensive 
account of how situational factors need to be studied in their own right, see Mark Granovetter, 
Economy and Society: Framework and principles (Harvard MA: Harvard University Press, 
2017). 
29 The idea that different perspectives on a situation may be irreconcilable is discussed in Section 
IIIA, Chapter 2. 
30 Even commentators who have been supportive of No Impact Man do not discount the 
importance of the camera; DeLaure makes the observation that recording and communicating 
the tragic-comic private battles with climate change makes the issue visible and intelligible to 
a large number of people. Marilyn DeLaure, ‘Environmental Comedy: No Impact Man and 
the Performance of Green Identity’ (2011) 5:4 Environmental Communication 447. 
Situating the Individual .indd   27 10/25/2017   5:14:23 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 28
Chapter 1
10
or undesirable) climate behaviour can depend on myriad contextual concerns, 
predispositions, and the nature of the incentive itself, such as the sweetness 
of the book deal, or the potential audience reach of the documentary film. 
Thus, the nature of the incentive or the nature of prior internal motivation or 
the nature of situational factors may play different weighted roles, but their 
engagement in relation to climate behaviour is brought about by association. 
The word ‘association’ is in currency among scholars working in Science and 
Technology Studies (STS). Simply put, material objects, people, knowledge 
assume a life of their own when they meet a mediator, and all the components 
(including the mediator) have the potential to be redefined or altered.31 The 
idea of association is central to Daniel Kahneman’s – the father of behavioural 
economics – oeuvre as well: external stimuli set off chains of associate intuitive 
and unconscious reactions; their interconnectedness creates an ‘associative 
coherence’.32 The economic term ‘incentive’ is insufficient to capture this 
phenomenon as both preferences as well as the desired outcome are altered 
by such factors. What may seem like a rational decision could be in effect a 
mobilisation of associated ‘impressions, intuitions, and response tendencies.’33 
In the case of the Beavan family, it could be said that the camera influenced 
the choice of carbon-friendly activities (fossil fuels consumed in spaces beyond 
the line of sight are fine), the people involved in the activities (naturally only 
the Beavan family was in the spotlight) and the duration of the experiment (it 
was terminated after one year). Thus, filming and recording could have been 
the incentive, but it assumed the role of an influential mediator. The effects of 
such a mediator in spurring ‘voluntary action’ that is desirable for the public 
good is questionable.34 Consider another example. 
31 For an introduction, see Ulrike Felt, Rayvon Fouché, Clark A. Miller and Laurel Smith-
Doerr, The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 4th ed, 
2016).
32 Carey K. Morewedge and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Associative Processes in Intuitive Judgement’ 
(2010) 14 Trends in Cognitive Sciences 435. 
33 Ibid, p. 439. 
34 Other writers who conduct similar experiments in reducing their carbon footprint are 
humbler about the social effects of their voluntary actions. James Mckinnon who spent a 
year trying to eat food produced within a hundred miles of the apartment observes “I am 
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Recently, there has been a kind move at the University of Groningen to 
partially subsidise the purchase of electronic tablets by its employees to move 
to a paperless world.35 I didn’t take advantage of this opportunity because 
I’m too used to paper; or to put it in economic language, my switching costs 
are too high. It would probably do me a lot of good, help me organise my 
articles (my office is a mess), and enable mobility (travelling for conferences 
is still a horror; deciding on which papers to carry is no easy task). Enabling 
mobility and organisation–and thereby enhancing professionalism –could be 
considered as positive externalities of a policy that seeks to promote going 
paperless as an objective. However, I cannot possibly imagine the prospect 
of not being able to scribble on margins; I don’t think there would be any 
point to life. I’m thankfully supported in this indulgence by Tim Parks who 
demonstrates that his students started reading texts far more closely when they 
used pen and paper,36 thus arguing that pen and paper have a comparative 
professional benefit, at least for studying literature and translation. The same, 
obviously, cannot be said for some of my colleagues who work primarily 
with software; their situated professional preferences may be different. I don’t 
think I mind too much, however, by the policy move in several EU Member 
States for having paperless tickets for public transport, as the inconveniences 
are quite minor. Switching to paperless tickets is not a problem-free process 
though – it requires some diligence to check-out one’s travel pass while getting 
off buses and trains,37 it enhances costs for some destinations (while reducing 
it in others), and if you are visiting a Member State temporarily, then you 
would need to buy a new pass (countries differ about ease of availability 
and costs of acquiring a pass). The paper tickets are gradually phased out 
and discontinued; thus adopting a more command-and-control rather than 
incentive-based regulation. In any event, there is an attempt to foster a default 
not deluded enough to feel that I’m making a difference or being the change I want to see in the 
world.” Quoted in Kolbert, supra n. 22. 
35 The Policy can be found at: https://docs.google.com/file/d/1O6ax_ 
71kdYQdFncQGiawKDv7IYB-VuIAPTXFIL2DIIBXvDUwhxgmZOISUU5y/edit
36 Tim Parks, “A Weapon for Readers”, The New York Review of Books, December 3, 2014. 
37 I forgot to do so the first few times, and lost a fair bit of money, as the amount for the entire 
route is automatically deducted. I wondered if an adjustment period, or a ‘delayed response’ 
was in order for the switch to a travel pass. 
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culture – or steps towards developing a social norm – of paperless tickets. I 
think I’m quite indifferent to the fostering of this social norm; when I travel 
to other countries within the EU, I expect to use my credit card to purchase a 
top-up travel card without much inconvenience. 
Unlike paperless transport, I doubt very much if I’d be happy with a 
social norm of paperless reading. The distinction between my fear of going 
academically paperless and indifference towards paperless transport regarding 
the desired goal of reducing paper could be captured in the Sunstein-Reisch 
framework of a default rule, where I would have the choice to use paper if I 
consciously object to paperlessness.38 They demonstrate that switching the 
default print option in university computers to double-sided printing has led 
to a tremendous reduction in the use of paper. But I could not help but 
wonder: but isn’t that an infringement of my privacy? Also, what would the 
paper industry have to say (especially the smaller companies and suppliers 
that do not have the economies of scale)? And is it possible that, though 
it might not take too much effort to switch to a tablet, it would have an 
unanticipated harmful effect of reducing peoples’ productivity? From the 
importance I attribute to pen-and-paper, I want to suggest that ‘pen-and-
paper’ is not just a tool for communicating thoughts, but a path-dependent 
technology39 that mediates one’s thoughts and actions by association. Paper, 
much like the steam engine, or Microsoft Word or the QWERTY keyboard, 
has a social and economic history;40 has close ties to the publishing industry 
that influences its path-dependence in individual attachment. From this, I 
infer that my love of ‘pen and paper’ is not an expression of a free world; there 
are undoubtedly forces that shape my preferences, even if I have internalised 
38 Cass R. Sunstein and Lucia A. Reisch, ‘Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and 
Environmental Protection’ (2014) 38 Harvard Environmental Law Review 127. 
39 The identification of pen and paper as a technology is found in Joseph Pitt, ‘The Autonomy 
of Technology’ in Craig Hanks ed. Technology and Values: Essential Readings (Blackwell 
Publishing, 2010), p. 95. For the foundations of path-dependence generally, see Brian 
W. Arthur, ‘Competing Technologies and Lock-in by Historical Small Events’ (1989) 99 
Economic Journal 116 and Paul A. David, ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’ (1985) 75 
American Economic Review 332.
40 For a recent account, see Lothar Müller, White Magic: The age of paper (New York: Polity 
Press, 2014).
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these forces and they now seem natural. I also infer that it is fine for me 
to prefer ‘pen and paper’ as the goal of paperlessness competes with other 
concerns such as productivity. In this case I think I would prefer to pay a bit 
more for paper in case there’s a university rationing of paper to meet a paper 
tax. Further, if the need to cut down on paper is high and I might pose an 
obstacle to this, I would prefer if my path-dependence is manipulated than 
deliberatively engaging in motivating myself to cut down. I also think that 
given my strong internalised inclination to use pen-and-paper, my reasoning 
about social costs and benefits would be biased. In other words, if it is necessary, 
I would be happier to sacrifice my deliberative freedom in exchange for not 
bearing the burden of switching costs. This way of reasoning is akin to Joseph 
Raz’s Normal Justification Thesis: Law is the mediator that people employ to 
achieve the ends that they have reason to value. Once such employment is put 
into effect, then per the Pre-emption Thesis, people sacrifice some means to 
achieve such ends in favour of legal institutions. 41 
The term ‘incentive’ in economics is normally considered in monetary 
terms, and something that is provided by an external party. On the other hand, 
the term ‘motivation’ in psychology intuitively seems to be something ‘internal’. 
In this section, I have tried to introduce the idea that the effects of incentives 
may be best understood by association, rather than something that is given. 
Similarly, motivation is not limited to an internal facet of an individual, but 
something that is situated. This approach will help us in considering questions 
of public responsiveness and political acceptance later in the book. 
C. Regulating Climate Behaviour: Transaction Costs and 
Distributional Concerns
Mr. Beavan’s actions seems to be as voluntary as driving an SUV, but unlike 
driving a dirty car, they seem morally commendable, as he is doing something 
41 Joseph Raz, Authority (Oxford: OUP, 1990), pp. 115 – 141. This thesis would appear to have 
desirable applicability for climate change issues, if we were to agree with George Marshall’s 
analysis on how individuals left to their own perform actions that are detrimental to climate 
change, even if some of their actions motivated by ‘warm glow’ or temporary dividends 
indicate otherwise. George Marshall, Don’t Even Think About It: Why our brains are wired to 
ignore climate change (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
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good. It seems that his actions are not regulated, and if everyone voluntarily 
did what Mr. Beavan is doing (over a longer period and with an eye on 
effectiveness) then things would work out. There would be no need for law. 
There would be no need for any intervention. As the reader would have guessed 
from the above discussion on the discontents on voluntary action and situated 
motivation, I do not think there is any such thing as a voluntary preference 
about a social phenomenon that can be explained in individualist terms.42 
This does not necessarily mean that the preference needs to be overruled; it 
also does not necessarily mean that there is need for an externally imposed 
responsibility to change. Drawing on these two lines of thought, it seems clear 
that law shapes behaviour through regulation, but not necessarily through 
the imposition of liability. Given the inevitable influence on preferences by 
myriad factors, there seems to be a justification for some intervention. Such 
intervention to shape behaviour does not necessarily need to be constraining, 
but could also be facilitative.43 Allow me to turn to the history of fossil fuels 
to provide some nuance to this suggestion. 
Though fossil-fuel based practices and activities now seem natural and 
part of everyone’s lives in many ways, it is important to remember that such 
practices are quite recent. Till the 19th century, renewable sources provided 
most of the world’s energy,44 and it was only in the twentieth century that 
42 This is the philosophical issue Sunstein had grappled with earlier, and its influence is very 
clear in his scholarship on Behavioural Law and Economics. See Cass Sunstein, ‘Preferences 
and Politics’ (1991) 20 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3, pp. 5 – 6. Initially Sunstein was 
working with Amartya Sen’s notion of an ‘adapted preference’ that some preferences may be 
considered spurious if they are bred in unjust conditions. However, he subsequently adopted 
the psychological insight that all preferences are inevitably circumscribed. For a discussion, 
see Suryapratim Roy, ‘Agency as Responsiveness’, European University Institute Working 
Paper Law 2016/04. 
43 This idea is a core premise of modern analytic jurisprudence; in moving away from John 
Austin’s notion of coercion as the primary interest of law, H.L.A. Hart emphasised the 
importance of law’s social function of ‘providing individuals with facilities for realising their 
wishes’ in addition to getting people to do or avoid doing things ‘irrespective of their wishes’. 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1961), p. 27. 
44 There was a prevalence of water-powered industrial activity, to be displaced by the promise 
of mobility and investment-shopping that the steam engine afforded. See Andreas Malm, 
‘The Origins of Fossil Capital: From water to steam in the British cotton industry’ (2013) 21 
Historical Materialism 15. 
Situating the Individual .indd   32 10/25/2017   5:14:23 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 33
Contextualising Climate Behaviour: An Introduction
15
1
concentrated hydrocarbon stores were exploited, beginning with England. 
Coal brought into play spatial changes, provided the incentive to develop 
the steam engine to facilitate coal mining, the first labour unions, the search 
for a fuel that flowed through networks that had lesser threats of blockages 
and lower costs of manpower.45 The discovery and mobility of oil led to 
the formation of coal cartels and lobbies for intergovernmental protection 
such as the European Coal and Steel Community.46 The threat to the first-
mover petroleum companies in the United States by cheaper oil producing 
countries owing to the mobility of oil led to payments to resource-owners 
such as Ibn Saud to reduce production and supply of oil. In parallel – and 
counterintuitively – there was a move among regulators and the oil industry 
in the United States to incentivise lifestyles and products that consumed 
large amounts of energy to maintain (at least for a short period) the artificial 
scarcity and relatively higher prices of oil.47 The primary industry that rose 
to energy-intensive middle-class aspirations was the automobile industry. 
Motor vehicles industries in Europe competitively invested in passenger cars. 
This is one example of how the materiality of fossil fuels was translated into 
naturalised high-energy consumption activities. Thus, selective regulation 
facilitated the growth of the consumption of fossil fuels, and it is within this 
paradigm that the individual consumer is situated. 
Within this context, it is difficult to put one’s finger on a single influential 
mediator (unlike Mr. Beavan’s camera), and it is also difficult to point a finger 
at a single party that could be made responsible for anthropogenic climate 
change.48 As is well known in climate liability disputes, causality is difficult 
to establish, and thus from the causal perspective, it is difficult to say why 
a household like Mr. Beavan’s is morally praiseworthy, or a gas-guzzling 
household is morally blameworthy. This is why both legal disputes that centre 
45 For an account of competing interests that came into being after the discovery of coal, see 
Barbara Freese, Coal: A human history (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2003). 
46 Timothy Mitchell, ‘Carbon Democracy’ (2009) 38:3 Economy and Society 399, p. 408. 
47 Ibid, p. 409. 
48 Mitchell provocatively points to the post-war economics profession including economists 
such as Keynes, Hicks, Samuelson, Arrow and Debreu to be either indifferent to or argue 
against the significance of the costs of climate change in economic measurements, either in 
indices such as the GNP or in theories of welfare. Ibid, pp. 416 – 418. 
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on causality as the basis for identifying the polluter who would be held liable,49 
as well as philosophical investigations that centre on the notion of fairness 
that one should get (or pay for) what one deserves, inevitably flounder. This is 
precisely where L&E would be useful, which warrants a detour into a couple 
of its primary intellectual developments. 
It is likely that Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi had laid the foundations 
of L&E around the same time without being aware of each other’s work.50 
Though their names are often said in the same breath, Calabresi took pains 
to clarify his interpretation of Coase’s work that was dramatically different 
from George Stigler’s interpretation – and indeed invention – of the so-called 
‘Coase theorem’.51 The motivation behind their work appears to be very 
similar: a crucial deviation by both Coase and Calabresi from a causality-based 
approach to the polluter-pays principle is decentering the idea that identifying 
the activity or party who caused harm should be the heart of analytical inquiry. 
Calabresi chose to concentrate on ‘accident-like’ situations.52 Coase showed 
the uncertainty and inconsistency of the imposition of causal responsibility in 
environmental cases ; there was no guarantee that causal responsibility would 
be the best way to deal with the pollution itself. The solution, therefore, was 
to keep one’s eye on the social cost such as the fact of pollution. In a Coasean 
world, perpetrators and victims would wish to deal with a social cost without 
taking too much of a hit; they would be both well placed and motivated to 
know their private costs and hence negotiate their way to a mutually agreeable 
49 This is why the climate change cases that seems to have had some success reason out the 
requirement to take action based on other principles such as the State’s duty of care towards 
citizens in Urgenda or the public trust doctrine in the ongoing Our Children’s Trust case in the 
United States. 
50 Steven Medema, ‘Juris Prudence: Calabresi’s uneasy relationship with the Coase theorem’ 
(2014) 77 Law & Contemporary Problems 65, p. 65. Mattei calls Calabresi ‘the true creator 
of law and economics’. Ugo Mattei, ‘The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An essay for 
Judge Guido Calabresi (2005) 64 Maryland Law Review 220, p. 230. 
51 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1; George 
Stigler, The Theory of Price (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 113; Calabresi has developed 
his interpretation of Coase’s work over several papers chronicled in Medema ‘Juris Prudence’ 
supra; the primary themes are discussed in Part V of Chapter 5. 
52 Guido Calabresi, ‘The Decision for Accidents: An approach to nonfault allocation of costs’ 
(1965) 78 Harvard Law Review 713.
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solution. This solution would also serve the public good or be an efficient 
solution in the absence of transaction costs. The Stiglerian interpretation of 
this view is that the point of regulation is to facilitate a zero transaction cost 
world so that parties can freely negotiate and pursue their rational interests 
using a market mechanism.53 Coase subsequently clarified that the Stiglerian 
view – that the Coase Theorem means that if we assume zero transaction 
costs, participants of a market can be left to their own devices to reach an 
efficient solution – is not what he meant.54 The Calabresian interpretation is 
that we cannot assume a zero transaction cost or distribution-neutral world 
and so law makes the least cost avoider – or the agent that can fix a problem at 
the lowest cost - liable for social costs. Conversely, those who bear high costs 
given their situation in the distribution chain would have an entitlement to 
be free of social harm. Essentially, it is not that the Calabresian view (that 
has been altered somewhat over time) is a critique of Coase’s work, but it is 
a distinct interpretation of it. To clarify, a Coasean world as interpreted by 
Stigler is to concentrate on how to arrive at a zero-transaction cost world and 
the concentration is the reduction of transaction costs. A Coasean world as 
interpreted by Calabresi is how to achieve at desirable social outcomes in a 
non-ideal world given the existence of positive transaction costs, and hence 
concentrating on issues of distribution.55 In both circumstances, regulation 
53 This also provides the basis for an Ellicksonian view, where it is possible for parties to negotiate 
efficient solutions without the shadow of law. Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How 
Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
54 As Coase explains, a world of zero transaction costs is “the world of modern economic 
analysis, and economists feel quite comfortable handling the intellectual problems it poses, 
remote from the real world though they may be.” He clarifies, “It would not seem worthwhile 
to spend much time investigating the properties of such a world.” Ronald Coase, The Firm, 
the Market and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 15. 
55 I have realised retrospectively that I have a bias towards the latter point of view. I arrived 
at this bias because my analysis concerns people and not firms. I will demonstrate that 
when it comes to people there is a fundamental and computational problem to overcome: 
fundamentally, the multi-dimensional nature of people’s lives and goals cannot be equated 
to that of organisations and firms. Computationally, their transactions costs are far more 
difficult to quantify and reduce. This bias need not afflict scholars investigating the behaviour 
of firms in relation to climate change, and who study regulations with the assumption that 
the end justifies the means; i.e. the requirement to reduce emissions at the lowest monetary 
cost is how we assess the effectiveness of regulation. I do not have that luxury.
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is inevitable. In the first situation, it is to identify parties that need to be 
regulated, assign property rights as well as to identify and mitigate transaction 
costs for assignees of rights so that markets can work. And in the second, 
it is to put in place complementary constraining mechanisms to ensure the 
achievement of desirable social outcomes. I will expand on how this applies to 
climate regulation in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
I took the reader through the detour above to make a couple of 
observations. The first is that individual behavior with respect to emissions 
is contextually situated, and due to the legal and political history of fossil 
fuels, implicitly regulated. Secondly, given this implicit regulation, causal 
responsibility is difficult to attribute. Thirdly, the difficulty of attributing 
causal responsibility does not mean that there is no space for regulation 
such as the creation of incentives, or even the imposition of liability. Rather, 
regulation is inevitable. The absence of specific regulation would imply a 
world where existing transaction costs and positionality with respect to 
distributional choices shape behavior. Thus, regulatory choices such as the 
creation of incentives or the imposition of liability require consideration 
of the state of affairs to appreciate the possibility of effecting any desirable 
or meaningful change in behaviour.Returning to the Beavan household, 
I am interested in the camera – and external behaviour-shaping forces - 
only if it serves an instrumental social function of meaningfully reducing 
emissions. In other words, if it plays an effective regulatory role. I also 
do not think we should praise or blame Mr. Beavan depending on our 
worldviews, but assess whether his actions are warranted, whether it is 
worth it to make bold decisions for some people (his family) and ignore 
others (the rest of the world essentially), and more importantly, whether 
everyone else – in my book all European citizens – need to be regulated 
to be some version of Mr. Beavan. And if yes, whether there might be 
an incentive that achieves a reduction of emissions without imposing 
unjustified burdens. 
Keeping the properties of situational informants of individual behaviour, 
associative incentives and situated motivation, transaction costs and distributional 
concerns, we can proceed to a discussion of the primary analytical lenses sought 
to be utilised as well as understood: BLE. 
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ii. Methodology and Axiology 
“Most scientists tend to understand little more about science 
than fish about hydrodynamics.”
—Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of 
Scientific Research.
To my mind, there are three ways of doing BLE. The first way is to use the findings 
of experimental psychology, make changes to economic models and studies, and 
apply them to legal issues. This is usually the method preferred by lawyers. To some 
extent, this is how I conduct some of the literature review in Chapter 2, where I 
claim to adopt a BLE approach. I apply a similar but somewhat unconventional 
approach in Chapter 3 – I arbitrage the idea of causal inference found in statistical 
methods to develop an analytical framework of engaging with expertise in legal 
inquiry. This may be considered as ‘simple arbitrage’ akin to Thomas Ulen’s critique 
of the usual practice of interdisciplinary work in law.56 Scholars more invested in 
the methodology of economics demonstrate that an application of knowledge 
may be viewed as an interpretation of knowledge (the hermeneutic view);57 and 
Ulen’s critique would therefore pertain to how interpretation is done. The second 
is to mimic the science of behavioural economics, which in turn is to either mimic 
the work of cognitive and social psychologists, or the work of economists who 
incorporate psychological findings to create more complete economic models. 
This is the preferred method by legal scholars who seek scientific sophistication 
or believe that empiricism is a value in itself such as Christoph Engel discussed 
below. This inspired my lab experiment in Chapter 4 and the survey in Chapter 5. 
The third way is similar to the way L&E itself has developed ‘a flavour and 
dynamic of its own’58 drawing on other disciplines. Though there is engagement 
with sophisticated legal inquiry and economic inquiry, the existence of L&E 
is independent of a form of internal correctness that may be true either for a 
particular field of law or a particular field of economics. This is the approach 
56 Thomas S. Ulen, ‘A Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and other) Additions to the Law 
School and Law and Economics Curricula’ (2004) 41 San Diego Law Review 35, p. 51. 
57 Sheila C. Dow, Economic Methodology: An inquiry (Oxford: OUP, 2002), pp. 113 – 115. 
58 Ulen, ‘A Crowded House’, supra. 
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adopted by scholars such as Calabresi.59 Much as one does not need to be a tort 
lawyer or an economist to contribute to L&E, one does not need to be labelled a 
psychologist to contribute to BLE. This is true for some of the leading BLE scholars 
working today.60 What is common to a Calabresian way of doing L&E and BLE 
scholars – and the reason it is particularly relevant for thinking about novel policy 
considerations – is the interest in designing new institutions, and theoretical 
innovation. There is neither a settled institutional framework on a mandatory 
emissions trading scheme for people, nor has the coherence of BLE as a discipline 
been worked out.61 I do not have the luxury of scholars working on improving 
and retrospectively analysing schemes such as the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and nor do I work within the settled boundaries of 
a scholarly discipline.62 BLE is, therefore, the approach that I adopt for most of 
the book. I need to make a clarification here. The independence of such ‘flavour 
and dynamic’ is debatable as there is an inclination to mimic the way L&E itself is 
done; i.e. to supplement analytical insights in L&E with BLE empiricism to make 
inquiries more ‘whole’ by filling in for lapses in rational behaviour. In Mirjam-
Sent’s account of the history of behavioural economics, the reason why the 
findings of Kahneman and Tversky were well received by economists as against 
the earlier efforts of psychologists is because such findings did not pose a threat 
to economics as a discipline; on the contrary, they helped rebuild mainstream 
economics.63 Briefly put, unlike the ‘old’ psychological inputs into economics that 
59 As Hackney puts it, “Although closely aligned with law and neoclassical economics, Judge 
Calabresi, aside from rejecting distribution agnosticism, has always been less tightly bound to 
the idea of law as science.” James R. hackney Jr., ‘Guido Calabresi and the Construction of 
American Legal Theory’ (2014) 77:2 Law and Contemporary Problems 45, p. 47. 
60 See discussion in Chapter 3, infra. 
61 Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioural Science: Removing the rationality 
assumption from Law and Economics’ (2000) 88 California Law Review 1051, p. 1075. 
62 There might be a dissonance between this approach and scholars trained within a particular 
scientific paradigm of doing economics, psychology, or even within the interpretative 
boundaries of a particular legal system. Hence Hylton: “…economic analysis is most valuable 
when it is helping us to solve existing puzzles, or understand institutions or conventions that 
exist, and less valuable when used to design new institutions.” Keith N. Hylton, ‘Calabresi and 
the Intellectual History of Law and Economics’ (2005) 64 Maryland Law Review 85, p. 93. 
63 Esther Mirjam-Sent, ‘Behavioral economics: How psychology made its (limited) way back 
into economics’ (2005) 36:4 History of Political Economy 735. 
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were rejected, the starting point of behavioural economists was expected utility 
maximisation, and then to trace deviations and conformity with such benchmarks 
found in economic models.64 There is, therefore, the temptation to maintain the 
normative ideal of maximisation and use psychological findings to account for 
deviations from maximisation in economic models.65 The same could be said 
about a normative position found in law. Though the incentives for legal scholars 
to subscribe to a normative ideal may be undercut given the interpretative nature 
of legal scholarship, any legal scholar who is wedded to a particular legal field and 
the settled positions therein66 would be tempted to use psychological findings 
to buttress a normative ideal, or tie-up the loose ends of a category. This usually 
transpires into categories such as ‘inviolable contracts’67 or – the one Calabresi 
and Melamed interrogated – inalienable entitlements.68 In other words, much 
like the ‘As-if ’ method of doing behavioural economics69 or arriving at a correct 
legal position, it is possible to adopt an ‘As-if ’ method of doing BLE. I adopt an 
‘As-if ’ method of doing BLE in the first part of Chapter 6 by working within the 
contours of the European legal order. 
64 Ibid, p.743. This is in stark methodological contrast to earlier efforts to move away from 
deductive reasoning, equilibrium outcomes and finding substitutes for utility maximization. 
65 Bruce Chapman, ‘Rational Choice and Categorical Reason’ (2003) 151 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1169.
66 This is usually found in originalist legal scholarship that subscribes to a view of what is correct 
based on doctrinal sources. See for instance Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Jack Balkin is an American’ 
(2013) 23 Yale Journal of Law and Human Rights 25. I have also tried to show that this 
is true for some scholars who claim to do comparative legal research; a common practice 
is to take a friendly tour in the laws of another legal order and then come back to one’s 
preferred legal system for the serious analysis. Suryapratim Roy, ‘Privileging (some forms of ) 
Interdisciplinarity and Interpretation: Methods in Comparative Law’ (2014) 12 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law786. 
67 The fact that public interest is an exception to this normative position which can be interpreted 
in different ways shows that there is scope for interpretation. 
68 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: 
One view of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Yale Law Journal 1089.
69 Nathan Berg and Gerd Gigerenzer, ‘As-if Behavioural Economics: neoclassical economics in 
disguise?’ (2010) 18 History of Economic Ideas 133. For an appraisal of how this is the preferred 
method of doing BLE, and the shortcomings of the same, see Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, ‘What 
is the Meaning of Behavioural Economics’ (2013) 37 Cambridge Journal of Economics 985.
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This is not, however, the only way in which BLE may acquire a voice in its 
own right. The way BLE can chart its own path is by querying the analytical 
categories70 of L&E, as well as creating new analytical categories to reflect 
Kahneman’s observation about preferences and choices being situated;71 and 
findings about choices being associated.72 The importance of concentrating on 
analytical categories in BLE’s development as a discipline in its own right has been 
examined by scholars such as Claire Hill,73 Bruce Chapman74 and Karen Yeung.75 
The different ways of doing BLE may be diagrammatically represented as follows:
Figure 1: Ways of Doing Behavioural Law and Economics
70 Claire Hill, ‘Beyond Mistakes: The next wave of behavioural law and economics’ 29 (2003) 
Queen’s Law Journal 563. 
71 Daniel Kahneman, ‘Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for behavioural economics’ 
(2003) 93:5 American Economic Review 1449, p. 1469. 
72 See discussion on ‘associated coherence’ earlier. 
73 Hill, ‘Beyond Mistakes’, supra; Claire Hill, ‘A Positive Agenda for Behavioral Law and 
Economics’ (2011) 3 Cognitive Critique 85.
74 Chapman, ‘Rational Choice ad Categorical Reason’, supra. 
75 Karen Yeung, ‘Nudge as Fudge’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 122.
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A brief explanation of the term ‘analytical category’ and what it entails is 
warranted. The phrase ‘analytical category’ is of central importance to science 
studies76 and economic sociology.77 Though it does not assume centrality 
to the work of L&E scholars, it has been relied on by pioneers as well as 
scholars interpreting the work of pioneers. Let us take for instance Carol 
Rose’s interpretation of Calabresi’s work.78 Rose identifies ‘property rules’ and 
‘liability rules’ as the two ‘analytic categories’ that lie at the core of Calabresi 
& Melamed’s One View of the Cathedral.79 Rose further shows a background 
intuition about the need to deal with property distribution in accident-like 
situations (where people do not have the opportunity to plan in advance) 
informs the selection of these two analytical categories that sought to replace 
traditional legal categories of contract, property and tort.80 As discussed 
earlier, Calabresi was already trying to deal with situations where people were 
faced with real-life difficulties without relying on a rational actor assumption. 
These categories may well be considered as part of the BLE canon that seeks 
to develop a voice of its own. Let us take a more conventional BLE example. 
While it may not be billed in such a fashion, the Thaler-Sunstein creation of 
a ‘nudge’81 is a separate analytical category. It does not involve incorporating 
experimental findings into economic models for application to regulatory 
concerns.82 Rather, it is using findings from experimental psychology as policy 
76 David Caudill, ‘Law, Science and the Economy: One Domain?’ (2015)5 UC Irvine Law 
Review 393. 
77 Michel Callon’s work on the interaction between the ‘firm’ and the ‘laboratory’ in concerned 
with how analytical categories found in either of these domains are re-invented during the 
process of interaction, or by association. See Michel Callon, ‘What Does it Mean to Say 
Economics is Performative?’ in Donald Mackenzie, Fabian Muniesa and Lucia Siu (eds) Do 
Economists Make Markets? (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 311.
78 Carol M. Rose, ‘The Shadow of the Cathedral’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2175.
79 Calabresi and Melamed, supra.
80 Ibid, pp. 2180 – 2181. 
81 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, Nudge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
82 Kahneman clarifies in an interview that Nudge is more psychology than behavioural 
economics: “When it comes to policy making, applications of social or cognitive psychology are now 
routinely labeled behavioral economics. The “culprits” in the appropriation of my discipline are two 
of my best friends, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. Their joint masterpiece Nudge is rich in 
policy recommendations that apply psychology to problems—sometimes common-sense psychology, 
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heuristics83 to desirably but mildly manipulate the environment in which 
choices and decisions are made. A nudge, therefore, is an analytical category 
in its own right, and it has taken substantial inquiry and critique over the last 
twenty years to give it substance. It is also tempting to think that nudge is 
the only meaningful analytical category of BLE as a discipline in itself. This is 
because the difficult exercise of balancing the paternalistic shaping of people’s 
choices and preserving their liberty has been mostly confined to the idea of a 
nudge. This does not mean that there could not be other analytical categories 
that could be shaped within the discipline of BLE. In this book, I suggest 
and try to put in motion the development of several such categories: public 
responsiveness (Chapter 4), discursive capture (Chapter 5) and the category 
of the end-user itself (Chapters 6 and 7). 
While writing this book, this endeavour to identify and explain analytical 
categories was not considered scholarship by scholars and practitioners 
interested in a scientific view of doing economics or considering all possible 
legal angles. This may indeed be a valid concern as this way of inquiry appears 
to be more arbitrary than either the first, second, or the ‘as-if ’ method of 
conducting BLE inquiries described above. I would like to suggest that this 
method of scholarship is not idiosyncratic but central to BLE inquiry. In 
L&E, the normative position – that of interacting rational actors arriving 
at efficient solutions once institutions facilitated rather than obstructed 
sometimes the scientific kind. Indeed, there is far more psychology than economics in Nudge. But 
because one of the authors of Nudge is the guru of behavioral economics, the book immediately 
became the public definition of behavioral economics. The consequence is that psychologists 
applying their field to policy issues are now seen as doing behavioral economics. As a result, they are 
almost forced to accept the label of behavioral economists, even if they are as innocent of economic 
knowledge as I am.” Jesse Singal, ‘Daniel Kahneman’s Gripe with Behavioral Economics’ 
available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/26/daniel-kahneman-s-gripe-
with-behavioral-economics.html [last accessed May 15, 2016] 
83 It may appear that the ‘nudge’ way of making policy interventions seems to be more compatible 
with Gerd Gigerenzer’s smart or ‘ecologically rational’ heuristics approach rather than 
Kahneman’s probabilistic irrationality approach (discussed in Chapter 3).This is interesting 
because Kahneman and Gigerenzer are professional rivals, so to speak. However, on closer 
examination a Nudge is more in line with Kahneman’s approach due to its paternalistic 
orientation. Gigerenzer’s interest is more oriented towards self-regulation, or how individuals 
can use better heuristics in everyday life rather than make decisions that border on optimality. 
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transactions – is clear. Sophisticated methodological choices would be made in 
the shadow of this axiomatic normative position, which explains an empirical 
and mathematical slant in L&E. BLE, however, is concerned with the axiom 
of the rational actor itself and inquiries are therefore axiological rather than 
methodological. Axiological inquiries entail a concentration on inductive theory-
building, including creating a new vocabulary to capture new properties of 
the altered paradigm. By way of an example, Ulen points out that the central 
concern of L&E is ‘people respond to incentives.’84 Accordingly, sophisticated 
institutional and new-institutional L&E will entail comparing incentives, 
how they can be designed, how they can be implemented and enforced. BLE, 
on the other hand, asks what ‘people’ means, what ‘responsiveness’ means, 
and what an incentive is; we cannot assume homogeneity among people, 
responsiveness does not necessarily mean strategic and competitive behaviour, 
and an incentive is different from motivation. 
iii. Outline of the Book 
A. Change in Outlook
This book started out very differently from what it is now. I was initially 
motivated to see how the EU ETS could be expanded to households, or how a 
cap-and-trade mechanism could be implemented at the household level. I had 
a comfortable research question: How can BLE help in implementing an end-
user emissions trading scheme? I felt there were two primary obstacles: the first 
is that people are biased in different ways, and once these biases are removed, 
then uncapped emissions from the residential sector could be accounted for and 
operationalised via a cap-and-trade system. The second obstacle I felt was that 
an emissions trading scheme for households seemed complicated. If the system 
could be made simpler, then individual or household engagement would be 
made possible. Given the prevalence of the EU ETS in understanding the L&E 
of climate policy in the European legal order, I was of course influenced by the 
idea that expanding the EU ETS to households at a pan-European level was 
the way forward. These motivations would be evident to the reader in Chapter 
84 Ulen, ‘A Crowded House’, supra, p. 41. 
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2 where I seek to conduct a literature review on the subject, and (to my mind) 
have an optimism bias. The orientation is to glean from the literature issues 
that can be resolved through empirical work and identifying the correct legal 
basis. Accordingly, Chapter 2 looks at existing literature on similar schemes and 
identifies three primary challenges: public acceptability, political acceptability 
and the legal basis for a European scheme. To ferret out these issues I initially 
sought to understand relevant biases using psychological methods and assess 
how they could be negotiated, gauge the inclination of regulators across Europe 
through surveys towards aspects of such a scheme, and learn European climate 
law to see if such a scheme could be accommodated. 
But then things happened. It began with a methodological unease while 
I was going about thinking about how to deal with public and political 
acceptability. I attribute a change in perspective to three events that occurred 
in the year after I completed Chapter 2. The first was a line in Daniel 
Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow where he says that despite a lifetime of 
research, his “…intuitive thinking is just as prone to overconfidence, extreme 
predictions, and the planning fallacy as it was before I made a study of these 
issues.”85 He applies the same pessimism to climate responsive behaviour.86 
Thus, the leading light of behavioural economics tells us that knowledge of 
biases is not enough to overcome them. If that is the case, then could we 
expect individuals and households to reduce their marginal abatement costs 
to respond to a cap-and-trade incentive? Perhaps knowledge of biases can have 
an effect on deliberative thinking rather than intuitive thinking. However I 
found no evidence to this effect; on the contrary the inability of people to 
move from an ‘intuitive System 1’ to a ‘deliberative System 2’ is what justifies 
paternalistic interventions. I couldn’t think straight till I explored this issue 
further, and this resulted in my paper on ‘Agency as Responsiveness’87, where 
85 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (London: Farrar, Giroux and Strauss, 2002), p. 
417. 
86 In an interview, Kahneman says that ‘no amount of psychological awareness’ would lead 
people to change how they live to respond to climate change issues. See Marshall, supra , p. 
56 – 58. 
87 Suryapratim Roy, ‘Agency as Responsiveness’, European University Institute Working Paper, 
2016/04. 
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I argue that BLE does not teach us how individuals can develop the agency 
to negotiate social spaces (or transact, to use the language of L&E), and 
for that we need a responsiveness paradigm. The second was a conference 
organised at Erasmus University Rotterdam88 with Cass Sunstein as a guest 
speaker. A question was raised in the discussions but was left unanswered 
– why would people buy his (co-authored along with Richard Thaler) 
bestselling book Nudge if it did not help them make decisions? On the 
contrary, would knowledge about biases and inability to act on them create 
an optimism bias in itself? But more important than this was the audience 
response to a paper by Christoph Engel, one of the most prominent 
advocates of an empirical approach to law working today.89 Engel had an 
insightful experimental study on the use of sanctions.90 At the end of his 
study, there was a question from the audience (among a couple of others 
in a similar vein): what policy inferences can we draw from the study? The 
answer was – and this captured a trend I noticed in behavioural economics 
generally – that the contribution is a scientific study and policy inferences 
cannot flippantly be drawn. However, similar questions are rare in L&E 
contributions that use econometric methods, mathematical modelling and 
game theory. I realised this made the piecemeal empirical orientation of 
BLE distinct from the modelled empiricism of L&E: in L&E, the scientific 
pursuit of efficiency is the normative basis of law. The intuitive core of 
L&E that people and institutions are looking out for their interests and 
liberty is in conformity with social welfare, and theoretical and empirical 
sophistication of this intuition is acceptable. Not so in BLE. The intuitive 
core is hard to digest: people are not looking out for their interests, and 
liberty is not in conformity with social welfare. The third event was when I 
experienced the inevitable gap between science and policy in my own stab 
at empirical work. To understand public acceptability, I realised there was 
a gap in experimental work on motivation: the nature of an environmental 
88 Nudging and Beyond: Current applications and new perspectives on behavioral insights, 
Rotterdam, 7 November 2013.
89 For a recent paper, see Christoph Engel, ‘Empirical Methods for the Law’, Preprint of the 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2017/7.
90 Christoph Engel, ‘Deterrence by the Use of Sanctions’, Ibid. 
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incentive was understood to be as important (if not more) than the size of 
an incentive, but properties of the nature of such incentives were not clear. 
Applying prospect theory to cap-and-trade, I wanted to test if a method 
of allocation where people have to ‘earn’ allowances would lead to more 
climate-friendly choices. I conducted the experiment discussed in Chapter 
4 at the Faculty of Economics under the guidance of Jan Willem Bolderdijk, 
a social psychologist who studies incentives. One afternoon in-between 
sessions in the lab, I realised the very limited question my experiment could 
answer, which quite simply was the relevance of loss aversion to climate-
friendly choices. I kept troubling Jan Willem with questions such as: is 
there any way we can infer from this experiment that an auctioning system 
is preferable to a grandfathering system? Could we say that a small incentive 
properly deployed works better than a small tax? In response Jan Willem 
communicated what must have been obvious to him but was difficult for me 
to accept: a psychological study is better if it is smaller. I understood then 
the dissonance between my analytical orientation and Jan Willem’s scientific 
mind: the point of an experimental study is to cut out the noise of the world 
and concentrate on as few variables as possible. Thus, while those who seek 
policy relevance think in generalisation, an empirical psychologist thinks in 
specifics. These two orientations are more dissonant than compatible. 
The above three events led specifically to my paper on Moderators and 
Mediators of Normative Reductionism, which I have included as an integral 
part of this book (Chapter 3). I try to develop an analytical framework for 
how policy and science interact. More generally, the events marked a shift in 
my worldview. I felt that what is more relevant than doing empirical work in 
the social sciences is to try and understand how to use them. This is necessarily 
a speculative process, involves inductive-theory building, and dramatically 
changed the approach of my book. I could no longer ‘perform’ Chapter 2, but 
had to reconsider the assumptions and categories used therein; an approach 
that is prevalent throughout the book. Two concerns – the possibility of 
inclusion of the individual in a cap-and-trade scheme like the EU ETS, and 
the potential of BLE as a preferred lens to examine this regulatory option 
– animate the dissertation. The central question may be formulated as: is it 
desirable to have an end-user emissions trading scheme in the EU, and what 
can BLE say about it?
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B. Chapterisation and Contributions
Considering the above approach, this is how the book stands. 
Chapter 1 is this somewhat long introduction where I try to provide a 
narrative account of the struggles and processes of engaging with the idea of 
incentivising household engagement with climate change. 
Primary Contributions 
t Provides a contextual background for an End-user Emissions Trading 
scheme (EET), concentrating on the discontents of voluntary climate 
action, the operation of incentives and motivation, and how to 
approach climate regulation. 
t Develops a framework for doing BLE research, highlighting the 
importance of axiological inquiry. 
Chapter 2 is a literature review on schemes similar to an EET, but is also 
indirectly an account of how such a scheme may be implemented, and 
the obstacles that lie in its path. The primary take-away from the chapter 
is that public acceptability, political acceptability and double counting are 
the primary challenges. Taking a leaf from the EU ETS, it also suggests that 
in contrast with cognate proposals that have been considered, the scale and 
scope of an EET can in fact be broadened. 
Primary Contributions
t Reviews literature on policy mechanisms akin to a cap-and-trade 
scheme for individuals, and suggests extending scale and scope of 
such schemes.
t Advances arguments for an EET scheme, primarily capping uncapped 
sectors, regulating offsets & voluntary sustainable behaviour, and 
achieving energy efficiency.
t Identifies challenges including justice & equity considerations, 
enforcement, public acceptability and political acceptability. 
Chapter 3 may be viewed as a separate chapter on methodology, but I prefer 
to think of it as a substantive component of a book that tries to negotiate the 
still nascent field of BLE. As described earlier, it chronologically follows the 
literature review because it revisits the question of how knowledge is selected 
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and used. Concentrating on BLE and climate change, I suggest in the chapter 
that the time has come to move away from looking at science and politics as 
conflicting categories, but work towards examining how they are associated 
and suggesting processes whereby expertise may be translated into law. I 
arbitrage the statistical tools of mediation and moderation into analytical 
reasoning on regulation. 
Primary Contributions
t Conceptualises the use of expertise in legal inquiry as a process of 
testimonial exchange.
t Maps institutional engagement with expertise in the EU and US, 
arguing in favour of developing analytical tools for negotiating 
expertise by legal scholars and decision-makers.
t Drawing on legal theory and Science and Technology Studies, 
develops a ‘moderated-mediation’ framework of climate regulation. 
Chapter 4 interrogates the concept of public acceptability, demonstrates why 
‘public responsiveness’ is a preferable heuristic, and in the process engages with 
the question of how a laboratory experiment may be translated into policy. 
Specifically, I report on and analyse a novel laboratory study on one aspect of 
a proposed EET scheme: whether the manner of allocation of allowances has 
an effect on climate choices. Subsequently, there is an attempt to understand 
what inferences can and cannot be drawn from the experiment. 
Primary Contributions
t Conceptualises public acceptability as acceptability of instruments 
and acceptability of context, re-categorises ‘public acceptability’ as 
‘public responsiveness’.
t Reports on an experiment on whether loss-aversion plays a role in 
designing an incentive, which would inform the manner of allocation; 
the results were inconclusive. 
t Develops a framework for drawing inferences from psychological 
experiments for regulatory decision-making, concentrating on what 
inferences can be drawn, what may not, and the costs of making 
inferences.
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Chapter 5 interrogates the concept of political acceptability and demonstrates 
why ‘political acceptance’ is a preferable heuristic. Initially I suggest that 
the behaviour of regulators is essentially their stated preferences – or their 
behaviour is anchored by justification – and accordingly attempts a survey 
of experts and regulators. However, responses to a Pilot Survey as well as a 
parallel project I pursued led me to a different way of thinking about the BLE 
of regulators: the political economy of discursive capture, where regulatory 
engagement is situated in a path-dependent way of understanding and 
deciding on policy issues. 
Primary Contributions
t Conceptualises political acceptability as making political choices, 
argues against treating regulatory choices as individual choices, thus 
arguing in favour of stated preferences. 
t Reports on a pilot survey and a survey on concerns related to an EET; 
the response rate for the survey was low, so no conclusive results are 
drawn, while responses to specific items are discussed. 
t Considers political economy considerations of EET, concentrating 
on a possible substitutive effect vis-à-vis the EU ETS and lobbying 
by different agents to enjoy the ‘opportunity benefits’ of an EET as 
compared to alternative potential regulation. 
t Conceptualises ‘discursive capture’ as a way to apply BLE to regulatory 
decision-making, and suggests ways to prevent discursive capture, 
reflects on a Calabresian concentration on distribution as negotiating 
the capture of justice-based and efficiency-based discourses; the 
EU ETS is thus conceptualised as an instrument that combines 
assignment of liability and a market mechanism. 
Chapter 6 picks up on the idea of extending the scope of the EET beyond the 
nation-state and argues that the European and Member State climate policy 
are intertwined in relation to both the constraining and facilitative role of 
European regulation, as well as in relation to responsibility distribution, 
allocation of burdens and implementation. This leads us to have a nuanced 
view of the operation of subsidiarity, concentrating on the iterative role of 
administrative federalism in the EU legal order, the issue of leakage, and 
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finally how climate governance points to a re-categorisation of the ‘end-
user’.
Primary Contributions
t Maps the relationship between EU regulation and Member State 
climate regulation, concentrating on the EU ETS and Effort 
Sharing Decision, analyses the relationship between distribution of 
responsibility, allocation of burdens and implementation in multi-
level climate regulation. 
t Interrogates the category of a ‘sector’ and ‘source’ of emissions, highlighting 
the importance of inventorying direct and indirect emissions. 
t Identifies administrative federalism, the issue of leakage, as well as 
Monitoring, Reporting & Verification as subsidiarity concerns. 
t Re-conceptualises an ‘end-user’ for the purpose of mitigation as the 
Most Advantaged and Least Cost Avoider of emissions activities, as 
against an individual or a household that is the source of emissions.
Chapter 7 interrogates the idea that the question of ‘who’ is to regulate and 
be regulated is intimately connected to the ‘how’. The justificatory tools that 
the proportionality principle provides are utilized to understand qualitative 
costs and benefits of regulating individuals and households through an EET. 
Primary Contributions
t Argues that individuals have no inalienable entitlement to emit, but 
have a right to be free of climate risk, which may require individuals 
to be mandatorily drafted into climate regulation.
t Argues that legitimacy of mandatory climate regulation does not 
imply appropriateness of chosen regulation, employs proportionality 
as an analytical tool to assess the necessity and suitability of an EET 
scheme.
t Argues that an EET scheme has irresolvable and incommensurable 
costs, whereas the benefits are either secondary or may be achieved 
through other mechanisms. 
As the findings of individual chapters are summarised at the end of every 
chapter, Chapter 8 avoids repetition and briefly concludes on a reflective note. 
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EXPLAINING END-USER EMISSIONS TRADING: 
A REVIEW *
i. Introduction
The EU ETS, which has been up and running since 2005, involves large 
carbon emitters, including power plants and steel makers. More actors and 
sectors such as aviation are being brought within its ambit. At first glance, the 
proposition to also involve individuals in an EU-wide emissions trading scheme 
seems too academic to be seriously considered in boardrooms or government 
departments given its seemingly unresolvable economic and ethical problems. 
The suggestion may also appear to be quite invasive as it evokes thoughts on 
food rationing, an imposition of ‘green’ choices, and perhaps even the potential 
failure of yet another market-based instrument. But there are also several 
developments that lend support to the idea of emissions trading for individuals. 
First, individuals are already involved in climate-driven market 
transactions: there are currently dozens of ‘carbon card programmes’ offered 
by financial houses and companies in the EU, inviting people to offset their 
emissions by making ‘green’ investments. 1At the time of writing this chapter, 
* This chapter is an updated version of Suryapratim Roy and Edwin Woerdman, ‘End-user 
Emissions Trading: What, why, how and when’ in Martha Roggenkamp and Olivia Woolley 
(eds), European Energy Law Report IX (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011).
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two companies based in Geneva were offering a Christmas Offset Package, 
where, depending on the cost of cards purchased, 0,2 tonnes to 1,25 tonnes 
of carbon dioxide can be offset.2 Second, individuals do already benefit from 
trading emissions: in some cases, for instance, it is now more profitable for 
farmers not to cut down trees than to sell wood,3 the financing of which is 
generated internationally through voluntary carbon markets.4 There have been 
several criticisms, though, directed against the recent inclusion of deforestation 
in the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol within the United Nations 
(UN) Framework, given their scope for misuse.5 Third, emissions trading 
for individuals has even entered the policy arena: the Environmental Audit 
Committee (EAC) of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom (UK), 
for example, has concluded that involving households is critical for reaching 
emissions reduction targets, and that a trading system is preferable to other 
available instruments, although it is seen as politically non-implementable at 
this moment.6 
From the above, it is clear that individuals are already engaging in market-
based approaches to climate change, and that formal institutions in some 
countries like the UK are of the opinion that such engagement is crucial 
for effective action to reduce emissions, if done in a rational manner under 
regulatory guidance. Therefore, the central question of this chapter is: why is 
emissions trading for energy-end users desirable, how could such a scheme 
be designed and under what conditions could such a scheme be acceptable? 
1 Sandrine Rousseaux, ‘An International Survey of Individual Carbon Card Programmes’, 
Report for ADEME, 2010
2 Ibid, p. 55
3 Sue Neals, ‘Emissions Trading Scheme: Take a Leaf out of Our Book’, The Australian, October 
12 2011
4 Valerie Volcovici, ‘A Slow Start for the Carbon Credit Market’, The New York Times, July 24 
2011
5 See for instance Ariana Densham, Roman Czebiniak, Daniel Kessler, Rolf Skar, ‘Carbon 
Scam: Noel Kempff Climate Action Project and the Push for Sub-national Forest Offsets’, 
Greenpeace 2010. Available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/report/2010/1/
carbon-scam-noel-kempff-clima.pdf.
6 Environmental Audit Committee, House of Commons, UK, Personal Carbon Trading: 
Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2007-2008, London, May 
26,2008, p. 20.
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This chapter highlights some of the primary issues regarding the possibility 
of engaging the end-user in a pan-European emissions trading market under 
legal and regulatory supervision. 
This chapter is organized around four basic questions: what, why, how 
and when. Before answering the central question, we begin in Section II by 
defining what we mean when referring to end-user emissions trading (‘what’). 
Section III then provides some arguments in support of end-user emissions 
trading (‘why’). Section IV analyzes various design variants of an end-user 
emissions trading scheme, including some economic trade-offs and legal 
problems (‘how’). Section V centres on the prospects of an acceptable system 
of end-user emissions trading (‘when’). Finally, in section VI, a conclusion is 
presented. 
ii. What is End-user Emissions Trading? 
In this section we introduce the concept of end-user emissions trading after 
taking stock of the conceptual variants that have already been articulated in 
the existing literature on the subject. 
A. Personal Carbon Trading
Current research on emissions trading for energy end-users is focused 
largely on Personal Carbon Trading (PCT).7 The PCT concept is used 
to describe a set of schemes largely developed by researchers working in 
energy and environmental research institutes in the UK, a compilation of 
which has been published in a special edition of the journal Climate Policy.8 
It is also the preferred terminology adopted by the House of Commons’ 
EAC in relation to proposals around end-user emissions trading.9 The core 
idea, derived from a combination of David Fleming’s idea of conserving 
7 For a review of research on the subject see Gill Seyfang et. al., ‘Personal Carbon Trading: 
Notional concept or workable proposition? Exploring theoretical, ideological and practical 
underpinnings, (2007) Working Paper - Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global 
Environment (1), pp. 1-31.
8 Yael Parag and Tina Fawcett (eds.), Personal Carbon Trading (Oxford: Earthscan Climate 
Policy Series 2010).
9 Environmental Audit Committee, Personal Carbon Trading, supra.
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fuel by way of a Tradable Energy Quota (TEQ)10 and the Hillman-Fawcett 
proposal of budgeting of allowances by individuals,11 is captured by Brohé: 
“the scheme would be a mandatory cap-and-trade emissions trading system 
where allowances would be allocated directly to individuals on an equal per-
capita basis”.12 There have been some variations of the PCT proposed, for 
instance by using an unequal allocation basis, but the central characteristics13 
of setting a national carbon budget, allocating to individuals and requiring 
surrender of allowances are constant. 
There are five features we would like to highlight in PCT schemes: (i) the 
objective is to reduce the consumption of energy and fuel; (ii) the preferred 
form of allocation and surrender of allowances happens downstream, i.e. the 
unit which gets, trades and surrenders these allowances is the individual; 
(iii) the sectors suggested for inclusion in a PCT scheme are the residential 
sector and the transport sector as the activities contemplated revolve around 
household energy consumption and fuel use for personal transport; (iv) the 
aspect of cap-and-trade is what allows this system to be environmentally 
effective and economically efficient, as an individual would reduce her 
consumption of energy or fuel to a level where the benefit derived from the 
final unit of consumption is equal to or greater than her marginal cost of 
sacrificing such units. If she requires to consume more than a predetermined 
limit (or cap) of total permissible emissions, then additional allowances have 
to be bought; on the other hand, if she can limit her consumption, then she 
can sell her excess allowances. Finally, (v) the suggestions till now have been 
limited to a national scheme. 
10 David Fleming, Energy and the Common Purpose: Descending the Energy Staircase with Tradable 
Energy Quotas (London:The Lean Economy Connection, 2005).
11 Mayer Hillman and Tina Fawcett, ‘Living in a low-carbon world: the policy implications of 
rationing’, Conference Proceedings, UKERC and PSI Seminar, June 30, 2005.
12 Arnaud Brohe, ‘Personal Carbon Trading in the context of the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme’, (2010) 10 Climate Policy 462, p. 463.
13 Catherine Bottrill, ‘Understanding Domestic Tradeable Quotas (DTQs) and Personal Carbon 
Allowances (PCAs), Working Paper- Environmental Change Institute, 2006, Oxford.
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B. Other Proposed Schemes
While the aspects of design will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4, 
suffice it to say at this juncture that a PCT scheme would generally involve 
substantial administrative and transaction costs. With a view to reducing 
such costs integral to the ‘downstream’ component of the PCT, Sorrell offers 
an ‘upstream alternative’ where allowances are surrendered by fossil-fuel 
producers or suppliers for the carbon contained in their fuel sales instead 
of by consumers.14 The involvement of upstream actors is also found, albeit 
in a different way, in the cap-and-dividend and cap-and-share proposals. 
Originally articulated by Barnes,15 cap-and-dividend is a scheme where all 
emissions rights are auctioned by governments to fuel suppliers, and the 
revenue from such auctions are distributed to individuals on an equal per-
capita basis. Two American senators have actually tabled a ‘Carbon Limits 
and Energy for America’s Renewal Act’ based on such a cap-and-dividend 
system before the Senate, but there has been no progress in this regard.16 
Unlike cap-and-dividend, under the cap-and-share variation individuals 
are given emission rights for free (or: ‘grandfathered’) on an equal per-
capita basis, which they sell to fuel suppliers via agents such as banks and 
post offices, and they in turn surrender such allowances.17 Though in the 
cap-and-share scheme it is the final consumer who is allocated rights, a 
robust trading mechanism is not envisaged.18 Woerdman and Bolderdijk 
have offered a combination of features of the PCT and upstream 
variants, advocating a ‘downstream allocation’ and ‘upstream monitoring’ 
mechanism, allowing for the involvement of individuals integral to a 
14 Steve Sorrell, ‘An Upstream Alternative to Personal Carbon Trading’ (2010) 10 Climate Policy 
481.
15 Peter Barnes, Who Owns the Sky: Our Common Assets and the Future of Capitalism (Washington 
DC: Island Press, 2001). 
16 The World Resources Institute has a summary on the Bill. Available at: http://www.wri.org/
stories/2010/02/wri-summary-carbon-limits-and-energy-americas-renewal-act. 
17 FEASTA, Cap & Share: a fair way to cut greenhouse emissions (Dublin: Feasta, 2008).
18 Ibid
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downstream system, and working towards reducing administrative costs at 
the same time.19 
Another upstream model, which consciously distinguishes itself from the 
PCT model, is the one developed by a conglomeration of Finnish research 
institutes [hereinafter the “Finnish Proposal”] which involves collection of 
allowances at a retail level. However, what distinguishes the Finnish Proposal 
is its attempt to include sectors other than household energy and fuel use (as it 
refers to “meaningful coverage of products and product groups”20), primarily 
foodstuffs. Further, although not expressly discussed in the Finnish Proposal, 
it has the potential to extend beyond national borders. Thus, although the 
research concentration till now has primarily been on PCT and its variants, 
changing some features can give way to different models. 
C. Towards an End-user Emissions Trading Scheme
For the purposes of this chapter, the phrase ‘End-user Emissions Trading’ 
(EET) will be adopted to prevent confusion with a PCT scheme incorporating 
the features discussed above. While we agree with the proponents of PCT 
variants that a cap-and-trade scheme incorporating downstream advantages 
would be a useful mechanism, we would like to extend the conceptualisation 
of the ‘end-user’ to introduce the possibility of including other activities 
within such a scheme. Should an emissions trading scheme for individuals 
be restricted only to reducing the release of greenhouse gases from energy 
and fuel consumption, or is there some scope for extending the scheme to 
include other ‘greener’ choices? Such ‘greener’ choices could well be related 
to consumption (for instance, changes in food habits), production (household 
production of green energy or installation of enabling infrastructure) or 
utilization of resources (changes in land-use or deforestation). This leads to the 
second possible distinction from PCT, following the objective of the Finnish 
Proposal, for a scheme to be more inclusive: under EET it is possible for other 
sectors, specifically agriculture, to be brought within its ambit. And-while 
19 Edwin Woerdman and Jan Wilem Bolderdijk, ‘Emissions Trading for Households? A 
Behavioral Law and Economics Perspective’ (2015) European Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
20 Ibid at 728
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we’re on the issue of expansion, we think it’s worthwhile to investigate the 
possibility of implementing such a scheme on a supranational level involving 
multiple countries.
Before we move on to the reasons why an EET should merit regulatory 
consideration, there is one aspect which needs to be discussed. That is who 
would be involved in such a scheme (or: who are the stakeholders)? As 
would appear from the discussion above, other than proposals to involve 
wholesalers and retailers, it is individuals who are the unit of concern, and 
it is their emissions that are meant to be curtailed. There has been debate 
about whether the allocations should be made to households, as electricity 
and gas consumption happens at the household level, invoking questions of 
intra-household distribution and whether children should also be allocated 
allowances. The case for and complexity in involving individuals goes deep 
as we will see in the next section, but we would like to note the possibility of 
involving communities and local governments.
The idea that private governance initiatives i.e. voluntary self-governing 
co-operative actions are helpful in relation to environmental problems is 
clear,21 and in some cases, decentralised public governance such as by local 
governments could be better suited in terms of both informational advantages 
and physical infrastructure to motivate long-term behavioral changes among 
their constituencies.22 In the UK, Community Rationing Action Groups 
(CRAGs) have also become popular.23 CRAGs are premised on motivating 
and facilitating co-operative action among carbon conscious people whereby 
methods to rationally implement emissions reduction activities at an individual 
and household level are adopted. This is done by methods such as information 
sharing, appointing a common carbon accountant to price and monitor the 
emissions of participants and disincentivising emissions by requiring over-
21 Tracey M. Roberts, ‘Innovations in Governance: a functional typology of Private Governance 
Institutions’ (2011) 22 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 67. 
22 Katrina Fischer Kuh, ‘Using local knowledge to shrink the individual carbon footprint’ 
(2009) 37 Hofstra Law Review 923-941. 
23 Rachel Howell, ‘Living with a carbon allowance: the experiences of Carbon Rationing Action 
Groups and implications for policy’ (2012) 41 Energy Policy 250. 
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emitters to contribute towards a common fund.24 What is especially interesting 
about the potential of local governments and communities is that they 
cover various sectors and activities with substantial emissions such as waste 
management and land-use. In such cases, local governments and communities 
could be the most effective unit of reducing downstream emissions owing to 
their economic and administrative proximity to such sectors. If that is so, 
then could allocating emissions and surrendering from local governments and 
communities be an option? We would like to argue that, if a system design 
which allocates to individuals has a certain amount of flexibility for collective 
action, then private governance initiatives could also be incentivized. The 
regulatory requirement would be to determine how a reduction of emissions 
from a whole range of activities could be included within a single scheme of 
allowance trade.
Thus, the EET as described above may be characterized as a variant of 
the PCT, but one that extends its geographical and sectoral scope, and makes 
space for community or collective participation. With the above background 
on the PCT, EET and related instruments, we can move on to understanding 
why they merit political, regulatory and legal consideration. 
iii. Why do we need to investigate an End-user 
Emissions Trading Scheme?
Why should individuals concern themselves with climate change, and, the 
corollary, is it more an institutional concern? Unfortunately, a rhetorical 
response to this question would lead to ‘polar opposite’ views, one being that 
it is imperative for individuals to ‘kick the habit’25 to deal with climate change. 
The other view is that by putting the responsibility on consumers to be ‘green’, 
and confining responses to climate change within the sphere of consumption, 
the actual political and commercial culprits are warding off culpability and 
24 Ibid, pp. 3-4
25 This is generally the preferred position by international organisations, such as the United 
Nations Environment Programme .Available at: http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/
kick-the-habit/.
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costs.26 Given the possibility of our selection-bias to present some opinions 
over others, a more systematic way of approaching divided opinions is by 
surveying attitudes, which is discussed further in Section 4. At this point, we 
would like to submit four reasons why there is need for regulatory attention to 
some form of an EET scheme: it allows for rational organisation of voluntary 
‘green’ activities, facilitates rational participation in voluntary markets, has 
complementarities with the EU ETS, and may contribute to attaining energy 
efficiency. 
A. Rationalising sustainable engagement
Climate change is now a popular cultural concern, as evidenced by its 
presence on the internet27, in Hollywood blockbusters28, and in literature29. 
Apparently, climate change has even given rise to psychiatric illnesses.30 
There are also efforts by people across the world to ‘do their bit’, as was 
evident with Mr. Beavan discussed in Chapter 1. However, notwithstanding 
‘green’ beliefs and attitudes, it is possible for such engagement to be both 
economically irrational and ecologically ineffective. In this regard, an 
American study found a negative correlation between general environmental 
knowledge and carbon offsets knowledge.31 What is effective engagement is a 
complex question, as the impact of individual activities on global emissions 
is difficult to conceptualise, but there is a solid economic case to be made 
26 For a strong articulation of this position, see Michael F. Maniates, ‘Individualization: Plant a 
Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?’ (2001) 1 Global Environmental Politics 31.
27 Nelya Koteyko, ‘Mining the Internet for Linguistic and Social Data: An analysis of ‘carbon 
compounds in Web feeds’ (2010) 21 Discourse Society 665.
28 For a review, see Michael D. Jones, Heroes and Villains: cultural narratives, mass opinions and 
climate change (2010), PhD Thesis, University of Oklahama.
29 The chief protagonists of the most recent works of two bestselling novelists writing in the 
English language are involved with climate change and related environmental issues. Ian 
McEwan, Solar (London: Waterstone Publishers, 2010); Jonathan Franzen, Freedom (New 
York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux , 2010).
30 Steven Moffic, “Is Ecopsychiatry a speciality for the 21st century?”, Psychiatric News, Apr 
2008; 43 (7).
31 Micael Polonsky, Stacy Grau and Romana Garma, ‘Exploring US Consumers Understanding 
of Carbon Offsets’, Proceedings of the 2009 Academy of Marketing Science (AMS) Annual 
Conference, p. 14. 
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for either individuals or communities to maximize emissions-reductions 
through minimum sacrifice.32 Whitmarsh, Seyfang and O’Neill argue that 
a method for assessing engagement is by examining the ‘carbon capability’ 
of individuals;33 i.e. “(…) the ability to make informed judgments and to 
take effective decisions regarding the use and management of carbon, through 
both individual change and collective action”.34 In their framework, carbon 
capability involves informed individual decision-making, translation of such 
decisions into practices and ability to participate effectively through collective 
action. Starkey and Anderson hypothesize that trading may cause people to 
be more aware of their personal emissions, more engaged with emissions 
reductions and more inclined to spend time and effort considering ways to 
reduce their emissions.35 Consequently, it may be argued that the operation 
of a broad end-user carbon market will enhance the carbon capabilities of 
individuals and encourage more effective ‘green’ activities. 
Some commentators have also warned us that the operation of a market to 
organise emissions reductions creates ‘cabon selves’ that require some budgeting 
and accounting skills, and hence a basic or even fairly sophisticated level of 
financial literacy.36 This is why the subject of individual engagement with climate 
change has been a prime area of interest for behavioural economists, as they try 
to identify cognitive obstacles to such rational engagement. From a law and 
economics perspective, a cognitive obstacle may be viewed as a transaction cost, 
and the reduction of such costs by way of regulation would allow participants 
to make more efficient trading choices, notwithstanding the initial allocation of 
allowances. Thus, following this line of reasoning, the enhancement of carbon 
capabilities would be integral to reducing emissions in an efficient manner. 
32 Warwick J. McKibbin, ‘The role of economics in climate change policy’ (2002) 16 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 107. 
33 Lorraine Whitmarsh et. Al., ‘Public Engagement with Carbon and Climate Change: To what 
extent is the public carbon capable?’ (2011) 21 Global Environment Change 56.
34 Ibid, p. 59. 
35 Richard Starkey and Kenneth Anderson, ‘Domestic Tradable Quotas: A Policy Instrument 
for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Energy Use’ (2005) Tyndall Centre for Climate 
Change Research, Technical Report 39.
36 Matthew Paterson and Johannes Stripple, ‘My Space: governing individuals’ carbon emissions’ 
(2010) 28 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 341.
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Vernon Smith, however, contests the argument that optimal market 
outcomes can be achieved only by ‘conscious cognition’.37 Smith demonstrated 
through his laboratory experiments (where unlike his predecessors, he sought 
to mimic the rules of real-world institutions) that the level of information 
or intelligence is irrelevant for the purpose of arriving at rational economic 
decisions given a laboratory replication of actual institutional rules and 
design.38 If Smith’s logic is to be applied to the EET, albeit with caution, 
then one could entertain the intuition that notwithstanding the levels of 
information or biases, a properly functioning market for individual carbon 
allowances would lead to efficient outcomes. 
Obviously, we cannot comment on whether Smith’s view applies to end-
user emissions trading without evidence, or at least without a specifically 
designed simulation. It would, however, be useful to gauge the level of end-user 
engagement required from the feedback and attitudes of those participating in 
CRAGs. From these interviews, there appears to be a positive attitude regarding 
a learning curve which develops due to continual engagement.39 While some 
individuals prefer a common accountant to take care of calculations, choices 
and decisions are made by individuals. Interestingly, such engagement appears 
to stimulate effectiveness and efficiency as people undertake a more intensive 
search for emission reduction opportunities, which in turn may lead them 
to discovering and taking advantage of lower cost emissions opportunities. 
This line of reasoning provides an impetus for further research on both 
field and laboratory experiments on whether actual exposure to analogous 
markets or simulated exposure to carbon markets would lead to more effective 
engagement and an economically efficient system.
B. Regulating Offset Markets
The desire of people to contribute to mitigating climate change has been 
capitalized by a still relatively small, yet fast growing voluntary carbon 
37 Vernon Smith, ‘Rational Choice: the contrast between economics and psychology’ (1991) 99 
Journal of Political Economy 877.
38 Ibid, p. 887.
39 Howell, ‘Living with a carbon allowance’, supra, p. 250.
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market.40 In this market, individuals voluntarily pay to offset their pollution, 
for instance by letting some entrepreneur planting trees for them. The 
participants in regulated (or compliance) markets have largely been firms; in 
the case of the EU ETS certain sectors have been identified and allocations 
have been done at a national level accordingly. The participants in these 
markets, however, have not been confined to those firms (or installations, 
however defined) that have been allocated allowances, but also non-account 
holding traders such as investment banks which have been transacting in the 
EU ETS. The reason could be that, given the transaction costs associated 
with the trading of such allowances, agents such as financial institutions are 
preferred. In addition, given that these markets are profitable for mediators 
such as brokers or investments banks, there may be incentives for firms to 
invest without being obligated to do so. This may explain why there are also 
several burgeoning voluntary carbon markets, where the participants are also 
individuals, in addition to firms.41 
However, such voluntary markets have been referred to as ‘cowboy 
markets’ due to the absence of common standards and regulations. There 
are also perverse incentives in the voluntary offset markets for producers and 
providers of climate-friendly goods and services that can lead to ineffective 
‘green’ activities.42 A regulated EET scheme involving end-users may facilitate 
better engagement with such markets due to harmonized/standardised 
certification, provided there is an opportunity for such markets to be linked. 
In the event there is no framework which facilitates linking, then there would 
be no incentive for sellers and suppliers to follow such standardised technical, 
contractual and accounting certification. Further, standardized certification in 
the EET may also help overcome the problem of price volatility43 attached to 
40 Molly Peters-Stanley et. al., State of the Voluntary Carbon Market 2011, (New York: Ecosystem 
Marketplace and Bloomberg Energy Finance, 2011).
41 Ibid.
42 There have been cases of misleading advertising and ‘greenwashing’ in the US and Australia. 
For example, see Eric L. Lane, ‘Consumer Protection in the Eco-mark Era: A Preliminary 
Survey and Assessment of Anti-Greenwashing Activity and Eco-mark Enforcement’ (2010) 
John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law, 2415.
43 Marc N. Conte and Matthew Kotchen, ‘Explaining the Price of Voluntary Carbon Offsets’ 
(2009) NBER Working Paper 15294 [Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15294.pdf ]
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credits generated from different offset programmes which makes fungibility 
(or interchangeability with other equivalent individual goods/assets of the 
same type) difficult. In addition to the benefits of standardised certification, 
linking has the potential to make the market thicker by enhancing liquidity 
and therefore introducing a higher potential for reducing costs. 
Theoretically, the issue of linking emissions credit markets is not new as 
even the EU ETS is linked to uncapped offset markets: certified emissions 
reduction (CERs) as offset credits generated through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)44 and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from Join 
Implementation projects can now be used by each installation subject to a 
country specific limit, to cover its emissions. However, by allowing offset-
linking, there is the difficulty of a potential superfluity of allowances that 
depress carbon prices and encourage further emissions. In this regard, it 
may be noted that the primary reason behind setting limits to the number 
of offsets that can be traded in the EU ETS is to fulfill the ‘supplementarity 
condition’ laid down in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol45 where CERs should 
only be used to achieve only part of the overall mitigation effort. The Linking 
Directive46 implements this condition as primary abatement should happen 
in the EU, i.e. there is an element of regional effectiveness of environmental 
policy. Unlike international offsets, an EET would satisfy the supplementarity 
condition as the reductions would be happening within the EU. This leaves us 
with the problem of the quantity and price effects that offsets from different 
sources may have on EU ETS allowances. In a recent paper, Vasa argues that 
CERs trade at a discount to allowances, and this price spread creates a ‘rent’ 
since such credits can be converted to allowances. This rent is, of course, higher 
for those countries with a higher limit for offset trading, the distribution or 
control of which must be guided by regulation.47 The suggestion put forward 
44 The legal basis for the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation is Article 
12 of the Kyoto Protocol , operating under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 1992. 
45 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22
46 EU Linking Directive EC 2004/101, 2004 O.J. (L338) 18-19
47 Alexander Vasa, ‘Implementing CDM Limits in the EU ETS: a Law and Economics approach’ 
(2011) DIW Discussion Paper 1032, Berlin
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for maintaining stability and reducing rents is by either auctioning CER usage 
certificates, or for the regulator to pre-sell allowances in the amount equal to 
the CDM limit (primarily because of the uncertainty inherent in CER project 
delivery relative to allowances) and subsequently buying CERs. With regard 
to controlling the quantity of offsets which can have a price effect on the EU 
ETS, a regulatory ‘ratchet’ could be developed whereby any over-allocation 
could be clawed back or retired. However, more research into its effects is 
needed. 
C. Capping Uncapped Sectors
In spite of the uncertainty regarding ways to deal with climate change, there has 
been a robust market-based regulatory reaction to mitigation internationally, 
with the EU ETS being the poster-boy for an effective response. While the EU 
ETS has also been criticised,48 if only for the modest and short-term emission 
reduction targets it imposes, whereas some commentators have favoured a 
carbon tax,49 it has nonetheless been quite a successful experiment as is evidenced 
by the absolute emission caps that have been imposed on major industries, 
the high compliance rates with those caps, and the acknowledgement by a 
majority of company managers that the EU ETS has caused them to reduce 
emissions.50 The EU ETS (governed by Directive 2003/87/EC)51, even with 
the revised rules as of 2013, has a limited number of sectors within its scope, 
and approximately 12,000 installations (comprising combustion and energy-
intensive manufacturing activities) within such sectors identified in Annex 
48 See for example Paul Collier, The Plundered Planet: How to Reconcile Prosperity with Nature 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), p. 177; Thomas Spencer and Emmanuel Guerin, 
‘Time to Reform the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2012) 23 European Energy Review 23 
January 2012. 
49 Shi-ling Hsu, The Case for Carbon Tax: Getting Past Our Hang-ups to Effective Climate Policy 
(Washington DC: Island Press, 2011).
50 Thomson Reuters Point Carbon (2011), Carbon 2011, available at: http://www.
pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.1545244!Carbon%202011_web.pdf
51 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme 
 For greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending 
Council Directive 
 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32
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I of EU ETS. Thus, the percentage of total emissions covered under these 
sectors can certainly be enhanced if more sectors are included. From the table 
below developed by the European Environmental Agency (EEA), we can see 
the percentage distribution of emissions from different sectors within the EU:
Though there is some flexibility under the amended ETS Directive (2009/29/
EC)52 to include additional sectors, the emissions from some sectors such as 
agriculture, waste, residential and transport (other than aviation) are uncapped. 
For some of these sectors, the EU has set national targets (the so-called ‘Effort 
Sharing Decision’),53 but cap-and-trade is not used as an instrument to 
implement these targets. The Commission has also expressed interest in pricing 
emissions in other sectors.54In a recent report, the European Environment 
Agency observes that if indirect emissions by households were to be included 
52 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading scheme of the Community, OJ L 140, 5.6.200
53 This is done by the Effort Sharing Decision. Decision No. 406/2009/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction 
commitments up to 2020, OJ L 140/136. It is the successor to the so-called Burden sharing 
decision (Council Decision 2002/358/EC, OJ L 130/1).
54 Council of the European Union, ‘Council conclusions on review of the European Union 
emissions trading scheme’ (2007) 12th Environment Council meeting, Luxembourg, 28 June 
2007.
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within total emissions, then the numbers presented in the table above would 
be significantly altered, to establish a substantially greater contribution of 
the residential sector to emissions.55 However, requiring the end-user to be 
responsible for indirect emissions would require a calculation of embodied 
carbon in all purchases and activities, which is not an easy proposition. Even 
without the revised figures of indirect emissions, it is difficult to imagine how 
the EU and its member states can meet their emissions reduction targets if 
emissions would rise (or continue at the current rate) in the uncapped sectors. 
The issue of expanding abatement opportunities is a contentious one, as the 
PCT variants cover household fuel and energy use within its scope. There have 
been debates in Australia recently about whether agriculture could be brought 
within the ambit of its national ETS. There are several activities which could 
be undertaken by farmers to facilitate a large amount of reductions: cropland 
management, grazing land management, the restoration of degraded soils, 
and sink enhancement (carbon sequestration). Further, agriculture has the 
interesting problem of being affected by climate change, which has prompted 
substantial funding of adaptation activities.56 While the economic relationship 
between mitigation and adaptation is a complex yet interesting question, in 
some circumstances, a single activity could yield complementary benefits 
for both purposes. The primary reason given for not including agriculture 
in an ETS is the uncertainty involved in the measurement of emissions of 
methane (from cattle) and nitrous oxide (direct and indirect soil emission) 
due to the changing parameters of biological processes.57 Brandt and Svensen 
interestingly argue that it is not necessary to measure such emissions directly to 
incentivize reduction in emissions by farmers; what is necessary is to calculate 
the (average) change in emission from a baseline practice to a new practice 
55 European Environment Agency, ‘End-user GHG emissions from Energy: Reallocation of 
emissions from energy industries to end users 2005–2009’, EEA Technical Report Number 19, 
December 2011.
56 Jørgen E. Olesen and Marco Bindi, ‘Consequences of climate change for European agricultural 
productivity, land use and policy’ (2002) 16 European Journal of Agronomy 239.
57 Jane M.F. Johnson et. Al., ‘Agricultural Opportunities to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions’(2007) 150 Environmental Pollution 107.
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with respect to agricultural activities.58 Given that not all farming practices 
and activities may be effective, a regulator could either exhaustively specify 
what practices should be accepted as valid reduction measures, or alternatively 
exclude practices that yield uncertain results.59 
In the Brandt and Svensen system, such reduction from a particular 
activity or practice can be calculated annually and would be the basis of a 
trading system in which farmers could choose those activities where marginal 
reduction cost would be lowest. It is suggested that ‘permits’ could be 
grandfathered to farmers by calculating emission levels from ‘a source’ at the 
beginning of a year and an excess or deficit of allowances can be sold or bought 
respectively before surrendering.60 Although making this trading system part 
of the EU ETS has been suggested, the mechanism for doing so is not clear. 
The difficulty may arise in (a) identifying all these non-point sources, (b) 
choosing a method of allocation that would not be equal allowance per capita 
(given the uneven distribution of resources for different sectors) while also 
the (c) price effect on the ETS must be taken into account. However, it may 
be noted that the awarding of credits on an incremental basis according to 
abatement, as discussed in relation to agriculture above, has been mentioned 
in the literature as a general solution for non-point sources of emissions.61Here 
the problem is that this could amount to a ‘credit trading’ system based on 
(relative) emission standards for polluters which is known to be less effective 
and less efficient than a ‘permit trading’ scheme with (absolute) emission caps 
for the emitters.62 However, what is clear is that there is certainly a qualified 
case to be made for engaging end-user farmers in an emissions trading system 
as it would incentivize ‘green’ investments and stimulate cost-effectiveness. 
58 Urs Steiner Brandt and Gert Tinggaard Svensen, ‘A Project-based system for including farmers 
in the ETS’, (2011) 92 Journal of Environmental Management 1121.
59 Ibid
60 Ibid, p. 17
61 Yacov Tsur and Harry de Gorter, ‘On the Regulation of Unobserved Emissions’ (2011), 
Discussion Paper No. 2.11, the Center for Agricultural Economic Research, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem.
62 Andries Nentjes and Edwin Woerdman, ‘Tradable Permits versus Tradable Credits: A Survey 
and Analysis’ (2012) 6 International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 1.
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It would be incorrect to say that emissions from transport are not priced 
in the EU. It is done on a piecemeal basis in some Member States by gasoline 
taxes ranging from 0.60 €/l (Luxembourg) to 1.25 €/l (Hungary).63 Further, 
EU emissions standards for vehicles have been adopted in my some countries.64 
However, emissions from road transport are increasing at an increasing rate 
and for that reason, more stringent measures such as harmonised taxes or 
restrictions on vehicles that run on diesel or petrol may be warranted. 
D. Energy Efficiency through the Backdoor?
Intuitively, saving energy and fuel at the residential level doubles up as both 
mitigation and energy-efficiency. While no comprehensive EU-wide study 
has been conducted to verify this relationship, national studies do point to 
co-benefits, especially with regard to the schemes adopted in Britain.65 End-
users would receive a more direct, visible and ‘hands-on’ incentive to reduce 
energy consumption. This is likely to have an impact on climate policy 
acceptance and energy conservation behavior: recent research suggests that 
law, via instrument choice and its institutional design, is actually able to 
change the ‘environmental mind’.66However, the institutional interaction 
between the two may not be that simple. An example of a possible conflict in 
institutional interaction was observed67 in 2011 when the Directorate General 
of Climate Action and the Directorate General of Energy Savings appeared 
to have different opinions about the efficacy of emissions reductions by way 
of mitigation through the EU ETS Directive and energy efficiency through 
63 Thomas Sterner, ‘Fuel Taxes: An Important Instrument for Climate Policy’ (2007) 35 Energy 
Policy 3194.
64 Council Directive 80/1268/EEC of 16 December 1980 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the fuel consumption of motor vehicles, OJ L 375, 31.12.1980, 
p. 36–45
65 Luis Mundaca and Lena Neji, ‘A multi-criteria evaluation framework for tradable white 
certificate schemes’ (2009) 37 Energy Policy 4557.
66 Yves Feldman and Oren Perez, ‘How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An Experimental 
Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral Perceptions and Civic Enforcement’ (2009) 36 
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a proposed Energy Efficiency Directive68 respectively. The issue was that 
efficiency measures may cancel out the need for as many pollution permits, 
thus lowering the price of carbon in the EU ETS market, which was suffering 
from an excess of allowances brought about primarily by the recession. While 
this issue is not resolved, and goes back to the question of how to control 
the number of allowances in the EU ETS, another way of examining this 
institutional interaction is by analysing the instruments that facilitate such 
interaction at a micro-level. 
A market-based energy efficiency measure that has been considered in the 
EU is the use of white certificates.69 White certificates are records of energy-
efficiency and may be traded nationally in countries that have them (currently 
Italy, France and the UK). They are used in combination with an obligation 
scheme whereby market actors (retail energy suppliers or distributors for 
France and Italy, households in the UK) are obliged to achieve a certain 
amount of end-use energy saving among customers (usually a percentage of 
the sales measured in physical terms).70 In order to be eligible for receiving 
white certificates, obligated parties need to demonstrate that there are savings 
in energy end-use beyond a baseline, or additional to business-as-usual. The 
relationship of white certificates with the EU ETS is complex, with regard to 
both schemes operating in parallel as well as with respect to the fungibility 
of allowances and certificates. Sorrell and a couple of other economists have 
been rather sceptical of such interaction, arguing that their co-existence 
would not result in an efficient reduction in emissions from electricity use, 
unless there is a tightening of the EU ETS cap. 71 In view of this difficulty, it 
is tempting to argue that, given energy-saving targets in the EU, a pan-EU 
EET system could be the preferred alternative incentive mechanism to white 
certificates for achieving energy efficiency by engaging the end-user. However, 
68 Proposal for a Directive on energy efficiency and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 
2006/32/EC [COM(2011)370, 22/06/2011].]
69 Martha Roggenkamp and Ulf Hammer (eds), European Energy Law Report IV (Oxford: 
Intersentia, 2007). 
70 Nicola Labanca and Adriaan Perrels, ‘Tradable White Certificates—a promising but tricky 
policy instrument’ (2008) 1 Energy Efficiency 233.
71 Steve Sorrell et. al., ‘White certificate schemes: Economic analysis and interactions with the 
EU ETS’ (2009) 37 Energy Policy 29.
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without discounting the role which an EET could play in energy savings, it is 
necessary to chart out the conditions where allowances and certificates could 
be fungible, without causing a problematic price effect due to an over-supply 
of units. 
Keeping the above purposes that an EET may serve in mind, we now 
proceed to examine some principles that could provide guidance on how such 
a scheme could be put into effect. 
iv. How is such a scheme to be designed?
Given that the market is supposed to govern the prices of allowances and 
correct mis-allocation in the EU ETS, the establishment and operation of the 
scheme is nonetheless heavily dependent on regulation. Thus, the EU ETS 
has been characterised as creature of design72 with aspects such as emission 
cap, time period, interaction with other schemes and instruments, eligibility 
to trade, registration, monitoring, verification, enforcement, and penalties all 
specified by way of regulation. Similar design facets would characterize an EET 
scheme as well, but we concentrate below on the principles that would inform 
the design of such a scheme. Normally, assessment of an environmental policy 
is done by examining whether it is equitable, efficient and effective. While 
these factors will be touched upon, we would also like to address the issue of 
integration with the EU ETS and the legal framework for such a system. 
A. Equity and Justice Considerations
Institutional mechanisms for dealing with climate change have always raised 
questions of equity and justice. The question who-pays-how-much and 
whether per-capita allocation is the best way forward has been at the heart of 
international and regional climate negotiations.73 Given that the success of an 
EET system would depend on the engagement of people and communities, 
such questions attain even greater prominence. For example, Starkey assesses 
design variants of PCT schemes and its alternatives against the yardsticks of 
72 For an overview of the regulatory aspects of the ETS see Martha M. Roggenkamp and Ulf 
Hammer ed. European Energy Law Report VII (Oxford: Intersentia, 2010).
73 Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Should greenhouse gas permits be allocated on a per-
capita basis?’ (2009) 97 California Law Review 51.
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equity, efficiency and effectiveness. In this regard, an equal per-capita allocation 
(which schemes such as cap-and-share or the Finnish proposal do not afford) 
is a favourable option owing to the long-term benefits of engaged individual 
participation as well as the reduction of implementation and participation 
costs owing to such engagement.
Interestingly, the effectiveness and efficiency of the system, such as the 
lowering of abatement costs by continuous rational engagement depends on 
whether the system is perceived as fair.74 In an online survey conducted by 
the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), around 70% believed that 
an equal per capita allocation under the PCT “would be unfair because some 
people need more carbon credits than others”.75 Such need in relation to 
household and transport energy use may arise from a host of circumstances: 
old people may have to use motorised transport and people living in colder 
climates may require more heating, for instance. Hyams argues that the best 
way of dealing with this situation is to initially distribute allowances equally, 
and to subsequently allocate more to applicants who can make specific 
cases for more allowances “on the grounds of their unchosen exceptional 
circumstances”.76 The problem with this suggestion is the requirement to 
determine criteria for ‘unchosen exceptional circumstances’ and to assess 
applications filed thereunder on a case-by-case basis. Modifying allowance 
allocations to correct for distributional inequities is also an approach that 
has been contrasted against financial compensation (a subsidy) to low-
income households in the UK by researchers at the Centre for Science and 
Environment.77 The conclusion reached was two-fold. First, the method of 
modification by way of exception is preferable and correcting to a certain 
extent as it reduces the deficit of allowances by households having certain 
‘losing’ characteristics (rurality, number of children, age of allottees, built 
74 Richard Starkey, ‘Personal Carbon Trading: a critical survey. Part 2: efficiency and effectiveness’ 
(2012) 73 Ecological Economics 19.
75 J. Bird and Mark Lockwood, ‘Plan B? The prospects for personal carbon trading’ (2009) 
Report by Institute for Public Policy Research, Oxford.
76 Keith Hyams, ‘A Just Response to Climate Change: personal carbon allowances and the 
normal-functioning approach’ (Summer 2009) 40 Journal of Social Philosophy 237, p. 248. 
77 Vicki White and Joshua Thumim, ‘Moderating the distributional impacts of personal carbon 
trading’ (2009), Report to the Institute of Public Policy Research, CSE, Oxford
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form, central heating type). Second, the method is information intensive and 
may also encourage perverse incentives to increase emissions as applicants 
could inflate their emissions to obtain additional allowances.
Due to the proposed scope of the EET, additional questions may be 
raised about distribution across sectors and locations. With respect to the 
latter, Fawcett raises the question as to whether the acceptability and success 
of the PCT would be influenced by national characteristics.78 With regard to 
distributional effects, she argues that the importance given to equity in policy-
making may be less considerable in countries with lower income inequality 
and concerns about fuel poverty.79 Further, lower regional variation in energy 
demand, access to greener transport modes and wide access to less carbon-
intensive fuels are seen as national characteristics favourable to a PCT.80 From 
the discussion above, it could be argued that notwithstanding income levels 
and fuel poverty, an EU level modified distribution system could identify 
and correct for characteristics that result in inequitable allowance deficits/
surpluses. 
In relation to other sectors under the EET, countries with larger potential 
for deforestation, land-use changes, and community or municipality waste 
treatment may benefit more, provided the system of allocation is addressed. 
As discussed earlier, such sectors may be capped, EU approved national targets 
set, and, taking a cue from the TEQ proposal of combining grandfathering 
and auctioning, allowances could perhaps be auctioned in such sectors. We 
hypothesise that such a system for sectors such as agriculture and waste treatment 
would incentivise collective action, whether through community engagement 
such as CRAGs or even local government institutions such as municipalities. 
Overall this system appears to be efficient and effective. Following Starkey, 
a TEQ-equivalent auctioning component has low implementation costs as 
the revenue from the auctions can be easily allocated by making adjustments 
to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The difficulty could be high participation 
costs, such as a substantial investment of time and upfront resources for the 
78 Tina Fawcett, ‘Personal Carbon Trading in Different National Contexts’ (2010) 10 Climate 
Policy 339.
79 Ibid, p. 344.
80 Ibid, p. 347. 
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auctioning.81 The agency costs which are normally incurred to reduce such 
participation costs may be moderated by way of collective action. Further 
research needs to be conducted to confirm whether this proposal might 
work, in terms of economic feasibility, political acceptability and assessments 
(simulated or otherwise) of public engagement. 
The next question that needs to be settled is whether an EET would be 
integrated into the ETS or would be a separate scheme in itself.
B. The Issue of Integration
A pan-European EET scheme would require policy intervention at an EU 
level, thus requiring collective action by member states. From an economic 
point of view, integrating it with the EU ETS would avoid the risk of 
unpopularity which may arise in a parallel system where allowance prices 
could exceed those paid by businesses in the EU ETS.82 The effectiveness of 
the EU ETS by adding additional sectors as it stands now may increase, not 
only by imposing emission caps, but also by reducing price instabilities caused 
by the concentration on fewer sectors. Lockwood observes that the benefit 
that a PCT scheme can confer upon the EU ETS may be contested in areas 
where they both cover the same sector (‘double counting’), such as electricity, 
due to the possibility of encouraging higher emissions in the EU ETS if the 
PCT is successful and exerts a downward pressure on the EU ETS carbon 
price.83 He suggests that the way around this problem is to identify abatement 
opportunities not captured by the EU ETS such as those in other sectors. We 
would like to add that an EET scheme which is wide in geographical and 
sectoral scope would deal more effectively with this problem by way of a single 
cap and monitoring system. Multiple national prices in sectors that fall under 
different policy schemes would only add to the uncertainty. What needs to be 
explored, as was evident in the discussions around voluntary offsets and white 
certificates, is whether (and, if so, how) to effectively introduce a ‘soft price 
cap (and/or floor)’ by allowing for a contingent addition or retirement of 
81 Supra, pp. 19-20
82 Matthew Lockwood, ‘The Economics of Personal Carbon Trading’ (2010) 10 Climate Policy 
447-461.
83 Ibid, p. 449.
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permits, and possibly even regulating their flow. Some authors have suggested 
that an EU ETS ‘Central Bank’ is the best way to deal with this situation,84 
while others caution against the short-run inefficiencies that will arise from 
carbon price interventions.85 
C. Choosing an Enforcement Mechanism
Eyre argues that one of the key issues related to design of a PCT scheme is 
enforcement.86 Enforcement includes aspects of implementation such as 
surrender, monitoring and verification which are the key determinants of 
efficiency and effectiveness of a proposed scheme, and in this context, was a 
major reason (in addition to public acceptability) why discussions around the 
PCT were halted in the UK.87 For a downstream approach, the administration 
costs are considered to be too high as every end-user would need to be 
monitored, and enforcing surrender of allowances would be difficult. Individual 
carbon accounts would need to be monitored, and a penalty imposed where 
such accounts contain inadequate allowances, thus ‘turning half the world’s 
population into carbon police.’88 Contrary to an exclusively downstream 
approach, in relation to household and personal transport fuel consumption, a 
downstream system which directly incorporates firms as well as households and 
car drivers can be administratively feasible by concentrating the monitoring 
activities as much as possible on the level of fossil fuel producers and importers 
(upstream) and by using a generic allocation criterion and chipcard technology 
for households and car drivers (downstream). 
84 Christian de Perthuis, ‘Carbon Markets Regulation: the case for a CO2 Central Bank’ (2011) 
Information and Debate Series, Carbon Markets and Prices Research Initiative, CDC Climat; 
available at: http://www.chaireeconomieduclimat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/11-09-
12-Cahier-ID-n10-De-Perthuis-market-regulation.pdf.
85 Christian Egerhofer et al, ‘The EU Emissions Trading System and Climate Policy towards 
2050: Real incentives to reduce emissions and drive innovation?’ (2011) CEPS Special Report, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
86 Nick Eyre, ‘Policing Carbon: design and enforcement options for personal carbon trading’ 
(2010) 10 Climate Policy 432.
87 DEFRA, ‘Synthesis Report on the findings from Defra’s pre-feasibility study into personal 
carbon trading’ (2008), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, London.
88 Eyre, ‘Policing Carbon’ supra, p. 439.
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The proposed upstream-downstream hybrid model for households 
has been proposed by Woerdman and Bolderdijk,89 and it may be briefly 
described as follows: For every unit of fossil fuel a firm or household purchases 
from distributors, it has to hand over a corresponding number of carbon 
allowances. Distributors, in turn, can only obtain fuels from their suppliers in 
exchange for carbon allowances. In this way, all allowances will end up in the 
hands of producers and importers of fuel, including the allowances purchased 
by distributors to cover their fuel supply to consumers and other small users. 
Producers and importers of fuel are placed under the obligation to turn over 
to the environmental authorities carbon allowances for the carbon contained 
in the fossil fuels they have sold on the market. 
Although the above is mostly self-enforcing, it may not be applicable to 
all sectors. A similar system with slight variations may be adopted for other 
sectors such as agriculture. As per the Finnish Proposal discussed earlier, 
it is at the retailer level at which enforcement takes place. The same logic 
could be extended for the agricultural sector. Monitoring and enforcement 
can take place upstream, perhaps at a retail level, or even at the point of 
taxation of the goods and land under question. However, agriculture may 
entail more administrative costs owing to the determination of criteria eligible 
for allowances. It could also be argued that for sectors such as waste, it is 
municipalities that could be the point of enforcement, thus reducing heavy 
administrative costs. 
While it is possible to reduce implementation costs by way of the 
downstream trading and upstream monitoring, the issue of penalty still remains 
unclear. The EU ETS functions under the pain of a penalty in the event that 
the number of allowances that need to be surrendered are not enough. For 
an EET scheme, while a penalty on the upstream mediators may be imposed, 
an opt-out into a taxation system may be a better alternative. Although the 
debate between the suitability of an emission tax and that of an emissions 
trading system is an old one, it is not spent, and not clearly resolved. Raux 
and Marlot, in their study on methods of reducing fuel consumption used 
89 Edwin Woerdman and Jan Wilem Bolderdijk, ‘Emissions Trading for Households? A 
Behavioral Law and Economics Perspective’ (2015) European Journal of Law and Economics 1.
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for personal transport, suggest that consumers should be allowed to choose 
their preferred policy.90 Thus, the suggestion is to allow a ‘tradable fuel permit’ 
scheme and a carbon tax to be introduced simultaneously, where anyone 
owning a vehicle could opt into the permit scheme, receive free allowances 
and avoid paying the carbon tax till the permits are used up. To continue 
refraining from paying a tax, additional permits would need to be purchased. 
Unfortunately, as far as we know, there is no precedent for an opt-in market 
mechanism to avoid paying a tax but it has the potential to be tested in a 
long-term field experiment. Following from the success of policies such as 
default organ donation, a variation on the ‘opt-in’ model for the EET scheme 
could be an ‘opt-out’ system where individuals would be allocated allowances 
by default, and would be given the choice to opt out of them by paying a tax. 
v. Legal framework
While this chapter in general dicusses the possibility of an EET scheme largely 
from a regulatory perspective and considers issues which are pertinent to its 
general framework, this section concentrates more on the rights that may be 
available to the end-user participant in such a scheme.
A. Defining different instruments
Though there is a temptation to use the terms ‘credits’, ‘permits’ and allowances’ 
interchangeably, the literature on the EU ETS has identified distinctions 
between them, often from an efficiency perspective.91 From a legal point 
of view, a clear identification of property rights embedded in and derived 
from such instruments is imperative, given the various commercial uses of 
emissions allowances and the existence of secondary, derivatives and futures 
markets around them. Romania, for instance, created a stir in this regard by 
characterizing a carbon allowance as a financial instrument.92 This sparked off 
an inquiry by the European Commission as to whether an allowance under 
90 Charles Raux and Gregorie Marlot, ‘A system of tradable CO2 permits applied to fuel 
consumption by motorists,’ (2005) Transport Policy 255.
91 Nentjes and Woerdman, ‘Tradable Permits versus Tradable Credits’, supra. 
92 “Romania has classified carbon allowances as financial instruments, threatening over-the-
counter carbon trade in the country”, Carbon Market News, February 24, 2010.
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the EU ETS can be considered as such,93 with the conclusion that allowance 
derivatives are recognized as financial instruments under the EU Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).94 However, the legal status of 
allowances in primary markets, spot markets and as security instruments is 
not fully clear. Some commentators have argued that an EU ETS allowance 
is an ‘investment credit’ under international law, raising questions about fair 
and equitable treatment of investors.95 It appears that the characterization of 
a carbon unit is related to its functionality, and given that the functionality 
of carbon units has been determined largely by the markets in which they 
are traded, they tend towards being viewed as commodities. On the other 
hand, a carbon unit does contain certain facets of a currency, the primary one 
being that unlike a commodity, its value is derived only from its use to meet 
an obligation.96 Further, the implementation of a PCT has been envisaged as 
a currency where ‘carbon points’ are sacrificed along with normal currency 
for fuel and energy use. However, Brohe criticizes characterizing a carbon 
unit as currency as it does not assist with the proper identification of the 
property rights therein.97 Button, on the other hand, argues that a ‘currency 
model’ is preferable to a ‘commodity model’ for international carbon markets, 
as governments could then maintain control on price volatility, promote 
transparency and have an international supervisory body.98 We have observed 
earlier that for an EET scheme, there may be a need for central supervision 
(by way of a carbon central bank, for example) of allowances, and in a pan-
93 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/docs/discussion_paper_en.pdf.
94 “Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID) and Proposals for a 
Regulation on Market Abuse and for a Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse: 
Frequently Asked Questions on Emission Allowances”, EU MEMO/11/719, October 20, 
2011. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressreleasesaction.do?Reference=MEMO/11/719.
95 Lisa Bennett, ‘Are Tradable Carbon Emissions Credit Investments? Characterizations and 
Ramifications under International Investment Law’, (2010) 85 New York University Law 
Review 1581. 
96 Jillian Button, ‘Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon 
Market Based on the Currency Model’ (2008) 32 Harvard Environmental Law Review 571, p. 
580.
97 Arnaud Brohe, ‘Personal Carbon Trading in the context of the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme’, (2010) 10 Climate Policy 462, p. 471.
98 Button, ‘Carbon’, supra.
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EU system, there is certainly a need to maintain exchange arrangements. 
However, a standard commodity standing-in for a certain amount of carbon 
with clearly defined rights as to how it may be traded is also advantageous. 
Thus, there appears to be a case for a regulatory mechanism that invests in 
a mixed-system. A broader regulatory perspective would require additional 
considerations regarding the nature of the instrument, taking into account 
concerns of equity, scope for misuse, and transaction costs. 
B. Voluntary Markets and Ex-Post Enforcement
In relation to voluntary markets, some commentators have pointed out that 
it is incorrect to group all voluntary markets as unregulated markets, as some 
of them are regulated to a certain extent by way of the investment rules set 
forth by the different trading platforms.99 However, the suggestion that those 
actors investing in the voluntary market and the agents facilitating such 
investment would transpose such behaviour onto a regulated EET market 
requires careful deliberation. From a BLE perspective, there is the possibility 
of a motivational and regulatory crowding-out. Regulatory crowding-out 
involves a regulation crowding-out other more effective governance structures 
(private or otherwise), while motivational crowding-out refers to a situation 
where an external incentive may crowd-out internal motives (usually moral) 
for certain behaviour. If this problem of ‘dual crowding out’ can be corrected, 
or may not prove to be insurmountable, then there is the possibility that 
sustainably inclined individuals and stakeholders of voluntary markets may 
benefit from an EET scheme. 
In addition to an ex-ante regulatory framework, there is also a need 
for recourse to a legal mechanism for settlement of disputes. However, this 
suggestion is not axiomatic; if an allowance is characterized as currency, there 
may not arise any need for a specific framework for settlement of disputes or 
protection of property rights. Again if it is characterized as a commodity, then 
regulations at an EU and national level dealing with commodity trade may 
be considered sufficient. At any event, it is submitted that there is scope for 
99 Richard Benwell, ‘Voluntary Aspects of Carbon Emissions Trading’, (2009) 66 International 
Journal of Environmental Studies 605. 
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unfair trade practices and application of consumer law in general to protect 
the interests of the end-user. This may be especially relevant in the context 
of the EU ETS as the CJEU has ruled that private parties have no standing 
before it to challenge allocations of allowances, which is a matter of executive 
and national prerogative.100 It is submitted that the absence of an ex-post 
enforcement mechanism would lead to uncertainty and a lack of trust in 
such a system. Following some cases on eco-labelling101 and misleading offset 
information102 in common law countries, an argument could be made for the 
private enforcement of environmental law within the EU by way of consumer 
protection against carbon goods and services. Eyre observes that a PCT 
scheme would involve vulnerable consumers who may be taken advantage of 
by financial mediators, such as being led into selling allowances at below their 
market value.103 The issue of perverse incentives is a considerable economic 
problem and consumer law would therefore be equally applicable to an EET 
scheme as it is to voluntary carbon markets and energy-efficiency markets. 
vi. When could we see such a scheme being 
translated to policy? 
Political and public acceptability would be vital if an EET scheme of the type 
we call for is to be implemented and to become established as a mechanism 
for responding to risks of climate change. Insights from Behavioral Law and 
Economics may help to identify the proper conditions. 
A. Political Acceptability
As indicated earlier, the UK has been quite interested in a PCT system at 
a policy level. David Miliband had expressed his interest in 2006, and this 
has been followed by work conducted and commissioned by DEFRA. While 
100 Case T-16/04 Arcelor SA v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2004/C 
71/64]
101 For a review of American cases see Lane, ‘Consumer Protection in the Eco-mark era’, supra.
102 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v GM Holden Ltd (2008) FCA 1428 is the 
most notable case in this regard; for a short review, see Glen Wright, ‘Carbon Offsets and 
Consumer Protection’ (2010) 90 IMPACT! 12.
103 Eyre, ‘Policing Carbon’, supra.
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both DEFRA as well as the House of Commons’ EAC have considered the 
proposal positively and found it technically feasible, they have deferred 
implementation till there is further research on acceptability and lowering of 
costs.104 To our knowledge, no other member state of the EU has expressed 
a clear political will to extend emissions trading to the end-user. The reasons 
are not clear, and we are currently in the process of consolidating the opinions 
of policy makers in the EU in relation to such a scheme. The intention is to 
consolidate the considered opinions of member-state representatives on the 
feasibility of the EET scheme, and views on public acceptability. 
Other than national acceptability, there is the issue of acceptability at the 
EU level. Drawing from the historical difficulties in the EU member-states 
with arriving at an agreement about a common carbon tax, Fawcett opines 
that a uniform personal carbon allowance system for all EU citizens would be 
unlikely. Instead a system of national allocation of emission rights within EU-
agreed national carbon budgets may be accepted.105 She further suggests that 
the issue of tradability may not be viewed favourably. Picking up from Fawcett, 
it could be argued that a policy option which may be politically acceptable 
would be a national sectoral budget for different sectors that may come under 
the ambit of the EET, and the setting of caps on such sectors. In addition, an 
EU limit on offsets from ‘soft-capped’ sectors may be permitted within such 
a scheme. In this way, the EET could be aligned with the ETS, and may not 
require significant policy changes. The issue of consensus on allocation of 
allowances requires consideration of some other factors. Parag and Eyre map 
some of the institutional, social and political factors that would be brought 
into play for the PCT to become policy. They argue, which is common in 
political science or policy science, that the policy-making process is not only 
one of rational problem-solving, but also one of agenda-setting, problem 
definition and technical-institutional feasibility.106 The other variations 
discussed in this chapter would depend on other factors; for example, the 
Finnish Proposal could be contingent on the lobbying power of retailers. The 
104 Environmental Audit Committee, Personal Carbon Trading, supra. 
105 Fawcett, ‘Personal Carbon Trading’, supra, pp. 9-10
106 Yael Parag and Nick Eyre, ‘Barriers to Personal Carbon Trading in the Policy Arena’ (2010) 
10 Climate Policy 10 353. 
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EET is more ambitious than the PCT in scope, and would be subject to the 
EU policy making process. Further, the same institutional factors that led 
to the political acceptability of the EU ETS, including improved learning 
about what emissions trading entails, the lobbying power of companies107 
such as British Petroleum and Shell, and a lowering of cultural resistance 
against ‘pollution rights’108, may not fully apply to the EET. In fact, it could 
work the other way around. Acceptance for the EET could be undermined 
by the fact that the EU ETS and the CDM, for instance, are occasionally 
appearing in the media as partially failing systems, for instance due to over-
allocation, windfall profits, too low carbon prices and environmentally 
unsound mitigation projects.109 Thus, it appears that political acceptability 
partly or perhaps largely depends on public acceptability, including the favour 
of influential agents and institutions. 
B. Public Acceptability
Unlike political acceptability which is crystallised by way of regulation, 
legislation and even ex-post enforcement, public acceptability is more dynamic 
and is difficult to generalise across both time and space. For example, in an 
effort to incentivize switching from personal transport to public transport in 
Denmark, free one-month travel cards for public transport were provided to 
500 car drivers.110 For the duration of this experiment, there was an increase in 
the usage of public transport and as soon as the coupons (or subsidy) stopped 
flowing, so did the sudden increase in using public transport. In addition for 
an EET scheme providing a long-term incentive, to be truly acceptable, it 
needs to be perceived by the public as fair and equitable in order to invoke a 
107 Marcel Braun, ‘The evolution of emissions trading in the European Union-the role of policy 
networks, knowledge and policy entrepreneurs’ (2009) 34 Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 479.
108 Edwin Woerdman, ‘Path-Dependent Climate Policy: The History and Future of Emissions 
Trading in Europe’ (2004) 14 European Environment 261.
109 See for instance, Gerard Wynn, ‘Europe Tries to Stem a Plunge in Carbon Prices’, The New 
York Times, January 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/business/global/09iht-
green09.html
110 John Thogersen and Berit Moller, ‘Breaking car use habits: the effectiveness of a free one-
month travelcard’ (2008) 35 Transportation 329.
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change in behaviour and attitudes.111 Indications towards public acceptability 
of the EET may be gleaned from studies that have already been conducted. 
Andersson, Lofgren and Widerberg have assessed the attitudes towards a 
personal carbon allowance scheme, and have arrived at a tentative conclusion 
that the perceived complexity of such a scheme may be the primary obstruction 
to acceptability.112 The study on attitudes, however, does not shed any light 
on whether a pan-European trading system would be acceptable, given that 
people may have different opinions on the emissions of individuals belonging 
to other countries within the EU, and may have strong attitudes in favour of 
or against the EU ETS. It may also be interesting to map the geographical 
location and professional profile of people corresponding to the attitudes 
expressed. For example, people involved in the agricultural sector may have 
differing views from those who use public transport in the city. Further, there 
is also no study as to whether the public views a carbon allowance or carbon 
credit as any different from a financial product. An extension of this endeavour 
to gather the attitudes of different stakeholders systematically would be to 
assess its acceptability among agents already involved in existing emissions 
trading markets, such as investment houses which trade in the EU ETS and 
the brokers who participate in any of the voluntary markets. We hypothesise 
that there is likely to be an asymmetry in the views of different stakeholders 
in a proposed EET scheme. 
As is clear from the above, more nuanced research may be required to 
gauge the attitudes of different prospective stakeholders. However, even if we 
were to conduct surveys to capture such factors, we come across the general 
problem that expressed attitudes are not always a robust indicator of actual 
behaviour. To this end, Capstick and Lewis have combined a carbon footprint 
calculator (including electricity consumption, personal car use and flights 
111 Sebastian Bamberg and Daniel Rolle, ‘Determinants of People’s Acceptability of Pricing 
Measures - Replication and Extension of a Causal Model’, in: Jens Schade and Bernhard 
Schlag (eds.), Acceptability of Transport Pricing Strategies (Oxford: Elsevier, 2003), pp. 235-
248. 
112 David Andersson, Asa Lofgren and Anna Widergerg, ‘Attitudes to Personal Carbon 
Allowances’ (2011), No. 505, Working Papers in Economics, School of Business, Economics and 
Law, University of Gothenburg.
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taken) and follow-up questionnaire on energy choices by way of a computer-
based simulation to assess people’s engagement with a constructed Personal 
Carbon Allowance system.113 Their results show that people with a high 
footprint were less inclined to support such a system, though the processing 
of one’s footprint and the desire not to run out of allowances seems to show 
that there is an overall carbon-conserving behaviour. This study also suffers 
from a self-reporting bias. A majority of the sample was in a relatively high 
income bracket (£40 000 or more)114, and the assessment of engagement 
with an allowance system was based on answers to questions provided after 
providing information on such a system. The other issue which is missing 
from this study is the aspect of tradability. 
Simulated experiments in both economics and psychology have 
shortcomings regarding their applicability in the real world, and this begs for 
field experiments. Given that the implementation of such a scheme would 
require the observation of energy saving and trading behaviour rather than the 
consolidation of stated preferences of participants, a trial pilot project appears 
to be the best way to assess acceptability. When Roberts and Thumim prepared 
one of the first reports on downstream carbon trading systems, they suggested 
that at that stage pilot testing is “not a good idea”,115 arguing that a pilot was 
unlikely to be representative of the real world without accounting for a system 
of “leakage (by annexing the Isle of Wight as some have suggested!) with 
decent transaction systems and with no sense of ‘free riders’”.116 Subsequently, 
a group of researchers at the Environmental Change Institute have considered 
in detail the possibility of conducting a trial for personal carbon allowances.117 
Interestingly, while the suggestion of annexing the Isle of Wight is said in jest, 
113 Stuart Capstick and Alan Lewis, ‘Personal Carbon Allowances: A Pilot Simulation and a 
Questionnaire’ (2009), UK-ERC Report, Environmental Change Institute, University of 
Oxford. Available at: http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/research/energy/downloads/capstick09-
pcasimulation.pdf.
114 Ibid, p. 6.
115 Simon Roberts and Joshua Thumim, A Rough Guide To Individual Carbon Trading: The ideas, 
the issues and the next steps (London: DEFRA, 2006), p. 35.
116 Ibid, p. 36. 
117 Tina Fawcett, Catherine Bottrill, Brenda Boardman, Geoff Lye, ‘Trialling Personal Carbon 
Allowances’ (2007) UKERC Report No. UKERC/RR/DR/2007/002.
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such an approach is being used in Australia where the 13-square mile Norfolk 
Island with approximately 2500 inhabitants is now a test site for trying out a 
trading scheme for reducing individual emissions. 118 The primary finding so 
far is that while the stated preferences of participants regarding climate change 
(‘Environmental Consciousness’) of the participants is a significant predictor 
of intention to participate in a PCT, their preferences for environmental 
behavioural is general (‘Environment Action’) is not.119 
Although the CRAG is not really the same thing as an EET scheme, the 
former may be viewed as a field experiment of some relevance for the latter. 
It is clear from the members of such groups that the perception of fairness is 
probably the most important motivator for participation.120 
vii. Conclusion 
End-user Emissions Trading (EET) refers to an emissions trading scheme for 
individuals, preferably on an EU-wide scale. Such a personal carbon trading 
scheme is targeted towards (a) reducing the release of greenhouse gases 
from energy and fuel consumption and (b) towards incentivizing climate-
friendly choices, related to consumption (for instance, changes in food habits), 
production (household production of ‘green’ energy or installation of enabling 
infrastructure) or utilization of resources (changes in land-use or deforestation). 
The central question that we have answered in this chapter is three-fold: 
Why would such an emissions trading scheme for individuals be desirable, 
how could such a scheme be designed and under what conditions could it be 
acceptable?
First, EET is desirable so as to rationalise sustainable engagement by 
individuals, regulate voluntary offset markets, place an emission cap on yet 
uncapped sectors and stimulate energy efficiency by households ‘through 
118 For a preliminary response to a survey that is part of the longitudinal project, see Alex 
Hendry et. al., ‘Influences on intentions to use a personal carbon trading system (NICHE 
- The Norfolk Island Carbon Health Evaluation Project)’ (2015) 5 International Technology 
Management Review 105. 
119 Ibid, pp. 109 – 110. 
120 Howell, ‘Living with a carbon allowance’, supra. 
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their backdoor’. It would make the carbon incentive explicit, visible and 
manageable for energy consumers. 
Second, EET can be designed, for instance, by allocating allowances 
‘downstream’ and concentrating the monitoring ‘upstream’ at the level of fossil 
fuel producers and importers, allowing for the involvement of individuals while 
working towards reducing administrative costs at the same time. Integrating 
such a scheme into the existing legal framework will be a challenge and begs 
the unavoidable question of policy interactions and resulting inefficiencies 
that may arise. 
Third, EET may be acceptable if people come to understand that they 
get an additional (carbon) bank account that will help them to improve 
the environment, as long as the allowance allocation is perceived to be 
fair. Although the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
for big companies is a success in the sense that absolute emission caps have 
been imposed on firms and that their trading of allowances to save costs 
is undisputed, the current criticism on the EU ETS (e.g. over-allocation, 
windfall profits, too low carbon prices) may actually spill-over to the EET 
debate and diminish its prospects. 
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EPISTEMOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS: A 
TESTIMONIAL APPROACH TO BLE AND 
CLIMATE REGULATION*
“Without a profound simplification the world around us would 
be an infinite, undefined tangle that would defy our ability 
to orient ourselves and decide upon our actions…. We are 
compelled to reduce the knowable to a schema.”
—Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved. 
i. Introduction
Among the literature reviewed in the last chapter, the most detailed 
consideration yet of a regulatory mechanism to arrest emissions from 
individuals and households is the Personal Carbon Trading Report by the 
Environment Audit Committee of the House of Commons, UK (‘PCT 
Report’).1. This Report, based on an assessment of expert testimony, concluded 
* This is a modified version of Suryapratim Roy, ‘Mediators and Moderators of Normative 
Reductionism: Towards a testimonial approach to expertise in legal inquiry’ (2016) 7 European 
Journal of Risk Regulation 532.
1 Environmental Audit Committee, House of Commons, UK, Personal Carbon Trading: 
Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2007-2008, London, May 26, 
2008
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that the idea was fundamentally sound, but noted that further research was 
needed on implementation and enforcement. The conclusions arrived at were 
dependent on the experts consulted, and how their testimony was appreciated. 
On reading the report, the general thrust that ‘once more research is done, we 
could consider’ was unhelpful. Some issues seemed irresolvable by improving 
on the sort of evidence considered. Notably, the PCT Report did not address 
what research could assist with problems of enforcement by way of liability, or 
equity considerations, or public acceptability, or political acceptability? These 
substantive questions led to procedural ones: How were the experts who 
testified selected, and how was their testimony understood and appreciated? 
This is a difficulty that afflicts EU regulatory and administrative inquiry, 
despite its technocratic nature of regulatory involvement, and is particularly 
germane to climate regulation. In the US, climate change regulation is heavily 
influenced by the judiciary; and even with respect to judicial inquiry on expert 
knowledge in the US, the fact remains that notwithstanding nuance regarding 
the use and filtering of specialised knowledge,2 the identification of relevant 
candidates of specialised knowledge to defer to does not involve a justification 
of how such deference may take place: ‘the judge is not capable of making 
an epistemically legitimate decision about which special master, law clerk, or 
court appointed expert to consult.’3 
Briefly put, while legal institutions and scholars in the EU and its Member 
States explicitly and implicitly rely on expert input in analysis and decision-
making, there is no theory of expertise, and limited tools to interrogate the 
process of placing reliance on expertise. In this chapter I suggest that the time 
has come to move away from looking at reason and the political as conflicting 
categories, but work towards examining how they are associated and suggesting 
processes whereby expertise may be translated into law. The aim of this chapter 
is accordingly a modest one  –it provides an analytical framework for how 
expertise may be understood and used by legal scholars and decision-makers. 
The motivation behind this inquiry is two-fold: (i) there appears to be limited 
2 This was set in by a line of cases following Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals discussed 
later in this chapter. 
3 Scott Brewer, ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process’ (1998) 107 Yale Law 
Journal 1535, p. 1681. 
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guidance within formal law regarding the negotiation of expertise, and (ii) 
the issue of negotiating expertise is a problem that afflicts legal scholars, but 
is rarely addressed. With respect to BLE and climate regulation specifically, I 
have to regularly consult expert materials, but am often at a loss in arriving at 
a justified basis for negotiating expert knowledge. The traditional dichotomies 
of reasoning, i.e. theoretical v. empirical, inductive v. deductive are not 
helpful in this regard; instead, I find myself engaging in an undisciplined way 
with second-hand knowledge. By way of approaching a method of how such 
discipline may be introduced, I aim to highlight some of the concerns I have 
encountered while writing this book, and arrive at a constructive method to 
negotiate expertise. To articulate this aim, I proceed as follows: Section II 
addresses the idea of examining the relationship between law and expertise 
as Testimony using BLE as an example; Section III develops a moderator-
mediator approach to how law may engage with expert inquiry, and situates 
EET regulation within this approach, and Section IV concludes. This exercise 
would undoubtedly alienate some readers. Rather than proceeding with the 
issues of public acceptability, political acceptability, EU law and governance 
identified in Chapter 2, it seems like an indulgence at best, and derailing 
‘real’ research at worst. But if I may urge the reader to consider this: without 
conducting exercises such as this one, both regulatory processes as well as 
interdisciplinary research may amount to little more than paper tigers that 
pander to momentary political or academic push generated in certain quarters. 
That, in turn, may do a disservice to the problem sought to be addressed.
ii.  Testimony In Behavioural Law & Economics 
And Climate Change
A. Engaging with Different Disciplines
While writing this book, I deeply desired some guidance on gatekeeping 
expert knowledge in relation to schemes similar to the EET. A quick Google 
Scholar search of ‘Personal Carbon Trading’ will reveal articles published in 
Obesity Review, Ecological Economics, Medical Journal of Australia, International 
Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management within the first five 
pages. Reviewing scholarship on ancillary subjects such as ‘emissions trading’ 
and ‘individual engagement with climate change’ leads to an information 
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overload, with different disciplines and sub-disciplines heavily weighing in. 
Other than overload are the two compelling issues of trust in experts regarding 
regulatory application and conflict between forms of expertise regarding the 
same subject. While dealing with regulators, experts have an incentive to 
bear the translation costs of their expertise; if some forms of expertise appear 
to be authoritative yet intelligible to policy makers, then they would be 
retained.4 In practice, regulators and judges refrain from second-guessing the 
findings of experts, and may well rubber-stamp expert opinions.5 The third 
issue of conflict between experts is also germane to the subject matter of this 
book. Integral to the EET is the idea of individual engagement with climate 
policy, and there are incommensurable perspectives of how this issue can be 
addressed. This is brought out clearly in an exchange between the sociologist 
Elizabeth Shove and the psychologist Lorraine Whitmarsh regarding the 
appropriate paradigm for thinking about climate policy. Shove critiques a 
‘language of individual behaviour and personal responsibility’6 in UK climate 
policy, arguing that it allows policy makers to paper over the ‘ways in which 
governments maintain infrastructures and economic institutions’7 where the 
real battles regarding anthropogenic climate change need to be fought. The 
paradigm for climate policy, Shove argues, should be the context rather than the 
individual. In response, Lorraine Whitmarsh (among others), a psychologist 
who works on instruments such as the PCT), argues that there is no reason 
4 Take for instance Winston Churchill’s belief that ‘scientists should be on tap, not on top’. This 
does not take away from the fact he rendered a more favourable ear to some scientists over 
others; he especially valued Frederick Lindemann because he could ‘translate complicated 
facts and theories in a way he [Churchill] could understand.’ See Michael D. Rogers, ‘The 
European Commission and the Collection of Science and Technology Advice’ in Justus 
Lentsch and Peter Weingart eds. The Politics Of Scientific Advice (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), p. 
116.
5 Busuioc makes this claim with regard to the de facto binding nature of non-binding opinions 
of executive agencies that inform the European Commission, and the reluctance on the Court 
of Justice to question technical findings. Madalina Busuioc, ‘Blurred Areas of Responsibility: 
European agencies’ scientific ‘opinions’ under scrutiny’ in Monika Ambrus et. al. eds. The Role 
Of Experts In International And European Decision-Making Processes (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), 
p. 383. 
6 Elizabeth Shove, ‘Beyond the ABC: Climate change policy and theories of social change’ 
(2010) 42 Environment And Planning A 1273, p. 1274. 
7 Ibid,p. 1283. 
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why policy makers should solely concentrate on ‘structural transformation’ 
rather than ‘self-direction’ of individual behaviour.8 She finds possible spaces 
of interdisciplinary interaction as individual behaviour is contextual. Finally, 
Shove replies that interdisciplinarity is a gloss; with respect to climate policy, 
she feels that ‘sociologists are invited to fill out the context of individual 
behaviour’ while there have already been decisions and policy-framing about 
‘a behaviour context of social action.’9 Her suggestion, therefore, is to allow 
different epistemic and ontological paradigms to exist in parallel. Shove 
admits that she does not explore ‘how policymakers might handle coexisting 
and divergent paradigms’10 and indeed provides no solution. 
Given the problems of information overload, trust, and conflict, how does 
one decide what to read, and how such materials should be utilised to evaluate 
normative issues under consideration? The way out for legal scholars appears 
to be to read as much from as many places as possible; or to be an exhaustive 
reader. This can be observed in instances such as the length of footnotes in 
legal articles that is implicitly a claim to exhaustive research.11 However, 
given that reading and writing is inevitably shaped by some inarticulate 
preferences, zeroing in on a particular epistemic community12 to guide such 
selection is the usual practice. There appears to be no reason, however, as to 
why the exploration of any legal question should be confined to a particular 
epistemic tradition; on the contrary, if a legal understanding is supposed to be 
democratic, it must resist any form of capture. 
8 Lorraine Whitmarsh, Saffron O’Neill and Irene Lorenzoni, ‘Climate change or Social Change? 
Debate within, amongst and beyond disciplines’ (2011) 43 Environment And Planning A 258, 
p. 259. 
9 Elizabeth Shove, ‘On the Difference between Chalk and Cheese’ (2011) 43 Environment And 
Planning A 262. 
10 Ibid, p. 263. 
11 Schlag has parodied the use of exhaustive references as a claim to justification. Pierre Schlag, 
‘Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on 
the State of the Art)’ (2009) 97 Georgetown Law Journal 803. In one footnote he writes: 
‘Excuse me, hello, but could I possibly get some cites here, maybe?’, fn 5, p. 804. 
12 The development of the idea of an epistemic community is attributed to Peter Haas, especially 
in relation to the politics that inform environmental policy. Peter M. Haas, ‘When Does 
Power Listen to Truth?:A constructivist approach to the policy process’ (2004) 11 Journal Of 
European Public Policy 569. 
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The above constraints highlight the need for a theory of knowledge, or 
some basis for negotiating expert knowledge for legal questions. This is evident 
in the approach I seek to adopt in my areas of inquiry, that of BLE and the 
scholars working within BLE who I cite and rely on. Such negotiation involves 
some amount of deference to the internal validity of behavioural economics 
(much like any other self-styled body of knowledge), and some manner 
of assessing external validity. I intend to first discuss a problem of internal 
validity to demonstrate that behavioural economics can be methodologically 
contested, namely the sort of psychology that BLE uses, and then proceed to 
some of the challenges posed to the external validity of BLE. 
i Engagement with BLE: Internal Validity
While psychology has historically been a much-ignored discipline in economic 
analysis and reasoning about legal issues generally (other than with respect to 
specific mental health issues), the discipline is now in vogue. The mediator 
that caused the translation13 of psychology into both law and economics 
is behavioural economics and BLE, with a group of scholars heralding 
this change. At the centre of this group is the social psychologist Daniel 
Kahneman, who made his work intelligible to economists and legal scholars 
through collaborations with the mathematician Amos Tversky, the business 
economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar and regulator Cass Sunstein. 
While Sunstein’s work and his application of social and cognitive 
psychology is often critiqued,14 legal scholars find themselves incompetent 
to assess the internal validity of Kahneman’s work. This is not entirely 
13 For an account of the events and associations that served as milestones in the ascendancy 
of behavioural economics within the history of economic thought, see Floris Heukelom, 
Behavioral Economics: A History (Cambridge: CUP, 2014). 
14 For the selective use of psychology in Sunstein’s work, see Dan Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald 
Braman and John Gastil, ‘Fear of Democracy: A cultural evaluation of Sunstein on risk’ (2006) 
119 Harvard Law Review 1071. For the translation of psychology in policy questions, see Amy 
Sinden, ‘Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2015) 1 Utah Law Review 93. 
For the absence of inquiry into the relevance of the forms of expertise Sunstein employs, see 
Martin Kusch . ‘Towards a Political Philosophy of Risk: Experts and publics in deliberative 
democracy’ in Tim Lewens ed. Risk: Philosophical Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2007), 
See also Pierre Schlag, ‘Nudge, Choice Architecture and Libertarian Paternalism’ (2010) 108 
Michigan Law Review 913.
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unproblematic: the way experiments are conducted by social psychologists 
– and hence the way internal validity is established – is not uniform across 
researchers relying on experimental methods and findings.15 Substantively, 
there is a particular methodological choice that I wish to highlight – the 
utilisation of the strong inference method in Kahneman and Tversky’s research,16 
the logic of which affects the interpretation of experimental data. This may 
be explained in the following way: in their experiments, there are questions 
posed to participants (or an activity designed) after a manipulation that can 
be answered (or performed) either through the use of irrational heuristics 
or rational decision-making. What is found in the experiments is that the 
subjects reason ‘heuristically’ as hypothesised leading to their predictive value 
of anticipated errors in decision-making; rationality is rarely achieved given 
the conditions.17 
In keeping with the benefits of strong inference, the interpretation of 
data is linked to the way it is presented as well: ‘strong evaluative language’ is 
used to describe experimental results.18 Thus, the production of behavioural 
science is intimately linked to the technologies of communication.19 Given 
the repeated successful experimental validation of pre-conceptualised 
15 Gerd Gigerenzer in particular questioned the methods used by Kahneman and Tversky over 
a series of articles and exchanges. See for instance, Gerd Gigerenzer, On Narrow Norms and 
Vague Heuristics: A rebuttal to Kahneman and Tversky (1996) 103 Psychological Review 592. 
16 A detailed methodological interrogation of Kahneman and Tversky’s foundational work, 
including the strong inference method is found in Lola L. Lopes, ‘The Rhetoric of Irrationality’ 
(1991) 1 Theory & Psychology 65.
17 Hence Lopes: “...the sheer weight of all the wrong answers tends to deform the basic 
conclusion, bending it away from an evaluatively neutral description of process and toward 
something more like ‘people use heuristics to judge probabilities and they are wrong’ or even 
‘people make mistakes when they judge probabilities because they use heuristics.’” Ibid, p. 
73.This may indicate why scholars such as Vernon Smith who conduct economic experiments 
that manipulate the conditions till participants reach rational behaviour are at odds with the 
methodology employed by Kahneman and Tversky. For an overview of such conflicts, see 
generally Heukelom, Behavioral Economics, supra. 
18 Lopes, ‘The Rhetoric of Irrationality’, supra, p. 76. 
19 Thus, knowledge about human behaviour is integrally linked to the way such knowledge 
is presented. This line of reasoning – though not directed at psychological experiments – 
motivates Bruno Latour’s work on the sociology of science, including the way economics as a 
discipline shapes itself. 
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deviances from a rational actor model, the predictive power of such research 
lends itself to mathematical modelling and ‘predictably irrational’ financial 
choices. Further, as several popular books on behavioural economics suggest, 
the findings regarding the inadequacy of people to make rational choices 
are intuitive and relatable to general readers. In brief, Kahneman’s work is 
rendered intelligible to a wide variety of readers from different disciplines 
owing to the highly successful experiments about intuitively appealing 
findings about heuristics and biases. But does that reduce the value of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s engagement with questions about behaviour? Lopes 
argues that notwithstanding the use of strong inference that makes ‘seeing the 
data unnecessary’, the thought experiments used reveal critical psychological 
variables that may have gone unnoticed.20 Further, I suggest that contestation 
about methods or questions about scientific certainty do not necessarily 
dampen the utility of such work for regulation. This brings us to external 
validity. 
ii. Engagement with BLE: External validity
In a recent contribution Owen Jones argues that the primary reasons why 
BLE has not become the primary approach adopted in mainstream legal 
scholarship are because (i) it confines its methodology to the experimental 
method found in social psychology, and (ii) it allows psychological studies to be 
filtered through economics.21 By way of an example, he takes the endowment 
effect and argues that if law is serious about ‘deploying the best models of 
human behaviour’, then it cannot rely on ‘conceptually hitching it to the 
single boxcar of economics’ or concentrating on social psychology, which can 
only offer a ‘small proportion of all relevant insights from psychology.’ He is 
quite blunt about his recommendations to bring about better scholarship: 
‘Stop defining the field of inquiry in relation to Economics’, ‘Stop thinking 
it’s really the method that matters.’ 
I would like to discuss the reasons why I partially agree with Jones, and 
why I don’t, and use this discussion as a starting point for explaining why it 
20 Lopes, ‘The Rhetoric of Irrationality’, supra, p. 73.
21 Owen Jones, ‘Why Behavioral Economics Isn’t Better and Why it Could Be’ in J. Teitelbaum 
& K. Zeiler eds. Research Handbook On Behavioural Law And Economics (2015). 
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is important to develop a conceptual framework for Behavioural Testimony 
in Law. 
To begin with, I share his concern about the unreasoned practise of 
privileging some forms of psychology and economics in deciding on a policy.22 
There seems to be no reason why social psychological methods or economic 
models should be used to decide on either a policy or a legal issue. This scepticism 
informs several critiques of Nudging.23 There seems to be a belief that ‘Nudge 
Units’24 are now a part of governmental structures. But the truth is that they are 
not. Few countries have these units, and they rarely translate into actual policy.25 
As to why that is the case, it could clearly be path-dependence to a certain way 
of doing policy, or reasoning about law. To switch from a certain path, there 
should be a convincing basis, which BLE arguably has not been able to provide. 
Indeed, prior to legal scholars who found normative applications for behavioural 
economics, it was mostly a descriptive enterprise, designed to ‘dispel the illusions’26 
that characterise neo-classical economics. There was no clear articulation by 
those who initially performed the experiments and drew inferences about the 
‘predictably irrational’ nature of individual decision-making as to whether and 
what extent it should provide a basis for policy, or legal decision-making. There 
was some indication, however, that the findings should not replace the focus 
on measurement and modelling prevalent in neo-classical economics. AsThaler 
puts it: “It goes without saying that the existence of an optical illusion that 
causes us to see one of two equal lines as longer than the other should not reduce 
the value we place on accurate measurement. On the contrary, illusions demand 
22 Roy, ‘Privileging (some forms of ) Interdisciplinarity and Interpretation’, supra. 
23 Yeung, ‘Nudge as Fudge’, supra; Sabine Frerichs, ‘False Promises? A sociological critique of the 
behavioural turn in Law and Economics’ (2011) 34 Journal Of Consumer Policy 289. 
24 The Behavioural Insights Team in the UK government is commonly referred to as the Nudge 
Unit. For an account of its functioning, see David Halpern, Inside the Nudge Unit: How small 
changes can make a big difference (London: Random House, 2015).
25 Evan Selinger and Kyle Powys Whyte, ‘Nudging Cannot Solve Complex Policy Problems’ 
(2012) 1 European Journal of Risk Regulation 26. 
26 Richard H. Thaler, ‘The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Economics’, in 
Richard H. Thaler ed. Quasi Rational Economics (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991), 
p. 138. 
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the need for rulers!”27 The proposition therefore appears to be that behavioural 
studies should be used to correct and complete simple neo-classical models;28 
thus the way the findings of behavioural economists would have normative 
power would require the moderation of existing economic models. Thus, there 
appears to be an argument for privileging some forms of psychological studies due 
to their compatibility with forms of economics that seek to model rational decision-
making.29 If this is the case, then Jones’ concerns could be considered to be 
misplaced, as there is a reasonable basis for privileging some forms of psychology. 
However, the other interpretation of Thaler’s observation could be that it is 
possible for the findings of behavioural psychology to exist independently of 
the measuring technologies found in some forms of economics. In practice, 
this is how the regulatory focus of BLE – rather than behavioural economics 
tout court - appears to function. Take Sunstein’s idea of going paperless through 
a default rule of double-sided printing, for instance.30 He acknowledges the 
value of finding a low-cost alternative for achieving an environmental goal, and 
then uses the default option as a heuristic device gleaned from the findings of 
behavioural economists. Practically speaking, therefore, there is no mediation 
by economic models, and a normative use of psychology-based heuristics is 
seen as worth pursuing in its own right. In this case, therefore, what would 
be useful for the policy to be effective, and generate responsiveness is to see 
what might explain individuals not resorting to the default rule. As Nathan 
Berg observes, normative behavioural economics requires the development of 
a distinct toolkit of analytical techniques ‘borrowing from psychology, sociology, 
cognitive science, political science, psychology, anthropology, and philosophy.’31 
This view is in conformity with Jones’. 
27 Ibid. 
28 This endeavour has been usefully characterised as ‘fitting and repairing the rational-choice 
model.’ Werner Güth, ‘(Non) Behavioral Economics: A programmatic assessment’ (2008) 
216 Zeitschrift Für Psychologie 244. 
29 Esther Mirjam-Sent, Behavioral Economics: How Psychology Made Its (Limited) Way Back Into 
Economics (2004) 36 History Of Political Economy 735. 
30 Cass Sunstein, ‘Deciding by Default’ (2013) 162 University Of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, p. 
13. 
31 Nathan Berg, ‘Normative Behavioral Economics’ (2003) 32 Journal of Socio-Economics 411, 
p. 419. 
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The reason why I think Jones’ critique is not entirely convincing is because 
he does not explain on what basis law should declare or refute allegiance to 
a particular method or science. Jones has made his career in exploring the 
relationship between law and evolutionary biology. In his worldview, BLE 
falls short because neuroscience and progress in behavioural biology can serve 
as better explanatory methods in explaining status-quo bias than the methods 
employed in the social psychology laboratory. Jones does not, however, offer a 
theory of why fMRI scans and methods found in behavioural biology should 
be privileged over a social psychology experiment.32 Generally speaking, this 
issue eludes BLE scholars –what is the basis for deciding on an appropriate 
science for policymakers and legal scholars to take human behaviour into 
account? One of Sunstein’s primary claims in his work is that expert knowledge 
should replace lay (and sometimes judicial) reasoning and decision-making. 
However, as Martin Kusch argues, Sunstein does not differentiate between 
experts; in any legal appreciation of risk, Sunstein’s work does not speak 
to which experts could be relied on.33 In addition, Pierre Schlag notes that 
Sunstein has no answer as to why we should trust experts.34 Admittedly, we 
should not trust ourselves as we are not in control of our irrational selves, 
but why should we trust experts? And which experts should we trust? What I 
draw from this is that Sunstein, like Jones, and BLE scholarship as such has no 
theory of expertise. Or, there is no disciplined manner in understanding which 
forms of expertise may be legally useful. 
Thus when Boyd, Kysar and Rachlinski (some of the leading scholars 
currently working on climate law and BLE) argue that environmental 
lawyers have ‘much to gain from canvassing such disciplines as geography, 
32 It may be noted that social psychologists have made similar arguments regarding the limited 
explanatory potential of evolutionary biology, and the primary methodological technology it 
employs–the differential equation. Mazahrin Banaji and Robert Crowder, ‘Experimentation 
and its Discontents’ in P.E. Morris and M. Gruenberg eds. Theoretical Aspects Of Memory 
(London: Routledge,1994), pp. 303 – 305.
33 Kusch, ‘Towards a Political Philosophy of Risk’, supra, p. 131. 
34 Schlag, ‘Nudge, Choice Architecture and Libertarian Paternalism’, supra. The cumbersome 
activity of determining individual instances of whether experts can be trusted can be eased 
by assessing the trustworthiness of experts. See Elizabeth Fricker, ‘Second-Hand Knowledge’ 
(2006) 73 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 592. 
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ecological anthropology, environmental sociology, environmental 
history, and political ecology,’35 they also acknowledge the need ‘to 
recognise knowledge production as something that can itself be studied 
and regulated.’36 We therefore turn to this concern of how knowledge 
production can be studied, and how appropriate forms of expertise can 
be recognised. 
What may be useful in this regard is to invoke the Philosophy of 
Knowledge, Sociology of Knowledge and the Economics of Knowledge to 
understand the context behind science and expert knowledge.37 One theme 
that runs through these sub-disciplines and bodies of scholarship is the issue 
of epistemic and hermeneutic reductionism. The issue of epistemic and 
hermeneutic reductionism has been an explicit subject of study for a body of 
scholars working at the interface of philosophy, ethics and political theory  on 
the idea of testimony. Scholarship on Testimony has been all but neglected by 
legal scholars38 and practitioners. Only Scott Brewer39 to my knowledge has 
expressly engaged in an extensive theoretical study of legal testimony. Recently, 
Gustavo Riberio, one of Brewer’s students, has considered the possibility of 
non-arbitrary legal reductionism.40 I will interrogate this possibility, and 
provide an approach as to how it may be done, using individual engagement 
with climate law as an example. To do so, I first provide a brief introduction 
to the idea of legal reductionism and the use of the discipline of Testimony to 
understand reductionism. 
35 William Boyd, Douglas Kysar and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Law, Environment and the “Nondismal” 
Social Sciences (2012) 8 Annual Review of Law and the Social Sciences 183, p. 205. 
36 Ibid. 
37 This manner of engagement is inspired by Coase’s preference for a Kuhnian view of the 
centrality of the philosophy of science rather than a Friedman-led scientific positivism in 
conducting economic inquiry. Ronald Coase, ‘How Should Economists Choose?’, Warren G. 
Nutter Lecture in Political Economy, 1982, pp. 15 – 18. 
38 A WESTLAW International combined world journals and articles search reveals that 17 
articles in total refer to C.A.J Coady, the most noted testimony scholar, as against 3685 
articles that refer to Daniel Kahneman. 
39 Brewer, ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process’, supra.
40 Gustavo Riberio, ‘No Need to Toss a Coin: Conflicting scientific expert testimonies and 
intellectual due process’ (2013) 12 Law, Probability And Risk 299. 
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B. A Testimonial Approach to Legal Reasoning
i. The Inevitability of Legal Reductionism
Like any other system, a legal system tends to be self-referential.41 Analysis 
conducted within the discursive boundaries of a legal system would be a tool 
for the actualisation of such a system. Such actualisation is achieved through 
interpretation, where interpretation serves normative ends. The primary 
property of legal interpretation is openness to complexity, and reduction 
of such complexity through generalisation. Scahuer gives the example of a 
police officer who stops a driver for unsafe driving to illustrate this property 
of generalisation. A particularistic police officer should ideally take everything 
into account: ‘the condition of the roads, the amount of traffic, the weather, 
the time of day, the type and condition of the car, the experience and previous 
driving record of the driver, the explanation offered by the driver, and perhaps 
even the ability of the driver to pay the fine.’42 However, in reality, such 
‘real differences’ are suppressed in favour of general rules made in advance 
regarding the entire category of road safety where ‘all drivers driving cars 
under all conditions on a moderately large stretch of the highway’43 are 
treated in roughly the same way, or where a rule gathers together dissimilar 
particulars and subjects them to similar treatment.44 Every particularity about 
the driver or the environment would have its own science or explained by 
myriad sciences. The process of legal reasoning is such that the ‘truth’ of 
other disciplines and communities is replaced and law creates truth; as Balkin 
puts it: ‘...one of the most interesting features of law as a system of social 
conventions is the ability to make things true or, to put it another way, create 
41 The chief proponents of this view are scholars who draw on Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory 
to highlight the autopoietic nature of law. See Gunther Teubner, ‘How the Law Thinks: 
Toward a constructivist epistemology of law’ (1989) 23 Law & Society Review 727. 
42 Frederick Schauer, ‘The Generality of Law’ (2004) 107 West Virginia Law Review 217, p. 219. 
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid, p. 233. ‘In law, it thus seems, generality has a disproportionate presence, but particularity 
has only a proportionate presence.’ 
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legal categories that permit characterisations of situations and practices that 
are true or false.’45 
Legal agents that derive their legitimacy from upholding ‘a culture of 
justification’46 such as the EU has to be open to epistemic communities during 
the process of truth-creation. Every community, in turn, would seek to have a 
hold on truth-creation: given the normative power of a legal system, different 
interests and epistemic communities compete to capture the life of the law. In 
general dealings, the technical language of investigation and communication 
of an epistemic community does not have to be reduced to a language that 
everyone speaks; not so in the case of legal testimony where there is a necessity 
for the speaker to formulate her assertion in an intelligible manner;47 where 
the properties of such intelligibility are determined by the legal institution 
or discourse that is appealed to. Every act of epistemic appreciation is an 
act of normative interpretation. The technologies of interpretation pervade 
knowledge itself, as expert assertions are interpretatively rendered intelligible by 
the legal hearer.
Thus, what we see above is the inevitability of legal reductionism of 
complexity through legal intelligibility. But what informs the process of 
rendering complexity legally intelligible? For this, we turn to a discussion on 
Testimony. 
ii. Introducing Testimony
I first came across literature on testimony while investigating the reliance 
placed on Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) by regulators. The project involved 
both forms of testimony that we discussed with respect to the PCT Report 
– official testimonial hearings before regulators, as well as the use of second-
hand knowledge by regulators and judges. I found it odd that the discourse on 
reducing the reliance placed on CRAs involved using the ‘common language 
45 Jack Balkin, ‘The Proliferation of Legal Truth’ (2003) 26 Harvard Journal Of Law And Public 
Policy 5.
46 Ibid. 
47 See Nicola Mößner, ‘The Concept of Testimony’ in Christoph Jäger and Winfired Löffler eds. 
Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Ontos Verlag, 2011), p. 
209. 
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of risk’ advocated by CRAs.48 Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice provided a 
way of explaining this paradox: If we were to characterize experts as ‘speakers’ 
and regulators as ‘hearers,’ a credibility excess could be attributed to some 
experts over time and/or space, whereby the hearer makes an unduly inflated 
judgment of ‘the speaker’s credibility, perhaps missing out on knowledge as 
a result.’49 Fricker concentrates mostly on ‘credibility deficit’ as a form of 
epistemic injustice where the speaker is underestimated by the hearer. She, 
however, also accommodates the possibility of a credibility excess that distorts 
any epistemic exchange, and may, on occasion, also constitute epistemic 
injustice for the speaker if this credibility excess leads to an inflated precarious 
‘epistemic arrogance.’ One may ask—how does credibility deficit or excess 
come about, and why does the hearer make an unduly deflated/inflated 
judgment of the speaker? Fricker’s response is that ‘pure’ power structures 
condition the credibility attributed to the speaker, and makes it difficult 
for the hearer to actively change the way the speaker is heard. The essential 
property of a ‘pure’ power structure is that proactive agency relations do not 
need to be identified in individual cases; the ‘pure structure’ perpetuates itself 
passively through ‘reason’s entanglements with social power.’50 
Such social power may be constituted through forms of capture: ‘revolving 
doors’ between some speakers and the hearer, more subtly through the 
similarity of cultural and epistemic orientations. It may also be constituted 
through surrogate measures of prestige51 such as the scientism of some forms 
of speech over others. Identifying such power structures that lead to epistemic 
deep capture seems to be one way to ‘study knowledge production’ (the 
concern raised in Section IIIA) and could be identified as a theory of expertise.
The above, however, is one of several ways of interrogating testimony. 
Fricker’s framework is more performative: she uses feminist ethics as the 
48 Giulia Mennillo and Suryapratim Roy, Ratings and Regulation: An irreversible marriage? 
Harvard Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs Working Paper 004/2014. 
49 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power And The Ethics Of Knowing (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 
p. 20. 
50 Ibid, p. 3.
51 See Susan Haack, ‘Credulity and Circumspection’, Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association, 2015. 
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moderator for her view on testimony, under the discursive shadow of which 
the mediator of social power operates. This method of reductionism differs 
from the standard concerns of testimonial reductionism, i.e. one where the 
question is whether testimony is ‘reducible to other epistemic sources, such 
as perception, memory and reason.’52 Thus, Fricker looks to social rather 
than individualist sources. Even if the identification of Fricker’s sources 
may be contestable, it is more nuanced than scholars who do not situate 
their sources within a chosen ethical or normative framework. The other 
primary testimonial framework is constitutive, i.e. testimonial exchange 
creates ‘epistemic features in its own right.’53 I suggest below that the 
testimonial process in legal decision-making is constitutive of normativity, 
but it is important to not lose sight of the elements that lend themselves to 
performativity.
iii. Testimony in Legal Analysis
Legal testimony is usually associated with an appreciation of formal 
evidence. When it comes to appreciating expert evidence in a courtroom, 
it is either left to the lawyers to identify the experts (and present them as 
amicus curae or expert witnesses), or in some cases, there could be court-
appointed experts. Irrespective of whether experts are selected by a judge or 
a lawyer, the judge has a gatekeeping role, and this includes selection of a 
credible testifier (in addition to the traditional requirement of weighing the 
testimony of different testifiers, performed by juries in some legal systems). 
This gatekeeping role is true for regulators as well: judges and regulators 
alike consult different forms of literature and opinions in arriving at their 
decisions. It is through such consultation that judges and regulators claim 
to replace arbitrariness with reason. 
52 Jennifer Lackey, ‘Testimonial Knowledge’ in Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard eds. 
Routledge Companion To Epistemology (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 316. 
53 Integral to this question is determining the scope of what constitutes testimony, as against 
a mere utterance. The law of evidence clearly has a preference for the performative view of 
testimony; the distinction between hearsay and direct evidence found in evidence law ‘lacks 
any agreed-upon vocabulary for discussing or regulating the use of expert documentation.’ 
Karen Petroski, ‘Texts and Testimony’, supra, p. 83. 
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Disputes have arisen when judges are found to replace the expert 
information provided by litigating parties,54 or when regulators in the EU 
replace the expert information provided by Member States.55 Such conflicts, 
however, do not vitiate the need or the practice of legal decision-makers to 
constantly consult and assess expert inquiry. In this regard, Sunstein believes 
that it is essential for decision-makers to consult the top peer-reviewed journals 
in different social sciences.56 In keeping with the general shortcomings of 
Sunstein’s view of expertise discussed earlier, he does not provide guidance as 
to how such consultation is to be done, or why peer-reviewed journals should 
be trusted blindly, given that the best journals within a certain discipline may 
privilege some intradisciplinary trends, and some interdisciplinary influences 
over others.57 
In contrast, both Brewer and Riberio argue that for legal analysis to 
be justified, it is necessary to chart out ‘epistemic non-arbitrariness in legal 
reasoning.’58 For this, it is necessary for the non-expert legal decision-maker 
to have a basis for deciding between conflicting scientific testimonies. In 
regulatory decision-making and legal scholarship, the search for justification 
goes a step further – there is need to justify what testimony is branded as 
expert or scientific testimony, and hence the process of identifying privileged 
testimonies that are in conflict would also need to be justified. As any speaker 
assumes the position of a testifier before the law, assessment of credentials of 
the speaker serves as a proxy for the testifier’s credibility. In that respect, the 
seemingly constitutive nature of legal testimony is actually performative: the 
54 Queensland Conservation Council Inc. v Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd & Others [2007] 
QCA 338. The Queensland Court of Appeals found a Tribunal in breach of natural justice as 
it relied on its own materials regarding climate science that were not submitted in evidence. 
55 Case C-405/07 P Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Commission of the European Communities 
[2008] ECR I-08301. The CJEU found a procedural impropriety on the part of the 
Commission in assessing scientific evidence, as it did not take into consideration data 
provided by the Netherlands. 
56 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘From Technocrat to Democrat’, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 
14-10, 2014.
57 Rik Pieters and Hans Baumgartner, ‘Who Talks to Whom? Intra- and Interdisciplinary 
Communication of Economics Journals’ (2002) 40 Journal of Economic Literature 483.
58 Brewer, ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process’, supra, p. 1672; Riberio, 
‘No Need to Toss a Coin’, supra p. 341. 
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hearer’s opinion depends as much on the predisipositions of the hearer and the 
status of the speaker as the content of the speaker’s testimony.59 This view of 
placing reliance on non-testimonial reasons for assessing a speaker’s testimony 
acquits the legal reductionist from the charges of ‘gullibility, epistemic 
irrationality and intellectual irresponsibility.’60 However, it is unclear on what 
basis the credibility of a testifier is assessed, and the creation of law’s truth is 
in reality merely performative. 
The first problem – how to assess the credibility of the testifier – is a problem 
that Brewer argued has no solution other than ‘tossing a coin’. To briefly 
reconstruct Brewer’s position, the primary problem that concerns Brewer is 
conflicting testimony, or how a legal decision-maker can negotiate different 
forms of expertise without making ‘epistemically arbitrary judgements.’61 
To do so Brewer assumes a pre-selection of relevant forms of expertise or 
science , and he argues that in order to replace epistemic arbitrariness by 
‘intellectual due process’, it is essential to appreciate the ‘cognitive aims and 
methods of science.’62 He stresses on the understanding of the cognitive 
aims and methods of expertise as this would avoid ‘reliance on such indicia 
of expertise as credentials, reputation, and demeanor,’63 that render legal 
decisions arbitrary. The practical method advocated to avoid arbitrariness and 
develop an understanding of the aims and methods of a science is for a legal 
decision-maker to wear two hats, i.e. to be an expert in the form of expertise 
sought to be applied to a legal issue. As Brewer explains: ‘On this [the ‘two-
hat’] model, the system seeks to ensure that one and the same decisionmaker 
has both legal legitimacy (by being duly elected or appointed by a legitimate 
elective or appointing authority) and epistemic competence with the basic 
formal tools of scientific analysis.’64
The scepticism expressed by Brewer regarding the unmediated influence 
of the ‘credentials, reputation and demeanor’ of experts is certainly worth 
59 Lackey, ‘Testimonial Knowledge’, supra, p. 316. 
60 Ibid, p. 324. 
61 Brewer, ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process’, supra, p. 1539. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid, p.1679. 
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noting, as such influence would allow for cementing and perpetuating the 
interests of particular epistemic communities. However, I would like to argue 
that the ‘two-hat’ solution mooted by Brewer does not acquit the legal scholar 
or decision-maker from arbitrarily determining the credentials of a testifier. 
This is primarily because the ‘expert hat’ cannot be assumed; and Brewer misses 
this point because he does not explain how the pre-selection of different forms 
of expertise to explain a legal issue works.65 As argued in relation to BLE, it 
is not clear whether a social psychologist or a neuroscientist or a behavioural 
biologist or a sociologist would be the appropriate expert. What this requires 
is an analytical process of how to determine and use expertise, which Brewer 
does not sufficiently respond to, and we can only conclude that placing reliance 
on the ‘two-hat’ solution should be subject to as much scepticism as reliance 
on the credentials, reputation or demeanour of the expert. There could be a 
normative problem with Brewer’s solution as well – scientific expertise may be 
on the side of rich defendants, or bodies of knowledge that support the status 
quo.66 Without a constitutive account of expertise, an assumed disciplinary 
competence in informing a particular legal question may implicitly result in 
preserving some privileged interests over others. Given difficulties with this 
alternative, it is necessary to chart out an analytical framework for assessing 
the performative and constitutive nature of expertise in law. 
In keeping with Fricker’s line of inquiry discussed earlier, the way 
forward seems to be to heuristically look for the construction of epistemic 
and hermeneutic authority.67 As to how this is done has occupied critical 
theorists for aeons,68 but more recently, this has been the primary line of 
65 Brewer, however, is not unaware of the conceptual difficulties surrounding a ‘two-hat 
solution’. He queries: ‘What kind of training should the experts – or expertly trained judges 
– get?’ And he hints at the possibility of intra-disciplinary conflicts: “Will scientific discipline 
become so specialised that it ceases to make sense to talk about general epistemic competence 
even within a discipline?” Ibid, p. 1679. 
66 This has indeed been one of the primary critiques aimed at the post Daubert line of cases, 
infra. 
67 Roy, ‘Privileging (some forms of ) Interdisciplinarity and Interpretation’, supra. 
68 Habermas, for instance, argues that in democratic decision-making epistemic authority 
requires communication between stakeholders, where ‘private experiences’ pass on to the 
‘public practices’ of a collective. Jürgen Habermas, Truth And Justification (Cambridge, MA: 
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inquiry by Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars who utilise a 
socio-historical method to interrogate the construction of expertise; their 
approach entails an interrogation of how the credibility of an expert or the 
body of knowledge itself may be assessed. Further, given their interest in how 
expertise is constituted in the process of communication, there is an analytical 
interest in assessing the interpretative event of knowledge being translated into 
expert testimony. Such scholarship has come to the fore in interrogating 
the criteria of scientific credibility developed by the US Supreme Court in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,69 and assessing the applicability 
of such jurisprudence in different legal systems, institutions and areas of 
law. Daubert was a substantial change from the existing Frye70 standard of 
‘general acceptance’ of scientific evidence, as now a greater role was given to 
judicial gatekeeping of expert testimony before such testimony was presented 
to the jury.71 This role was judicially assumed and constructed through the 
development of non-exhaustive criteria for the judicial assessment of the 
reliability of such evidence. Subsequently, General Electric v. Joiner72allowed 
for the contesting of expert ‘opinion’ based on other data, and Kumho Tires 
v. Carmichael73 applied gatekeeping inquiries to ‘scientific, technical or other 
specialised knowledge.’ The primary concern in these cases was a re-evaluation 
of legal gatekeeping of expert knowledge, especially with regard to filtering 
reliable knowledge in jury trials. 
MIT Press, 2003), p. 134. For a review of the engagement of others theorists, see Teubner, 
‘How the Law Thinks’, supra. 
69 509 U.S. 579 (1993).The primary issue in the case was whether birth defects in the petitioner’s 
children could be attributed to the drug Benedectin produced by the respondents.
70 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, D.D. Cir. 1923. The D.C. Appellate Court famously 
disallowed the use of the polygraph test till there was a ‘general acceptance’ among the 
‘relevant scientific community’.
71 Cole summarises the difference as follows: “Whereas Daubert asks the court itself to render 
a judgment as to whether the proffered evidence is reliable, Frye directs the court to defer to 
the judgment of the ‘relevant scientific community.” Simon A. Cole, ‘Out of the Daubert Fire 
and into the Fryeing Pan: Self validation, meta expertise and the admissibility of Latent Print 
Evidence in Frye jurisdictions’ (2008) 9 Minnesota Journal Of Law, Science And Technology 
453, p. 460.
72 522 U.S. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
73 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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Gradually, the influence of the Daubert triad of cases seeped outside 
the boundaries of formal evidentiary procedure and jury trials, and spread 
to the use of expertise by judges in domains such as administrative law.74 
The judiciary was not the only institution that was hit by this movement, 
as it spread into regulatory reasoning, and legal scholarship generally. 
As Brewer sums it up, the change was not restricted to positive law on 
evidence as it was a paradigm shift regarding legal reasoning involving ‘the 
paradigmatically philosophical task of [directly] exploring the criteria of 
the concept of science.’75 Given the extension of Daubert to ‘non-scientific’ 
expertise76 through Joiner and Kumho Tires, legal reasoning goes a step 
beyond looking at science in a narrow way, and Brewer’s formulation could 
be extended to involve the analytical task of directly exploring the criteria of 
expertise. This line of analysis is relevant for other legal systems and areas of 
law due to the universality of this task; importantly, in the absence of an 
explicit inquiry into the kinds of expertise favoured by legal institutions in 
the EU and other legal orders, some of the contested features of Daubert 
may implicitly seep into normative reasoning. For instance, while Justice 
Blackmun’s reliance on Popperian falsification in Daubert as a marker of 
reliable science has been heavily critiqued,77 it may be noted that Justice 
Blackmun cited a legal scholar as an interpreter of the epistemic authority of 
Karl Popper.78 For legal scholars and decision-makers engaged in normative 
reductionism, this approach therefore seems to be one preferable to one that 
74 Alan Charles Raul and Julie Damper Zwyer, ‘Regulatory Daubert: A proposal to enhance 
judicial review of agency science by incorporating Daubert principles into Administrative 
Law’ (2003) 66 Law and Contemporary Problems 7. Some commentators have argued that 
Daubert shifts the policy function to the judiciary, as judge-made ‘rhetorical’ standards are 
used by administrative agencies to decide on the quality and nature of expert information. 
Claire R. Kelly, ‘The Dangers of Daubert Creep into the Regulatory Realm’ (2006) 14 Law 
and Policy 165.
75 Scott Brewer, ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process’ (1998) 107 Yale Law 
Journal 1535, p. 1547.
76 See Leslie Morsek, ‘Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life-The ups, the downs, the Twists, 
and the Turns of the Applicability of the Gatekeeper Function to Scientific and Non-Scientific 
Expert Evidence: Kumho’s Expansion of Daubert’ (2000) 34 Akron Law Review 689. 
77 See Haack, ‘Credulity and Circumspection’, supra. 
78 Citing Michael D. Green in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, pp. 585-586.
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requires ownership of a specialised ‘hat’ tailored to suit the self-referential 
demands of a particular science or narrow aspect of scientific inquiry. Thus, 
the suggestion is in relation to both institutional reform and discursive 
preferences: institutionally, the interest in science and expertise should 
be accompanied by an interest in meta-expertise entailing appointment 
of scholars and consultants who approach meta-expertise in a disciplined 
manner, rather than leaving such inquiry to experts or legal decision-
makers. Discursively, reliance on a disciplined mechanism of assessing the 
credibility and construction of expertise79 appears to be a less arbitrary 
method of engaging with experts than imitating or selecting a particular 
self-referential form of expertise. If this suggestion is found to be persuasive, 
then there needs to be a change in the approach adopted in legal education, 
assessment of grant proposals by legal scholars and appointment of experts 
from investing in the honorific value of science and expertise to adopting 
a disciplined manner in interrogating the uses and abuses of expertise. 
Having said that, there is no reason to believe that STS (and related 
scholarly communities) would provide neutral mechanisms of assessing the 
performative nature of expertise by conducting specialised inquiries into 
meta-expertise. It is suggested that this problem of infinite regress may be 
arrested by turning the inevitable constitutive process of creating legal truth 
into a process of creating desirable truths. 
Let us consider desirable truth-creation in the context of climate law.80 
Till Massachusetts v. EPA,81 the science of climate change was regularly 
challenged and tailored to suit political responsibility in the US. However, 
subsequently the legal category of air pollution was revised to allow for 
federal regulation of climate change. Why was that? While political 
arguments can be mooted, from the reasoning provided in the majority 
79 The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission has expressed an interest in STS; 
see: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/science-and-technology-studies. However, in 
specific or general regulations as well as in case law, there appears to be very little actual 
influence of STS and related inquiries. 
80 For an account of how testimonial studies could inform responsibility for climate change 
action despite climate scepticism, see Lorraine Code, ‘Doubt and Denial: Epistemic 
Responsibility Meets Climate Change Scepticism’ (2013) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 3.5. 
81 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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opinion, it appears that the specific nature of climate change demanded 
converting the precautionary principle into a constitutive legal mediator and 
interpreting all testimony – including expert legal testimony regarding 
federal division of powers – in that light. In Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Court of the United States did not peremptorily compel the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, it declared 
that the EPA may avoid doing so ‘only if it determines that greenhouse gases 
do not contribute to climate change’.82 Following a procedural approach to 
the precautionary principle,83 the burden was put on the EPA to provide 
a ‘reasonable explanation’ regarding its inactivity vis-à-vis mitigation of 
carbon emissions. Thus, policy measures such as a carbon tax nor a cap-
and-trade system, or ‘green consumerism’ are mediated by the precautionary 
principle, and expert testimony in this regard (from lawyers, economists, 
NGOs, political scientists, psychologists) is subject to normative scrutiny. 
It may now be asked, how is this normative scrutiny to be done without 
the mediator succumbing to epistemic capture (swayed by the attractions 
of a technical legal interpretation, a neat economic model)? This concern 
is not an abstract one – in relation to the precautionary principle, for 
instance, a compelling debate rages between the substantive content of the 
precautionary principle,84 including what sort of reasoning is germane to 
the precautionary principle as applied to climate change.85 
I suggest that one approach to appreciating the constitutive nature of 
the process of interaction between law and expertise could be to identify 
moderators and mediators that function at the interface of expert input and 
normative ends.
82 Ibid, p. 533. 
83 See Roy and Woerdman, ‘Situating Urgenda versus the Netherlands within Comparative 
Climate Change Litigation’, supra.
84 See Cass Sunstein, Laws Of Fear: Beyond The Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: CUP, 2006); 
Kahan, Slovic, Braman and Gastil, ‘Fear of Democracy’ supra; Cass Sunstein, ‘Misfearing: A 
reply’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1110. 
85 See Jacqueline Peel, ‘Precaution – A matter of principle, approach or process?’ (2004) 5 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 483; Amy Sinden, ‘Formality and Informality in 
Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2015) 1 Utah Law Review 93. 
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iii.  Identifying Moderators And Mediators As 
Tools Of Reductionism
A. Law as Mediation
Legal practitioners conventionally associate the term ‘mediation’ with an 
institutional mechanism of alternative dispute resolution. However, in legal 
scholarship, the term assumes a more holistic understanding, integral to the 
property of legality itself. The most celebrated account of ‘law as mediator’ is 
the one forwarded by Joseph Raz. Underlying Raz’s scholarship is his position 
that there is no a priori obligation to obey the law;86 rather, the authority of 
law needs to be justified in order to pose restrictions on the autonomy of 
individuals. Legal authority is justified or may be considered legitimate when 
it ‘mediate[s] between people and the right reasons that apply to them;’87 billed 
as the Normal Justification Thesis. If this is the case, then people would do 
better to follow an authority than work things out on their own. To allow such 
a justified authority to do its work, some forms of contestation are foreclosed. 
That is to say, the authority may take ex-ante measures that exclude some of 
the reasons people have for their actions: this is Raz’s Pre-emption Thesis. The 
justification behind a legal institution or a legal decision – or the reason why 
an institution or decision may be construed to possess ‘practical authority’ – 
lies in its ability to mediate. 
The Normal Justification Thesis and the Pre-emption thesis may justify 
the enterprise of BLE, as it offers a way we can achieve our best interests by 
allowing a group of experts to take over our conscious judgement and make 
policies accordingly. Further, such a group has the (legitimate) power to take 
away some of our ‘reasons for action’ – the mediator is not just a passive 
vehicle of the achievement of our thoughts and actions.
86 This position has been labelled as a form of ‘philosophical anarchism.’ Some scholars have 
taken issue with the need for justification, claiming that if law is supported by collective 
decision-making, then there is no need to seek another justification. See Scott Hershovitz, 
‘Legitimacy, Democracy and Razian Authority’ (2003) 9 Legal Theory 201. 
87 Joseph Raz, ‘Authority, Law, and Morality’ in Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the 
Morality of Law (Oxford: OUP, 1994), p. 214. 
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 How does this process of mediation happen? On this issue there is limited 
guidance, as it is assumed that the legal authority uses its own imagination 
to figure out the relationship between ‘people’ and the ‘reasons’ they consider 
important. From this perspective, law seems like an administrative tool that 
implements the will of the people in the light of constitutional values. This, 
however, does not take into account the possibility that law interprets both 
people and values in its own image through normative reductionism; i.e. 
both democratic expression (including what constitutes democracy) and 
constitutional values are interpreted and reconstituted by legal agents. In 
other words, the power and influence of the mediator is underestimated. 
The transformative potential of a mediator is taken a step further by 
Bruno Latour when he observes that mediators are those agents that brings 
all other actors, norms and objects into motion: ‘Mediators transform, 
translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed 
to carry.’88 For Latour, all truths are created through associations between 
animate and inanimate agents (or actants). Thus, the phenomenon of 
climate change, people and industries invested in a fossil fuel economy, social 
psychology laboratories, legal institutions would be transformed and defined 
by their association facilitated by a common mediator, say an EET policy. 
Latour claims that his enterprise is descriptive. He does not offer a normative 
philosophy behind his identification of mediators, or the associations 
formed, or the result of such associations. However, I would argue that there 
is a qualifier to Latour’s descriptive imagination, and that quite simply is 
the unique ethnographic position he adopts when he positions himself as 
an observer who identifies mediators and describes associations. Thus, it is 
his idiosyncratic anthropological-philosophical method of observation and 
description that influences the way a mediator is conceived and presented 
to the reader. Thus, notwithstanding his stated aversion towards adopting 
‘explanations’ and ‘theories’ that inform his descriptive exercise, there appear 
to be unconventional context-transcending explanations that inform both 
the descriptive exercises he undertakes, as well as the lessons he derives from 
88 Bruno Latour, Reassembling The Social: An Introduction To Actor-Network Theory (New York: 
OUP, 2005), p. 39. 
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them.89 This may explain why despite his startlingly insightful observations, 
Latour is prone to indifference and criticism by scholars working within the 
co-ordinates of their defined fields. In his more recent work, Latour admits 
that ideological choices need to be made for any social inquiry to have value; 
in relation to climate science, for instance, he sees the necessity to ‘pick sides’ 
before entering the laboratory. Thus, both implicitly in his identification of 
mediators, as well as expressly in relation to some areas of investigation, Latour 
relies on ways of putting into effect pre-textual reductionism. Similarly, the 
need to identify appropriate forms of expertise in the EU legal order and 
in the USA post-Daubert - and a parallel requirement in the assessment of 
expertise in legal scholarship in areas such as BLE - , necessitates an account 
of a qualifier to the process of mediation. This brings us to the conceptual 
device of a moderator. 
B. Legal Justification as Moderated Mediation
I first started thinking about the term ‘moderator’ in relation to normative 
reductionism after auditing lectures in social psychology. Prior to that I did 
not see a conceptual difference between mediator and moderator. What 
I gathered from the lectures is that confusing the two would amount to 
confusing causal mechanisms conceptually, strategically and statistically.90 
In the most-cited article on the mediator-moderator distinction in causal91 
analysis, Baron and Kenny argue that unlike a mediator, a moderator variable 
is stable, and not correlated with independent and dependent variables.92 In 
89 ‘All in all, Latour’s examination of the history of science shows some signs of implicit 
inclination towards such context-transcending explanations as limiting cases of other 
explanatory strategies.’ Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, ‘Demystification of Early Latour’ in K. 
Francois, B. Lowe, T. Muller and B. Van Kerkhove eds. Foundations Of The Formal Sciences 
Vii (Bonn, 2009). 
90 Rueben M. Baron and David A. Kenny, ‘The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction 
in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations’ 
(1986) 51 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1173. 
91 The reader may correctly prefer the word correlation to causal, but as Kenny points out, 
mediation analysis becomes useful when we endeavour to conduct a causal analysis. David A. 
Kenny, ‘Reflections on Mediation’ (2008) 11 Organizational Research Methods 353, p. 356. 
92 Baron and Kenny, ‘The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological 
Research’, supra. 
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fact, it becomes important to decide on whether a moderator or mediator 
model is being tested, as the same variables can have moderation and 
mediation effects. 
The conventional understanding of the relationship between a 
moderator and a mediator in statistical methods may be reconstructed as 
follows: If we seek to understand the relationship between independent 
variables and a dependent variable or outcome (say X), then the variable Y 
that has explanatory power over this relationship is a mediator. However 
it is possible to anticipate that another variable Z could modify93 the 
outcome to X2, thereby affecting the relationship between X and Y. Z in 
this case would operate as the moderator. While testing for mediation has 
been standard in statistical methods for some time,94 the standardisation 
of moderation has been a relatively recent phenomenon, primarily owing 
to a specialised programme developed by Andrew Hayes.95 It may be noted 
that Hayes’ work as well as other scholarship on the subject anticipates the 
possibility that the same variable can have both mediating and moderating 
effects.
The relationship between mediation and moderation may be appreciated 
by briefly engaging with a study on the role of religion and spirituality as 
93 In legal analysis, the term ‘modify’ would be used in a different manner than that understood 
in statistical analysis, where moderation effects are studied in relation to strengthening or 
changing the direction of the relationship between the other variables. As Miller, Judd and 
Yzerbyt explain, “Mediational analyses attempt to identify the intermediary process that leads 
from the manipulated independent variable to the outcome or dependent variable. The issue 
of moderation focuses on factors that influence the strength and/or direction of the relation 
between the treatment variable and the dependent variable. Moderational analyses attempt 
to identify individual difference or contextual variables that strengthen and/or change the 
direction of the relationship between the treatment variable and the independent variable.” 
Dominique Muller, Charles M. Judd and Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, ‘When Moderation is Mediated 
and Mediation is Moderated’ (2005) 89 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 852, pp. 
852 – 853. 
94 Standardised testing of the significance of mediation usually heavily relies on the work of 
Michael Sobel. See Michael E. Sobel, ‘Asymptotic Confidence Intervals for Indirect Effects in 
Structural Equation Models’ (1982) 13 Sociological Methodology 290.
95 A synthesis of his work can be found in Andrew F. Hayes Introduction To Mediation, 
Moderation, And Conditional Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach (New York: 
Guilford Press, 2013).
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factors that affect the association between perceived stress and psychological 
health.96 It was hypothesised that spirituality would be a mediator for 
those afflicted with anxiety to reach psychological adjustment. It was also 
hypothesised that religious commitment would moderate this relationship, 
or the strength of spiritual experiences as a mediator in affecting the 
psychological outcome. Any reader who (like myself ) is sceptical of the way 
categories are defined would have a problem with the operational definition 
of all of these variables (anxiety, outcome, spiritual, religious) and the 
differentiation between them,97 but my intention is to point out that the 
relationship between a dependent and independent variable may be usefully 
studied by identifying the mediators and the moderators. Further, as one of 
the authors of this study points out, ‘the influence of the moderating variable 
can be assessed in terms of the path from independent variable to mediator 
(e.g., the relationship between stress and spirituality) and/or the path from 
mediator to dependent variable (e.g., the relationship between spirituality 
and psychological adjustment).’98 The study did not set out to prove the 
relationship between anxiety and adjustment, but merely asked how, and the 
way they went about asking how is by identifying the effects of a mediator 
and moderator. 
I will not go more into detail regarding this study, as my intention 
was only to introduce the idea of mediation and moderation. I have since 
then found it in several contexts: whether the Capabilities Approach should 
moderate human engagement with nature,99 how job autonomy moderates 
the mediating role of perceived leadership qualities in negotiating the 
96 Kirby K. Reutter and Silvia M. Bigatti, ‘Religiosity and Spirituality as Resiliency Resources: 
Moderation, Mediation, or Moderated Mediation?’ (2014) 53 Journal for the Scientific Study 
of Religion 56. 
97 Reutter and Bigatti are mindful of this limitation, especially with regard to the differentiation 
between religiosity and spirituality. Ibid, pp. 68 – 69. 
98 Kirby K. Reutter, The Effects of Spirituality and Religiosity upon Stress, Anxiety, and Depression: 
Mediation, Moderation, or Moderated Mediation? PhD Dissertation, April 2012. 
99 Antje Brock, ‘The Environment in the Capabilities Approach: Why and how its constitutive 
role for capabilities matters’, paper presented at the 2014 Human Development and 
Capability Association Conference, Athens, August 2014.
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relationship between personal traits and effective management,100 the 
moderation of environmental informational mediators by biospheric 
values.101 The primary takeaway I have from such research is that the 
mediator affects the relationship between independent and dependent 
variables. Latour (relying on semiotics rather than statistical techniques) 
would argue that the mediator in effect defines the independent variables, 
the dependent variables and their relationship.102 However, as discussed in 
Section IV.A., there is no reason to trust the idiosyncrasies of a mediator. 
From a descriptive standpoint, a stable moderator has the power to distort 
the relationship between the independent variables and the mediator in 
predicting the dependent variable. Transposing this understanding onto 
normative reasoning, identifying and selecting desirable and undesirable 
interacting moderators could be how law engages in the creation of ‘desirable 
truths’. This way of reasoning is akin to developing a framework of ethical 
moderation of epistemic mediation in appreciating the relationship between 
law and justice.103 There is an ethical concern that animates such a project – 
how legal institutions could respect feelings of injustice and articulations of 
justice that arise from a social order without defining it in its own image, or 
in the light of other principles. 
How can we put this into practice? This question may appear odd, as 
a philosophical discussion on testimony does not provide guidance on the 
practice of epistemic reductionism, but on the properties of the phenomenon 
of reductionism. However, I can try to sketch out a discursive framework in 
relation to climate law. 
100 Kok-Yee Ng et. al., ‘Personality and Leader Effectiveness: A moderated mediation model 
of leadership self-efficacy, job demands, and job autonomy’ (2008) 93 Journal Of Applied 
Psychology 733. 
101 Jan Willem Bolderdijk et. al. ‘Values Determine the (In)effectiveness of Informational 
Interventions in Promoting Pro-Environmental Behaviour’ (2013) 8:12 PLoS ONE e83911. 
102 Statistically, Latour’s view may be considered equivalent to a complete mediating effect 
where the correlation between independent and dependent variables are eliminated when 
the mediator is controlled for. See Ali al Nima et. al., ‘Anxiety, Affect, Self-esteem and Stress: 
Mediation and Moderation Effects on Depression’ (2013) 8 PLoS ONE e73265, p. 2. 
103 Roy, ‘Justice as Europe’s Signifier’, supra. 
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C. Moderated Mediation of Climate Law
To return to our discussion on an EET scheme, it would be tempting to 
identify reduction of emissions as an end that is desirable, and the EET as 
a means to achieve this end. But this characterisation is not useful. What 
does it mean to have EET as a means? In a Razian framework, can EET be 
called a ‘reason that people value’? A policy measure that mandates individual 
engagement with climate change may be viewed as an infringement of 
one’s freedom to live a private life; but so could a preference for exposing 
the current and future generations to hazardous risk. The heuristic notion of 
balancing seeks to reconcile means and ends, and how such balancing occurs 
is the concern of the proportionality principle. But what is balanced, and 
how? What is the idea of risk that people have reason to value? Who is this 
‘people’? And we are back to the all the difficult questions about expertise 
and risk. What cannot be disputed is that there are factors, or variables, that 
shape a normative appreciation of means and ends. In other words, restricting 
normative discussions to means categories and ends categories is clearly not 
enough. It is essential to interrogate how variables influence how means and 
ends are normatively construed.
In relation to climate change generally, our dependent variable could 
be said to be reduction of emissions. This is the normative end which will 
inform all reductionism. The independent variable is expert testimony on 
means. Epistemic intervention requires the identification of moderators and 
mediators. What we do know from our discussion so far is that a moderator 
is not a specific characteristic of the exercise, but a variable that distorts. 
Mediators, on the other hand, are technologies or institutions that facilitate 
engagement. So applying this epistemic framework to climate policy, we get:
Drawing on the discussion in this section, mechanisms that operationalise 
or deploy means have been characterised as mediators, and value-preferences 
that have the potential to shape the relationship between the other variables 
have been characterised as moderators.
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Figure 2: Mediators and Moderators of Climate Regulation
The mediating instruments and institutions have lives and epistemologies 
of their own and shape the way both means and ends come into play by 
association. The two-way relationship of mediators with both means and ends 
represented above is significantly different from its representation in statistical 
design, as it captures both the associational importance of mediators (per 
Latour) and the role of law as mediator (per Raz). It is also suggested that such 
mediators are prone to distortion by moderators. Legal reasoning – owing 
to the authority of the law to reduce complexity and create truth by – seeks 
to arrive at a desirable distortion while negotiating expert input and political 
choices. In the process of such reductionism, it would be necessary to be 
mindful of other distortionary forces. 
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The inadequacy of viewing climate law solely within means and ends is 
evident in the commentary104 around Urgenda105 where the Court directed 
the government to adopt higher reduction targets. Queries were raised (the 
government has sought to file an appeal at the time of writing this book106) 
about whether the end of global climate mitigation justified the Court taking 
over the means of the political process. It is only when the mediating effects of 
the precautionary and prevention principles are invoked, and the moderating 
force of the epistemic authority of international climate governance (the Court 
defers to the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and 
constitutional discourse on protecting the individual from endangerment (the 
Court combines the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
as well as Dutch precedents), that the ‘truth-creation’ by the Court can be 
grasped.107 To clarify, I do not necessarily endorse the mediators and moderators 
of the Court’s reasoning, but seek to demonstrate that the reasoning of the Court 
becomes easier to understand and contest. It may be asked why I may have 
(somewhat controversially) characterised legal principles, and especially rights, as 
mediators. Drawing on the fact that the inviolability of rights in any legal system 
are either not absolute108 or at best open to interpretation, rights –along with 
principles – operate as legal technologies for arriving at an outcome. In the process 
of justification, reasoning about rights is constitutive; the contours of rights are 
created during the process of reasoning. To ensure that such reasoning is directed 
towards a particular way or ‘desirably distorted’, it would be more useful to ensure 
that such interpretation is in keeping with values integral to constitutionalism, 
such as freedom and equality. This is why in Urgenda, the interpretation of the 
104 See for instance See James Huffman, Global Warming goes to Court, available at: http://www.
hoover.org/research/global-warming-goes-court. 
105 Urgenda v. Government of the Netherlands, supra.
106 The official announcement is available at: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/
kamerstukken/2015/09/01/kabinetsreactie-vonnis-urgenda-staat-d-d-24-juni-jl .
107 For a review of the arguments, see Roy and Woerdman, ‘Situating Urgenda v The Netherlands’, 
supra. 
108 For a debate on whether some rights are absolute in the European legal order, see Stavros Tsakyrakis, 
‘Proportionality – An assault on human rights?’ (2009) 7 International Journal Of Constitutional 
Law 1; Madhav Khosla, Proportionality an Assault on Human Rights?: A Reply (2010) 8 International 
Journal Of Constitutional Law 298; Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality an Assault on Human 
Rights?: A Rejoinder to Madhav Khosla’ 8 International Journal Of Constitutional Law 307. 
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Right to a Private Life was moderated by the value of protecting the individual 
from endangerment, rather than the State’s political determination of climate 
targets109 (this moderator will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7). 
With respect to a regulatory appreciation of a specific instrument such as 
the EU ETS or a proposed EET rather than climate action per se, the analytical 
device of interacting mediators and moderators may prove to be useful. In 
distinguishing the EU ETS from climate policy in Japan and the United States, 
José Manuel Barroso (the former President of the European Commission) had 
stated that what is needed for the EU ETS to succeed is not ‘technology and 
goodwill’ but ‘a binding emissions cap to put a real price on carbon and give the 
right incentives for environmentally-friendly technologies’.110 To this end, what 
is crucial, therefore, is to allow the emissions cap (or a quantity mechanism) 
to operate as the determining factor in the trajectory of EU climate policy. 
The ‘environmental scarcity’ included in the price of an allowances is arguably 
the primary defining feature that distinguishes a cap-and-trade system from 
other competing mechanisms, such as (emission standard-based) credit trading 
systems.111 This is why advocates of upstream mechanisms of dealing with 
climate change are also critics of the EU ETS, as there is the apprehension that 
the technologies of determining a price (such as secondary markets) effectively 
render the EU into a price rather than a quantity mechanism.112 What this 
criticism unfortunately overlooks is that the clear distinction between price 
and quantity mechanisms is not useful in practice. The EU ETS is a policy 
instrument that operates as a price and quantity mechanism. The endeavour 
should instead be to ensure that the market-based price mediator is stabilised 
and ‘desirably distorted’ by the moderating effect of a quantity-based fixed cap 
in keeping with minimum emissions targets. This understanding informs the 
avoidance of an exclusive focus on either fairness or efficiency in Chapter 5 (as 
109 Urgenda, para 4.49. 
110 “Barroso Defends EU’s Climate Strategy”, ENDS EUROPE DAILY, Issue 2399, Oct. 2, 2007, 
available at: http://www.endseuropedaily.com/articles/index.cfm (last visited May 28, 2015).
111 Edwin Woerdman, ‘Path-dependent Climate Policy: The history and future of emissions 
trading in Europe’ (2004) 14 European Environment 261, pp. 267 – 268. 
112 Shaun Chamberlin, Larch Maxey and Victoria Hurth, ‘Reconciling Scientific Reality 
with Realpolitik: Moving beyond carbon pricing to TEQs – an integrated, economy-wide 
emissions cap’ (2014) 5 Carbon Management 211.
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these are both mediating principles), and leads to the characterisation of the EU 
ETS as a liability-based instrument with an implementing market mechanism. 
When it comes to an EET scheme, behavioural biases may mediate the 
operation of incentives; as to whether such biases may be shaped or capitalised 
on is more a question of how the responsiveness and freedom of participants 
(including the freedom from responsibility, and the freedom to pursue lives 
without the threat of hazardous risk) is construed, which is tied to the question 
of the external validity of BLE. As discussed earlier, it is not necessary for a 
discipline or manner of expert inquiry to have acquitted itself of all charges of 
internal validity to be useful,113 but the findings would have to satisfy external 
validity, and this is where a testimonial approach to legal reductionism 
becomes important. In this regard, following the discussion in Section III.B 
and Section IV, mediators including expert findings on behavioural biases of 
individuals have the potential to shape the legal truth of justifying a policy 
instrument such as EET. We have also seen the need to identify positive and 
negative distortions of the truth-creating potential of mediators. We could 
view the interacting variables in the EU ETS and EET as follows:
Figure 3: Moderators and Mediators of ETS
113 See the discussion in Section III.A.
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Figure 4: Moderators and Mediators of EET
A couple of issues need to be clarified in relation to the EU ETS and EET. 
Firstly, the logic of economic activity that defines companies and industries 
in the EU ETS is not true for a EET. This is brought out in the reasoning of 
the General Court regarding whether the EU ETS infringes on Arcelor SA’s 
right of property, its freedom of establishment and its freedom to pursue an 
economic activity.114 Per the Court, as the contested provisions of the EU 
ETS directive did not result in ‘substantial negative economic consequences’,115 
there was no infringement of the rights of Arcelor SA. Consequences of a 
policy on a company’s freedom are viewed in an economic paradigm, while 
that would not be the case for individuals (as discussed in Chapters 4 and 7). 
Further, while for the EU ETS that covers industries, it may seem obvious 
that industry lobbies may moderate or distort decision-making in relation to 
climate policy, or influence the resolution of climate disputes. The same does 
114 Case T-16/04 Arcelor v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2010] ECR 
II-211, para 175. 
115 Case T-16/04, para 168. 
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not seem obvious for the EET. This does not mean that the EET is free from 
public choice considerations; industries may lobby in favour of transferring 
responsibility to individuals. In addition, associated interests in relation to 
a EET scheme such as climate-friendly products and equipment would try 
to have a say. I do not suggest that the electric car lobby (for instance) has 
as much bargaining power as the fossil fuel lobby, but only that they would 
seek to promote their interests. This line of reasoning is developed in detail 
in Chapter 5. 
Admittedly, the above framework does not satisfactorily provide 
a sacrosanct analytical model to solve the problem of ‘coexisting and 
divergent paradigms’ of expertise discussed in the first few pages of this 
article. However, it does provide a first step in categorising and negotiating 
expert testimony. 
iv. Conclusion
This heavily conceptual chapter was drafted in response to a practical concern: 
how to identify and utilise relevant forms of scientific research in reasoning 
about a proposed regulatory measure such as the EET. While attempting to 
address this concern, I encountered three problems. First, the methodological 
and disciplinary orientations of social scientists result in them talking past 
each other. Second, the privileging of disciplines and sub-disciplines within 
a discipline appears to be as political a process as the formulation of legal 
principles. Third, by virtue of its nature, law reduces complexity to suit its 
self-contained system. To do so, it seems to internalise some disciplines (and 
sub-disciplines) or potentially disregards disciplines to suit pre-determined 
political purposes. These three problems pointed to a gap in how an external 
point of view is translated into legal inquiry, and therefore any claim to reason 
based on an internal or external view may be nothing more than a claim to 
scientific or political authority. 
This chapter suggested looking at appreciation of expertise as Testimony. 
In the process, it highlighted some features of Testimony as a discipline in 
itself, identifying reductionism as a property of testimony in law, owing to 
truth-creation through legal decision-making. It was then suggested that 
reductionism or truth-creation is constituted by mediators, and that the power 
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of mediators is moderated or ‘desirably distorted’ in law. This framework 
was then applied to climate regulation in general and EET specifically. This 
framework prompts analytical exercises in understanding the relationship 
between empirical findings and regulatory choices, as is evident in the chapters 
that follow. 
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PUBLIC RESPONSIVENESS: AN EXPERIMENTAL 
STUDY*
i.  Conceptualising ‘Contextual Public 
Acceptability’ And ‘Public Responsiveness’ 
A. The Current Conceptual Framework
In Chapter 2, the importance of political and public acceptability was 
highlighted. Recent work on PCT restates the importance of these two factors.1 
In the introductory discussion on the EET, in the PCT Report as well as recent 
work on TEQs,2 the concept of public acceptability has not been interrogated. 
I will seek to do so in this chapter, and in the process demonstrate why the 
literature on direct engagement of individuals with climate regulation is not 
only incomprehensive, but does not take into account an understanding of the 
‘public’ that could assist in moving towards at a comprehensive framework. 
Specifically, I will seek to show the difference between public acceptability of a 
policy, public acceptability of a system and public responsiveness, and argue that 
* The themes discussed in the section on ‘Drawing Inferences’ in this chapter have been 
developed in Suryapratim Roy, ‘Agency as Responsiveness’, EUI Working Paper 2016/04. 
1 Yael Parag and Tina Fawcett, ‘Personal carbon trading: a review of research evidence and real-
world experience of a radical idea’ (2014) 9 International Journal of Nanomedicine 1883.
2 Chamberlin et. al., ‘Reconciling scientific reality with realpolitik’, supra.
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the acceptability of a system and responsiveness are crucial considerations of 
understanding how people engage (and can potentially engage) with climate 
instruments. 
The concentration in the literature on instruments analogous to the 
EET (such as PCTs and TEQs) regarding public acceptability has been on 
perceptions and attitudes of people towards such a policy, collected through 
surveys and interviews.3 Even studies that have employed an ‘experimental’ 
perspective betray a reliance on stated preferences. In the Bristow et. al. study 
contrasting the public acceptability of a carbon tax and a PCT, respondents are 
directly asked questions about technical properties of climate instruments.4 In 
a study done by leading psychologists working on PCT systems on different 
carbon instruments, reliance is placed on how people react to differently 
framed questions.5 Even in the exciting Norfolk ‘field experiment’, the central 
research outcome from a baseline study is perceived usefulness and perceived 
ease of use of a PCT based on self-reports on attitudes. 6
The reasoning in the above literature has been that if people find a policy 
to be fair and workable, then there could be an expectation that the policy will 
3 L. Owen, L. Edgar, S. Prince and C. Doble, Personal Carbon Trading: Public Acceptability: A 
report to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA: London, 2008); 
Abigail L. Bristow, Mark Wardman, Alberto M. Zanni, and Phani K. Chintakayala, ‘Public 
acceptability of personal carbon trading and carbon tax’ (2010) 69:9 Ecological Economics 
1824-1837. Specifically in relation to PCT and road transport, see Helen Harwatt, Miles 
Tight, Abigail L. Bristow and Astrid Guhnemann, ‘Personal Carbon Trading and Fuel Price 
Increases in the Transport Sector: An exploratory study of public response in the UK’ (2011) 
47 European Transport 47-70. Harwatt et. al. consider use ‘interviews’ and ‘behavioural 
response’ interchangeably. Even PhD dissertations that employ qualitative research to explore 
incentive-based household emissions have restricted their focus to surveys and interviews. See 
Andrew Athall Wallace, Reducing Carbon Emissions by Households: The effects of footprinting 
and personal allowances, PhD Dissertation, University of Southampton, 2009. 
4 Bristow et. al., Ibid. 
5 Yael Parag, Stuart Capstick and Wouter Poortinga, ‘Policy Attribute Framing: A comparison 
between three policy instruments for personal emissions reduction’ (2011) 30:4 Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 889-905. 
6 In fact, the authors note that ‘individuals’ values and beliefs do not correlate with their 
actions. This gap is especially prevalent in environmental policy where environmental beliefs 
do not always translate into behaviours and actions’, Hendry et. al., supra, p. 110. They clarify 
that this gap is not something that has been tested in their study. 
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be adhered to. Some scepticism about this view had already been expressed 
in Chapter 2 when it was suggested that expressed attitudes are not always a 
robust indicator of actual behaviour. But a suggested shift from the current 
appreciation of the ‘public’ could be met with a compelling objection – is it 
not somewhat patronising to tell people that they don’t know themselves? I 
will seek to address this objection in the following two sections. 
B. Contextualising Public Acceptability
When I say I have a certain preference for a carbon policy instrument, my 
statement has the backing of selective information, experiences, influences 
and interests. However, the law respects peoples’ choices, and therefore allows 
people to have these views. The best manifestation of such respect is the fact 
of voting through adult franchise. Though there are countless studies in 
several disciplines on the way voters are influenced, the law still respects the 
fact of voting. However, it could be argued that peoples’ stated preferences 
and opinions about climate policy are not exhaustive of their choices, as in 
addition or despite their preferences, they might expect the law to free them 
of the risk of climate change. This is different from the act of voting, where 
there is an assumed equivalence of preferences and choices. This is also in 
keeping with the Razian point of view discussed earlier that law’s legitimacy 
lies in fulfilling what we have reason to value. Thus, there is a possibility for 
the law to compel engagement despite stated preferences. I will explore this 
idea in more detail in Chapter 7. Now we concentrate on the idea that the 
appreciation of peoples’ stated preferences may be influenced by factors that are 
not directly inquired about.
In this regard, I’m trying to invoke the idea that associating with the 
technology of assessment leads to the formulation of the stated preference. 
Thus, the manner of soliciting preferences through the survey method, 
semi-structured interviews, and other such methods invariably influence the 
responses given.7 Admittedly, qualitative research provides several tools to rein 
7 In charting out the common threats to validity in social science research, Pelham and Blanton 
put it quite succinctly: ‘the process of studying people changes people.’ Brett W. Pelham and 
Hart Blanton, Conducting Research in Psychology: Measuring the weight of smoke’ (4th 
International Edition, Wadsworth, 2013), p. 130. 
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in researcher bias, and also addresses the specific issue of framing questions. I 
do not seek to question the rigour of the methodology employed by researchers 
who have examined the public acceptability of climate instruments. I 
instead question whether asking about an instrument in itself is useful for a 
comprehensive assessment of public acceptability, as such questions are silent 
about context. Undoubtedly, unlike some of the studies such as the comparison 
of public acceptability of a PCT and a carbon tax, the ‘experimental’ studies 
have engaged in providing a context, such as the Capstick-Lewis endeavour to 
situate such questions within individual dispositions to environmental issues.8 
However, all these studies had no interest in contextualising the normative 
basis of the incentive mechanism, i.e. how the respondents felt about the 
legitimacy of the authorities and reference groups involved in designing 
and implementing a norm. Drawing on Tom Tyler’s work on moving away 
from law’s deterrence models to motivation systems, it appears that ‘willing 
acceptance’ depends on ‘the extent that people view the law as (a) legitimate and 
(b) consistent with cherished moral values.’9 Ideally speaking, there should be 
congruence between moral values and legal rules; however assuming that not 
everyone10 shares the moral values that a particular law is based on, trust and 
confidence in the legal authority that makes particular decisions and policies 
is a crucial factor for public acceptability.11 Tyler uses surveys and interviews 
in his studies, and the key takeaway is that unless there is perfect congruence 
of internalized moral values and the aims of a particular policy, then context 
becomes important. This context in Tyler’s work applies to the perceived 
legitimacy of the authority in the eyes of the public that would be involved in 
8 Capstick and Lewis, ‘Personal Carbon Allowances: A Pilot Simulation and a Questionnaire’, 
supra. 
9 Tom R. Tyler, Psychology and the Design of Legal Institutions (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 
2007), p. 22. 
10 In fact, Tyler makes the critical point that if legal authorities can successfully bring about a 
congruence between legal rules and value-based motivations, then this could easily allow for 
the isolation of the minority population that do not share these critical values. Ibid, p. 32. 
11 See the discussion on legitimacy, Ibid, pp. 23-26. In his earlier work, Tyler empirically charts 
the finding that procedural fairness (as against outcome) is perceived to be the most important 
component of trust and confidence in an authority for non-contractual engagements with 
legal authorities. Tom R. Tyler, ‘Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law’ (1997) 
133 Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 219-240. 
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making and implementing the norm. A similar concern prompts Tjernstrom 
and Tietenberg to develop a model for capturing variables that mirror the 
context in assessing attitudes towards specific attributes of climate policies, 
with the conclusion that: “Since attitudes toward public and global goods are so 
important in the formation of one’s attitudes on climate change, and therefore also 
nations’ policies, they will also be closely associated with people’s beliefs about the 
role of government and of international organization.”12 Assessments of attitude 
towards context are sorely lacking in studies on direct individual engagement 
with climate change policies, and would be a much better indicator of public 
acceptability.
From the above, it appears that surveys that enquire about a particular 
policy are incomplete if they do not inquire the authorities involved in policy-
making and implementation. In case of a downstream climate initiative, this 
would be the level of government responsible for law-making and agents 
involved in different levels of implementation. Indeed explicitly inquiring 
about these factors could lead to a certain form of ‘framing’, but drawing on 
Tyler and the Sunstein-Thaler injunction that no opinion or choice exists in 
vacuum,13 such framing happens anyway. In responding to a survey question, 
an individual has the weight of an internalised context inside him. In addition 
to the legitimacy of authority, there is another crucial contextual variable that 
I would like to discuss; this is perceived association with other policies in which a 
particular regulatory or legal intervention finds itself. At various points in the 
book, the relationship of a climate policy with other policies is discussed. In 
Chapter 3 we considered the idea that perhaps an EET policy could be a way 
to achieve energy efficiency through the back door. In Chapter 5 we will look 
at the relationship of an EET with the EU ETS and other potential climate 
policies that engage the individual. In Chapter 6 we will look at the association 
of climate policies between the EU and Member States. Importantly, such 
12 Emila Tjernström and Thomas Tietenberg, ‘Do Differences in Attitudes Explain Differences 
in National Climate Change Policies?’ (2008) 65:2 Ecological Economics 315-324.
13 As Sunstein and Thaler argue, non-institutional fetters on freedom of choice are inevitable. s 
Sunstein andThaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron’, supra, fn 11. 
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association is not only with goals and aims, but particular events14 or laws. 
Given that the relationship between different instruments is mediated by 
several institutional factors and different policies, could it not be that people 
informally associate a particular climate regulation with factors that may not 
be ‘rationally relevant’? 
To return to the studies on EET and ancillary instruments done till now, 
assessing attitudes towards context appears to be a much-needed attribute of 
getting a hold on public acceptability. The reason why such an endeavour is 
required is not because this is my subjective opinion of good qualitative research 
practice, but that – much like Tyler – my concern is whether acceptability has 
a bearing on behaviour, or compliance with policies. Compliance with an EET 
or a variant that seeks to directly engage individuals in climate policy requires 
robust and continued engagement to reduce a higher amount of emissions as 
a lower cost. Thus, given attitudes about context has a strong propensity to 
bear on compliance, the assessment of such attitudes should play an integral 
part of a preference-based approach to assessing the role of the public. 
C. Public Responsiveness 
The concentration in the above section has been to arrive at a preference-based 
approach that would allow policy-makers a better hold on the relationship 
between public acceptability and compliance. Indeed, following Tyler above, 
the way a person rationalises her engagement with a climate instrument may 
have a bearing on the way she actually engages with such an instrument. 
However, this is only part of the story. The fact and nature of rationalisation 
for our purposes plays an instrumental role in actual behaviour; thus, what 
we are more interested in is public responsiveness towards a particular policy 
instrument. 
Following the primary BLE insight that an individual may not behave 
in a manner that is best for herself, I would like to suggest that climate law 
may require an understanding of means of law whereby it may be justified to 
14 My colleagues have sought to specifically examine the interactions between energy and carbon 
markets using an event-study approach. See Thijs Jong, Oscar Couwenberg, and Edwin 
Woerdman, ‘Does EU Emissions Trading Bite? An event study’ (2014) 69 Energy Policy 510.
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intervene by assuming that people do not know themselves,15 whereby the 
epistemic basis of any policy initiative or judicial decision does not need to be 
grounded in public opinions and perceptions. The epistemic basis for a policy 
could therefore be situated in how people behave instrumentally in response 
to climate change, rather than what they think should be an appropriate way 
to behave, or what they see is an appropriate response to reducing emissions. 
This, of course, assumes that there is need for such intervention (including the 
normative basis of the manner of intervention), which is a complex issue, and 
animates most of this book. But if we were to assume that it is necessary to 
engage individuals directly to reduce emissions (as we shall discuss in Chapter 
7), then perhaps it is important to concentrate on how the public responds 
rather than judging an intervention to be acceptable by the public. This brings 
me to the question posed at the very beginning if this book – does my opinion 
as a citizen or a consumer or a producer matter? 
From a conventional16 jurisprudential perspective, it is not necessary 
for law to be tried in the court of public opinion; i.e. the internal position 
of law (and officials who endorse and implement the ‘rules of recognition’) 
is independent of what individuals within a particular legal system think. 
Legal philosophers who disagree with each other regarding whether law is a 
social fact, or needs to be grounded in morality to have a claim to correctness, 
nonetheless agree that law does not need to correspond with public opinion. 
At the same time, the EU now stresses on the importance of public opinion;17 
and considers public consultation to be an important part of legal decision-
making. However, a distinction needs to be made between public consultation 
for decision-making and public opinion. The former has been considered in 
Chapter 3, as to the way of selecting, appreciating, and using appropriate 
consultation is an exercise in legal reduction of testimony. Public opinion, on 
the other hand, is usually not considered for testimonial purposes, but confers 
15 Calabresi, ‘The Decision for Accidents’, supra, p. 743. 
16 By conventional jurisprudence, I refer to mainstream jurisprudence that draws on analytical 
philosophy, with scholars such as H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin being the foremost 
authorities on the subject. 
17 For an overview, see Salvatore Signorelli, ‘The European Union in Touch With its Citizens: 
The analytical tools of public opinion’, Notre Europe Policy Brief, No 34, March 2012. 
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democratic legitimacy on policies. Indeed, a poll appears to be a convincing 
proxy for democracy, as it is akin to adult franchise and conducting issue-
based referendums. However, given that public opinion is susceptible to 
different forms of capture,18 a formal right to have an opinion as a signifier 
of democracy betrays a preference for a dispositionist19 view of the liberal 
individual; this is something that social theorists have been at pains to refute by 
offering constructivist accounts.20 In addition to the difficulties with trusting 
public opinion (or identifying the forces that shape such opinion), there is 
considerable research to suggest that there isn’t a strong positive correlation 
between stated preferences regarding climate change and actual behaviour. 
At the cost of oversimplification, this is primarily why behavioural studies 
resonates with scholars who work on regulation: the idea that choices do not 
correspond with judgements and that choices are not made autonomously 
provides added impetus to regulatory intervention. 21 
Taking the above into account, it is suggested that public opinion may 
not be a reliable method of appreciating actual public behaviour, and therefore 
responsiveness to a climate change initiative would not be adequately assessed 
through survey-based research. At the same time, actual public engagement is 
18 The most obvious among which is capture by different forms of media. Claes de Vreese and 
Hajo Boomgaarden, ‘Media effects on public opinion about the enlargement of the European 
Union’ (2006) 44  Journal of Common Market Studies 419. For a comparative view on how 
public opinion regarding climate change is subject to political capture, see Steven R. Brechin, 
‘Comparative Public Opinion and Knowledge on Global Climatic Change and the Kyoto 
Protocol: The U.S. versus the World?’ (2003) 23:10 International Journal of Sociology and 
Social Policy106. 
19 A preference for a situationist account over a dispositionist account of human behaviour is 
found in Jon Hanson and David Yosifon, ‘The Situation: An introduction to the situational 
character, critical realism, power economics, and deep capture’ (2003) 152:1 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review129.
20 In Bourdieu’s famous critique of ethnographic practice, for instance, he finds that people’s 
thoughts and opinions are moderated by an internalised discourse of power, or doxa, whereby 
‘every established order tends to produce ... the naturalisation of its own arbitrariness.’ 
Bourdieu, An Outline of a Theory of Practice, supra, p. 164.
21 See for instance On Amir and Orly Lobel, ‘Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How behavioural 
economics informs law and policy’ (2008) 108 Columbia Law Review 2098. 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   8 10/25/2017   5:13:25 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 133
115
Public Responsiveness: An Experimental Study
4
crucially instrumental to the effectiveness of an EET scheme,22 which makes 
it imperative to assess actual responsiveness to such a policy initiative. 
ii. The Experimental Turn 
I wish to clarify at the outset that there is a distinction between legal 
experiments and the use of experiments to explain legal issues, and assist with 
legal decision-making. Legal experiments refer to experimental regulation 
common to the European legal order as discussed in Chapter 6.The EU 
ETS, for instance, has been characterised as ‘a giant experiment in law and 
economics’23 owing to its ‘learning by doing’ feature, but the explanatory 
power of an experimental study on the nature of incentives  – as I endeavour to 
carry out and describe in this section – cannot be characterised as such. Before 
I proceed with the particulars of my study, it may be asked why experiments 
should be conducted at all in relation to the issues studied in this contribution, 
and what sort of experiments could have explanatory power. 
With regard to why use experiments at all, the alternative approaches 
derived from the social sciences could be roughly categorized into the 
following24: a) Laboratory Experimentation, b) Field Experimentation, c) 
Survey-based Research, and d) Observation & Introspection. The travails of 
survey-based research have been discussed above, and will not be repeated 
here. In relation to ‘observation & introspection’, while this method is 
certainly strongly susceptible to researcher-bias, I find it difficult to discount 
this component primarily because I think there are analytical issues which 
are not adequately considered in positivist experimental work, and which 
may affect the findings of such work. Deliberative introspection on a subject 
22 For the importance of robust public engagement for mandatory individual engagement with 
climate regulation, see Gill Seyfang, Irene Lorenzoni and Michael Nye, ‘Personal Carbon 
Trading: a critical examination of proposals for the UK’, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 136, 
August 2009, p. 14. Available at: http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/twp136.pdf. 
23 See Chapter 2. 
24 For a typology of various research methods commonly used, reliance has been placed on 
Richard Singleton and B. Straits, Approaches to Social Research (5 ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). What is missing in such standard texts is distinguishing the use 
of such methods by proponents of different disciplines among the social sciences, notably 
economists and psychologists.
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where the descriptive and the normative are intertwined is unavoidable, as is 
evident from this book. Observation and introspection, however, would likely 
be far too wedded to contextual ways of seeing and assessing a phenomenon 
in providing a generalizable view on how people behave; indeed, the whole of 
BLE is premised on the idea that just because economists want to believe that 
people are rational does not mean that they actually are. This leaves us with 
experiments. 
There is a clear possibility that field experiments25 would reflect how 
an EET might work in the real world more than laboratory experiments. 
However, to assess particular and distinct components of such a scheme, a 
laboratory setting may be more suitable, and it is the identification and testing 
of such components that this chapter concentrates on.
As far as laboratory experiments are concerned, there are two primary 
methods, economic experiments and psychological experiments. It may appear 
that the field of behavioural economics has combined these two approaches 
into one. Not so. Following Daniel Kahneman’s lead, BLE has concentrated 
primarily on using psychological experiments to understand economic issues. 
Some other advocates of the experimental method working in the legal 
academia have sought to highlight the importance of economic experiments, 
following an approach pioneered by another Nobel-prize winning economist, 
Vernon Smith.26 Though the assumptions and approaches of the two methods 
are quite different, there are substantial possibilities for combining the two. 
We will briefly discuss the two approaches below, before analysing their 
application to our current study. 
Muller raises the question as to why we should conduct experiments 
in economics. In response, he offers: “Ultimately, we wish to test whether the 
predictions developed through a priori economic reasoning can safely be applied 
in field conditions that are generally much more complicated than the abstract 
environment in which the theorizing occurred…experiments are conducted to 
25 The Norfolk experiment to date has not declared results that would qualify as a ‘field 
experiment’ as the concentration has been on stated preferences. Hendry et. al., ‘Influences 
on Intentions to Use a Personal Carbon Trading System’, supra. 
26 See for instance Leonard S. Hyman, ‘The California Story and its Impact on the Future of 
Electricity’ (2001) 12 International Energy Law & Taxation Review 264. 
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provide the investigator with control over the conditions under which data are 
collected”.27 He further characterizes laboratory experiments as ‘a cheaper 
complement for field experiments’.28 While this provides an argument for why 
laboratory experiments may be preferred over field experiments, compelling 
arguments may be made against such preference, which we shall address in 
the sections on field experiments. The other question which deserves to be 
addressed here is what distinguishes economic experiments from psychological 
experiments, given that laboratory experiments in the social sciences have 
historically largely been the preserve of psychologists. To answer this question, 
it would be useful to briefly look at the development of economic experiments. 
Edward Chamberlin is credited with publishing the first economic 
experiment with students in his class at Harvard to show that there is a 
difference between the outcomes of exchange among students (who tended 
towards monopolistic behaviour) as against the theoretical predictions of the 
laws of equilibrium.29 Thus, Chamberlin used experiments as an ancillary 
pedagogic tool to demonstrate the inadequacies of economic models. Vernon 
Smith, one of the students who participated in Chamberlin’s experiment, 
subsequently sought to disprove this conclusion by changing the ‘system 
design’ under which trading occurs (primarily by introducing a centralized 
information system and repetition of the experiment) – he believed that if 
the context of a laboratory experiment mimics the institutional structures 
that are present in the real world, then the behaviour of the participants 
would result in the same conclusions as suggested by conventional economic 
models. Smith identifies the following as the ‘most important implication of 
experimental economic research’: 
“What is imperfectly understood is the precise manner in which institutions 
serve as social tools that reinforce, even induce individual rationality. Such 
27 R. Andrew Muller, “Experimental methods for research into trading of greenhouse gas 
emissions”, Workshop on Understanding the Design and Performance of Emissions Trading 
Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Resources for the Future, January 15, 1999.
28 Ibid.
29 For a historical look at the development of experiments in economics, see Ted Bergstrom, 
‘Vernon Smith’s Insomnia and the Dawn of Economics as an Experimental Science’, (2002) 
105 Scandinavian Journal of Economics 185.
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economic concepts as noncooperative equilibrium and incentive compatibility are 
helpful, but they are inexorably static and do not come to grips with the interactive 
process between agents and institutions. One misses all this in research limited to 
the individual expressing an opinion about described situations and alternatives.”30
Thus, from the above it appears Smith considers basic economic models 
as lacking institutional complexity, and is critical of a stated preference 
approach (found in psychological surveys) due to non-mindfulness of the 
effects of institutional influence. It may be noted that though both Smith 
and Herbert Simon are concerned with institutional influence, there is a 
crucial difference between the two: while Smith seeks to alter institutional 
conditions in order for participants to approximate rationality models. 
Simon on the other hand seeks to alter organisational design in order for 
personnel to reach organisational rationality.31 In this regard, Smith’s work 
is closer to Kahneman’s as they both seek to study rational models, with the 
key difference that Smith is more interested in institutional design while 
Kahneman is more interested in individual biases. Interestingly, while Vernon 
Smith shared the Nobel Prize with Daniel Kahneman, he has been critical 
of the work conducted by behavioural economists, where there is a more 
pervasive presence of psychological research. Most importantly, Smith appears 
to disagree with the project of behavioural economics to fill in the gaps of 
people in rational decision making, where psychological studies inform an 
otherwise uninformed decision maker. Smith demonstrates through his 
experiments that the level of information or intelligence is irrelevant for the 
purpose of arriving at rational economic decisions given certain institutional 
settings.32 Further, he finds Tversky and Kahneman’s famous study on the 
negligible effects of monetary benefits on behaviour problematic, suggesting 
30 Vernon Smith, ‘Rational Choice: the contrast between economics and psychology’, (1991) 
99:4 The Journal of Political Economy 877. 
31 Given Simon’s view is often misunderstood, I take the liberty to quote him at length: “…there 
are limits to human rationality, and that these limits are not static, but depend on the organizational 
environment in which the individual’s decision takes place. The task of administration is to design 
this environment that the individual will approach as closely practicable to rationality (judged in 
terms of the organisation’s goals) in his decisions.” Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 2nd ed. 1957), p. 240.
32 Ibid, p.887
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that variations in level of rewards and the nature of rewards can well influence 
behaviour. In one of his modifications of his first trading experiment to see 
if buyers and sellers arrive at a competitive equilibrium, Vernon Smith found 
that inexperienced subjects converge towards rational behavior more rapidly 
as the size of rewards increase.33 
Following the above line of reasoning, the experiments that have been 
conducted on emissions trading have sought to prove/disprove the efficiency 
of emissions trading.34 Also, given Smith’s major innovation of capturing 
institutional factors, experiments try to test existing and proposed institutional 
features. It would also appear that it would be useful to conduct experiments 
related to end-user emissions trading if the context of the experiment 
approximates institutional settings. Thus, in relation to an EET scheme, 
there could be several institutional factors which could be tested such as the 
comparative efficiency of participant behaviour in a free-trading mechanism 
v. an auction mechanism, the informational advantages of actors who have 
participated in similar schemes or those with a comparatively higher level of 
financial literacy, or an experiment that manipulates the size of rewards as a 
motivating factor. 
It may appear from the above that any future experimental work with 
respect to an EET scheme should rely on the economic-experimental turn. 
However, this may prove to be an inadequate mechanism to study an EET 
scheme if we consider the challenges posed to this turn by behavioural 
economists. George Loewenstein has argued that although there are similarities 
in the approaches of experimental and behavioural economics, the former 
does not allow for the incorporation of findings from diverse psychological 
studies and methods.35 While there are shortcomings with regard the internal 
validity of economic experiments (such as the absence of random assignment), 
33 Smith V., “Monetary rewards and decision cost in experimental economics” in Smith V., ed. 
(2000), Bargaining and Market Behavior, pp. 241-260. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
34 For a review, see R. Andrew Muller and Stuart Mestelman, ‘What have we Learned from 
Emissions Trading Experiments?’ (1998) 19 Managerial and Decision Economics 225. 
35 George Loewenstein, ‘Experimental Economics from the Vantage Point of Behavioural 
Economics’ (1999) 109 The Economic Journal 25. 
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the major criticisms have been levelled against their external validity. For 
example, control over incentives is maintained usually by monetary payments 
contingent on behavior. This excludes the possibility of considering incentives 
other than profit-maximisation, such as projection of a positive self-image or 
satisfying notions of justice.36
I do not think, however, that Lowenstein’s critique of the narrowness of 
experimental economics explains the distinction between the two approaches 
to experimentation; something that was also left unaddressed in the Nobel Prize 
Committee’s summary of using experiments in economics.37 I suggest that the 
primary distinction lies in the fact that while experimental economics tries to 
identify contextual variables that influence behaviour (or external factors), BLE 
attempts to identify behavioural characteristics (or internalised factors) despite 
the context. To some extent, therefore, experimental economics endorses 
a constructivist approach regarding the context that shapes behaviour, but 
has a dispositionist view of the individual.38 On the other hand, behavioural 
economics has a more dispositionist view of the context, but a more nuanced 
view of individual behaviour. Thus, even if behavioural economics is concerned 
with context (such as the effects of reference groups), such context is assumed 
to be internalised and adjusted to suit internal predispositions. A corollary to 
this approach is the one adopted by experimental economics, where internal 
dispositions are assumed to adjust to contexts, whereby contextual variables 
can be identified to have explanatory value. I suggest that this difference in 
approach has to do with the epistemic orientations and technologies of doing 
research. Both of them share a similar ontological orientation: both Smith 
and Kahneman believe that deliberative decision-making is not an adequate 
36 The primary professed advantage of the methods adopted by experimental economists is 
the replication of context to assist with the engineering of institutions to enable efficient 
outcomes . However, suppression of context through theorising (or pre-textual reductionism) 
is a characteristic of economic experiments as well. See Gary Bolton, Testing Models and 
Internalizing Context: A comment on “Theory and Experiments: What are the questions?”’ 
(2010) 73 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 16. 
37 See Information Department, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Foundations of 
Behavioral and Experimental Economics: Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith, Advanced 
information on the Prize in Economic Sciences 2002, 17 December 2002. 
38 See Hanson, supra. 
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marker of actual behaviour.39 Further, both of them share the scientific 
inclination to identify the effects of a specific variable to ensure the internal 
validity of their research. 
Integral to the experimental approach are normative assumptions about 
efficiency, prescriptive conditions within which rational actors operate, 
identification of as many institutional factors as possible to enable laboratory 
replication. Given that behaviour pursuant to an introduction of a discrete 
policy mechanism such as an EET may not be premised solely on utility 
maximization, and be affected by social factors as diverse as the influence 
of reference groups, it is clear that an EET could benefit from experimental 
approaches. Keeping in mind the introduction on the complexities of incentives 
and motivation in Chapter 1 and the need for ensuring the effectiveness of 
an EET scheme, we concentrate on a variable not considered by those who 
have conducted emissions trading experiments: the nature of the incentive for 
reducing emissions. 
A. The Role of Incentives and Loss Aversion
Examining the effect of incentives on climate change related behavior is not a 
straightforward inquiry. Whether incentives are required at all is a moot point. 
MacMakin, Malone and Lundgren, for example, demonstrate by way of a 
field experiment that residents are more motivated to conserve energy without 
financial incentives.40 However, the constraint of a field experiment is that 
particular characteristics of an incentive mechanism are difficult to ascertain. 
Drawing primarily on laboratory experiments, Bolderdijk has problematized 
the relationship between monetary incentives and behavioural change, finding 
that the source of the incentive, the way rewards are communicated and the 
perception of privacy-infringement by financial gains profoundly affect the 
effect of such incentives.41 This demonstrates the necessity for clarity on 
how effective a particular incentive-based scheme would be for responding 
39 See their respective Noble Prize lectures. 
40 Andrea H. McMakin, Elizabeth L. Malone and Regina E. Lundgren (November 2002), 
‘Motivating Residents to Conserve Energy without Financial Incentives’ (2002) 34:6 
Environment and Behavior 848. 
41 Jan Willem Bolderdijk, Buying People: The persuasive power of money, PhD Dissertation, 2011.
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to climate change, and how such incentives can be effectively designed 
for policy purposes. The importance of the nature of incentives had been 
indicated in studies on energy conservation, but studies have been limited 
to the size of the incentive.42 Recent work on incentives has been moving 
towards interrogating the nature. This commenced primarily with the idea of 
a motivational crowding-out43 with a concentration on exploring what forms 
of rewards would seek to crowd-out intrinsic motivation.44
This problematisation adheres to the spirit of behavioural economics: it 
applies the way motivation is researched in social psychology to the study 
of incentives. If we look at the recent history of behavioural economics, 
we find that psychological research was looked to initially by economists 
because replicable experiments on economic decision-making (primarily 
the Ultimatum Game) revealed that ‘other-regarding motives’ are a better 
predictor of behaviour than monetary incentives.45 Thus, the complex nature 
of intrinsic motivation has been a preoccupation with economists trying to 
find out reasons why extrinsic incentives did not function as predicted. This 
interaction is essentially the cornerstone of the endowment effect and loss 
aversion. 
Loss aversion is arguably the cornerstone of Kahneman’s work in 
behavioural economics. Within legal scholarship, there has been considerable 
interest in loss aversion and the endowment effect, with its use as an explanatory 
framework for various areas of private and public law.46 There have also been 
regulatory efforts to utilise the experimental findings of loss aversion in policy 
42 Paul Stern et. al., ‘The Effectiveness of Incentives for Residential Energy Conservation’ (1986) 
10 Evaluation Review 147. 
43 Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier and Pedro Rey-Biel, ‘When and why incentives (don’t) work to 
modify behavior’ (2011) 25 Journal of Economic Perspectives 191. 
44 Stephanie Stern, ‘Reconsidering Crowding Out of Intrinsic Motivation from Conservation 
Incentives’ in N. Chalifour (ed.) Critical Issues of Environmental Taxation : International and 
Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: OUP: 2008). 
45 John M. Gowdy, ‘Behavioural Economics and Climate Change Policy’ (2008) 68:3 Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organisation 632. 
46 For a recent review, see Eyal Zamir, ‘Loss Aversion and the Law’ (2012) 65 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 829. 
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design,47 but none to our knowledge regarding climate change behaviour. Even 
within sectors that are covered within the EU ETS, the implementation of 
new technologies by energy companies such as smart-grids require individual 
behavioural responsiveness. The primary difficulty identified in relation to 
putting a transition to smart grids into effect is switching costs, of which 
individual resistance to change is of paramount importance.
B. Motivation behind the Particular Study Conducted
As discussed in Chapter 3, the effectiveness of an EET depends on public 
participation, which requires an assessment of public responsiveness of such a 
scheme. However, this component is problematic as recognized by the PCT 
Report. In this chapter, we first argue that the studies relied upon to gauge public 
responsiveness are amenable to improvement, and may be complemented 
by experimental modifications. We then proceed to experimentally test one 
primary component of the EET scheme- the nature of the incentive offered to 
facilitate public engagement with climate change, as the EET scheme can be 
distinguished against non-incentive based climate policy alternatives, as well 
as other incentive-based proposals (such as subsidies) based on this criterion. 
It may be argued that it would be difficult to assess the acceptability of a 
scheme without inputs regarding a workable design of the same. And integral 
to the PCT and EET schemes is incorporation of a convincing incentive into 
its design. Most of the literature regarding the PCT scheme suggests allocating 
an equal number of allowances to all individuals. While concerns such as 
equity and distributional fairness have been explored in Chapters 5 and 7, the 
concern of this chapter is to assess the nature of individual engagement with 
an incentive scheme. 
Specifically, the short policy question that informed the experiment was 
whether the nature of allowance allocation to individuals makes a difference in the 
mediating role of incentives in climate change behaviour. A corollary question was 
whether such mediation was moderated by environmental (or biospheric) values. 
Within the epistemic framework of behavioural economics, the question was 
47 See for instance, Alberto Alemanno and Amandine Garde, Regulating Lifestyle – Europe, 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Unhealthy Diets (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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whether loss aversion plays a role in the use of incentives. The motivation 
behind the experiment can be described in both policy terms, and behavioural 
terms, as explained below. 
As far as policy interest is concerned, the primary issue is formulating an 
appropriate design for an end-user emissions trading scheme. One aspect of 
such design is the manner in which allowances are allocated. Within the EU 
ETS, we have noted a shift in the manner of allocation from a free allocation 
(or a grandfathering system) to an auctioning system. This shift has been 
justified on institutional grounds, as well as correcting unforeseen deficiencies 
of a grandfathering system. As far as individuals are concerned, there is 
sufficient literature to suggest that the nature of an incentive has effects on the 
behaviour of the target group.48 Thus, the motivation behind this experiment 
may be explained as follows: (i) the design of an EET scheme is important 
from a policy-maker’s perspective, (ii) one of the crucial aspects of such design 
is the nature of allocation of permits/allowances, and that (iii) the nature of 
allocation could have an impact on the effectiveness of the incentive, or the 
public responsiveness of the scheme.
From the perspective of behavioural studies, studies on loss aversion and 
the operation of incentives have been conducted independent of each other. 
This is primarily because as far as experimental methodology is concerned, 
loss aversion has conventionally belonged to psychological experiments (albeit 
with explanatory value for economic issues), and incentives have been studied 
in economic experiments, such as through trading games. This is brought out 
very clearly in Houde and Todd’s review of the use of behavioural economics 
in energy policy, where loss aversion and incentives are identified as two 
separate categories, with no interaction between them.49 Our intervention in 
this regard was to make an attempt at de-clustering the concerns that animate 
48 Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel, ‘When and why incentives (don’t) work to modify behavior’, 
supra. 
49 Sebastian Houde and Annika Todd, ‘List of Behavioral Economics Principles that can Inform 
Energy Policy’ Precourt Energy Efficiency Center, Stanford Working Paper 2011; available at: 
http://ewp.industry.gov.au/sites/prod.ewp/files/submissions/Energy%20White%20Paper/
EWPGP128-802.pdf. 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   18 10/25/2017   5:13:26 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 143
125
Public Responsiveness: An Experimental Study
4
such categorisation without compromising the internal validity of a simple 
laboratory experiment.
iii.  The Experiment: Description, Analysis And 
Inferences
A. Introducing the Experiment
Keeping the above motivations in mind, we collaborated with the Faculties of 
Economics & Business and the Faculty of Psychology to secure the support 
of their expertise and facilities. In brief, the experiment was about assessing 
whether green food choices (which we used as a proxy for environmental 
responsive behavior) are influenced by ‘earned’ carbon allowances as against 
‘free’ carbon allowances. For this purpose, half of the participants received their 
‘tokens’, representing carbon allowances, as compensation for grading papers 
and therefore earned them. The other half of the participants (the control 
group) received allowances for free; they received allowances without being 
told about the link between grading papers and making food choices. Next, 
participants indicated what food items they would like to have for lunch by 
ticking off specific items on a menu. ‘Greener’ items require a smaller number 
of allowances. The participants are told that they will receive the money 
equivalent of the allowances they do not use for lunch. It was hypothesized 
that earned allowances would result in participants making greener (less carbon 
intensive) food choices as they would not like to let go of their allowances so 
easily. Importantly, the participants were also required to complete an exercise 
in relation to their Value Orientation,50 which were contrasted against their 
choices. The value orientation formed a significant part of the experiment as 
it was linked to the idea that choices the participants made were influenced 
by their predisposed values; and there would be a correlation between these 
values and the nature of the incentive. 
50 This has been devised largely by Linda Steg and her team at the Faculty of Psychology, 
University of Groningen. See J.I. De Groot and L. Steg ‘Value Orientations to Explain Beliefs 
Related to Environmental Significant Behavior: How to Measure Egoistic, Altruistic, and 
Biospheric Value Orientations’ (2008) 40 Environment and Behavior 330.
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B. Conducting the Experiment 
From the discussion in the above sections, I would like to highlight the 
axiological51 concern that people may not know themselves, and this 
concern would prompt interest in methodologies other than surveys or 
interviews in appreciating whether an EET or a PCT would be useful. 
Specifically, we have discussed how experimental research shows us that the 
effect of an incentive on behaviour is not straightforward. We have seen that 
the effect of an external incentive is contingent on the way it is structured 
and how it is internalised. Factors such as size of incentive, the way it is 
communicated, the reference group for the allegiance to an incentive have 
been shown to be relevant factors in relation to structuring an incentive. 
In relation to internalisation, we have seen that the primary import of the 
Kahneman-inspired scholarship of behavioural economics, cognitive and 
social psychology is to show that the internal hard-wiring of an individual 
is underestimated is relation to assessing the effect of external forces such 
as incentives. From a normative perspective, therefore, there is an interest 
in structuring an incentive in a manner that would reveal and address the 
‘predictable irrationality’52 of internalisation. Thus, what needs to be studied 
in the context of a PCT or EET is to assess how internalisation works, and 
the features that should be considered in incentive-design to respond to the 
processes of internalisation. 
Intuitively, capturing all possible structures and internal features of 
individuals in a single study would be impossible. Thus, I had to choose 
for the purpose of my study some particular structure of feature. Given the 
phenomenon of loss aversion has the potential to predict a close relationship 
between external incentives and internal motivation, and the fact that it is 
the central phenomenon in Kahenman’s entire canon, this is what I chose to 
focus on. Ultimately, the study zeroed in on the very particular question on 
whether the phenomenon of loss aversion may have something to say about 
the way allowances may be allocated to individuals. This was, however, not 
51 Please refer to the discussion on methodology and axiology in Chapter 1. 
52 This phrase is borrowed from Dan Ariely’s popular book on behavioural economics. Ariely, 
Predictably Irrational (New York: Harper Collins, 2008). 
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my initial desire. I wanted to see the difference between a ‘simulated’ EET and 
a simulated tax, and their effect on behaviour. Methodologically – as I was to 
discover in the course of my stint in a lab– exploring anything more than one 
phenomenon in one study is inadvisable. With this, we turn to the study. 
C. Analysing the Experiment53
The experiment was divided into six steps, which are summarised below:
Step1:performance of mundane task, Step 2: division of participants 
into the group which was made to link the mundane task to the lunch 
reward (or ‘loss aversion’ group) and those who were made to believe that 
the lunch was independent of the task and hence would not view it as a 
reward (control group), Step 3: the allocation of assigned allowances by 
the participants to a climate-friendly or a climate-unfriendly lunch, Step 
4: completing the value test, Step 5: providing their personal details, and 
Step 6: debriefing when they returned for lunch, during which time the 
believability of the manipulation was inquired about, as well as the difficulty 
of the mundane task.54 
In this section, we first explain how the different variables correspond to 
the above steps while compiling the raw data set, and then demonstrate the 
different steps in analysing the data compiled. 
i. Compilation of Raw Data
In the table below, we show how each of the five steps described above are 
reduced to different variables, and the nature of the variable used. SPSS was 
the preferred software used for the purpose of entering the data and examining 
the correlations between the different variables.
53 I am indebted to Oscar Couwenberg for helping me with processing the data and Daniela 
Crisan, a PhD Candidate and Lecturer in Statistics at the Faculty of Behavioural and Social 
Sciences, University of Groningen for reviewing this section. 
54 The documentation related to the experiment is on file with the author
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Step of the Experiment Variable Nature of Variable
Mundane Task Number of Words Numeric (calculated 
manually)
Loss Aversion Group or 
Control Group
Task plus Tokens 
(TpT) or Task 
separated from Tokens 
(TsT) 
Binary / Dummy 
Variable
Allocation of allowances Number of Allowances 
Allocated for Lunch, 
or Total Carbon Value 
(TCV)
Minimum = 0 and 
Maximum= 34
Values Score obtained on 
each of the 16 Values 
Respondents rated 
the importance of 
the values on a nine-
point scale
Total Score on Values Aggregate of score 
for 16 Values on 
single scale
Personal Details Sex Dummy variable
Age Numeric
Course of Study Dummy variable 
(Bachelor or Master 
degree)
Debriefing Believability of 
Manipulation
Respondents rated 
the believability on a 
5 point Likert scale
Difficulty of Mundane 
Task
Respondents rated 
the difficulty on a 5 
point Likert scale
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The total number of participants was 134. However, among these participants, 
some were excluded during the process of capturing the data owing to non-
satisfaction of one or more of the steps mentioned above. We chose not to 
exclude participants who did not show up for lunch because the variables 
considered during the debriefing are not integral to the experiment.55 
ii. Analysis of the Data: Relationships Sought in the Data
After the raw data was compiled, we sought to:
(1) Assess the effect of how the allowances were obtained (i.e. either for free 
or the ‘No Lunch’ group or the ‘earned’ Lunch group) on the number of 
allowances used (or TCV). This is the first relationship that we sought to 
study in this experiment; i.e. whether participants would be more reluctant 
to give up their earned allowances, and would therefore chose more climate-
friendly items on the menu. However, it would be insufficient to restrict our 
analysis to this correlation, as other variables may influence the relationship 
between these two variables. 
(2) As the effect of the allowances on decisions regarding food choices could 
be influenced by other factors, our next step was to examine such possible 
relationships. In this regard, examining the influence of values could be 
instructive for three reasons: (i) there could be a noticeable but independent 
trend regarding certain ‘internal’ values of the participants, and the external 
incentive mechanism of the earned (or free) allowances; (ii) the values could 
also influence or mediate the amount of allowances spent on lunch; and 
(iii) the relationship between the incentive and the allowances spent could 
be moderated by the strength of the different values. Existing literature has 
concentrated on biospheric values,56 but we sought to study the relationship 
between the incentive and other value categories as well. To examine these 
relationships, we combined and aggregated individual items in the value test 
into categories commonly used in the literature, i.e. Altruistic Values (AV), 
55 The initial coded data is on file with the author. 
56 Jan Willem Bolderdijk, Madelijne Gorsira, Kees Keizer and Linda Steg, ‘Values Determine 
the (In)Effectiveness of Informational Interventions in Promoting Pro-Environmental 
Behaviour’, Plos One, December 2013, Volume 8, Issue 12. 
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Egoistic Values (EV) and Biospheric (or green) Values (BV).57 In a second step, 
we constructed three variables that represented percentages of the total values 
of the AV, EV and BV that were Altruistic Value Fraction (AVF), Egoistic 
Value Fraction (EVF) and Biospheric Value Fraction (GVF) respectively. 
(3) Similar to the possible influence of internal values, other personal traits 
could also affect the relationship between an incentive mechanism and climate 
choices. We therefore sought to analyse the correlation between the personal 
details and the other variables. As we noticed a significant correlation between 
Sex and other variables in the first analysis, we decided to probe this influence 
of Sex further. 
Annexure 1.1. shows the standard descriptive statistics for the variables 
discussed above.
However, ongoing discussions with among others Jan Willem Bolderdijk, 
made clear that this approach could not be completely rationalized; testing 
the hypothesized relationships was in the end done via (i) a T-test, (ii) assess 
the biospheric values via a Hayes’ test to test its strength as a moderator, (iii) 
perform an Analysis of Co-variance (ANCOVA) to see the predictive effects 
of the variable ‘Sex’. I will describe these steps in the next section, and discuss 
the implications for our study. 
iii. Analysis of the Data: Modified Approach
The T-Test 
Given that there were two primary groups into which the participants of the 
experiment were categorised, i.e. the Loss Aversion Group and the Control 
Group, it stood to reason that the first and primary point of inquiry is to 
see whether the mean of the dependent variable (i.e. number of allowances 
used on the lunch) differed significantly for these two groups. Further, as the 
members of the two groups were almost equal, a simple T-test would suffice. 
57 Ellen van der Werff, Linda Steg, and Kees Keizer, ‘The Value of Environmental Self-identity: 
The relationship between biospheric values, environmental self-identity and environmental 
preferences, intentions and behaviour’ (2013) 34 Journal of Environmental Psychology 55.
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We conducted this test and found no significant difference between the two 
groups (t = 0,40)58. 
a) Effect of Biospheric Values 
I looked at different correlations between egoistic, altruistic and biospheric 
values and with other variables to assess whether they had any predictive 
power. Assessing biospheric value strength for the experiment could be 
justified because an incentive mechanism might cause dissonance among 
people who already were already motivated in a particular fashion towards 
climate issues. 59 Thus the primary point of inquiry was whether the 
strength of such values form a moderating role. While other values might 
(hedonistic, altruistic etc) exhibit a correlation with the dependent variable, 
there was no inference that could be drawn from such a correlation for 
studying the impact of loss aversion on carbon choices.60 In other words, 
unlike following the dissonance trail for biospheric values, there would 
be no basis for inquiring after these other values for the purpose of this 
experiment. 
Once it was clear that the testing of the moderating role of biospheric 
values had a purpose, the next question was how to conduct such an assessment. 
For this purpose, we used the analysis of variance (ANCOVA) procedure in 
SPSS. The idea was to see whether loss aversion was associated with the TCV 
of lunch and whether this relation was further moderated by the biospheric 
values of the participants. The outcome did not show a significant effect of the 
biospheric values on the TCV variable. The annexure below gives an overview 
of the results and shows that all variables are not significant From this we may 
conclude that biospheric values, at least in this experiment, appear to have 
not created a dissonance nor in the reaction of participants to the incentive 
mechanism.
58 A one sided, two sample equal variance T-test was used, hypothesizing that the loss aversion 
group would use less tokens on the lunch than the control group.
59 The assumption is that the values reflected climate change concerns, i.e. there is equivalence 
between climate change and biospheric concerns represented on the value questionnaire. 
60 This exclusion could be because of working towards a clear strong inference that would 
characterise an experiment of this sort. See discussion in Chapter 3, Section II. 
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b) Analysis for Gender
Taking a step back, the variable ‘Sex’ was not an independent variable that 
was sought to be measured; i.e. in the study we did not seek to examine the 
relationship between gender and climate incentives. However, when we did 
explore our data, it appeared that the gender of the participants seemed to 
play a role, namely there is a significant correlation between gender and two 
of the biospheric value indices . It also appeared that there was a negative 
correlation between gender and the allowances used for food in both control 
groups. There could be multiple explanations for this correlation. It could be 
hypothesised, for instance, that the calorific value of low carbon foods were 
also low, and the female participants tend to eat healthy. Simply put, there 
was a high possibility that gender might have a bearing on the nature of the 
incentive, but we did not have (or seek to have) an a priori explanation for 
it. The solution, therefore, would be to see if the results would alter if gender 
would be controlled for in the analysis. Again for this purpose, the ANCOVA 
procedure in SPSS was used. The idea was to find whether the two groups 
behave differently regarding the effect of the incentive on carbon consumed 
(TCV), and the influence of Sex at the same time.61 To check the robustness of 
this result a multiple linear regression model was run with the same variables, 
to find that only the variable gender was significant in the model. The output 
is found in Annexure 1.2. 
iv. Conclusions from the Experiment 
To recap, it was suggested that the nature of an incentive mechanism may 
have a bearing on individual engagement with the climate instrument 
containing such mechanism. All aspects of an incentive mechanism cannot 
be captured in a single experimental study; on the contrary, the endeavour of 
a lab experiment is to single out a specific element of the mechanism. In this 
study, the concentration was on the method of allocation, and specifically 
whether it would make a difference whether allowances were allocated freely. 
Drawing on Kahneman’s work, we hypothesised that if the allowances are 
allocated freely to individuals, carbon-savings may be less worth compared 
61 Andy Field, Discovering Statistics using IBM SPSS Statistics (London: 4th edition, Sage, 2013), 
pp. 478-506. 
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to a method of allocation where allowances are ‘earned’. It is this property of 
loss aversion that we sought to test by designating two groups of respondents 
in a lab-setting. 
It could be argued that since the T-test revealed that there was no difference 
in the mean allowances used between the two groups, then the policy 
implication is that loss aversion does not play a role here. The conclusion 
that it therefore does not matter how allowances are allocated in an EET 
is, however, too much. The rigorous satisfaction of the internal validity of 
lab experiments would disallow such an easy transit to an external norm. 
Specifically, there is a presumption against a regression towards the mean 
that derives from a preference for the null hypothesis, i.e. causality between 
dependent and independent variables is assumed to not exist, unless it can be 
demonstrated otherwise. It is for this purpose that we test for the moderating 
force of biospheric values and see if it is possible to neutralise variables that 
may influence the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. By taking these steps, we inch closer to the conclusion that perhaps 
there is no loss aversion in this case, and therefore the method of allocation 
may not make a difference.
D. Drawing Inferences
The term ‘inference’ in psychological research is usually understood as 
statistical inference.62 Once the data has been accumulated, then it is up 
to statistical tools to point to correlations between the different variables. 
Accordingly, inferences flow from the significance of such correlations, and 
primarily with regard to the significance of the correlation in the hypothesized 
relation between dependent and independent variable(s). Mediators and 
moderators are checked to assess inferences with correlations. This is the idea 
of inference that flows from the methods used in the experiment in question. 
However, the term ‘inference’ is inevitably used in a different sense once we 
situate the experiment within a different discipline such as economics, or view 
it as expert testimony for a policy question. In behavioural economics, the 
62 See for instance the discussion on inference in a standard prescribed psychology textbook. 
Brett Pelham and Hart Blanton, Conducting Research in Psychology: Measuring the weight of 
smoke (Wadsworth, 4th ed.,2013), pp. 316 – 325. 
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term inference is viewed in terms of incorporation of psychological findings 
in economic models. These two ways of looking at inference are different from 
the way validity is understood for regulatory issues. The way a legal scholar 
or a regulator would view inference is in terms of external validity, or how 
an experiment may illuminate a policy question. In Chapter 3, the issue of 
comparing the external validity of a lab experiment with findings on similar 
issues from other disciplines was raised, and how they may or may not be 
compatible while making regulatory choices. In this section, we look at how 
the experiment described above may be used to understand incentives for 
climate behaviour. To do so, I seek to explain how inferences may be made –
what inferences can be expected to be made from this and similar experiments 
for policy purposes. Concomitantly, there are some inferences that may not be 
expected to be made from similar experiments. More precisely, inferences from 
psychological experiments such as this one would be unsuitable for certain 
analytical categories. I will start with this issue and work up to the possibility 
of deciding on the relevance of empirical findings for policy questions. 
i. What Cannot Be Inferred 
In Chapter 1, I suggested that BLE scholarship may proceed with the 
interrogation and development of analytical categories. The scholar who has 
most comprehensively articulated this way of doing BLE is Claire Hill.63 In her 
view, BLE analyses ought to address the questions of ‘how people make sense 
of the world’ or ‘how people categorise’.64 This is an important query in its 
own right (in fact, as would be evident, categorisation and recategorisation is 
the way I internalise BLE scholarship in my writing); however I suggest that 
inferences regarding these questions cannot be drawn from the experiment that 
was conducted, and I suspect nor can similar lab experiments that operate within 
the axiological preference for how people behave. While BLE is concerned with 
questioning and arriving at alternatives to the rational actor axiom, its axiology 
is still centred around the fact of behaviour, or choices. Thus the several other 
dimensions of ‘how individuals live in the world’ or ‘what their identities are’ 
become relevant for their instrumental nature, i.e. they are important only for 
63 Hill, ‘Beyond Mistakes’, supra. 
64 Ibid, p. 567.
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the purpose of what bearing they have on behaviour. Thus, in the experiment 
conducted, the ecological values were assessed only to see if they influenced the 
incentive mechanism that was devised. To clarify, it is one thing to say ‘what 
people value’ is an end in itself. It is quite another thing to say that ‘how people 
categorise’ is important for ‘how they make choices’. The latter is the axiological 
concern of BLE.65 In fact, a static view on viewing the world or valuing something 
over another is an ‘as-if ’ view for the purpose of BLE.66 For analytical categories 
that are designed to interrogate what people value and how people see the world, 
this experiment would have precious little to contribute. Undoubtedly, we 
could single out one component of the experimental design (the values bit, for 
instance) and draw inferences from it. This, however, would require multiple 
other considerations, such as what effect the other components of the experiment 
may have had on this component. If we were to view the steps of the experiment 
as a whole, as components of one process, then it would be difficult to make such 
inferences. It is for similar reasons that we cannot conclude that women are more 
climate neutral than men though gender appears to play a role in veering towards 
greener choices. All the inferences that may be drawn from the experiment as 
a whole are with regard to the relationship between the incentive mechanism and 
behaviour, and the factors that may influence such behaviour. Given this limitation, 
I wish to clarify that there are three inferences germane to an EET that cannot 
be made from this experiment or piecemeal studies using a similar methodology: 
whether the incentive operates as an internalised motivation, how people can organise 
themselves collectively in a market, and how people can make themselves rational. 
These are now discussed in turn. 
a) Whether Incentives can become Motivation or Moderate Social Norms
The most obvious difficulty of a laboratory experiment is that the dependent 
variable(s) under examination cannot be tested over time. Take for instance 
the famous field experiment on motivation crowding-out where a small fine 
was levied on parents for picking up children late.67 The primary result – that 
65 To come back to the sociological critique of the individualist bias of psychological experiments 
discussed in Chapter 3, the critique that an individualist view of behaviour is not reflective of 
the social context gathers steam only when the social context has an effect on behaviour.
66 See the discussion in Chapter 1 on Methodology and Axiology. 
67 Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, ‘A Fine is a Price’ (2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
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parents were willing to pay a small fine to pick up their children late – showed 
how an incentive can crowd-out an inclination. The finding that is seldom 
discussed is that once the fine was lifted, the disincentive stuck – parents kept 
picking up their children at the later time even if they didn’t have to pay a 
fine.68 Thus, this appears to be a situation where the disincentive is internalised 
and effectively worked against other forces that may have prompted parents 
to pick up their children on time, such as social sanctions of shame or guilt. 
One reason that may be offered is that the parents were disposed to picking 
up their children late anyway, and the incentive served to strengthen this 
disposition. It seems that the pressure to pick up children exactly on time 
is not an internalised social norm, and the incentive could not create new 
preferences. The incentive did appear to create a change in behaviour, and not 
desirably so. Further, it seems that the incentive did not create a change in real 
preferences, or motivations. What is clear, however, is that only a longitudinal 
study permitted observing the relationship between incentives and behaviour. 
Let us return to Mr. Beavan and the camera. We do not know whether the 
Beavan family returned to a high-carbon lifestyle after filming a ‘no-impact’ 
life for a year, whether this lifestyle was the same as earlier, whether it was less 
carbon-intensive or more carbon-intensive. This factor would be especially 
important for a new market mechanism, as the property of learning-by-doing 
would heavily contribute to an understanding of dynamic efficiency. Even if 
the costs of participation may be initially high, they do not need to be sunk 
costs if habit reduces the costs of engagement over time. The longitudinal effect 
of an incentive, and how it corresponds with social norms is not something 
that can be captured by a temporary study such as a laboratory experiment. 
The issue of temporality prevents observing the presence of a ‘carbon social 
norm’ and whether social norms can be altered. L&E scholars such as Robert 
Ellickson and Eric Posner have argued that it is more social norms than formal 
law that shape behaviour; the interest in social norms has been branded as the 
concern of ‘the new Chicago school’.69 Ellickson famously argued that collective 
action without the organising force of law leads to ‘order’ because people act 
68 ‘The number of late arrivals seemed to remain stable after the fine was removed.’Ibid, p. 8. 
69 Lawrence Lessig, ‘The New Chicago School’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 661. 
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out of self-interest.70 Posner partially criticises the Ellicksonian order as there 
is no assurance that spontaneous social order would lead to social welfare 
better than legal intervention;71 social reform through law may be required 
to alter the functioning of social norms. However, he follows Ellickson’s basic 
line of thought: the possibility of repeat interactions (or repeat games) creates 
incentives for individuals to engage in co-operative behaviour and creates 
‘behavioral regularities’. Per Posner, such regularities are characterised primarily 
by ‘reputational signalling’ in order to ensure collective payoffs.72 Dan Kahan 
has critiqued the rationality assumption in accounts such as Posner’s, arguing 
that people are emotionally moved by the voluntary contribution of others to 
the public good and thus build-up a relationship of trust, and it is trust that 
informs collective action.73 Anthropologists such as John Conley have critiqued 
the rational-actor model of social norms, and Ellickson’s assumption of a law-
free tabula rasa where social order happens in the absence of the shadow of 
law.74 Irrespective of whether we agree with the Ellickson-Posner rational actor 
model of social norms, Kahan’s trust-based behavioural framework or a situated 
account of social norms, there is one aspect that is common to all: social norms 
stick. Unlike the Ellicksonian account, the point of regulation such as the 
introduction of an incentive would be to create a desirable state of affairs taking 
into account the potency of social norms. Rather than assuming the existence 
of ‘order without law’, there is merit in exploring the relationship between legal 
reform and social norm. 
70 Ellickson, Order Without Law, supra. 
71 ‘Legal intervention may have made things worse, but we cannot really tell’. Eric Posner, Law 
and Social Norms (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 176. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Dan Kahan, ‘Signaling or Reciprocating? A reponse to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms’ 
(2002) 36 University of Richmond Law Review 367. Similarly, Rachlinski is of the opinion that 
social psychology offers a far richer insight into social norms than the ‘impoverished’ account 
that economics and game theory have to offer. Jeffrey Rachliski, ‘The Limits of Social Norms’ 
(2000) 74 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1537. 
74 John M. Conley, ‘The Sacred Cows of Shasta County: An anthropologist’s view of Ellickson’s 
Order without Law’ (1994) 7 Social Justice Research 419. For a similar view on Ellickson’s 
reductionist view of the contextual factors that shape peoples’ behaviour, see Douglas 
Litowitz, ‘A Critical Take on Shasta County and the ‘New Chicago School’’ (2003) 15 Yale 
Journal of Law and the Humanities 295. 
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A laboratory experiment like the one conducted (even if replicable) 
would not be indicative of the mediation of behaviour by social norms, what 
social norm would be an effective one for the reduction of emissions, or how an 
incentive mechanism can moderate social norms in producing desirable emissions 
mitigation behaviour. This does not mean that psychological experiments are 
incompatible with the study of social norms. On the contrary, experiments 
conducted by social psychologists point to the speedy development of social 
norms when individuals are members of groups75 and the prevalence of 
social norms in everyday behaviour (such as individuals respond differently 
depending on who they compare themselves with76). Such prevalence could 
be a stand-in for a component of a formal incentive mechanism, such as a 
penalty. This would require the possibility of an incentive mechanism or a 
regulatory intervention to create or manipulate a social norm to have an effect 
on people’s behaviour, what has been termed as ‘the expressive function of 
law’.77 The potential of a regulatory intervention to moderate the mediating 
force of social norms is amenable to investigation, though such investigation 
requires identification of the mediators of social norms, something that 
cannot be studied in an experiment that follows a method such as the one 
described in this chapter. 
An example of how the relationship between a regulatory intervention, 
a social norm and the expressive function of the regulation may be studied 
is Susan Yeh’s work on whether obesity laws in different states in the US lead 
75 The first systematic articulation of social norms may be attributed by a series of experiments 
conducted by the Muzafir Shefir in 1936 on how individuals respond to stimuli on their 
own and in groups; Shefir found that a group creates a social norm that shapes the behaviour 
of individual members even in the absence of the group. Also worth noting is Kurt Lewin’s 
famous experiment on incentivising the eating of organ meats by households during World 
War II to reduce the demand for meat by getting households to make a public commitment. 
For a discussion, see Rachlinski, ‘The Limits of Social Norms’, pp. 1547 – 1549. 
76 Daniel T. Gilbert, R. Brian Gysler and Kathryn A. Morris, ‘When Comparisons Arise’ (1995) 
69 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 227. 
77 “…my simplest suggestion here is that we begin to make sense of law’s expressive function if 
we attend to the role of law in the management of social norms. No system of law can entirely 
avoid that role; even markets themselves-which are very much a creation of law-are exercises 
in norm management.” Cass Sunstein, ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’ (1996) 144 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2021, pp. 2052 – 2053. 
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to a reduction in obesity, given the mediating effect of social stigma.78 Yeh 
categorises nutrition education requirements79 as anti-obesity regulation 
(the intervention), longitudinal data on self-reported feelings of acceptance 
as a proxy for social stigma (the social norm) and income as proxy for the 
educational outcomes of obese and non-obese students (the effectiveness 
for gauging expressive function).80 Given that states in the US have varying 
anti-obesity laws, such variance allows Yeh to assume away endogeneity 
(or that the social norm could influence regulation)81 and conduct cross-
sectional regressions to estimate differences in the effectiveness of such 
regulation. She finds that the states with the stricter anti-obesity regulation 
have worse obesity stigma. Unlike my study that concentrates on an aspect 
of the nature of the incentive mechanism that may inform regulatory 
intervention, Yeh’s study has the benefit of retrospectively studying the 
effects of an existing (and assumed to be exogenous) regulatory intervention. 
While I did check for the effect of environmental values on the decisions 
made by the participants, I would be hesitant in categorising such values 
as internalised social norms. Though a BLE scholar might have issues 
with Yeh’s reliance on a longitudinal accumulation of stated preferences 
about stigma, which in turn is assumed to be a proxy for a social norm 
of adolescent engagement, the idea of stigma fits with the social norm 
literature on signalling group behaviour. Thus, what I wish to highlight is 
that studies similar to the one reported in this chapter could contribute to 
a study such as Yeh’s, and both are important in discerning the expressive 
function of regulation, but they cannot be conducted simultaneously or 
using the same methods. 
78 Susan Yeh, ‘Laws and Social Norms: Unintended consequences of obesity laws’ (2013) 81 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 173. 
79 These education requirements are in addition to labelling requirements, taxes on unhealthy 
products, or treasury-sponsored information campaigns. Yeh refers to regulation such as 
the enforceable requirement by ‘high schools to offer instruction on dietary behaviors and 
nutrition as part of their health education curricula.’ Ibid, p. 187. 
80 Ibid, p. 194. 
81 Unlike Ellickson who ignores endogeneity in his idea of ‘law’ or something that is exogenously 
imposed, Yeh is explicit about this assumption. 
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b) How People Can Make Themselves Traders
A crucial incentive mechanism of the EU ETS is the flexibility to buy and 
sell allowances. While it is not mandatory to trade, a robust market would 
lead to a stable price, as well as incentivise participants to consider whether 
it makes economic sense to reduce emissions or buy more allowances. As 
is evident from robust primary and secondary spot and futures markets for 
allowances that have quickly and actively developed, the trading component 
engenders participation in sophisticated markets, with the mechanisms and 
tools of finance playing a mediating role. There are sufficient arbitrage options 
that may be capitalised on, and the technologies of valuation need to be 
understood and applied carefully in order for participants to benefit from the 
process of trading. This has, in fact, led to questions regarding how allowances 
and credits should be characterised as financial transactions. 
The same applies to an EET (as well as variations mooted so far such as a 
PCT); as we will see in Chapter 5, several of the respondents to a survey see 
the trading component as crucial. A crucial question, therefore, is whether 
this experiment, or BLE scholarship, can shed light on how individuals can 
become good traders. 
One of the intuitions behind the experiment was that if allowances are 
‘earned’, then owners will be hard pressed to let them go; they will therefore 
– a hypothesis - be used wisely. Perhaps the method of allocation could 
influence information-forcing, and individuals would have to engage in 
thinking through their carbon choices, and whether they would economise 
their carbon choices. As discussed earlier, we did not arrive at results that 
would support their intuition. In our experiment, however, there was no 
relationship between the actual prices of products that the allowances 
would have to be spent on, and the carbon prices. To do so would render 
the experiment far too noisy to arrive at results regarding the manipulation 
of loss aversion I sought to study. As discussed earlier, a key insight on 
psychological experiments on incentives is that it is the nature rather than 
the quantity of the incentive that is of primary concern. This is likely to be 
true for a stand-alone EET market. We cannot anticipate an EET market 
to be robust enough for individuals to have their eye on arbitrage. Should 
the EET be a part of (or be linked to) the EU ETS market, then individuals 
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would compete with firms in the various carbon markets. In this regard, one 
may imagine that the field of ‘behavioural finance’ may make individuals 
into good traders, strategists, arbitrageurs. However, this is not the case. The 
field of behavioural finance – commencing with Richard Thaler’s substantial 
contributions – is developed around the idea that behavioural anomalies 
lends support to disproving the efficient market hypothesis.82 Behavioral 
finance does not support analyses on how participants in a market can make 
themselves better strategists or better traders. 
I have argued elsewhere that the enterprise of behavioural economics that 
incorporates the findings of cognitive and social psychology does not have the 
tools to make individuals more ‘able’ or vest them with agency,83 and following 
this general disposition, it does not have the ability to make people into better 
traders. The discipline can predict flaws in meeting an ideal, but cannot teach 
people to be competitive self-regulating units. Psychological experiments 
following Kahneman’s lead are methodologically constrained in making people 
rational, or self-regulating their responsiveness. Combining Coase’s initial 
insight of forming a firm to engage in markets84 and Hebert Simon’s work on 
psychological constraints in reaching organisational goals,85 the contribution 
of BLE to trading seems to be to bring people together and then making 
intra-organisational changes in order to get the best out of individuals within 
such an organisation (rather than assuming their rationality). As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the formation of ‘firm-like’ structures appears to the way that 
voluntary EET schemes such as CRAGs seem to function: individuals get 
together and distribute responsibilities such as information gathering, carbon 
accounting and monitoring emissions.86 Once such institutional attributes 
82 For Thaler’s account of the role behavioural economics played in the world of finance, see 
Misbehaving, supra, pp. 203 – 253. 
83 Roy, ‘Agency as Responsiveness’, supra .
84 Ronald Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
85 As Kahneman recently clarified, behavioural economics is not derived from Simon’s work 
but is nonetheless compatible. The key difference is that while Simon sought to ‘satisfice’ 
performance in an organisational setting given pre-determined organisational objectives, 
Kahneman sought to map predictable deviations of individuals from models of perfect 
rationality. See Simon, Administrative Behavior, supra, p. 240. 
86 Howell, ‘Living with a Carbon Allowance’, supra, p. 258. 
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are taken care of, then it may be possible to trade competitively. Literature on 
social norms indicates the possibility of ‘learning’ through observation and 
association.87 If that were the case then individuals could – though this is pure 
speculation –learn how to trade within a desirable institutional setting. In 
any event, it seems to be safe to suggest that it would be through association 
that individuals could adopt an institutional rationality that allows them to 
either individually or collectively participate in a market mechanism. Once 
the ‘structural’ components of trade are taken into account, then economic 
experiments on emissions trading would assume relevance. 
c) How People Achieve Collective Ends 
In both the accounts above regarding what inferences cannot be drawn 
from the experiment described in this chapter, the concentration is on the 
individual, either with respect to the internalisation of social norms or with 
respect to being a strategic market player. However, like other moral issues, 
climate change is a collective commitment. For a neo-classical L&E scholar, 
an efficient outcome is guided by the invisible hand when self-interested 
individuals interact. Irrespective of whether one advocates or disagrees with 
the invisible hand hypothesis, there is no doubt that an efficient outcome 
is not necessarily an effective one in dealing with a commons problem. In 
developing a behavioural account of collective action, Elinor Ostrom argues 
that Hardin’s famous suggestion – that rational individuals are trapped 
in social situations and it is only an external intervention that can solve a 
commons problem – leads to bad policies.88 Rather, the concentration should 
be on how co-operation is achieved through reciprocity (assessed through 
observation and experimentation rather than the backward induction method 
of theoretical models of cooperative and non-cooperative games), reputation 
and trust. This is true even for interacting individuals within a household; as 
Ellickson correctly pointed out individuals could be in different relational 
87 The classic text on the subject is Albert Bandura, Social Foundation of Thought and Action: A 
social cognitive theory (New York: Prentice Hall, 1986). 
88 Elinor Ostrom , ‘A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action’ 
(1998) 92 American Political Science Review 1, p. 3. 
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arrangements within a household.89 However, contra Ellickson, following 
Ostrom, there are several mediators that shape desirable co-operative action 
rather than assuming strategizing individuals arrive at some ‘order’ despite the 
nature of the relational arrangement.90 
To step inside the Beavan household once again, Mr. Beavan’s individual 
actions may be both cost-effective as well as emissions reducing, and the camera 
that might make him popular may prove to be a good incentive. However, 
we cannot know if the camera creates a long-term motivation, whether he is 
able to negotiate several film and book deals in the ‘market for incentives’ and 
we also cannot know what impact the camera can have on other households. 
Assuming (as with the EET) all households get a similar incentive (such as 
a camera, the promise of a movie and book deal) studying the nature of the 
incentive can not enlighten us as to whether (i) all households will all be 
willing to make concessions on their priorities to make a film indefinitely, (ii) 
whether they can strategically negotiate a similar movie and book deal, and 
(iii) whether all households will consist of accommodating family members, 
and whether they can all come together and co-operate in reducing emissions. 
ii Tensions in Making Inferences
From the above, we have a view of what cannot be inferred from the experiment. 
Now the question is what can be inferred other than the very specific findings 
of the experiment. Can the findings be abstracted to say something general 
about incentives and behaviour? If the reader has attended any gathering 
where both psychologists and legal scholars are in attendance, the common 
discomfort would be with the psychologist insisting upon the limited finding 
of a sophisticated inquiry, and the legal scholar insisting upon applications or 
89 Robert C. Ellickson, ‘Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth’ (2006) 116 Yale Law Journal 226. 
90 Carol Rose highlights Ellickson’s disregard of the relational. She reconstructs Ellickson’s 
household as: “the household’s participants all bring some chips to the table, in the form 
of capital and labor, and their different chips result in different payoff structures.” She then 
points out that the problem with this is that Ellickson “sidelines the intimate conflicts between 
spouses, and the same move allows him to give only minimal attention to larger social patterns 
that generally allow one spouse to bring more capital to the table than the other.” Carol M. 
Rose, ‘Of Natural Threads and Legal Hoops: Bob Ellickson’s Property Scholarship’ (2009) 18 
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 199, p. 204. 
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some generalisation that can be abstracted for a policy purpose. In most cases, 
the tension between specificity and generalizability seems irreconcilable. This 
is not a problem for psychological experiments specifically, but for the use of 
the experimental method generally. This is evident in a debate between two 
of the best development economists working today – Abhijit Banerjee who 
uses Randomized Control Trials (RCT) to understand the effectiveness of 
policy interventions and the recent Nobel laureate Angus Deaton.91 Banerjee’s 
approach is to see a problem in a policy initiative that cannot be explained by 
traditional economic theory. For instance, he (alongwith Esther Duflo) picks 
up the problem of the ineffectiveness of microfinance, and how conventional 
economic theory does not illuminate the problem.92 Despite conditions on 
disbursement that sought to avoid rent-seeking behaviour and training of 
users to fill in information gaps, the rates of return on such investment seemed 
abysmally low. This led Banerjee and Duflo to develop hypotheses (proxied 
by independent variables) as to why this might be the case and – similar to a 
lab experiment like the one described in this chapter – identified two random 
groups in the field to test such hypotheses, with one group in each instance 
operating as a control group. This led to some counterintuitive findings such 
as what matters for the rate of return is not the interest rate but the time period 
for which the loan is provided, and that small ‘learning-by-doing’ loans are 
not as effective as single cash transfers above a certain threshold. Innovative 
explanations are provided that may support such findings, such as people in 
poverty are motivated to take risks only when they feel loans can help their 
children to escape the world of small business. Deaton takes exception to this 
way of doing economics for policy input for methodological reasons such as 
selection bias among respondents who agree to participate, and the impossibly 
high dimensionality of drawing inferences from an experiment. Given this 
dimensionality, the inferences drawn do not flow from the methodology of 
conducting the experiment itself, but are ‘just-so stories’. He also makes an 
91 The recorded debate is available as ‘Deaton v. Banerjee’ at the NYU Development Research 
Institute: https://wp.nyu.edu/dri/events/auto-draft/annual-conference-2012-debates-in-
development/deaton-v-banerjee/
92 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor Economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight 
global poverty (London: Random House, 2011), pp. 157 – 181. 
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axiological critique –an RCT cannot by its nature address the concern of 
how people can be responsive to an external intervention (such as a loan); 
that instead would require trial-by-error learning.93 In response Banerjee 
argues that the primary value of RCTs is to expose possible confounds in 
a generalised model or the expected behaviour of people behaving in an 
economic world of rational exchange. Deaton’s trial-and-error method may 
not result in smart generalisations for policy intervention; hence the preference 
for a piecemeal approach even if the ‘whole’ is not clear. In what may seem 
jarring for scientifically-minded deductive economists, Banerjee goes on to 
say that perhaps conducting the RCTs are not as important as the thinking 
that goes into the idea of causality. It is no wonder, therefore, that Deaton – 
who believes strong empirical work should complement sophisticated models 
that contribute to predictability – finds Banerjee’s approach incoherent.94 
Like Banerjee, psychologists such as Kahneman also rely on experiments 
to question traditional economic theory. However, Kahneman’s focus 
is narrower; he considers the axiomatic rational actor model as the null 
hypothesis, and is able to draw particular and replicable inferences about 
deviations. The concentration on lab experiments allows him this focus 
on particularity.95 It could be suggested that the fact of replicability allows 
Kahneman’s lab experiments to overcome the criticism of incoherence to some 
extent, an advantage that Banerjee does not have in his work. Scholars who 
trace the development of behavioural economics suggest that the abstraction 
of a specific psychological finding could be achieved through the mediating 
authority of economic models.96 Not all psychological experiments can be 
thought to have applicability for an economic purpose. It seems, therefore, 
that the quality of an experiment appreciated by behavioural economists is 
replicability. Should a finding be replicable, then it may say something about 
93 ‘Deaton v. Banerjee’, supra. 
94 Ibid. 
95 See discussion in Chapter 1, III, and Chapter 3, II.A.(i).
96 Heukelom, Behavioral Economics, supra. Amos Tversky’s economic modelling approach made 
Kahneman’s work intelligible to economists. For a recent account of the different approaches, 
compromises and subsequent fallout of Kahneman and Tversky, see Michael Lewis, The 
Undoing Project (London, W.W. Norton, 2016). 
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human behaviour, and with respect to behavioural economics, a predictable 
bias that distorts rational behaviour. Replicability, however, is not always a 
sufficient consideration for utility with respect to a policy question. 
If the experiment described in this chapter arrived at similar results on not 
only exact replication,97 but using different proxies (other than food choice) 
and manipulations (other than the display of food, the textual relationship 
between two tasks for the control group, among others) to represent the 
same hypotheses, then perhaps we could say that loss aversion does not 
play a big role in relation to a climate incentive. From this, it is tempting 
to make the inference that the way allowances are allocated do not make a 
big difference on their utility as an incentive mechanism. It is also tempting 
to make the further inference that grandfathered allowances to individuals 
would incentivise climate-related expenses. Both of these inferences, however, 
cannot be made from this experiment. Having said that, these inferences are 
not fundamentally incompatible with the experiment. Both these inferences 
can be made only (i) when this experiment is replicable, and (ii) when this 
experiment is supported by complementary experiments that go to prove this 
point. The experiment, however, cannot speak to the whole gamut of factors 
that constitute individual motivation for climate action, nor can it speak to 
how individuals interact in a social context to mitigate emissions. 
Given this dimensionality problem, it therefore stands to reason why 
experiments have been more successful such as a policy intervention that 
takes advantage of a bias, or field experiments on electricity bills that contain 
smileys.98 Such experiments need only to be replicable in order to satisfy their 
utility. In fact, given the complexity of (i) and (ii), the epistemic costs of 
drawing policy inferences about an EET scheme from an experiment such 
as this one seem extremely high. The phrase ‘epistemic costs’ has been used 
to signify both information costs incurred to gain knowledge to effectively 
97 I am indebted to Maarten Derksen at the Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University 
of Groningen, to point me to the complexities of replication. Some of the major debates can 
be found in the special edition of Perspectives on Psychological Science on ‘Replicability in 
Psychological Science’, available at: http://pps.sagepub.com/content/7/6.toc. 
98 In these experiments, replicability can be satisfied by carrying out the experiment in different 
geographical settings or residential areas. 
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respond to climate change, as well as the opportunity costs of investing in 
certain forms of expertise in relation to a subject.99 Theoretically, multiple 
experimental results may reduce the epistemic costs from the perspective of 
dynamic efficiency (as seems to be the general motivation behind the EU’s 
experimental regulation paradigm discussed in Chapter 6), but should there 
be other constraints, then it may be preferable for regulators not to bear a 
particular epistemic burden. 
iii. Costs of Drawing Inferences 
In the above sections, we considered what can be inferred, and the tensions that 
are involved in making inferences. It was suggested that given the epistemic costs 
of drawing inferences, it may be inadvisable to conduct a series of experiments 
that could illuminate the effectiveness of an EET scheme as an implementation 
mechanism. But what are these costs, one may ask? How are they assessed? 
Drawing on Cartwright, I would like to suggest that epistemic costs can be 
looked at comparatively. Two criteria could be useful in assessing whether the 
costs of an experiment can be said to be comparatively low: (a) if the hypothesis 
implies the intervention in question,100 and (b) if the intervention can be cheaply 
implemented. It was suggested in Chapter 2 that the costs of implementation of 
an EET following a downstream implementation and an upstream monitoring 
mechanism are not too high. Thus (b) seems to be well placed.101 Regarding (a), 
the hypothesis here does not enjoy the support of a strong inference method, and 
an intervention such as an EET scheme is multi-dimensional in nature, some 
of which was suggested in the inferences that cannot be made. The epistemic 
costs of using behavioural economics for market-making structurally seem to be 
comparatively higher than the costs of predicting biases within an established 
framework (using the functioning rational actor as the null hypothesis). The 
99 More generally, Yalcintas considers both resources and time in gathering expertise, as well as 
‘epistemic resources forgone’ if one had opted for other ways of generating knowledge. Altug 
Yalcintas, ‘The Problem of Epistemic Costs: Why do economists not change their minds 
about the ‘Coase Theorem’?’ (2013) 72:5 American Journal of Economics and Sociology 1131. 
100 Nancy Cartwright, ‘Evidence-based Policy: What’s to be done about relevance?’ (2009) 143 
Philosophical Studies 127, p. 129 and p. 134. 
101 It will be suggested in the next chapter that implementation is not the whole story regarding 
a policy intervention. 
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epistemic costs of using a piecemeal experimental approach like this one appear 
to be high. The opportunity costs may be assessed in relation to ‘competing 
theories’ that could be empirically assessed using similar methods, or whether 
similar theories may be assessed using ‘competing methods’. 
Drawing on this idea of epistemic costs, we can also possibly think of 
epistemic benefits that could be achieved. High epistemic costs can still yield 
a policy benefit that cannot be captured in the scholarly benefits of epistemic 
costs. In this regard, if the experimental method can speak to policy design, 
then it might be worthwhile to incur such costs. One of the major attractions 
in the application of cognitive and social psychological experiments to policy 
initiatives such as nudges or default organizational interventions (such as a 
default printing rule) has been the low costs of translating a finding into a 
policy alternative. Thus, what may be a problem in epistemic costs is offset by 
the low costs of translation into policy design. In comparison, lab experiments 
on incentives that can influence climate-neutral strategic behaviour have 
significantly higher translation costs. If the goal is to reduce emissions from 
individuals, this benefit can better be obtained by incurring epistemic costs 
where empirical studies lend themselves easily to translation. The way the costs 
of inference may be assessed in advance is by following Cartwright’s insight 
about the relationship between the hypothesis and the policy intervention. This 
is true for some experimental applications (as discussed above), but not true 
for others. The high costs of translating some experimental studies into policy 
design has been noted by Douglas Kysar’s review of the working of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Obama Administration, 
spearheaded by Cass Sunstein, the body that inspired similar agencies such as 
the Behavioural Insights Team in the UK.102 While a prominent advocate of 
BLE and the attention to context that BLE has brought in,103 Kysar finds that 
it is possible that ‘the addition of behavioral sciences seems only to have given 
industry more weaponry with which to delay regulations and fudge calculation 
102 Douglas Kysar, ‘Politics by Other Meanings: A comment on ‘Retaking Rationality Two Years 
Later’’ (2011) 48:1 Houston Law Review 43. 
103 Douglas Kysar, ‘Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some evidence of market manipulation’ 
(1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 1420. 
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of their impacts.’104 He arrives at this conclusion after examining the OIRA’s 
involvement with regard to implementation of a fuel efficiency consumer 
information programme where OIRA rejected the programme as the focus 
group and survey methods used were considered to be insufficient without 
‘scientifically valid experiments’. Thus, the burden of proof with regard to 
any regulatory intervention may be acquitted based on such experiments. A 
more problematic issue is how this burden of proof may be met, and that 
usually turns on the interpretation of evidence. With respect to whether coal 
ash can be categorised as ‘hazardous waste’, the OIRA pointed out that such 
categorization can cause a ‘stigma effect’ which would significantly reduce 
the benefits of recycling such materials. Kysar notes that the ‘stigma effect’ 
has featured in Sunstein’s work where a reference was made to the primary 
experimental study on the stigma effect where participants in the experiment 
refused to drink juice from a glass that had a cockroach despite assurances that 
the glass had been completely sterilized. Kysar asks whether it is advisable to 
‘extrapolate from a study on cockroach juice’ to the health costs and benefits 
of coal ash reuse. To apply the framework developed above, the costs of 
translation in such a case seem too high to require experimental research and 
then translating such research into the policy measure in question. 
How do we know, therefore, whether a study might have high epistemic 
and translation costs? Following Cartwright, the inferences drawn from 
experiments with a strong hypothesis may demonstrate low epistemic 
costs. Should the hypothesis and the relationship with the policy question 
in mind be a layered one, then it may be useful to warrant against bearing 
such translation costs. However, the concept of inference costs cannot answer 
questions regarding devising standards of proof or allocating the burden of 
proof. A legal answer to this question is that the precautionary principle 
determines the amount of epistemic and inference costs to be incurred keeping 
in mind the benefit the precautionary principle is trying to attain. Having said 
that, the precautionary principle can be interpreted and applied in different 
ways; Sunstein’s preference for a risk-assessment view of the precautionary 
104 Kysar, supra, p. 56. 
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principle105 may indicate his inclination to accept high epistemic costs. I have 
argued elsewhere that the moderating value of protecting people from the 
hazards of climate change warrants an allocation of the burden of proof to 
the party advocating less activity with regard to climate action.106 More or less 
action, however, is not a signifier of appropriateness. The rest of this book 
concentrates on how to think about the appropriateness of an EET scheme. 
iv. Conclusion 
It was discussed towards the beginning of this chapter that we are interested 
in ‘public responsiveness’. This category of study cannot be assessed solely 
through a stated preference approach. Further, given that the rational actor 
axiom cannot be taken for granted, BLE studies seemed to be the way forward. 
Within this discipline, the experimental method was selected. 
In relation to experimentally assessing facets of an EET, the nature of an 
incentive sought to be understood as this is a gap in the literature on how 
individual behaviour may be influenced by incentives to secure certain goals. 
The results were inconclusive; as much as I would like to conclude following 
the experiment that the way in which the incentive is earned or allocated does 
not make a difference, that conclusion cannot be drawn. 
The conclusion that can be drawn, however, is that the experiment fails 
to deliver behavioural evidence to suggest that loss aversion plays a role in 
relation to a climate change incentive. Whether this can be abstracted into a 
policy conclusion that would have predictive value for an EET is a question 
that cannot be answered given the constraints of the experiment. For this, 
there is a need to apply other analytical tools to assess external validity. In 
this regard, I sought to demonstrate what cannot be inferred, the tensions of 
inference and the costs of inference. 
105 See Cass Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the precautionary principle (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). For a critique, see Dan Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman and John 
Gastil, ‘Fear of Democracy: A cultural evaluation of Sunstein on risk’ (2006) 119 Harvard 
Law Review 1071. 
106 Roy and Woerdman, supra. 
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POLITICAL CHOICES REGARDING AN EET*
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a need to appreciate the political acceptability 
of an EET scheme. Studies on similar schemes such as the PCT system have 
left the question of regulatory opinion unexamined. This chapter, therefore, 
is a first attempt to address the issue of political acceptability. Much like the 
reticence in Chapter 4 in equating peoples’ choices with public acceptability, 
this chapter too concentrates on analytical themes in understanding political 
choices rather than concentrating on public acceptability based on stated 
preferences. Contrary to recent work on BLE and institutional decision-
making,1 however, I show that methods used to understand individual 
behaviour cannot be translated into regulatory behaviour. Specifically, I argue 
that there is a compelling case for paying attention to the stated preferences 
of regulators as the stated preference or reason-giving is regulatory behaviour. 
* The section on ‘Hard-wired Biases’ discussed in this chapter draws on Giulia Mennillo and 
Suryapratim Roy, Ratings and Regulation: An irreversible marriage? Harvard Weatherhead 
Centre for International Affairs Working Paper 004/2014. 
1 Among the more detailed studies is Anne van Aaken’s application of behavioural economics 
to international law. Though van Aaken is careful about the problems of applying individual 
decision theory to international relations, the analysis nonetheless maps research on individual 
biases to political actors to supplement rational choice approaches. Anne van Aaken, ‘Behavioural 
International Law and Economics’ (2014) 55 Harvard International Law Journal 421.
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Having said that – and picking up on a couple of responses to a pilot survey 
conducted – studying the political economy of regulation is a meaningful 
way of assessing political behaviour. In this regard, I make an analytical 
move in arguing that BLE points to constraints on the rational institutional 
actor in public choice as well; unlike the conventional concentration on 
the psychological make-up of individuals who serve as regulators and other 
institutional actors, I argue that the constraints on rational or strategic 
decision-making may be in the form of ‘discursive capture’ of such institutional 
actors. Analogous to psychology-informed interventions such as nudges that 
desirably moderate individual choices, I further suggest that there could be 
mechanisms for preventing discursive capture. Given that the possibility 
of discursive capture applies to the way commentators like myself reason 
about regulatory choices such as the EET, I end with a reflective note on the 
possibility of discursive capture in concentrating solely on either ‘efficiency’ or 
‘fairness’ as the organising principle of regulatory reasoning. 
i. Gauging Political Acceptability through 
Stated Preferences of Regulators
Considering the application of behavioural economics to political decision-
making brings to mind studies on the effects of meals on judges’ mood,2 or 
essentially cognitive processes that adversely influence the nature of decisions. 
It may be suggested from such studies that the scope for discretion by legal 
decision-makers should be tempered. This appears to be the conclusion 
from a recent study on the biases of American judges by the prolific Jeffrey 
Rachlinksi.3 There is one clear problem with the application of these studies: 
they do not take into account the responsibility of regulators to rationalise 
their decisions. Reasons constitute the desirable anchor of the regulatory 
process. Individuals are susceptible to shape their behaviour and responses 
2 Shai Danzigera, Jonathan Levav and Liora Avnaim-Pesso, ‘Extraneous factors in judicial 
decisions’ (2011) 108: 17 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 6889-6892. 
3 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, ‘Can Judges Make Reliable 
Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences’ (2015) 90 Indiana Law 
Journal 695.
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in the shadow of invisible or primed ‘anchors’ or reference points.4 In legal 
systems that accord primacy to justification, the need to reason should serve 
as the anchor.5 We saw in Chapters 1 and 4 that the reasons individuals or 
groups give for their decisions are biased, and may have little bearing on their 
behaviour. However, for legal institutions, reason-giving is their behaviour. To 
put it differently, the achievement of a public good depends on how people 
behave and not the way they rationalise (hence the argument for assessing 
‘public responsiveness’ rather than ‘public acceptability’ mooted in Chapter 
4). However, individuals who in a legal or regulatory capacity formulate 
or mediate the public good, it is necessary to provide reasons despite their 
individual psychological make-up or biases. For public officials, there is 
no justification to discount their opinions or the giving of reasons, as such 
opinions or reasons are considered to be the behavior against which they are 
assessed. In fact, the solution to the studies regarding cognitive causes above is 
for legal decision-makers to provide reasons intelligible to the public to which 
they are accountable, against which their bias could be assessed. This is why 
materials such as press releases, legal briefs, speeches become evidence to assess 
the ‘psychological make-up of States’ under public international law.6 The 
understanding of the psychological element here is very different from the 
cognitive7 one we have considered in Chapter 4. This is why I am hesitant in 
4 For a review, see Adrian Furnham and Hua-chu Boo, ‘A Literature Review of the Anchoring 
Effect’ (2011) 40 Journal of Socio-economics 35. 
5 In a conference I posed this question to Professor Rachlinski, as to whether the opportunity 
to reason could influence the decisions given by judges. He was of the opinion this could be 
the case if judges were allowed to use reasoning ‘anchors’ than the numeric ones he considered 
for his study. Admittedly, there is debate on the informational relevance of the anchors in 
question; i.e. it is not necessary that the issue on which the anchor is based necessarily 
correlates with the issue on which the response is generated. Ibid, p. 38. 
6 The reference here is the establishing of opinio juris as a component of customary international 
law. Tim Hillier, Sourcebook on Public International Law (London: Cavendish Publishing, 
1998), p. 76. The authoritative formulation of opinio juris as an integral component of 
customary international law is usually attributed to the Nicaragua (Merits) case before the 
ICJ. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America). Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14. 
7 Banakar makes the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive causes behind behavior 
contrary to morality; thus prejudice is characterized as a cognitive cause behind discrimination 
while ‘rational economic action’ or ‘political reasons’ are characterized as non-cognitive causes. 
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accepting cognitive causes to assess political acceptability, and why it might be 
beneficial to inquire into the stated preferences of political institutions using 
surveys, interviews or statements issued. 
Notwithstanding the above argument for appreciating reason-giving 
as the primary form of regulatory behavior, it could be argued that public 
institutions use ‘paper tigers’ including directives, regulations and cases to 
legitimize or deceive those they allegedly represent or decide on behalf of. This 
brings us back to the public choice concerns, where the process of collective 
or institutional decision-making may be construed to operate despite the 
reasons given. Thus, if BLE has some explanatory potential for public choice, 
then we might see the utility for such a framework for appreciating political 
choices, as against mere political acceptability. Writing more than a decade back, 
the political scientist Jack Levy pointed out that ‘determining whether his 
[Kahneman’s] theory of individual choice can be extended to the strategic 
behavior of collective actors, and tested empirically against observed behavior 
in real-word settings remains a formidable task for future research.’8 Since then 
attempts have been made by scholars working within political psychology to 
work towards this formidable task9 both in the context of internal decision-
making of a legal system, and in relation to foreign policy.10 This literature 
has proceeded largely to demonstrate two applications: (i) even if political 
actors represent collective interests, their policy-decisions can nevertheless be 
explained by hardwired individual biases that behavioural economics seeks to 
Reza Benakar, The Doorkeepers of the Law (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998), 
p. 119. The term ‘cognitive’ may, however, be understood differently from other standpoints; 
one notable instance is its use as a discursive orientation that prompts Black’s argument for 
requiring a shift in one’s cognitive framework in thinking about political issues. Julia Black, 
‘Seeing, Knowing, and Regulating Financial Markets: Moving the Cognitive Framework 
from the Economic to the Social’, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 24/2013. 
8 Jack S. Levy, ‘Daniel Kahneman: Judgment, Decision, and Rationality’ (2002) 2 Political 
Science & Politics 271, p. 273. 
9 For a review of this endeavor, see David P. Redlawsk and Richard R. Lau, ‘Behavioural 
Decision Making’ in Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy eds. The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: 2nd. ed, Oxford University Press, 2013). 
10 Uri-bar Joseph and Jack S. Levy, ‘Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure’ (2009) 124:3 
Political Science Quarterly 461. 
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expose.11 It stands to reason that to make this argument, it has been necessary 
to show that there has been sufficient individual discretion or power to make 
idiosyncratic executive decisions; and (ii) the phenomenon of ‘group-think’ 
or decision-making by a collective entity has been experimentally shown to be 
no less prone to mistakes than an individual making decisions.12 Some of the 
studies used to illuminate both cases – individual decisions by politicians and 
decisions made by groups – use Prospect Theory to demonstrate that political 
decisions made can be unnecessarily risky, high-cost alternatives are opted for 
without any increase in value.13 In all these studies there is a comparison of the 
political decisions made with the ex-post assessment of consequences. Thus 
the use of behavioural economics in studies of political decision-making is 
not the same as its use in individual decisions. For studying political decision-
making on a particular issue, we either need an ex-ante assessment of what 
would be a reasonable decision, or an ex-post assessment for a policy (or legal 
decision or statement of collective import) that has been around for a while. 
For a PCT or an EET, we do not yet have this proposal that can be deemed 
to be reasonable or rational. This need for a reasonable yardstick brings us 
back to the use of the stated preferences approach, and the decision to survey 
experts against which political opinion can be assessed. 
ii. The Idea of Surveying Regulators And 
Experts, And The Pilot Study
A clear distinction between rational justification and political justification is 
obviously untenable as is clear from the entirety of the book, as any justification 
regarding responsibility, liberty, or expert knowledge is clearly a political issue. 
Having said that, this distinction may be useful if we were to confine the 
11 Matthew Fuhrmann and Bryan R. Early, ‘Following START: Risk acceptance and the 1991–
1992 presidential nuclear initiatives’ (2008) 4.1 Foreign Policy Analysis 21-43.
12 Norbert L. Kerr and R. Scott Tindale, ‘Group performance and Decision Making’ 
(2004) Annual Review of Psychology 623-655.
13 For an overview of the use of Prospect Theory in political psychology see Barbara Vis, 
‘Studying Political Decision-Making Using Prospect Theory’, paper presented at ECPR 
General Conference, Postdam, Germany, July 2009, available at: http://www.barbaravis.nl/
ECPR_Political_Psychology_Vis_final.pdf. 
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idea of the political to the regulatory process, namely institutions and officials 
of government, how they approach an issue, and how they decide. This is 
the view that motivates conducting a survey in order to gauge the political 
acceptability of an EET scheme. 
A. Conducting the Pilot Study
The approach adopted in the study to determine the perception of regulators 
is one of surveying regulators, and thus the primary preparatory work is of 
identifying appropriate regulators and ferreting out an appropriate survey 
design.14 For the pilot phase, the respondents were researchers based in faculties 
of law, economics, philosophy, sociology and psychology in the University of 
Groningen and experts in different universities and research organisations who 
have worked on Personal Carbon Allowances and Tradable Energy Quotas 
(n=19). I am aware that the sample size for the Pilot Study was decided 
arbitrarily; but given that I did not have to differentiate between the participants 
and did not seek to conduct a feasibility study,15 I did not follow a sophisticated 
methodology in selecting the members and size of the participants of the study. 
Pretesting procedures primarily in the form of qualitative feedback was sought 
from the respondents of the pilot survey. Such feedback was in relation to 
interpretation of questions, time taken to respond, and suggestions solicited for 
improvement of instrumentation. With regard to instrumentation, responses 
were sought to mostly close-ended (dichotomous and rated) questions. The 
luxury of the interactional nature of correspondence that a Pilot Study affords 
allowed feedback through follow-up emails and conversations in person. 
i. Methodological Concerns 
The difficulty with any survey; or indeed any method to assess stated 
preferences; is that it may be tainted by the various biases of the researchers 
14 I benefited immensely from the European Consortium of Political Research Summer School 
courses in ‘Qualitative Research Methods’, University of Ljubljana, 2013 in writing this 
chapter. 
15 Feasibility studies are small scale trial runs of the larger study. This is narrower in breadth from a 
general pilot study that has the purpose of obtaining input on methodology, assumptions and 
content. It is also to way to assess the difficulties respondents face in tackling the questions. 
David De Vaus, Surveys in Social Research (3rd edn, London: UCL Press, 1993), p. 54. 
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and respondents. As far as researcher bias is concerned, the challenges of 
reliability and validity lie generally in relation to conversational, cognitive 
and motivational processes that underlie how questions are asked and 
interpreted; such bias manifests in designing surveys and drawing inferences. 
Specifically, problems may be encountered in: (i) Defining the continuum of 
the rating tasks within which respondents place themselves, as it is difficult 
to confidently assert that the factors identified are the most salient; and (ii) 
Framing dichotomous questions.16 This is why there were several rounds of 
revisions of the survey, including how the continuum of the rating tasks was 
designed. The Likert response scale was preferred to the semantic differential 
rating approach to do away with dichotomous categories in questions asked. 
Given the need to make the survey simpler, dichotomous questions were 
unavoidable, but control questions to check for framing were inserted such 
as the following: 
The scheme is fair towards lower income groups as they can sell allowances 
The scheme is fair towards higher income groups as they can buy allowances 
to keep emitting
The only dichotomous question asked where framing was not interrogated 
was the cumulative one right at the end: do you think an EET is a good idea. 
This question was complemented with a similar continuum question right at 
the beginning: the idea was to allow the respondents to rethink their opinion 
once they considered various components of such a scheme.17 
With regard to respondent bias, research on surveys conducted by 
political scientists has demonstrated that there are two primary concerns: 
Question Ordering Effects and Question Wording Effects, which explains 
the experimental turn in surveys.18 Survey experiments, in brief, entail a 
16 Royce A. Singleton, Jr. and Bruce C. Straits, Approaches to Social Research (5th Edition. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 269 – 270. 
17 There was admittedly the possibility of an avoidance of cognitive dissonance on the part of 
the respondents; respondents may not have liked to see themselves as opinion-changers. I 
took this risk in a web-based survey because the respondents would probably not make the 
effort to go back all the way to see what box they ticked on the continuum on the first page. 
18 Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, Going Negative: How Attack Ads Shrinks and 
Polarize the Electorate (New York: Free Press, 1995).
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deliberate manipulation of either the form or placement of items (or both) 
in a survey instrument by incorporating methods such as priming questions 
used in psychological research. However, such survey experiments are utilised 
to assess public opinion of the electorate in relation to policy choices, and the 
samples are usually random. This project does not proceed along such lines as 
it does not seek to expose whether the actual preferences of the respondents 
are different from their stated preferences- an exercise which would be useful 
if the voting tendencies of the groups studied were to be assessed. Admittedly, 
the responses could be affected by the framing and wording of the questions, 
but instead of creating two separate treatment groups, we employ a control 
group to contrast the stated preferences of regulators. This is what led us 
to the idea of surveying regulators and using experts as a control group. This 
distinction was not maintained for the Pilot Sample, but the intention to do 
so was communicated to the respondents. 
ii. Content of Survey 
The intention was to devise a comprehensive questionnaire where different 
properties of an EET would be put forward and respondents requested to 
comment on the same. The contents may be explained as follows:
Previous Experience of Respondents
a) Precedent: the regulator’s experience with similar proposals and their 
fate. 
b) Analogous instruments: the regulator’s experience with such analogous 
policy measures were solicited. It was decided that specifics will not 
be brought to their attention; alternatively, instead of embarking 
on such self-selection, the regulators may be requested to identify 
analogous measures.
c) Experiences and issues with the EU ETS: given the EU ETS would 
directly or indirectly influence the EET, views regarding the 
functioning of the EU ETS would be sought.
Design Questions 
a) Assessment of such a scheme as against a tax: this would have implications 
from legal, economic and behavioural perspectives.
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b) Nature of the instrument: not only is the question as to whether an 
EU ETS allowance would constitute property unresolved, but it is 
also unclear whether it is an investment or a financial instrument. 
Theoretical debates regarding whether an ETS unit is a commodity 
or currency has practical implications. The same questions would also 
apply to an EET scheme.
c) Permit or credit: As there is now research on the distinction and 
efficiency implications of permit and credit based schemes, it is hoped 
that the questions provided may lead the respondents to consider 
whether the scheme would be more in line with a permit scheme 
such as EU ETS or with a credit scheme such as the CDM.
d) Tradability: This has two components. The first is whether allowances 
should be allowed to be traded at all. The second component is 
whether the EET should be linked to the EU ETS.
e) Market design: It needs to be determined how trading is to be 
facilitated; this includes the nature of the transactions that are 
contemplated (i.e. whether futures trading would be permitted- 
this is linked to the issue regarding the nature of the units) and the 
nature of the institutions that would facilitate such transaction. This 
is complemented by a question regarding linking with the EU ETS. 
f ) Geographical scope: I hypothesised that regulators in different 
jurisdictions in the European Union may provide different responses 
to the questions asked. I further hypothesised that EU regulators 
would provide answers very different from national regulators. 
g) Sectoral scope and coverage: One of the major unexplored questions 
in an end-user scheme is regarding which activities would be covered. 
Policy design in this regard would need to take into account the 
thickness of markets, how to include non-point sources in a regulatory 
scheme and double counting.
h) Implementation (Penalties): The issue of non-compliance requires 
consideration. In this regard, regulators’ opinions on a penalty similar 
to the EU ETS and a default tax system would have to be sought;
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i) Implementation (Administrative costs): This would include 
measurement, monitoring and institutional supervision.
j) Interface: Thoughts on how people would be required to engage were 
solicited.
The final draft of the Pilot Survey circulated was very different from the first 
one. As I discussed the contents primarily with Edwin Woerdman and Oscar 
Couwenberg and suggested alternatives, the survey was substantially altered 
and shortened. For a list of the participants of the Pilot study and a copy of 
the Pilot questionnaire that was circulated, please see Annexure 2.1. 
B. Responses to the Pilot Study
Fundamental Observations: One respondent made a fundamental observation 
regarding the purpose of the study itself, rather than details regarding the 
execution of the project. She was of the opinion that the assessment of political 
acceptability would be difficult to be meaningfully ascertained by way of a survey.19 
One suggestion to address this issue may be to insert open-ended questions on 
political support within a particular party, within the legislature generally, and 
in relation to public support generally. If I reconstruct the exchanges with this 
respondent, the observation was that political interests cannot be revealed in 
a survey, but need to be analytically ascertained following a political economy 
approach. Another respondent observed that the complexities of a new policy-
mechanism such as the EET can affect the attitude of regulators.20 Regulators 
in Member States are already dealing with the complexities of the EU ETS itself 
and the EU ETS is in many ways much less complex than the challenges the 
EET faces. Given this burden, the time may not be right to divert attention 
to another yet more complex policy mechanism.21 Without reading too much 
into this respondent’s comment, perhaps the burden of considering yet another 
complex climate policy would affect the response rate to the survey. 
19 Correspondence with Respondent 15; on file with the author.
20 Correspondence with Respondent 9; on file with the author. 
21 It may be noted that owing to the changing experimental nature of the EU ETS such as the 
recent shift to an auctioning system in Phase III, or the problem of over-allocation still being 
fixed, the set-up costs of the EU ETS cannot be assumed to be zero. 
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i) Methodological Observations: Comments on the design of the survey were 
mostly positive. One criticism was that the description of an EET provided 
may not provide sufficient information for the respondent to answer the 
questions; in such event, the ‘survey responses would be worth little more 
than noise.’22 The suggestion was that perhaps semi-structured interviews 
would be the way to cultivate interest and guide respondents through the 
survey. This is similar to another comment, where a respondent declined 
to fill up the survey as it required specialised knowledge.23 Another 
observation that may be considered substantive points to the assumptions 
in the framing of questions: instead of asking about Sectoral Scope, would 
it not be more appropriate to ask ‘who should do what or who should be 
responsible’?24
ii) Substantive Observations: One respondent took the trouble to read my 
co-authored paper available online on EET that served as a background 
document (the paper is substantively the same as Chapter 2) for the 
survey. On reading the paper and examining the survey, he had the 
following (reconstructed) comments on fairness and distributional 
concerns of an EET that are not adequately addressed, and even seem 
irresolvable:25 (i) Concentrating on methods of allocating (such as 
through auctions) or administrative costs do not address the issues of 
distribution of entitlements. This concern does not feature in the paper 
and therefore is not reflected in the survey; (ii) there is an assumption 
that individuals can all equally make informed choices about an opt-
out option and participate in allocation mechanisms such as auctioning 
schemes. Another respondent pointed out that the survey did not make 
a distinction between direct and indirect emissions, and this could have 
an effect on the fairness of the scheme.26 The workability of end-user 
emissions trading as compared with a tax-based approach was questioned 
by one respondent. A tax that that could ‘simply build the incentive into 
22 Correspondence with Respondent 11; on file with the author. 
23 Correspondence with Respondent 18; on file with the author. 
24 Correspondence with Respondent 7; on file with the author.
25 Correspondence with Respondent 14; on file with the author.
26 Correspondence with Respondent 5; on file with the author.
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the prices end-users pay for goods and services’ was found to be preferable 
to an EET;27 the only reason to opt for an EET rather than a tax is 
political acceptance as a carbon tax is nearly impossible. 
iii. The Survey
This section while expected to be the heart of this chapter will prove to be a 
disappointment. To cut a long story short, I could not analyse the responses 
to the survey in detail – especially since several questions required a rating that 
would require a large sample for a reliable distribution – primarily due to the 
low response rate. Out of the 300 potential respondents contacted, I received 
22 responses. Further, as there were several more experts than regulators, the 
idea of checking for regulator bias through a control group would not be 
possible. Having said that, allow me to briefly describe the process. Given 
the positive responses regarding the design of the Pilot Study, I made minor 
alterations to the survey. Unlike the Pilot, however, selection of my sample 
was more crucial. As briefly mentioned earlier, I decided to have an ‘Experts’ 
group as a control group. Regulators are political creatures who make political 
choices, which cannot be predicted from their responses. Essentially, this 
is an information asymmetry problem similar to used-car salesmen in the 
1960s, they know more than the public and may not be willing to divulge 
information. Further, regulatory choices may be political choices which are 
situation and context-based, subject to negotiation and compromise. Thus, 
the opinions of regulators may not be reliable, and may not even be trusted. 
I attempted to address this issue in two ways: first, the survey itself is divided 
into two sections – one in which the participants are requested to express their 
views in an agentic capacity, and in the other section, they are requested to 
express their personal views. Second, the survey of regulators is complemented 
by a control group survey. I identified and surveyed a select group of experts 
including academics and practitioners who could provide reasoned views on 
the subject. I sought to compare the responses by regulators and the expert 
control group.28Annexure 2.2 details the selection of EU regulators, Member 
27 Correspondence with Respondent 11; on file with the author. 
28 Commentators have also observed that surveys in political science usually lack a control 
group, and that is sought to be remedied in this paper. Brian J. Gaines, James H. Kuklinski 
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State regulators and Experts. A summary of the responses received is also 
attached as Annexure 2.3. Some of the answers were supported by a significant 
percentage of the respondents, and those may be worth noting:
1) Sectoral Scope: Fuel Consumption for Private Vehicles (65.2%), Electricity 
Consumption (73.9%) and Gas Consumption (69.6%) were favoured.
2) Governance (EU, National, Municipal): National determination of capping 
individual emissions (55%), national enforcement (70%), national settlement 
for disputes (60%). No strong preference for allocation of allowances. 
3) Fairness Concerns: 
– Participation should be mandatory (61.9%) with an equal number of 
allowances for every citizen (66.7%) excluding children (61.9%). 
– People should be able to buy and sell allowances (90.5%). The EET is 
unfair to people who are not financially literate (65%).
– The scheme is fair towards lower income groups as they can sell allowances 
(60%) and fair towards higher income groups as they can buy allowances to 
keep emitting (80%). It should be noted that this question was met with 
unreliable responses, as they changed according to the way the question was 
framed, though the content sought to be captured was essentially the same. 
– The EET is unfair to people living in rural areas (70%), unfair to people 
living in areas of extreme climatic conditions (66.7%). 
– It is not advisable to settle complaints about fairness judicially on a case-by-
case basis (88.9%). 
– A carbon tax would be more equitable (66.7%), and so would renewable 
energy subsidies (75%). No strong preference for energy efficiency 
standards. 
4) EU ETS Concerns: 
– EU ETS not the most effective policy instrument in dealing with emissions 
(76.2%), higher administrative costs if EET is made part of the ETS 
(78.9%). 
and Paul J. Quirk, ‘The Logic of the Survey Experiment Reexamined’ (2007) Political Analysis 
15: 1-20 
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– EU ETS markets too complex for lay people (63.2%); people would not 
have more choices if EET is part of EU ETS market (62.5%). 
– Sectors for an EET are different for the sectors under an EU ETS, so 
compatibility would be difficult (82.4%). EET covers sectors not covered 
by the EU ETS and hence there would be no conflict (70.6%). It should 
be noted that both these questions were put in to control for framing; so 
this question received unreliable responses as they differed according to 
the framing of the question, though the content sought to be captured 
was essentially the same. 
– The EET should not be part of the EU ETS (84.2%).
5) System Design: Most of these questions were rated along a Likert scale 
and hence I refrain from reporting them owing to the low response rate. One 
response that may be noted is a strong preference for No opt-out mechanism 
(81.3%). Following Raux and Marlot, it was suggested in Chapter 2 that the 
opt-out could be a possible solution to the difficulties of enforcing a cap-and-
trade system for households;29 a strong preference against this system would 
make enforcement tricky.
One regulator explicitly declined to fill out the questionnaire owing to 
disenchantment with the EU ETS.30 Only one respondent (currently an ‘Expert’ 
but an erstwhile EU Regulator) provided comments in addition to filling up 
the survey.31 This respondent felt there were two major concerns with an EET: 
“(1) carve out emissions already covered by the ETS (electricity & heat) [the 
‘double counting’ problem], and (2) make it simple enough for my mother to 
manage without her computer (…)).” He further observed that a carbon tax 
would be theoretically sound but difficult to implement legally at the EU level 
(something I discuss in Chapter 6) and politically at the national level. 
It would be difficult to report the findings of the survey as reflective 
of the political opinion of regulators in EU Member States owing to the 
29 See Chapter 2, Section IV.C.
30 As the survey was anonymised except designation, I hesitate to disclose the details of the 
respondent. Correspondence on file with the author. 
31 The respondent is currently a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University and was formerly a 
member of the European Commission for Climate Policy. 
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low response rate, Having said that, it is not difficult to identify the need 
to explore some issues32 based on the stated preferences: the properties of 
mandatory participation coupled with the trade of allowances seem essential, 
fuel, electricity and gas consumption seem to be the preferred activities, 
there seems to be a general apprehension that an EET is unfair, and the 
complex association of an EET with the EU ETS needs to be explored. We 
will explore these issues over the course of this chapter and the next two 
chapters. Some of them can be better appreciated by assessing the making 
of political choices, rather than examining stated preferences regarding 
political acceptability. 
iv. Gauging Political Choices by analysing the 
political economy of regulation
In keeping with the Fundamental Criticisms to the Pilot Study and the fact 
there was substantial regulatory indifference to the survey, I wish to explore the 
possibility of a political economy of EET in an attempt at appreciating how 
political choices with regard to an EET may be brought about. Admittedly, 
assessing political choices is not epistemologically straightforward, as there 
could be myriad ways of studying how regulators approach an issue and 
make a decision.33 One way of approaching the subject is to see how gaining 
public acceptability may shape political choices. Thus, much like Mr. Beavan’s 
camera, regulators may feel the force of an implicit electorate in making policy 
choices. The regulatory interest in a PCT, for instance, may not have arisen 
if David Miliband was not trying to align his proposed regulatory approach 
of an environmental contract between the State and citizens with a wave of 
32 This orientation to qualitative research is akin to Lopes’ view discussed in Section IIA of 
Chapter 3 where even if ‘seeing the data’ may be controversial in experiments that use the 
strong inference method, they still bring to light variables that may have gone unnoticed. 
A similar line of reasoning is adopted by Banerjee in relation to RCTs where what is more 
important than the results of the actual experiments is the thinking that it generates regarding 
causality and the possible confounds that interfere with generalised models. See discussion in 
Section IIID of Chapter 4. 
33 For a classic treatment of policy-making processes, see Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The art 
of political decision-making (New York: W.W. Norton, 3rd ed, 2012). 
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environmental populism.34 There is no evidence, however, to suggest that 
elections in the UK or elsewhere have been won based on preferred climate 
change policies. It would also be presumptuous to suggest the absence of 
the separation of powers between legislative and regulatory bodies; on the 
contrary, for systems like the EU, regulation appears to be more influenced 
by competing special interests than the need to keep the electorate satisfied, 
as is borne out in discussions on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’.35 It may be 
meaningful, therefore, to consider the influence of different interests in the 
formulation of regulation. 
Internationally climate change is seen as a public bad with political actors 
attempting to strategically negotiate restrictions on national responsibility for 
a commons problem, as well as fulfil ancillary interests such as national energy 
security through international climate change policy. This motivates the line 
of reasoning adopted by Posner and Weisbach regarding the interests that 
are served by international climate treaties; as it is crucial to have a climate 
treaty with which major emitters comply, the treaty is hostage to the interests 
of the major emitters.36 In a similar vein, Anatole Boute argues that it is the 
political interest of maintaining its future energy security that characterises 
EU’s international climate change and energy efficiency policies.37 Internally, 
the EU could be said to be somewhat different; although Member States are 
political actors, the constitutional nature of the EU involves the utilisation of 
reason – or a ‘culture of justification’38 – in the provision of public and primary 
34 Matthew Lockwood, ‘A Tale of Two Milibands: From Environmental Citizenship to the 
Politics of the Common Good’ (2010) 81 Political Quarterly 545. 
35 See for instance Davies who argues that EU elections have a low voter turn-out than national 
elections due to the EU’s inability to appreciate and foster the ‘expressive capacity’ of EU 
citizens. Gareth Davies, “The Expressive Deficit of EU Law” in Dimitry Kochenov, Andrew 
Williams and Grainne de Burca (eds). Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2015). 
36 Eric Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 2010), p. 6.
37 Anatole Boute, ‘The EU’s Shaping of an International Law on Energy Efficiency, in Dimitry 
Kochenov and Fabian Amtenbrink, eds., The EU’s Shaping of the International Legal Order 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
38 The phrase may be attributed to Etienne Murienk in his work on locating individual 
freedom within the achievement of social interests. Cohen-Eliya and Porat suggest that this is 
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goods; such reason moderates the collective action problem of a continuous 
battle of competing interests. The legal equivalent of public finance theory that 
seeks to normatively39 arrive at optimal levels of public goods appears to be 
to the optimal allocation of competence through subsidiarity on one hand, 
and the application of the proportionality principle on the other to achieve 
primary goods in an optimal way. These principles are discussed in Chapters 
6 and 7. For now, I would like to suggest that public choice considerations40 in 
explaining economic and political behaviour cannot be ignored; i.e. the role 
of interest groups in shaping regulation on climate change. 
A. Why the Political Economy of the EU ETS may be Relevant
The Public Choice approach involves following the interests of different 
groups of actors in relation to regulation. These groups have traditionally 
been categorised into voters, politicians, bureaucrats and economic actors.41 
With respect to environmental issues, civil society has been categorised as a 
separate interest group, as non-governmental collectives have historically had 
a say in the importance attributed to environmental policies. Writing in 2003, 
Kirchgassner and Schneider felt that the most compelling public choice finding 
on incentive-based environmental instruments was that neither bureaucrats 
nor industrial actors had much of an interest in such instruments.42 Rather, 
they had a path-dependent interest in ‘traditional bureaucratic measures’ in 
precisely the objective of the proportionality principle. Iddo Porat and Moshe Cohen-Eliya, 
‘Proportionality and the Culture of Justification’ (2011) 59:2 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 463. 
39 The distinction between the public choice and public finance approach to environmental 
federalism has been explained in Michael Faure and Jason Johnston, ‘The Law and Economics 
of Environmental Federalism: Europe and the United States Compared’ (2008) 27 Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal 205, p. 239. 
40 Public choice considerations are a narrower version of locating the political; thus the 
concentration does not encompass the idea of the political as purportedly rational decisions 
being in any way contingent on actors, norms or processes, but focuses on particular and 
identifiable interests. For a broader view of the political in environmental decisions, see Haas, 
‘When Does Power Listen to Truth?’ supra. 
41 Gebhard Kirchgassner and Frederich Schneider, ‘On the Political Economy of Environmental 
Policy’ (2003) 115 Public Choice 369, p. 373.
42 Ibid, pp. 370 – 371. 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   61 10/25/2017   5:13:29 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 186
168
Chapter 5
dealing with environmental issues including air pollution.43 However, this 
finding is likely untrue for climate regulation in the EU, as well as interest 
groups outside the EU that are associated with the EU (as is clear from the 
political debates on the applicability of the EU ETS for the aviation sector) 
or the challenges to linking other climate change schemes with the EU ETS.
Given that the EU ETS is the primary climate instrument in both Member 
States and at the EU level that involve economic actors, there are evident 
public choice concerns that animate incentive-based climate policies. In fact, 
at around the same time Kirchgassner and Schneider lamented the lack of 
public choice concerns with regard to incentive-based climate instruments, 
the EU ETS was coming into its own. The EU ETS Directive was the product 
of intense negotiations by industrial actors, as is reflected by the difference in 
the original Commission Green Paper on the EU ETS and the final directive 
that was released.44 The differences reveal political contests with regard to the 
attribution of abatement responsibility through the inclusion of some sectors, 
as well with regard to the nature of allocation: the Commission’s attempts at 
introducing auctioning of allowances received heavy opposition from industrial 
actors, eventually giving way to freely allocated allowances. The argument that 
free allocation was a transitory policy choice is not true in reality: the effect 
of over-allocated grandfathered allowances is affecting prices in Phase III.45 
Analysing the political economy of EU climate policy, Meckling concludes 
that ‘the rise of carbon trading can partially be understood as a strategy of 
big emitters to prevent the introduction of carbon taxes.’46 Baldwin proposes 
a similar view when he suggests that the EU ETS was ‘regulation lite’ that 
found acceptance by emitters.47 These two accounts concern themselves with 
the tussle between economic actors and regulators, and how the EU ETS won 
43 Ibid, p. 371. 
44 Peter Markussen and Gert Tinggard Svendsen, ‘Industrial Lobbying and the Political 
Economy of GHG Trade in the European Union’ (2005) 33 Energy Policy 245-255. 
45 Claudia Kettner, ‘The EU Emission Trading Scheme: First Evidence on Phase 3’ in L. Kreiser 
et al. (eds.), Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation, Vol. XV, Edward Elgar, 2015, p. 63
46 Jonas Meckling, Carbon Coalitions: Business, Climate Politics and the Rise of Emissions Trading 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), p. 48. 
47 Robert Baldwin, ‘Regulation Lite: The rise of emissions trading’ (2008) 2 Regulation and 
Governance 193.
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out over other alternatives. The tussle between ‘bureaucrats’ and ‘politicians’ 
should not be ignored, though all but absent from the public choice literature. 
As we will see in Chapter 6, climate law in the EU is heavily informed by 
conflicts and complementarities between the Commission and Member 
States. This is true even in the selection of climate instruments; ‘regulation 
lite’ was true even for acceptance by Member States, especially as compared 
to a carbon tax. Consider further Boute’s provocation discussed earlier that 
perhaps the EU extends its stringent climate policies internationally in order 
to ensure future energy security. Even if this provocation may be speculative, 
there is foundation in the suggestion that the EU is establishing itself as the first 
mover in setting the terms of an international linked carbon market. In both 
cases, there would be an alignment of ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘political’ interests 
with regard to climate regulation. Integral to such regulation is the liability 
of some industrial and commercial actors in contributing to climate change. 
There is a tendency to concentrate on the flexibility mechanisms found in the 
Kyoto Protocol and the transactional nature on the EU ETS and ignore the 
fact that the reason why competing interests are at stake is to alleviate or do 
away with the onus of liability. To begin with, there is an onus of liability on 
nation-states at the international level. This liability is both with respect to 
the payment of penalties for non-compliance48 with Kyoto requirements, as 
well the possibility49 of liability-like effects of international reputation.50 More 
subtly – as discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 – the way carbon accounting 
is inventoried internationally paves the way for a production-based model of 
liability. Such liability is redistributed at the EU level among Member States, 
and further among industrial actors.51 Most of the judicial disputes related to 
the EU ETS are with regard to the redistribution of liability by Member States 
to industrial actors. It may be noted that the recent Paris Agreement does not 
48 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/3024.php. 
49 I mention possibility as the payment of penalties appears to be a stronger disincentive, as 
evidenced by Canada’s withdrawal in 2011 from the Kyoto Protocol to avoid payment of 
penalties. 
50 See for instance, Joyeeta Gupta, ‘A History of International Climate Change Policy’ (2010) 1 
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 636. 
51 Specifically installations and activities within installations as discussed in Chapter 6. 
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impose liability onto States,52 but enhances the role of reputation through 
enhanced monitoring and reporting requirements.53 The Paris Agreement 
does not replace the Kyoto Protocol, so the liability mechanism of Kyoto 
remains. If in the near future, the Kyoto Protocol becomes redundant, the 
EU may have to make decisions regarding the first stage of distribution of 
liability rather than the redistribution of international liability. Thus, political 
and industrial interests clearly have a stake in the life of climate regulation in 
the EU and Member States. 
The role of voters and civil society appears to have had much less visible 
influence on climate regulation. In the Member States – as Urgenda shows – 
climate change concerns have been mooted by civil society and citizens, but 
they have not directly affected the nature of regulatory response (such as the 
type of climate instruments) that may be adopted. Thus, perhaps one reason 
why there was relative disinterest in responding to the EET survey is that the 
EU ETS has created a path-dependent analytical interest in industrial actors 
rather than other influences behind climate regulation. Indeed, accounts in 
favour of policies such as a PCT or a climate instrument that seeks to involve 
individuals usually point out that unlike a scheme such as the EU ETS, there 
is less opportunity for political interests to shape climate policy.54 One of 
the highlights of a regulatory orientation regarding citizen-engagement with 
climate change is that there appears to be no obvious interests that Member 
States or organised lobby groups may have; rather, it would be smaller players 
that shape the information and technologies of individual engagement 
with climate change that would be interested. I would like to suggest that 
though this account of public choice being of explanatory value in relation 
to regulatory choices such as the EU ETS rather than an EET appears to 
make intuitive sense, it is misplaced. Should the individual be replaced by the 
phrase ‘end-user’ and end-user engagement be seen in either a sectoral way, or 
52 Hence the view that the Paris Agreement lacks teeth. Clive Spash, ‘This Changes Nothing: 
The Paris Agreement to ignore reality’ (2016) 13 Globalizations 928.
53 Article 13 of the Paris Agreement provides a ‘transparency framework’ to build ‘mutual 
trust and confidence’ with enhanced reporting requirements. The text is available at: https://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf. 
54 Chamberlin et. al. ‘Reconciling Scientific Reality with Realpolitik’, supra.
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one that involves private transport,55 electricity, food;56 essentially collective 
economic actors; then it is not difficult to see why public choice concerns 
would be compelling. Further, should aspects of the EET substitute goods and 
services attached to interest groups involved in either the EU ETS or other 
proposed measures, then political economy aspects seem more compelling. I 
expand on these ideas below. 
The intuition that the role of interest groups may provide negligible 
analytical insight for an EET may seem reasonable because (i) the traditional 
conceptualisations of the end-user as an individual or a household or the 
residential sector implies a disparate group of stakeholders; and (ii) those 
who have mooted a PCT-like instrument are a small community of scholars 
whose interests do not directly operate in the same ecosystem as industrial 
or regulatory interests. Methodologically, given that individuals tend to be 
irrational, and – as argued in Chapter 4 – behavioural economics provides 
very little guidance on how individuals may behave like firms, studying the 
political economy of strategic citizens may not be a fruitful endeavour. What 
should not be discounted is the public choice implication of this line of 
reasoning: if individuals cannot meaningfully engage in strategic behaviour, then 
there is an incentive for institutions that can engage in strategic behaviour to shift 
their burdens onto individuals. In other words, individuals may not be able to 
compete with firms in rent-seeking behaviour vis-à-vis climate regulation; they 
would pose a relatively insignificant threat in challenging the distributional 
impacts of climate policy. Currently, the challenges to the distributional 
impacts of climate policies in the EU and in Member States have been 
pursued (though mostly unsuccessfully) by companies like Arcelor who have 
the wherewithal to litigate their interests. There could well be an incentive for 
the ‘losers’ in political contests to support individual engagement with climate 
policy. The losers could either be industrial actors whose interests have been 
given short-shrift in the current climate policy framework or the regulators 
who have been unable to pursue their desired agendas. Van Zeben argues 
55 Federal debates about climate change in the US have been motivated primarily by clashes 
regarding emissions from automobiles. 
56 Agriculture is a sector not covered under the EU ETS, but as the Australian and New Zealand 
experiences demonstrate, agricultural emissions has been a highly politicized issues. 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   65 10/25/2017   5:13:29 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 190
172
Chapter 5
that in Phase III of the EU ETS, regulators in the EU can for the first time 
pursue a ‘market consolidation’ project since a desirable path-dependence57 
has now set in, assuaging the contests that raged during ‘market creation’ in 
Phases I and II.58 EU or Member State regulators, or actors covered under the 
ETS could also be looking to influence an EET scheme, other than the new 
players that an EET seeks to cover. The existing stakeholders would not have 
a say if an EET scheme leaves the current policy mix unaffected; however, a 
possible change in the current framework may well provide an incentive for 
different stakeholders to influence the nature and content of an EET scheme 
– or become ‘climate protagonists’.59 The nature of the ‘say’ exercised by a 
current stakeholder would depend on the ability of such stakeholder to shape 
climate regulation to suit her interests.60 Notable in this regard is the shift to 
auctioning in Phase III that imposes higher costs on industrial actors due to 
the requirement to purchase allowances. Just as the political economy of the 
EU ETS was charted in association with other alternatives and instruments 
such as a carbon tax, so can the political economy of the EET be said to be 
brought about in association with the EU ETS. 
57 The phrase ‘desirable path dependence’ may seem like a contradiction, as path-dependence 
connotes a self-reinforcing decision-making process that leads to suboptimal outcomes. For 
a discussion, see Edwin Woerdman, ‘Path-dependent Climate Policy: The history and future 
of emissions trading in Europe’ (2004) 14 European Environment 261, p. 263. However, 
there is no reason to assume that higher costs of reversing previous decisions or a decision 
making process cannot be set-off against the benefits that are achieved. As far as the EU ETS 
is concerned, it appears that the costs of market creation are reduced over time while climate 
targets are being steadily met; thus there appear to be increasing returns to the regulatory 
process. In relation to a new climate regulation, it is unclear whether the new market-creation 
and consolidation costs would necessarily complement the EU ETS. Further, for climate 
change, we are dealing with ‘non-ideal’ situations: unaccounted historical contributions, 
moderated discounting for future risks, collective action problems all contribute to the reality 
of institutional action on climate change. 
58 Josephine van Zeben, Competence Allocation and Regulatory Functioning: A study of the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, ACLE dissertation Series No. 5, pp. 171-200. 
59 I borrow this phrase from Jacob M. Grumbach, ‘Polluting industries as climate protagonists: 
cap and trade and the problem of business preferences’ (2015) 17:4 Business and Politics 633.
60 For an account of how identifying the relationship between interests and reason is the core of 
behavioral research, see Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More nuts and bolts for the social 
sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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In addition, there is a normative argument to be made for analysing 
the relationship between an EET and the EU ETS; and that simply is that 
the substitution of the EU ETS (or possible extension of the EU ETS into 
other sectors) with an EET may be undesirable. Van Zeben assesses whether 
centralisation or decentralisation of the EU ETS involves more compelling 
public choice considerations such as regulatory capture by industrial 
groups or environmental interest groups, concluding that the proximity 
of decentralised regulators tends to favour capture at a ‘local’ level.61 She 
recognizes the possibility of capture at the EU level as well with industrial 
actors using EU regulation to fend off more intrusive national regulation. 
The possibility of capture, she argues, was well in play at the time of ‘market 
creation’; this is also supported by the issue of preferring grandfathering 
over auctioning mentioned above. The overallocation of allowances in Phase 
I due to industrial support for grandfathering62 continues to influence 
the low prices of allowances; and it will take several years till prices can 
stabilize.63 However –perhaps a bit counterintuitively for public choice 
scholars – she commends the path-dependence that has set in the EU 
ETS, where the competing interests for market creation is giving way to 
the more equilibrium-achieving interest of ‘market consolidation.’ As to 
whether there could indeed be a possible substitution effect by an EET is 
a matter that is discussed in the next chapter with respect to subsidiarity 
and Double Counting. For now, suffice it to say that much like the public 
acceptability of a particular scheme cannot be looked at in isolation; the 
political acceptability of an EET is mediated by political economy concerns 
arising from the climate policy mix. 
B. Political Economy Concerns of Other Potential Climate 
Measures
61 Josephine van Zeben, ‘(De)Centralised Law-making in the Revised EU ETS’ (2009) 3 Carbon 
and Climate Law Review 340, pp. 343-345. 
62 Meckling, supra. 
63 View taken by Point Carbon’s lead analyst; interview reported in Jillian Ambrose, ‘EU has 
‘failed’ to save carbon market from long-term gloom, say analysts’, The Telegraph, March 12, 
2016. 
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In the above section, it was argued that the substitution and complementary 
effects of an EET on interests associated with the EU ETS would provide a 
window into assessing the political acceptability of an EET without relying 
on the stated preferences of regulators provided in response to a survey. In this 
section, I suggest that the interests of stakeholders not currently involved in 
the EU ETS may also have a bearing on the political acceptability of an EET. 
A pre-ETS world was one where the threat of a carbon tax was looming 
in the air. In response, industrial actors in the UK, financial actors across 
the EU and the Commission joined hands in bringing about the EU ETS. 
The absence of a carbon tax could therefore be considered to be the primary 
‘opportunity benefit’64 of units covered under the EU ETS. The opportunity 
benefits include the advantages in being a first-mover for a policy that is 
poised to expand; the advantages of being an early actor in market creation 
and influencing the rules that future stakeholders would follow is notable over 
a less flexible policy such as a carbon-tax. A similar way of reasoning may be 
applied to a potential EET. A stakeholder not currently bearing the brunt of a 
carbon price may lobby for an EET if the opportunity benefits of avoiding an 
impending policy mechanism are higher than the costs incurred in an EET. 
This may explain, for instance, why companies such as Coca-Cola Enterprises 
fund research on PCT.65 It could be because they seek to avoid the imposition of 
a carbon price or carbon liability through a different policy mechanism. Though 
he uses the phrase ‘hedging strategy’ rather than reaping opportunity benefits, 
Meckling argues along similar lines when he says that while firms would 
seek to avoid the reputational costs of anti-regulatory strategies, they would 
64 Pindyck uses time as a mediator to assess opportunity welfare benefits of a social policy; in 
relation to adopting a policy at present, he assesses the present value of the additional flow 
of social cost from continued emissions. Robert Pindyck, ‘Irreversibilities and the Timing 
of Environmental Policy’(2000) 22:3 Resource and Energy Economics 233-259. I use it in a 
slightly different sense as benefits enjoyed by stakeholders in avoiding a costlier alternative. 
65 ‘Personal Carbon Allowances White Paper: How to help consumers makes informed choices’, 
Report developed by Carbon Trust and Coca Cola Company, 2012. Available at: https://
www.cokecce.com/news-and-events/news/personal-carbon-allowances-helping-consumers-
make-informed-choices. 
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propose or support regulatory measures that would ‘hedge’ against costlier 
policy options.66
Three developments in the current climate policy environment may 
lend support to the credibility of the suggestion that firms might promote 
mitigation measures that regulate individuals: (i) the international consensus 
in the Paris Agreement to adopt higher targets than those currently assumed, 
(ii) the inclination of Member States and environmental groups to take 
climate action in addition to the EU ETS, specifically (iii) proposals by 
Member States to robustly intervene in the production and sale of fossil-fuel 
based vehicles that would cover private transport. The Netherlands has for a 
while been seeking to impose fuel standards; an issue that has been contested 
in EU courts. Norway – alongwith some parliamentarians in the Netherlands67 
– has recently considered banning petrol and diesel based cars (or internal 
combustion cars) by 2025.68 France has followed suit, proposing a ban on 
petrol and diesel cars by 2040.69 Given such developments, there is clearly the 
possibility of either the expansion of the EU ETS to include newer industrial 
actors and installations, or the adoption of other more potentially costly 
measures such as taxes or command-and-control mechanisms such as fuel 
standards.70 The Dutch case with imposing higher fuel standards bore out the 
fact that internal market considerations might prompt action at an EU level 
66 Jonas Meckling, ‘Oppose, Support or Hedge? Distributional Effects, Regulatory Pressure and 
Business Strategy in Environmental Politics’ (2015) 15 Global Environmental Politics 19, pp. 
23 – 25. 
67 Janene Pieters, ‘MPS Want only zero emissions cars sold on Dutch market by 2025’, 
NLTimes, March 30, 2016. Available at: http://www.nltimes.nl/2016/03/30/mps-want-only-
zero-emissions-cars-sold-on-dutch-market-by-2025/. 
68 David J. Morris, ‘Norway Moves Towards Banning Gas-Burning Cars By 2025’, Fortune, 
June 4, 2016. Available at: http://fortune.com/2016/06/04/norway-banning-gas-cars-2025/. 
69 ‘France Plans to Ban All Diesel and Petrol Cars by 2040’ New Scientist, July 7, 2017.
70 Concerns have been raised regarding the pass-through of costs to consumers in proposed 
climate policies in other jurisdictions such as Australia. See for instance Lenore Taylor, ‘Labor 
proposes two emissions trading schemes costing $355.9m’, The Guardian, April 26, 2016. 
Restrictions on the pass-through of costs would incentivize the imposition of liability directly 
onto consumers. 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   69 10/25/2017   5:13:29 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 194
176
Chapter 5
rather than at the national level.71 In fact, the EU has already put in place fuel 
standards for passenger vehicles to kick in by 2021.72 It clearly may not be long 
before other potential sectors covered by the EET are brought into regulatory 
purview. It does stand to reason that those who would be affected by such 
policy mechanisms may choose an alternative policy mechanism (‘horizontal 
alternative’) or lobby for either the EU or Member State whichever affords a 
more favourable policy (or ‘vertical preference’) where they would either not 
have to bear the liability of compliance, or one where re-allocating or passing 
costs through may be easier. 
In the discussion above, I try to chart a political economy of EET, relying 
on ways of reasoning akin to the Public Choice approach. This approach places 
reliance on rational actors attempting to promote their interests by influencing 
the distributive preferences of political decisions. This is not, however, a BLE 
approach owing to an inclination for strategizing parties looking out for their 
interests. Would BLE be useful for public choice? The obvious way to do so 
would be to assess the psychological biases of individual strategisers, be it 
regulators, economic actors or influential civil society actors. However, in the 
introductory pages of this chapter, I argued against this approach, pointing out 
that regulations anchored by reason (or strategic decisions in case of economic 
actors) are political choices. Individuals may state an opinion and behave in a 
different way, thus meriting the study of responsiveness as against acceptability. 
Not so with respect to regulators or experts. With respect to this book, there 
should be a non-contingent rational ‘autonomous justification’ for an EET. 
Having said that, the thrust of this section has been to demonstrate that the 
absence of political economy concerns cannot be assumed. As indicated, 
the political economy of EET can be studied and analysed using the tools 
of public choice theory, where different interest groups strategically seek to 
become winners as climate protagonists. In such analyses, therefore, it may 
appear that BLE has no place. I would like to suggest that BLE might have 
a place, but this is not necessarily an obvious one. It is one that draws on the 
idea of BLE described in Chapter 3 – a discipline that is not restricted to some 
71 For the Commission’s initial reaction, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-879_
en.htm. 
72 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/cars/index_en.htm
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forms of psychology, and may look to different social sciences to pursue its interest in 
analysing actual behaviour without deferring to the axiomatic counterfactual of the 
rational actor. As suggested in Chapter 3, BLE is not restricted to the tabulation 
of predictable deviations from rationality that can be tested in a lab. Rather, 
it involves developing an analytical toolkit drawing on behavioural disciplines 
to understand behaviour once the rationality assumption has been relaxed. 
Specifically, while analysing the political economy concerns raised above, 
I came across an extension of the idea of regulatory capture to the concept 
of ‘cognitive capture’ of regulators and experts engaged in rational decision-
making processes. This concept, to my mind, captures the spirit of BLE in the 
realm of collective decision-making as it is concerned with the formulation of 
public reason, and unlike conventional political economy approaches utilized 
in Sections A and B, does not concentrate on the rational interest-based 
distortions of public reason. It nonetheless captures the idea of actors being 
influenced by forces other than rational deliberation that lead to good policy. 
In the following section, I discuss the idea of cognitive capture, and argue that 
the word ‘cognitive’ may be misleading owing to its association with cognitive 
psychology, and suggest instead that the category of ‘discursive capture’ proxies 
the concept better. Subsequently, I suggest that though evidence of discursive 
capture cannot be obtained in the same manner that deviations from rational 
actor models can be gleaned from the experimental method, it is possible to 
identify properties of this concept in order to avoid overestimating its presence 
or assuming its absence.
C. ‘Hard-wired’ Biases in Public Reason: BLE and Political 
Economy of EET
i. Re-thinking Capture 
In their edited collection of studies on ‘Preventing Regulatory Capture’, Moss 
& Carpenter conclude that the scholarship on capture is turning a corner; 
this turn is towards studying capture as ‘mechanisms of influence’ that define 
and restrict the public interest.73 This is different from the conventional 
73 Daniel Carpenter and David Moss (eds) Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest 
Influence and How to Limit it (Cambridge: CUP, 2013).
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concentration on identifying wilful rational acts of some industrial actors in 
buying out regulators, and ‘bad’ regulators who voluntarily sacrifice the public 
interest once they see an alignment of their material self-interest with those 
of certain industries.74 Traditionally, regulatory capture involves actual and 
expected utility gains enjoyed by regulators by way of career opportunities 
within and outside the regulatory sphere.75 Though such gains were initially 
identified to make an argument in favour of less regulation, industry pressure 
to reduce regulation is now a widely acknowledged form of capture.76 of 
the defining property of capture is the asymmetry in the influence yielded 
by interest groups that can be arbitraged for affecting the distribution or 
redistribution of gains and liability.77 This conceptualization does not directly 
accommodate the possibility that capture might exist despite regulators acting 
in good-faith, and private actors not intentionally seeking to game regulation. 
Would it be possible to provide a more behaviourally constrained account of 
capture? This is where discursive capture comes in. 
In relation to financial regulation, regulators such as Adair Turner 
acknowledge the possibility of the ‘mindset’ of associations developed due to 
74 The coining and elaboration of the concept of regulatory capture is credited to Stigler. 
George Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science 3. 
75 For a summary, see Luigi Zingales, ‘Preventing Economists’ Capture’ in Preventing Regulatory 
Capture, supra, pp. 124 – 151. 
76 Posner provocatively asks: given the fact that industries seek to weaken rather than grab hold 
of regulation, has the concept of ‘capture’ become meaningless? Richard Posner, ‘The Concept 
of Regulatory Capture: A short, inglorious history’ in Preventing Regulatory Capture, supra, 
pp. 49 - 56. Moss & Carpenter respond that while Posner is right in his observation of 
dramatic changes in how capture is done, the idea of capture remains as relevant as ever. 
David Moss and Daniel Carpenter, ‘Conclusion: A focus on evidence and prevention’ in 
Preventing Regulatory Capture, Ibid, p. 456. 
77 Conventionally, the concentration was on identifying political processes that directed 
regulatory interest away from the satisfaction of public interest. This – as Engstrom puts it – 
had the obvious problem of defining public interest. David Engstrom, ‘Corralling Capture’ 
(2013) 36 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 31. This is especially problematic in the case 
of climate change where the benefits of climate regulation are difficult to ascertain. Jonathan 
Masur and Eric Posner, ‘Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2011) 
99 California Law Review 1557.
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their connection with actors in the financial services industry.78 Thus a form 
of ‘cognitive capture’ arises out of regulators and financiers thinking along the 
same lines; the language of regulation is shaped by ‘common backgrounds, 
education, experience and intermingling of powerful players in the policy-
making process.’79 The substantive content of the interactions between 
regulators and interest groups is shaped by cultural capital that such actors 
seek, primarily ‘group identification, status and relationship networks’.80 The 
idea of cognitive capture that scholars articulate and extend relies heavily on 
a much-cited article by Hanson & Yosifson where they developed the idea of 
‘deep capture’: a replacement of Stigler’s idea of regulatory capture based on 
interacting rational agents with a situated account based on psychologically 
and socially constrained agents.81 They argue that we live in a world of deep 
capture where the universalisation of particular interests is perpetuated even 
without the moderating force of deliberate strategic interests. The focus is 
shifted from identifiable and measurable individual incentives to structural and 
interactional influences behind regulatory cognizance and decision-making 
that are difficult to identify and measure, especially using the tools available 
to economists. Given this difficulty of identification and tools of assessing 
validity and reliability, it is not difficult to see why economists – much like 
the relevance of psychology prior to Kahneman and Tversky’s systematization 
of social and cognitive psychology in economic models – may be hesitant to 
take deep capture or its variants seriously. If everything can be labelled deep 
capture or cognitive capture, then nothing is. Further, there is no evidence to 
suggest that all forms of capture are undesirable; it could be argued that it is 
only when capture either has the potential or can be shown to work against 
public benefit that it becomes undesirable. Moss & Carpenter suggest that 
evidence-based diagnosis of capture is crucial, though a presumption against 
78 Cited in James Kwak, ‘Cultural capture and the Financial Crisis’ in Preventing Regulatory 
Capture pp. 78 – 79.
79 Lawrence G. Baxter, ` Capture in Financial Regulation: Can we channel it toward the common 
good’ (2011) 21 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 175, p. 183
80 Kwak, supra, p. 79. 
81 Jon Hanson and David Yosifson, ‘The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, 
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture’ (2003) 152 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 129. 
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over-diagnosis should not preclude taking preventive measures to avoid it. 
Further, scholars working in political economy are systematically beginning 
to study variants of deep capture. Allow me to explain with the help of an 
example from my engagement with CRAs discussed briefly in Chapter 3. 
An area where different forms of capture has been sought to be studied is 
financial regulation. Indeed the informants of capture identified in financial 
regulation – education, interaction, relationship networks – can be empirically 
examined; there has been a ‘revolving door’ that has gained a monopoly 
on transactions over time between expertise about the assessment of risk, 
industrial actors who finance the generation of expertise, and national and 
international regulators.82 What makes this door problematic is (i) conflict 
of interest, and (ii) homogeneity among a small group of participants. While 
traditional capture existed over time that created a ‘universal language of risk 
assessment’ through interactions facilitated by the revolving door; deep capture 
lies in how this language operates on its own without the strategic behaviour 
of individual lobbyists or regulators or knowledge-brokers. This language pre-
empts competition among risk-assessment technologies, or consideration of 
different understandings of welfare through credibility assessments. Thus, 
even without evidence of individual instances of strategic behaviour, it is 
possible to make an argument for a path-dependent cartelized information 
space that shapes how individual regulators approach and understand the 
idea of credit risk.83 Admittedly, I was able to make this argument because 
there was a retrospective consensus on the erosion of public benefit by the 
assessment and management of credit risk that contributed to the recent 
credit crisis. Once there was evidence on the compromise of public benefit, 
I was able to buttress the claim of discursive capture with the support of 
evidence of traditional capture over time and space. While I felt it necessary 
to identify a form of capture that exists without individual instances of a 
Stiglerian pursuit of interests, I would not feel confident in making a claim 
82 Kwak, ‘Cultural capture and the Financial Crisis’, supra; Baxter, `Capture in Financial 
Regulation’, supra. 
83 Mennillo and Roy, ‘Ratings and Regulation’, supra, n. Per Miranda Fricker, `pure’ power 
structures condition the credibility attributed to the speaker, and make it difficult for the 
hearer to actively change the way the speaker is heard. Fricker, supra.
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of ‘reason’s entanglements with social power’84 in the absence of a historical 
revolving door, conflicts of interest and homogeneity among participants. 
Coming back to Moss & Carpenter’s plea to prevent the reduction of public 
benefit due to capture, it needs to be asked: can the idea of deep capture or 
cognitive capture be used analogously in areas which do not benefit from 
hindsight bias, i.e. where there is no evidence of an erosion of public benefits 
or welfare? Drawing on Edwin Woerdman’s analysis of institutional path-
dependence,85 Zeki Sarigil’s concept of habitual path-dependence86 and James 
Kwak’s account of cultural capture,87 I suggest it is advisable to invest in the 
prevention of discursive capture. 
A clarification before I move on to a discussion of these three accounts: 
it may appear that I conflate path-dependence and capture. In effect, they 
might mean the same depending on the breadth of their conceptualisation. 
However, I would like to note that intuitively capture can lead to path-
dependence, but more crucially capture has distribution as its central 
concern. In traditional regulatory capture – as is true for the entirety of public 
choice theory – there is an attempt to secure privileged gains or comparative 
benefits in relation to other agents. This could either be in relation to ex-ante 
distribution or ex-post redistribution in relation to any regulation (including 
deregulation.88). In the example on credit risk discussed above, the same 
applies to deep capture, where some distributive privileges are found in a 
path-dependent way of assessing and managing credit risk. The avoidance 
of securing privileged gains has a value in itself due to its potential to distort 
the achievement of desirable policy outcomes. This idea is different from 
a desirable path-dependence (as discussed in relation to the EU ETS), as 
path-dependency does not necessarily contain the potential of distorting the 
way the reasonableness of a policy has been worked out. Even if we were to 
narrow down path-dependence to welfare, much like the presumption against 
84 See the discussion in Section II. B., Chapter 3. 
85 Woerdman, ‘Path-dependent Climate Policy’, supra. 
86 Zeki Sarigil, ‘Showing the Path to Path-dependence: The habitual path’ (2015) 7 European 
Political Science Review 221.
87 Kwak, supra.
88 Carpenter and Moss, Preventing Regulatory Capture, p. 21. 
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monopolistic behaviour, there is a presumption against capture owing to the 
collapsing of discourses and approaches into a privileged institutional outlook. 
This suggestion receives support from accounts on how mitigation of power 
through distributive mechanisms such as division and separation of powers 
leads to growth-enhancing institutional innovation.89 Distributed power 
facilitates both bargaining among and experimentation within institutions.90 
Capture – whatever form it might take – has the potential to pre-empt or 
dilute the potential for inter-institutional bargaining and disincentivise intra-
institutional experimentation. 
ii. Preventing Discursive Capture
Inspired by Max Weber’s ideal types of social action, Sarigil identifies three 
types of path-dependence: utilitarian, normative and habitual.91 The first type 
concentrates on any form of self-reinforcing dynamic that shapes the achievement 
of maximizing expected utility or resulting in a socially optimal outcome. The 
second does not concentrate on any outcome, but a pre-determined belief in 
certain values or norms that constitute the path. Both these types of path-
dependence are characterized by the property of deliberative agency of agents 
to choose an option that ‘is expected to achieve the highest degree of ideational 
or material benefits or efficiency’. Habital path-dependence, on the other 
hand, happens because choice-making happens within a ‘behavioural lock-in’92 
or an internalized disposition, capacity, or power that generates a tendency.93 
In Woerdman’s analysis of path-dependence in European climate policy, the 
89 Eric Chaney, ‘Separation of Powers and the Medieval Roots of Institutional Divergence 
between Europe and the Islamic Middle East’ in Masahiko Aoki, Timur Kuran and G´erard 
Roland (eds.) Institutions and Comparative Economic Development (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), pp. 116-127. 
90 In van Zanden’s memorable phrase, a ‘wave of institutional gadgets’ are brought about when 
institutional negotiations are in play. Jan Luiten van Zanden, ‘The Road to the Industrial 
Revolution: Hypotheses and conjectures about the medieval origins of the ‘European Miracle’’ 
(2008) 3 Journal of Global History 337, pp. 351 – 354. 
91 Weber’s four types of social action were: instrumentally rational, value rational, affectual 
(emotional) and traditional (habitual). Sarigil, supra n., pp. 227 – 228. 
92 William Barnes, Myles Gartland and Martin Stack, ‘Old Habits Die Hard: Path Dependency 
and Behavioral Lock-in’ (2004) 38 Journal of Economic Issues 371. 
93 Sarigil, supra n., 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   76 10/25/2017   5:13:30 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 201
183
Political Choices regarding an EET
5
analytic core is the possibility of an institutional lock-in that may result in 
sub-optimal climate policies unless there is an ‘institutional break-out’ usually 
caused by exogenous changes. The argument goes that there is a tendency of 
climate regulators to opt for incremental changes to existing environmental 
policies (given sunk costs, learning effects and increases in institutional scale) 
thereby avoiding the switching costs to an optimal policy alternative.94 The 
example Woerdman provides is the sub-optimal regulatory choice for credit-
trading over permit-trading due to the path-dependence of policy makers in 
voluntary energy-efficiency standards; the addition of credit trading would add 
flexibility to the standards that existed and allow perpetuation. It may be noted 
that Woerdman subscribes to one of the properties of Sarigil’s characterisation 
of utilitarian path-dependence: the assessment of a socially optimal outcome. 
Though an institutional break-out requires regulators to respond rationally 
to internal and external political events, the acquisition and continuation 
of path-dependence does not seem to involve a maximization of expected 
utility by regulators. Woerdman’s account, therefore, veers towards a habitual 
path-dependence of regulatory behaviour, with the qualification that such 
habits or path-dependence is retrospectively or externally understood against 
an efficiency criterion.95 From the point of view of prevention, pre-emptive 
costs that may be incurred to avoid higher costs of path-dependent policies 
are (i) consideration of alternative policies, and (ii) an authoritative external 
basis for comparison of such policies. The concentration on prevention rather 
than achievement of efficiency or optimality draws inspiration from Sarigil’s 
observation that terms such as efficiency assume a pre-determined value – and 
assumptions about subjective assessments of benefits –that constitutes the 
path. Kwak provides flesh to this suggestion in his examination of the financial 
crisis: without the benefit of hindsight, it could still be assumed that price 
and availability of credit is most efficiently determined through a market of 
94 Woerdman, ‘Path-dependent Climate Policy’, supra, p. 268. 
95 “Regulation is thought to be dominant when it is (formally adopted and) effectively 
implemented, while its alternative is not. Superiority is defined in terms of efficiency. By 
doing so, we avoid any absence of institutional change being called an institutional lock-in, 
which would make the theory too broad and imprecise.” Woerdman, ibid, p. 265. 
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unregulated financial services.96 I do not necessarily97 disagree that an ideal 
conceptualisation of efficiency (as Woerdman does) can put path-dependency 
retrospectively in perspective. At the same time, given the different ways in which 
efficiency can be utilized in climate policy,98 a preferable alternative would be 
to ‘debias’ regulators through the requirement to consider alternative policies, 
and to consider institutional mechanisms to counteract biases.99 Woerdman, 
for instance, observes that in the Netherlands, the Social-Economic Council 
in its advisory role could not upstage the inclination of several ministries and 
energy-intensive industries to adopt a permit-trading system.100 This may not 
have been the case if a reviewing body such as the Office of the Information 
and Regulatory Affairs in the United States or the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
in the EU could re-direct or compel a reasoned review of the policy disposition 
to adopt a credit-trading scheme. Rather, there would have been an external 
incentive for regulators to invest in considering and effecting a ‘break-out’ from 
path-dependent policies. The possibility of inter-institutional bargaining and 
intra-institutional experimentation (discussed earlier) appears to have been 
96 Kwak, supra n, p. 74. It may be noted that Sunstein and Thaler in Nudge (published prior to 
the financial crisis) did not find an institutional problem with the lending practices of banks 
and opposed limits on subprime mortgage lending as that would be too intrusive on peoples’ 
choices. The preferred approach was disclosure of total fees and interest. For a discussion, see 
Samuel Freeman, ‘It’s In Your Own Best Interest’, New York Review of Books, October 24, 
2013. 
97 I am yet to be convinced of the value of efficiency as an organising principle of regulatory 
decisions. Both Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and Pareto efficiency are difficult to accept after 
Coase identified the inevitable existence of positive transaction costs, and appealed for a 
comparative institutional analysis as the preferred way of understanding costs. This position 
was clarified by Coase on multiple occasions but most succinctly demonstrated by Calabresi. 
Guido Calabresi, ‘The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase further’ (1991) 100 Yale Law 
Journal 1211.
98 We will see in Chapter 6 the difficulties in defining efficiency, whereby the simpler alternative 
of cost-effectiveness is usually preferred. The identification and quantification of optimality 
entails costs that lead to the discounting or even avoidance of several costs and benefits. This is 
true for environmental policy in general and climate change in particular. For environmental 
law regulation in general, see Amy Sinden, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis, Ben Franklin and the 
Supreme Court’ (2014) 4 UC Irvine Law Review 1175. For climate policy in particular, see 
Masur and Posner, ‘Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis’, supra. 
99 Ibid, Kwak relies on Sunstein and Jolls for the idea of debiasing. 
100 Woerdman, ‘Path-dependent Climate Policy’, supra, p. 268.
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   78 10/25/2017   5:13:30 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 203
185
Political Choices regarding an EET
5
pre-empted. The suggestions Moss & Carpenter offer after a review of multiple 
accounts of avoiding capture are all in relation to institutional mechanisms 
that consider alternatives and review existing regulatory inclinations; the 
suggestions would be familiar to scholars of administrative law: diverse forms of 
expertise, judicial review, a body to conduct retrospective regulatory oversight.101 
While investment in such alternatives is supported from the perspective of 
fair procedure, such investment would be of similar value to avoid discursive 
capture. As regulators and experts alike are amenable to discursive capture the 
way it has been conceptualised in this section, I try something unconventional 
below. I try to apply the idea of preventing discursive capture to my own 
thinking on climate regulation. 
iii. Preventing Discursive Capture in EET: A Reflective Note on Negotiating 
Efficiency and Fairness
While writing this book, I felt that several members of different departments 
at the law faculty at the University of Groningen would talk past each 
other on European Law or consumer law or environmental law, and rare 
attempts at compatibility would be made. This is not necessarily a problem; 
as the discussion on psychological and sociological approaches to climate 
regulation in Chapter 3 demonstrated, different approaches could well have 
independent value without being discursively compatible.102 In the legal 
academia, there is often a divide among scholars who value deontology and 
hermeneutic approaches (scholars who normally work on human rights, 
citizenship, continental philosophy) on one hand and others who value 
consequentialism and scientific approaches (scholars who normally work on 
finance, competition law, economic analysis) on the other. To me, it would 
be unwise to situate either climate regulation or BLE in either of these camps 
as it deals with both deontological and consequential questions. It would be 
useful to avoid missing out on knowledge because of ‘credibility deficit’ or 
‘credibility excess’ attributed to some forms of scholarship.103 It may appear 
101 Moss and Carpenter, ‘Conclusion’, supra, pp. 451 – 465. 
102 See the debate between Elisabeth Shove and Lorraine Whitmarsh discussed in Chapter 3, 
Section III.A. 
103 See the discussion on Testimony in Chapter 3, Section III B. 
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that L&E is found in the consequentialist camp; this is so if we were to follow 
a Beckerian or Posnerian way of analysing the world. However, deontological 
scholars such as Ronald Dworkin104 made equally arresting contributions to 
L&E. Subscribing exclusively to either of these ways of analysing regulation 
may well be a manifestation of discursive path dependence. Should epistemic 
choices be completely intentional or after a rational assessment of costs and 
benefits, then there would be little scope for the applicability of BLE. I 
suspect, however, that the influence of training, networks, incentive schemes, 
job security, desire to belong to a community has the potential to create a 
form of naturalised discursive capture that may not be intended or beneficial 
for contribution to knowledge or informing regulatory choices. How do 
we prevent discursive capture? I believe Calabresi can show us the way. If 
the reader would indulge me for the remainder of this chapter, I will try to 
demonstrate how, and in the bargain develop a conceptualisation that I would 
use in subsequent chapters. 
The survey conducted and reported in Section III yielded mixed and in 
some cases contradictory responses. In brief, it seemed to me that responses 
pointing to unfair attributes of the EET could not be reconciled with ferreting 
out administrative and implementation costs. While designing the survey, 
I felt I should give equal importance to both efficiency and fairness. While 
efficiency considerations moderated most of the questions asked (governance, 
104 Despite popular acceptance of Dworkin’s deontological orientation, there is some confusion 
as to how Dworkin’s analytical outlook may be categorised. This is due to his claim that 
his ‘embedded approach’ to legal reasoning seeks to look out for desirable consequences: 
“It [the embedded approach] aims at a structure of law . ..that is egalitarian . . . .And it is 
consequential in detail: Each interpretive legal argument is aimed to secure a state of affairs 
that is superior,according to principles embedded in our practice.” Ronald Dworkin, ‘In 
Praise of Theory’ (1997) 29 Arizona State Law Journal 353, p. 361. However, as Kamm 
clarifies, the import of this statement means that there are no deontological characteristics 
of legal reasoning that obstruct legal decisions that ‘best express deontological principles 
embedded in practice’. This is made clear in Dworkin’s disagreement with Posner where 
Dworkin does not critique Posner’s outlook towards consequentialism but the deontological 
values that Posnerian efficiency is geared towards. Dworkin claims that the maximisation of 
aggregate welfare is the deontological principle implicit in Posnerian efficiency at the cost of 
fairness and equality. Frances Kamm, ‘Theory and Analogy in Law’ (1997) 29 Arizona State 
Law Journal 405, p. 410.
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EU ETS concerns, system design, and questions in the fairness section such 
as buying and selling of allowances), fairness concerns crop up regularly in 
analyses of schemes akin to the EET (see Chapter 2); this motivated me to 
have a separate section on fairness. The difficulty with the terms efficiency 
and fairness is that they are often incompatible, primarily because the former 
is the outcome aimed at by economists and the latter the central point of 
inquiry by many philosophers and legal scholars. This is not to say that 
economists do not study fairness and philosophers or legal scholars do not 
study efficiency, but that their training lends themselves to opt for one of these 
two concerns as the central unit of analysis. This is evident in the professed 
incompatibility of the positions taken by economists such as Richard Posner 
and philosophers such as Jules Coleman in ferreting out the discipline of L&E.105 
While reconciliation seemed difficult, what is noteworthy is that scholars 
inclined towards economic analysis and philosophical analysis provided an 
authoritative review of each other, thus allowing the possibility of L&E to 
avoid discursive capture. Having said that, it seems necessary to identify with 
a particular discipline in order to make a rigorous or scientific contribution. 
This was my way of thinking while conducting my literature review in 
Chapter 2 and while designing the survey described in this chapter. However, 
this is not the only way to conduct analyses. The possibility of reconciling 
disciplines – and their discursive orientation – was demonstrated by Calabresi 
where he engaged in ‘middle-theorising’106 and for that was attacked by both 
philosophers107 and economists.108 Per Calabresi, the primary idea that lies at 
the core of both efficiency and fairness (or ‘justice’ as he put it) is distribution; 
it is a concentration on distribution that makes both justice and efficiency 
105 Most of these debates are captured in the 1980 ‘Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern’ 
published in the Hofstra Law Review. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/
hlr/vol8/iss3/. 
106 For a review, see James R. hackney Jr., ‘Guido Calabresi and the Construction of American 
Legal Theory’ (2014) 77:2 Law and Contemporary Problems 45; Keith N. Hylton, ‘Calabresi 
and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics’ (2005) 64 Maryland Law Review 85. 
107 Dworkin disliked Calabresi’s interest in efficiency. Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’ 
(1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 191, p. 205.
108 Posner disliked Calabresi’s interest in justice. Richard Posner, ‘Guido Calabresi’s ‘The Costs of 
Accidents’: A Reassessment’ (2005) 64 Maryland Law Review 12, p. 15.
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compatible. Drawing on this line of thinking, I would like to suggest that a 
focus on distribution is both reflective of the real world of climate regulation 
as well as the way towards reconciling some of the key tensions in an EET 
scheme. Importantly, the Calabresian way avoids being invested in a particular 
discourse that creates categories of how the world is viewed and policies are 
made, but provides a way to negotiate discourses traditionally thought to be 
found in either the science of economics or the rigour of philosophy. A strong 
discursive preference – identified by a cultural belonging to a community 
that is trained in a similar way of thinking109 or that is unwittingly shaped by 
the same professional incentives110 – has the potential to partition regulatory 
discourse, or one that is inclined to view climate policy as a justice-based issue 
or one that opts for a narrow language of efficiency. 111 
In Section IV.A and IV.B, the role of interest groups in influencing 
the distribution of climate liability was discussed. Calabresi’s interpretation 
of The Problem of Social Cost was that “where a market does not exist to 
internalize costs, the assignment of liability will have the effect of creating 
a market or market-like interconnections between classes of agents that will 
cause relevant costs etc. to be reflected in the prices faced by all agents.”112 
This is precisely how the flexibility mechanisms came about in the Kyoto 
Protocol through Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, the 
Burden Sharing Decision in the EU and finally the EU ETS through the 
Emissions Trading Directive. As to how this has a hold on climate policy in 
Member States as well will be discussed in Chapter 6, but for now, it may 
109 Drawing on Douglas Vick, a discursive discipline is characterised by two primary properties: 
it is a body of knowledge designed around ‘internal protocols and assumptions, characteristic 
behaviours and self-sustaining values’, and it is a social community whose members share 
‘personal experiences, values and aesthetic judgements’. Douglas Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity 
and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 163, p. 166.
110 The attachment to a particular scientific or social-scientific discipline to understand law is 
susceptible to disciplinary fashions and politics that shape the manner and language of inquiry. 
See Suryapratim Roy, ‘Privileging (some forms of ) Interdisciplinarity and Interpretation: 
Methods in Comparative Law’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 786. 
111 Kysar provides nuance on when ‘different truths’ may be spoken to the same powers in relation 
to climate regulation, and when that may prove to be difficult owing to incontestable regulatory 
views on what efficiency entails. See Kysar, ‘Politics by Other Meanings’, supra, p. 68. 
112 This reconstruction is Medema’s. Medema, ‘Juris Prudence’, supra, p. 78. 
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be noted that the ‘cap’ in the ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme that characterizes the 
EU ETS is a result of distributive choices, enforced by placing liability on 
installations in certain sectors for payment of large penalties in the event of 
non-compliance, in addition to making reparations for unpriced emissions. 
What distinguishes the EU ETS from a carbon tax is the creation of a 
market that would arrive at a price of carbon, and what distinguishes the 
permit-trading preference of the EU ETS from a credit-trading mechanism 
is the fixed cap decided on distributive preferences enforced by a ‘nuclear 
option’ of high penalties. To clarify, the penalties required under the EU 
ETS do not require an estimation of the social cost of carbon,113 but operate 
more as exemplary damages that need to be paid for non-compliance by 
way of strict liability. The operation of strict liability is evident from a 
couple of cases where the CJEU effectively ruled that in the absence of 
force majeure, there is no room for firms to negotiate either the penalty 
or the reparations requirement.114 While the price of one tonne of carbon 
dioxide is (at the time of writing this chapter) lower than ten euros, the 
penalty for non-compliance for Phase III is one-hundred euros for one 
ton of extra emissions, in addition to a carry-over of the shortfall to the 
following year. The distributive choices that entail the setting of a cap (even 
the more flexible ‘intensity caps’ in some cap-and-trade systems such as the 
Chinese national ETS115), and implementing such caps such as the threat 
of penalty or reparations entails the assignment of liability. It is crucial to 
note that there are no great assessment costs incurred in deciding on the 
penalty; ingeniously, the price of carbon is left to the market, where market 
interactions take place after the assignment of liability that implements a 
113 As Calabresi has recently clarified, contrary to the perception of several economists, a liability 
instrument need not mimic the market, or arrive at a price assessment as if the market 
functioned properly. Guido Calabresi, ‘A Broader View of the Cathedral: The significance of 
the liability rule, correcting a misapprehension’ (2014) 77 Law and Contemporary Problems 1. 
114 C-203/12 Billerud Karlsborg Aktiebolag v Naturvårdsverket [2012] OJ C184; Case C-580/14 
Sandra Bitter v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:835.
115 See Yingying Zeng, Stefan E. Weishaar and Oscar Couwenberg, ‘Absolute v. Intensity-based 
Caps for Carbon Emissions Target Setting: An obstacle to linking the EU ETS to the Chinese 
National ETS?’ MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research Working Paper 
2016-008. 
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cap. Thus, the valuation of carbon is determined by the market, for which 
the recognition of property rights in the permits is imperative. Unlike the 
EU ETS characterised by a fixed enforceable cap, voluntary carbon trading 
practices or credit trading systems (such as the trading of Kyoto credits by 
countries to who responsibility for curbing emissions is not distributed) do 
not have a liability component. What it has instead is a market mechanism 
facilitated by regulation; the market entails recognition of the property 
rights found in the credits, as well as valuation of carbon116 through the 
functioning of the market. Thus, the primary alternatives to climate policy 
can be categorised as: 
Type of Instrument Categorisation of Instrument
Carbon tax Liability instrument
Credit-trading Property instrument
Cap-and-trade
Instrument based on assignment 
of liability + Valuation of carbon 
through bargaining (enforced by 
property rights) 
I realise that the characterization of cap-and-trade117 above is at odds with 
conventional views of the EU ETS that characterise it as an exclusively 
116 Admittedly, determining a baseline in credit trading mechanism above which credits can be 
earned is a controversial non-market component in the valuation of carbon. However, the 
valuation of the property right found in a credit is determined by market forces. 
117 The combination of assignment of liability and a market mechanism may appear unusual. 
However, prominent L&E scholars have analysed and advocated a ‘liability rule with a 
bargaining component’. See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, ‘Property Rules Versus Liability 
Rules: An economic analysis’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 713. Kaplow and Shavell 
advocate a liability rule with a bargaining component over a property rule to avoid the costs 
of strategic behaviour in a property rule. I do not suggest that the EU ETS is based on a strict 
liability rule in the Calabresian sense. I will argue in Chapter 7 that there is a constructive 
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property rights instrument. Given the importance of distributive concerns 
to the allocation of allowances in the EU ETS (starting with Kyoto and 
ending with National Allocation Plans in Phases I & II, and allocation 
to certain installations in certain sectors in Phase III) and the centrality 
of penalties in market-making, I beg to differ with this conventional 
discourse.118 Undoubtedly, an allowance amounts to a license that gives 
its purchaser a limited right to emit, and this right can be enforced in 
a court of law.119 However such license essentially implies that for those 
installations that are included in the EU ETS and required to pay a penalty 
for not meeting a cap, there is no inalienable entitlement to pollute. 
Currently, anyone willing to bear the registration costs can be registered in 
the EU ETS registry and participate in the market for emissions, but it is 
not mandatory for them to do so, i.e. there is no regulated liability attached 
to their participation. 
entitlement of all citizens to be free of climate risks against which liability is assigned. See also 
Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, ‘Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a legal entitlement to facilitate 
Coasean trade’ (1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 1027.
118 There is yet another argument to be made for the centrality of liability to the EU ETS. In 
an exclusively property rights framework, the property rights are clearly defined. This has 
never been the case with any permit trading mechanism. As Driesen puts it, ‘Unfortunately, 
typologies of property rights do not explain who owns what under an emissions trading 
scheme.’ David M. Driesen, ‘What’s Property Got to Do With It?’ (2003) 30 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 1003, p. 1011. In the Sulphur-dioxide trading programme in the United States that 
served as motivation for the EU ETS, Section 403f of the US Clean Air Act, 1970 clearly 
specified: “An allowance under this title is a limited authorization to emit sulfur dioxide....
Such allowance does not constitute a property right.” Available at: https://www.law.cornell.
edu/uscode/text/42/7651b. Notwithstanding the absence of formal property rights of the 
underlying asset, an EU ETS allowance as with a sulphur dioxide allowance, the property 
of transferability clearly exists, as is evident from derivate transactions in secondary markets. 
Taking account of this complexity, Button characterizes allowances in permit-trading 
frameworks as currencies rather than commodities. Jillian Button, ‘Carbon: Commodity or 
Currency? The Case for an International Carbon Market Based on the Currency Model’ 
(2008) 32 Harvard Environmental Law Review 57.
119 There are disputes, however, on how this right is characterized, and what duties may be 
conferred on others for recognition. This became evident in a case where legal categorizations 
of an allowance across jurisdictions had to be analysed; the issue was whether ownership of 
an allowance bestows corresponding duties on parties in different jurisdictions in the case of 
bonafide purchases of stolen allowances. Armstrong DL GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd. 
[2012] EWHC 10.
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Other than the above descriptive account of the centrality of 
distributive preferences in climate regulation, there could be a normative 
purpose of thinking about distribution for an EET. As we have seen from 
the survey, there is preference for the EET to be a mandatory mechanism 
without an opt-out clause, which means it would have to be enforced 
in a manner similar to the EU ETS. However, should this mandatory 
mechanism be enforced by a penalty if it is perceived to be unfair? I admit 
that the framing of questions in the survey was conceptually convoluted. 
The ‘fairness’ questions may have received more considered responses 
were they represented as they are: questions of distribution. Fairness often 
represents an incommensurable value preference and is often characterized 
by the idea that ‘each person should bear the cost of his or her activities’.120 
This is more in line with the polluter-pays principle. To a great extent, 
both Coase and Calabresi tried to find a way out of conflicting views 
about causality found in the polluter-pays principle. Rather than invest 
in causality, Calabresi’s preferred approach to ‘accident-like’ situations 
is ‘when in doubt, allocate the cost to the party who can most cheaply 
enter into transactions to rectify the error.’121 With regard to climate 
regulation, a causal responsibility-based polluter-pays principle would 
inevitably privilege one point of view in relation to liability for climate 
action across time and space;122 this is why fairness justifications could 
collapse into ‘intuitions about what is just.’123 These intuitions – much 
like preferred conceptions of efficiency – have the potential to assume a 
privileged way of defining fairness. To clarify, per Calabresi, distribution 
is not the same as ‘fair distribution of costs’; there is no normative pre-
determined fairness qualifier. Rather, distribution is descriptively a 
state of affairs in the world that has bearing on the effects of an event. 
120 Stephen G. Giles, ‘Causation and Responsibility after Coase, Calabresi and Coleman’ (1996) 
16 Quinnipac Law Review 255, p. 277. 
121 Guido Calabresi, ‘Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?’ (1968) 
33 Law & Contemporary Problems 429, p. 447. 
122 See discussion in Chapter 1, Section I, Part C on ‘Regulating Climate Behaviour’. 
123 Guido Calabresi, ‘First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can Economic 
Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?’ (1984) 69 Iowa Law Review 833, p. 833. 
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This informs regulatory assignments of entitlements and liability –or 
regulatory distribution – to shape desirable outcomes. Nor is efficiency an 
ideal or ‘as if ’ yardstick, but one which aims at identifying the ‘cheapest’ 
of available alternatives taking into account distributive realities; again, 
there is no pre-determined optimal model of efficiency.124 It should come 
as no surprise that BLE scholarship that questions the actual effects of 
normative interventions and the taken-for-granted axioms of economics 
is more in tune with Calabresi’s interpretation125 rather than Stiglerian 
interpretations of Coase.126
If we were to shift the discussion to distribution rather than fairness or 
efficiency, then we could see an EET as one where the liability for emissions is 
likely to be distributed to individuals or households. This distribution could 
amount to redistribution if it serves to substitute existing or potential liability 
of other participants in climate regulation, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
This brings us to two questions: what is the current regulatory mechanism 
within which issues of distribution and redistribution can be conceptualised? 
Secondly: is distribution of liability to individuals or households necessary 
and suitable, keeping in the mind the requirement to achieve the highest 
amount of emissions reduction at the lowest possible cost? To answer these 
questions, let us turn to climate regulation in the European legal order and 
whether an EET would satisfy the proportionality test. 
124 Calabresi argues that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is possible in a world of zero transaction costs, but 
not otherwise. He further argues that the Paretian criterion cannot provide any real guidance 
without taking into account distributive concerns; if there were no distributive concerns, then 
Pareto superior moves would have already happened. Calabresi, ‘The Pointlessness of Pareto’, 
supra, pp. 1221 – 1227.
125 There are two independent accounts to my knowledge of how Calabresi had foreseen BLE. 
Michael Faure, ‘Calabresi and Behavioural Tort Law and Economics’ (2008) 1 Erasmus Law 
Review 75; Hylton, ‘Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics’, supra, pp. 
100 – 101.
126 Given the psychological evidence supporting loss aversion, Sunstein argues that “the [Coase] 
theorem is wrong because the allocation of the legal entitlement may well matter in the 
sense that those who are initially allocated an entitlement are likely to value it more than 
those without the legal entitlement.” Cass Sunstein ‘Behavioral Analysis of Law’ (1997) 64 
University of Chicago Law Review 1175, p. 1179. 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   87 10/25/2017   5:13:31 PM
514920-L-bw-roy




This chapter started out by observing that there is a clash of two intuitions 
about the attractiveness of an EET: the first is to listen to what regulators 
have to say about it and gauge its feasibility. The second is to consider the 
opinions of regulators as problematic, given that regulators are people, and 
therefore they must be subject to the same biases as individuals. However, 
I argued that unlike individuals, there isn’t a disconnect between ‘stated 
preferences’ and choices of regulators in legal systems that value justification; 
what they say is what they do. Their reasoning serves as anchors for policies. 
Accordingly, I suggested that surveying regulators about an EET would fill 
a much-needed gap in understanding the political acceptability of an EET. 
To this end, I conducted a pilot survey, and subsequently a survey. In the 
survey conducted, I selected ‘experts’ as a control group to keep a check on 
the political preferences of regulators. Unfortunately, due to the low response 
rate, no robust conclusions could be drawn from the survey. Nonetheless, 
the responses to particulars were used to appreciate different views on of the 
components of an EET. 
The second part of the chapter concentrated on the political economy 
of an EET. Self-interest based behaviour of political agents in L&E is the 
concern of scholars working on public choice and political economy, where 
the interest is on how incentives influence the strategic behaviour of different 
agents. Schemes similar to an EET (such as the PCT) sorely miss such an 
account; this could be because climate regulation involving individuals and 
households do not conventionally bring into play public choice concerns.127 I 
argue that even if individuals and households may not constitute a compelling 
lobby group, interests of agents invested in the EU ETS, as well as agents 
seeking to avoid regulation in relation to sectors not covered by the EU ETS, 
would try to shape the contours of an EET. To the extent the EET serves as 
127 The public choice tradition focuses on organised interests rather than vague demands by 
disparate groups or individuals; even in the ‘shadow interest group’ theory where a general 
public demand influences regulation when an event occurs assumes that the shadow group 
would exhibit the characteristics of a general interest group. See Faure and Johnston, supra, 
p. 39. See also the discussion on the influence of relevant interest groups on environmental 
policy in Kirchgassner and Schneider, supra.
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a substitute to the EU ETS and for possible non-EU ETS regulation, agents 
may prefer an EET if it provides an ‘opportunity benefit’. This suggests that 
there may well be a disconnect between the stated preferences and political 
choices made by regulators. With respect to method, there appears to be 
limited utility for BLE as the concentration is on how strategic interests seek 
to attain distributional gains. 
Finally, while I disagreed with scholars who assume equivalence of 
individual cognition and collective or regulatory cognition, there is still a 
(much-needed) way of keeping the spirit of BLE alive in analysing collective 
decisions. This spirit can be found in the possibility of discursive capture: 
it is possible that institutions and regulators assume a privileged discourse 
in analysis and decision-making without strategically doing so owing to 
embedded social and cultural forces. I suggest that such discursive capture 
cannot be assumed, but needs to be established. Having said that, I argue that 
it would be wise to prevent such capture by allowing competing authorities 
to keep a check on each other. Calabresi took pains to avoid the capture of 
L&E by non-negotiable views on ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ by concentrating 
on the ‘middle-theorising’ of distribution. I adopt this view and argue that 
distribution reveals the analytical basis of the EU ETS: a combination of 
assignment of liability and adoption of a market mechanism to discover the 
price of carbon. This combination is crucial to appreciating the regulatory 
architecture of a possible EET scheme as we shall see in the two chapters 
that follow.
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   89 10/25/2017   5:13:31 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 214
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   90 10/25/2017   5:13:31 PM
514920-L-bw-roy




EU CLIMATE REGULATION, SUBSIDIARITY  
AND EET*
Proposals akin to an EET have been mostly silent on European law. Legal 
scholarship on climate change in the EU has centred primarily on tussles 
between the EU and Member States, and between industries and regulators. 
On the other hand, proposals on Personal Carbon Allowances and Tradeable 
Energy Quotas were developed by non-legal scholars who were making a 
case for the engagement of individuals in responding to climate change. The 
PCT Report betrays that the House of Lords did not address the influence 
of European law on a national climate measure. The only two articles that 
considered interactions with the EU legal order are Tina Fawcett’s article on the 
interest of PCT in the UK rather than other jurisdictions,1 and Arnaud Brohe’s 
analysis of the interaction of a PCT with the EU ETS.2 To summarise their 
positions briefly, Fawcett opines that the PCT should initially be introduced at 
the national level owing to factors such as particulars of energy consumption 
and wealth distribution. Brohe looks at possible economic interactions with 
* Some of the arguments mooted in this chapter can be found in Suryapratim Roy, ‘Distributive 
Choices in Urgenda and EU Climate Law’ in Catherine Banet and Martha Roggenkamp eds. 
European Energy Law Report XI (forthcoming, 2017). 
1 Fawcett, ‘Personal Carbon Trading in Different National Contexts’, supra.
2 Brohe, ‘Personal Carbon Trading in the context of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’, supra.
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the EU ETS, and insightfully points to overlaps that may not allow the PCT to 
generate any meaningful environmental benefit given the problems of Double 
Regulation and Double Counting. Further, unlike Fawcett, Brohe points to 
the inevitability of the EU coming into the picture for non-stationary actors 
such as individuals.3 Brohe’s insights could be substantially complemented 
by analyses of the interaction of a PCT scheme with European law. With this 
chapter I seek to fill this gap. Complementary to the analysis on the European 
political economy of an EET conducted in Chapter 5, is the discussion I’m 
about to embark on with respect to European regulation. 
i. The EU Climate Regulation Complex
In the Introduction to this book, it was suggested that voluntary action, 
incentive-based interventions as well as internalised motivations are 
inevitably situated in an institutional context. This inevitability requires us 
to assess and design regulation in a holistic sense, entailing the identification 
of parties that need to be regulated, the assignment of property rights to 
parties engaged in transactions, as well as to identify and mitigate transaction 
costs for these parties so that markets can work. Regulation may also well 
include complementary constraining mechanisms to ensure the achievement 
of desirable social outcomes. Given that regulation does not take place in 
vacuum, there are inevitably redistributive effects. The absence of a particular 
regulation entails retaining the status quo which cannot be assumed to be 
free of distributive concerns, be it exposure to climate risk, or the differential 
burdens placed in responding to such risks. 
A. The Constraining and Facilitative Role of EU Regulation
The first aspect of the inter-relationship between EU and Member State 
regulation is one of constraint: no national climate policy is independent 
of the EU. Some scholars argue that national climate measures have no 
independence at all; they are inevitably circumscribed both by primary and 
secondary European Law, namely Articles 291 and 292 of the Treaty of the 
3 Ibid, p. 473. 
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Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the EU ETS Directive.4 
Others are of the opinion that there is leeway, especially given Article 293 
TFEU that allows Member States to adopt more stringent measures,5 and the 
Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) that allows Member States to adopt measures 
not covered by the EU ETS. As we shall see, Member States do not have 
unfettered discretion with regard to these instruments and provisions. 
The second aspect is that an understanding of European regulation, 
rather than a narrower focus on positive law, brings forth considerations 
regarding an appropriate level of governing such a scheme. This reason is 
one of facilitation. The facilitative role of regulation would be evident to 
L&E scholars who consider the focus of regulation to be the reduction of 
transaction costs. Even within a realistic situation where transaction costs 
cannot be eliminated, regulation can serve to assist with guiding the behaviour 
of different stakeholders. In fact the entire enterprise of nudge and nudge-like 
devices is to facilitate the making of good choices. As discussed in Chapter 
4, the role of incentives may be useful for purposes other than facilitating 
efficient bargaining. If we look at European regulation, both constraint and 
facilitation are pursued simultaneously. Take for instance the harmonising role 
of the Energy Labelling Directive.6 The Directive constrains the freedom of 
Member States to do what they like in relation to energy efficiency; Member 
States are prohibited to deviate from the requirements laid down in piecemeal 
EU regulation on specific products giving effect to the Directive.7 Further 
Member States are mandated to allocate such requirements to suppliers and 
4 Ted Thurlings, ‘The Dutch Climate Case – Some Legal Considerations’, available at: http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2696343.
5 Lorenzo Squintani, Marijn Holwerda and Kars de Graaf,, ‘Regulating greenshouse gas 
emissions from EU ETS installations: what room is left for the Member States’ in Marjan 
Peeters, and Mark Stallworthy (eds.) Climate Law in EU Member States: Towards National 
Legislation for Climate Protection (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 67 – 88. 
6 Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on 
the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy 
and other resources by energy-related products OJ L 153, 18.6.20. 
7 Article 3 (1) (b) states: ‘with respect to products covered by this Directive, the display of other 
labels, marks, symbols or inscriptions which do not comply with the requirements of this 
Directive and of the relevant delegated acts is prohibited.’ 
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dealers to ensure that labels are designed and displayed in a certain way to 
ensure that the final consumer is adequately informed to make appropriate 
consumption choices. Facilitation occurs because the information costs 
of appropriate product labelling, as well as how Member States may deal 
with suppliers and dealers are specified. The Directive also aspires to play a 
distributive role that is facilitative for small and medium-sized entrepreneurs.8 
With respect to consumers, their choices are at the same time facilitated 
through aiding choices as well as constrained in comparison to pre-regulation 
availability of products. It must be noted, however, there is no liability on 
consumers to become energy efficient under the Directive; in this regard, the 
Directive does not mandate a distribution of responsibility to consumers. This 
brings us to a discussion on distribution and allocation. 
B. The Distributive Role of EU Regulation
Though the discussion above was framed in terms of constraint and facilitation, 
the terms ‘allocation’ and ‘distribution’ were used without explanation. I will 
seek to articulate what I mean by such terms in this section, as they are of 
crucial importance to not only this chapter and the ones to follow, but the 
entirety of the book.
In the literature review conducted in Chapter 2 I used the terms allocation 
and distribution interchangeably. In Chapter 5 I demonstrated that the Public 
Choice approach to climate policy is essentially a study of conflicts over the 
distribution and redistribution of costs (such as those that liability brings) and 
benefits (such as the ‘opportunity benefits’ of avoiding an alternative policy). 
Concerns regarding distribution are traditionally understood as being confined 
to the realm of the political, or issues that need to be dealt with prior to and 
despite reason-based inquiries. In relation to cost-benefit analyses, Adler and 
Posner point out that “the purpose of CBA, as typically understood, is to 
separate out the distributional issue and isolate the efficiency issue, so that 
8 Recital 25 states: ‘When Member States implement the provisions of this Directive, they 
should endeavour to refrain from adopting measures that could impose unnecessarily 
bureaucratic and unwieldy obligations on the market participants concerned, in particular 
small and medium sized enterprises.’ 
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the agency will evaluate projects solely on the basis of their efficiency.”9 Thus 
conceptualised, when parties bear differential costs and benefits in relation 
to regulation, such costs and benefits are allocated in pursuit of efficiency. In 
relation to climate regulation, therefore, a desirable division and separation 
of powers10 would thus be analysed from the point of view of allocation; 
changing responsibilities and burdens may amount to a transfer of wealth. 
Such allocation or transfer should theoretically not amount to redistribution, 
as that would then fall outside the purview of a rational assessment of a policy 
mechanism. I will show below that delineating allocative concerns from 
distributive concerns in relation to climate instruments is not feasible. Being 
mindful of the inevitability of distributive choices with respect to a climate 
instrument would, in turn, point towards a comparatively efficient choice. 
i. Distributive Choices in Climate Regulation 
The Hague District Court in Urgenda11 required the government of Netherlands 
to adopt higher climate targets. To do so, it made two distributive choices. The 
first is that the Court endorsed the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report finding 
that a reduction of 25 per cent by 2020 and 40 per cent by 2030 needs to be 
achieved by Annex 1 countries.12 It would be difficult to characterise this target 
as scientific as the target for ‘Annex 1’ countries is a distributive choice; the 
very idea of distinguishing among countries for a commons problem finds its 
roots in the political negotiations conducted under the aegis of the UNFCCC 
and the normative idea of Common but Differentiated Responsibility. The 
second distributive choice the Court made was to require the Netherlands 
to fulfil this target on its own, irrespective of the achievement of the EU as a 
collective or Annex 1 countries as a collective.13 The government argued that 
the Court made a redistributive choice by mandating the allocation of the 
9 Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, ‘Re-thinking Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (1999) 109 Yale Law 
Journal 165, p. 186. 
10 For a discussion on the concerns of division of powers and separation of powers to regulation, 
see Chapter 3, Section II. 
11 Urgenda, supra, n. 143, Chapter 3. 
12 Urgenda, para 2.15.
13 See Roy and Woerdman, ‘Situating Urgenda’, supra, p. 
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State’s resources away from other programmes such as climate adaptation.14 
This interpretation is a hasty one, as a claim of redistribution would require an 
assessment of how costly an instrument choice is, how it interacts with other 
goals and what effect it has on myriad stakeholders. What Urgenda makes 
clear is that the adoption of a climate target by a country has (at least) two 
distributive choices. This is just the starting point of the distributive choices 
embedded in the choice of climate instruments. 
After a target has been assumed, there is the question of achieving the 
target. It could be argued that this is where distribution ends and allocation 
begins. This is why the conflicts regarding National Allocation Plans (NAP) of 
the EU ETS were – as the phrase signifies – about allocation. However it needs 
to be stressed that allocation incorporates distributive preferences and possible 
redistributive effects; the allocation and adoption of Kyoto targets amounts 
to a distribution of climate responsibility. Such responsibility is marked by 
unequal distribution (captured in the concept of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities), and liability of Annex 1 countries to pay penalties for non-
compliance. This distributed responsibility is then passed on to industries in 
the EU through the EU ETS. It will require some explanation of the EU legal 
framework to attain clarity as to how this is done. Later on in this chapter, 
I will show that the method of carbon accounting and emissions inventories 
facilitated by the IPCC allows for the distribution of liability to industries.15 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the selection of industries and the imposition of 
penalties for non-compliance are distributive choices, as it involves different 
stakeholders bearing unequal burdens. Such distributive choices play a 
redistributive role depending on the gains or losses that the EU, Member 
States and private parties bear due to the consequences of compliance or non-
compliance. Writing as early as 1976, Giandomenico Majone – arguably the 
first political scientist to comprehensively analyse the role of regulation in 
the EU – argued that conflicts in relation to environmental policy are about 
distribution and redistribution,16 and it is difficult to sever these concerns 
14 Urgenda, paras. 4.71 and 4.75
15 See Section III.A (iii). 
16 Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’ (1996) 17 West European 
Politics 77. 
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from the content of the regulations themselves.17 In addition to the industrial 
interests that fought against the adoption of a carbon tax described in Chapter 
5, influential Member States sought to have a hold on the distributive choices 
and redistributive consequences of climate regulation. Thus, in addition to 
climate targets, climate instruments also entail distributive choices. 
ii. Distribution, Allocation of Burdens and Redistribution: Caney meets Calabresi 
Simon Caney’s work on the philosophy of climate action is unusual among his 
peers; he provides a qualified defence of emissions trading as an appropriate 
regulatory response to climate change.18 In the process, he provides nuance as to 
how the distribution of climate responsibility may be approached.19 Notably, he 
makes a distinction between the distribution of responsibilities and the distribution 
of burdens, both of which come into play after targets have been decided on.20 The 
primary distinction between distribution of responsibilities and distribution of 
burdens is that the former deals with the assignment of duties or responsibilities 
to prevent climate change, which is in effect the assignment of liability ‘of those 
who have failed to comply with theirs [responsibilities]’.21 The latter deals with 
the imposition of burdens on third-parties without responsibilities by those who 
have been assigned such responsibilities. Per Caney, the shifting of such burdens 
may be justified given the ‘priority of climate change’; however, it amounts to 
‘appeasing reluctant emitters [or responsibility bearers] and acceding to their 
demands to bear less costs than they ought to’.22 Such a shift may be required 
17 Giandomenico Majone, ‘Choice among Policy Instruments for Pollution Control’ (1976) 
Policy Analysis 589. 
18 Simon Caney, ‘Markets. Morality and Climate Change: What, if anything, is wrong with 
emissions trading?’ (2010) 15 New Political Economy 197. 
19 Simon Caney, ‘Climate Change and Non-ideal Theory: Six ways of responding to 
noncompliance’ in Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser (eds) Climate Justice in a Non-ideal 
World (Oxford: OUP, forthcoming). Pre-copy version available at: https://www.academia.
edu/10371799/Climate_Change_and_Non-Ideal_Theory_Six_Ways_of_Responding_to_
Noncompliance [accessed May 30, 2016].
20 Caney acknowledges that selection of a target has underlying interests and ideals; a target 
‘reflects not just empirical beliefs about the causes and impacts of climate change but also 
normative commitments’. Ibid, p. 3. 
21 Ibid, p. 5. 
22 Ibid, pp. 7 – 8. 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   97 10/25/2017   5:13:31 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 222
204
Chapter 6
to achieve compliance, but Caney warns, those bearing original responsibilities 
may exploit the need for compliance; further, burden-shifting needs addressing 
questions such as whether there are ‘minimal or very great burdens on some, 
on whom it falls, how many are adversely affected, for how long, whether they 
can be compensated’, among others. In making such judgements, it is necessary 
to see whether reassigning responsibilities may be worse than unjustified burden 
shifting.23 In the event compliance with a target can be met with minimal 
burdens borne by those that do not bear responsibilities, then there appears to 
be a presumption against reassigning responsibilities. It may be asked, given that 
the assignment and reassignment of responsibilities are so important for Caney’s 
framework, on what basis is such assignment decided? To begin with, Caney’s 
primary concern is compliance with pre-decided targets; or effectiveness. As to 
who should be assigned responsibility to comply with targets, Caney argues that 
those who are comparatively ‘advantaged’ should pay.24 The ‘advantaged’ in turn 
is characterised by a combination of an Ability to Pay Principle (anyone who can 
maintain ‘a decent standard of living’25) and a Polluter Pays Principle (a polluter 
is characterised as someone who has emitted excessive amounts of carbon dioxide 
in the past). Combining both, Caney arrives at a ‘History Sensitive Ability to 
Pay’. Based on this concept, Caney argues that ‘the most advantaged should 
bear the cost of the emissions of both past generations and the disadvantaged’26; 
and hence is not in favour of an equal per capita entitlement to pollute, as is 
the assumption in schemes such as the PCT. As long as a regulatory choice 
meets the ability and advantage criteria laid out, Caney is indifferent to a tax 
or a trading system. This indifference, however, is not practical. As we saw in 
Chapter 5, public choice considerations pre-empt such indifference. Further, 
without putting in place additional distributive regulation, a tax or a trading 
system may well be regressive. This brings us to Calabresi.
To a considerable extent, Caney’s analysis resembles Calabresi’s work. 
Calabresi would characterise the distribution of responsibilities as the 
23 Ibid, p. 13. 
24 Simon Caney, ‘Climate Change and the Duties of the Advantaged’ (2010) 13 Critical Review 
of International Social and Political Philosophy 203. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, p. 221. 
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assignment of liability, and the allocation of burdens, ex-ante and ex-post, 
is a primary consideration that informs such assignment. Similar to Caney’s 
‘most advantaged’ is Calabresi’s ‘least cost avoider’. However, responsibility is 
more complex in Calabresi’s characterisation of ‘accident-like situations’, he 
would question a responsibility-based polluter-pays principle. With regard 
to climate change, it is not easy to identify causal responsibility and hence 
there is a need for a constructive categorisation of end-user liability. Arguing 
in favour of incurring identification costs regarding assignment of liability, 
Calabresi had cost-effectiveness in mind; the least cost avoider would be 
required to look for ways to reduce the costs borne, and this would involve 
mechanisms of requiring parties who do not bear such liability to bear some 
or all of the burdens. This would also involve looking for ways to reduce 
production costs and transaction costs27 to comply with an obligation and 
avoid invoking liability enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the identification 
of the party on whom liability is imposed is important in a Calabresian 
framework; whether polluters pay or not depends on the burdens they 
bear, and they can avoid liability by complying with the actions required of 
them. But it may be asked: why would a regulator incur identification costs? 
And what is the point of allowing parties who could be held liable to shift 
their burdens to those who cannot? The answer, quite simply, is to create 
the architecture for the functioning of a market. Calabresi does not neglect 
the market, but rather concentrates on the institutional aspects that would 
lead a market to have desirable effects. This is where Calabresi would part 
company with Caney, as the concentration is not solely on distribution, but 
how to achieve emissions reductions. As discussed in Chapter 5, the EU ETS 
combines the assignment of liability and the discovery of price through a 
market. Scholars in the US have pointed out that finding a social cost of 
carbon is notoriously difficult, leading to unavoidable arbitrary normative 
27 The identification of ‘transaction cost’ is a notorious administrative cost. Following Calabresi’s 
framework, it is not important to distinguish between production costs, assessment costs and 
transaction costs as the primary concern is identification of parties who would bear liability 
rather than the actual costs of exchange. So the characterization of costs is not crucial.
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judgements in quantifying such cost.28 The reason this exercise has been 
undertaken is because there isn’t a common market in the US to determine 
the value of emissions reductions. 29 The costs of pricing carbon are avoided by 
opting for a market mechanism as has been the case with the State-level cap-
and-trade systems in the US such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) and the Californian cap-and-trade system.30 It is this combination 
of distribution and institutionally facilitating a market that makes the EU 
ETS (and similar cap-and-trade systems with hard caps and price discovery 
through auctioning or other market mechanisms) distinctly Calabresian. 
With this Caney-meets-Calabresi discussion on distribution, burden-shifting, 
cost-effectiveness and redistribution in mind, we are well placed to address the 
regulation of a potential EET mechanism head-on. 
Given the constraining and facilitative dimensions of regulation on one 
hand, and the allocative and potentially redistributive role on the other, any 
consideration of a PCT or an EET policy is woefully incomplete without a 
discussion on multi-level regulation. I seek to work towards filling this gap 
in this chapter and the next. Admittedly, this gap is too great to exhaustively 
address, and I will use subsidiarity and proportionality as heuristic devices 
to guide me through the rest of the book. The reason as to why I pick these 
two devices is simple: they are the primary normative devices that moderate 
the appreciation of both European primary and secondary law. Irrespective 
of whether the interest is to preserve the stability of the internal market or 
to fulfil objectives related to climate change, reasoning about normativity 
cannot escape these mediators. I also admit that this choice is not informed 
by a free-falling inductive finding on perusing literature on European law. 
As indicated in Chapter 2, I was interested in understanding whether an 
EET could be extended sectorally and geographically, and for this purpose 
28 Masur and Posner, ‘Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis’, supra; Daniel 
Farber, ‘Coping With Uncertainty: Cost-Benefit Analysis, The Precautionary Principle, and 
Climate Change’ (2015) 90 Washington Law Review 1659, pp. 1689 – 1719. 
29 Masur and Posner, Ibid, p. 1561. 
30 For a comparison of such systems with the EU ETS, see Simone Borghesi and Massimiliano 
Montini, ‘The Best (and worst) of GHG emission Trading Systems: Comparing the EU ETS 
with its Followers’ (2016) 4 Frontiers in Energy Research 1.
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the appropriate level of governance becomes an important consideration. 
Further, equity and liberty are at the heart of any considerations of an EET. 
Proportionality assumes a useful heuristic for investigating these two aspects, 
and situating them within a legal framework. Among these two mediators, 
subsidiarity has received more attention owing to the fact that climate 
change law, and environmental law generally, in the EU has conventionally 
be considered to be about figuring out the relations between the EU and 
Member States, or ‘who’ is required to and allowed to take action. This 
could be due to the nature of European legal inquiry itself: nation-states and 
institutions in Brussels have been considered to the object of legal scholars’ 
attention. I therefore first turn to this question, as EU climate law can be 
better introduced by looking at a division of powers. I will then proceed in the 
next chapter to considering whether proportionality offers an ‘autonomous 
standard of reason’ for a regulatory appreciation of a climate change measure 
like the EET. 
ii. The Legal Basis for EU and Member State 
Climate Policy 
The preference for a top-down discussion on climate regulation in the EU 
featured strongly in the discussions around Urgenda. The Court directed 
the government to pursue a target of 20% emissions reductions by 2020; 
in contrast, the Dutch government was on track to meet a target of 16%. 
While the Court found this Order to be in compliance with EU law, a flurry 
of criticisms by notable scholars in both academic journals and popular 
media pointed to the judgement being incompatible with both primary and 
secondary EU law.31 It may be noted that the criticism was levelled with 
respect to the adoption of a higher target, and not even a policy mechanism 
adopted to implement such a target. The level of criticism that can be 
anticipated in relation to a Member State policy mechanism such as the 
EET may be anticipated to be much higher, and the objections far more 
intense. To have a clear hold on this point, it is necessary to take a look at 
EU climate law.
31 For a review, see Roy and Woerdman, ‘Situating Urgenda’, supra., p. 167. 
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A. EU Primary Law on Climate Change 
The explicit inclusion of climate change in EU primary law occurred in 2009 
by way of an amendment to Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) dealing with ‘Environment’.32 This inclusion 
did not meet much resistance, as the Maastricht Treaty already provided the 
basis for climate action (it mentioned ‘promoting measures at international 
level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems’ as a 
Community objective). I would in fact go a step further and suggest that 
the EU has been historically predisposed towards climate change action right 
from the moment it started being interested in environmental issues. Unlike 
the United States, the genesis of the EU’s cognizance of environmental issues is 
intimately linked to the reasoning that it has competence to deal with external 
issues that have a bearing on its internal legislation and executive policies. 
Shortly after the CJEU decision in European Road Transport Agreement33 that 
allowed the Commission to exercise its ‘external jurisdiction’, the first non-
binding Environmental Action Programme was drafted by the Commission;34 
and it was as early as the 1970s that the Commission sought to reconcile 
the concerns of competitiveness integral to the common market and the 
requirements of international environmental agreements.35 Notwithstanding 
the EU’s shaping of environmental law in association with international 
developments that lends itself to playing a major role in the implementation 
32 Article 191 (1) states: Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the 
GPMMPXJOHPCKFDUJWFTtQSFTFSWJOHQSPUFDUJOHBOEJNQSPWJOHUIFRVBMJUZPGUIFFOWJSPONFOUt
QSPUFDUJOHIVNBOIFBMUItQSVEFOUBOESBUJPOBMVUJMJTBUJPOPGOBUVSBMSFTPVSDFTtQSPNPUJOH
measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, 
and in particular combating climate change.’
33 Case 22/70 EC Commission v. EC Council [1971] ELR 60-79.
34 The link between the European Road Transport Agreement judgement and the development of 
EU environmental law is made in Chad Damro, Iain Hardie and Donald Mackenzie, ‘The 
EU and Climate Change Policy: Law, politics and prominence at different levels’ (2008) 4:3 
Journal of Contemporary European Research 179,182. 
35 Since then, EU environmental law has taken a life of its own, has been extended to areas such 
as public health, and the body of law revolves largely around whether Member States can 
infringe EU law on free movement and competition based on environmental considerations. 
For a review see Jan Jans and Hans B Vedder, European Environmental Law (Europa 
Publishing, 2012). 
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of its Kyoto commitments, the specific inclusion of climate change in the 
TFEU was a way to specify in its primary law that the EU’s engagement with 
climate change would have an effect on all policies across the Union.36 It is in 
response to this objective; i.e. how climate policy would be implemented and 
enforced, and how it engages with other policies, that the body of current EU 
law on climate change has been fleshed out. 
The formulation of measures in response to Article 191 TFEU operates 
under the aegis of Article 192, where 192(1) provides measures that can be 
adopted by the Council and Parliament by following an ordinary legislative 
procedure involving a qualified majority vote in the Council and 192(2) 
requires the Council to follow a special legislative procedure involving a 
unanimous vote when it seeks to adopt measures that are (i) ‘primarily of 
a fiscal nature’, (ii) affects town planning or water management, and (iii) 
‘significantly’ affects a Member State’s choice of energy source and energy 
supply. This little bit of text contained in Article 192(2) that provisions of a 
primarily fiscal nature requires a unanimous Council vote is a crucial set of 
words in the history of EU climate law, as it thwarted a Commission proposal 
on a carbon tax,37 but allowed a proposal on emissions trading to pass muster. 
Without going into a debate of whether a carbon tax or an emissions trading 
scheme is more desirable, it is evident that a carbon tax is construed to be 
primarily of a fiscal nature, rather than primarily a climate change instrument. 
This demonstrates that the specific nature of climate change had to defer to 
the way in which a fiscal instrument is generally interpreted in EU law.38 The 
dependency of the nature of the response to climate change on Member 
State representatives in the Council brings us to questions of federalism that 
influence the development of climate law in the EU.
36 Article 11, TFEU, states: Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view 
to promoting sustainable development.
37 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council directive introducing a tax on carbon dioxide emissions 
and energy’ COM (92) 226 final. 
38 Practically speaking, the EU ETS with a complete auctioning system could be said to resemble 
a carbon tax. Perhaps the Commission did indeed find an implementation instrument that 
took into account the specific nature of climate change. 
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By virtue of Articles 11 and 191 TFEU, the EU is required to pursue 
its objective of responding to climate change, which is evident from the 
European Climate Change Programme (ECP) comprising more than thirty 
initiatives cutting across different sectors and domains of law with the EU 
ETS being the most visible item. The EU’s discretion in relation to climate 
policy, however, is not unfettered, and is not restricted to the representation 
of the Member States in the Council. By virtue of Article 4(2) TFEU, the 
EU and Member States enjoy shared competence with respect to areas related 
to climate change policy including environment, transport and energy. As 
to how shared competence is exercised is one of the most hotly contested 
issues in the gamut of EU law, and it is this issue that has characterised most 
political differences, legal disputes and scholarly interest in relation to climate 
policy. This brings us to Article 193 TFEU. 
Article 193 TFEU states: The protective measures adopted pursuant to Article 
192 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more 
stringent protective measures. Such measures must be compatible with the Treaties. 
They shall be notified to the Commission.
The above can be interpreted in two ways, one that is more favourable 
to the Member States, and the other more favourable to the EU. The first 
reading divides the Article into two parts. The first part is that Member 
States have a right to take more stringent measures. As Lorenzo Squintani has 
observed, ‘…it [Article 193] grants a more or less incontestable right to the 
Member States to adopt or maintain more stringent measures’.39 The second 
component is that such stringent measures need to be compatible with EU 
law. The consequence of this division is that of allocating the burden of proof 
to demonstrate incompatibility. If the distinction is accepted, then the effect 
of Art 193 would be that Member States have a right – or an entitlement – to 
adopt more stringent or more protective measures, unless its incompatibility 
can be demonstrated. The other reading is linked to the interpretation of the 
word ‘Treaties’. It is a matter of interpretation as to whether ‘Treaties’ used 
in the second sentence includes the implementation of such treaties through 
secondary law. There is a possibility that if ‘Treaties’ includes secondary law, 
39 Lorenzo Squintani, Gold-Plating of European Environmental Law, PhD Dissertation, p. 19. 
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then the first sentence would become redundant. This would be because any 
possible violation of secondary law would disallow any stringent measures 
from being taken. Thus, if there is secondary law on the issue of climate 
change and such secondary law amounts to harmonisation of EU climate 
law, then any measure adopted by Member States can be assumed to be 
incompatible. In practice, this interpretation also results in the allocation of 
the burden of proof: in this case the Member State would need to establish the 
compatibility of measures adopted. It is also possible that the word ‘notified’ 
can be interpreted to mean obtaining approval of the Commission. If the 
Commission has the power to decline a notification, then the second reading 
– i.e. burden of proof rests with the Member State in question to establish 
compatibility of any measure taken – would be more persuasive. These two 
readings are difficult to reconcile within the textual parameters of primarily 
law; this prompts a turn to the particulars of secondary law. 
B. EU Secondary Law on Climate Change 
The secondary law on climate change is essentially the suite of instruments 
covered under the ECP. The two most visible specific instruments are the EU 
ETS Directive and the ESD; in addition, there are several instruments with 
regard to standard-setting that may also have a bearing on Member State 
policies. A quick glance at the Commission ECP webpage leads one to think 
that the EU ETS covers some industrial sectors, while the ESD covers other 
sectors, or non-ETS sectors.40 From a regulatory point of view, I would like to 
suggest that viewing the two legislations in terms of sectors that can be easily 
demarcated is not helpful for responsibility distribution, burden allocation 
or implementation. To understand the scope and relationship between the 
different instruments, let us turn to the instrument that sets the terms of 
distribution, the ESD.
i. The Scope of the Effort Sharing Decision 
Article 1 of the ESD states: ‘This Decision lays down the minimum contribution 
of Member States to meeting the greenhouse gas emission reduction commitment 
40 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020/index_en.htm; also the ESD webpage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort/index_en.htm. 
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of the Community for the period from 2013 to 2020 for greenhouse gas emissions 
covered by this Decision, and rules on making these contributions and for the 
evaluation thereof.’ 
From this Article, we get the following points: (1) the Community has 
a greenhouse gas reduction commitment for 2020, (2) this commitment 
is distributed among Member States, whereby they are required to make 
a minimum contribution, (3) the ESD lays down ‘rules on making these 
contributions’ (I quote this verbatim as scope of the phrase ‘rules on making 
these contributions’ is not clear) and evaluating these contributions. The 
basis for (1) or the reduction commitment by 2020 can be gleaned from a 
European Council decision of 1993 that recognised the obligations of the 
EU with respect to the UNFCCC.41 Thus, the reduction commitment is 
essentially the Council’s recognition of the responsibility the EU has assumed 
by virtue of its ratification of the UNFCCC and the obligations spelled out 
in decisions that give effect to the UNFCCC, namely the Kyoto Protocol 
and the periodic Conference of Parties decisions. To clarify, Recital 9 of 
the ESD mentions that the decision deals with the ‘independent reduction 
commitment of the Community’ [emphasis added]. The Member States of 
the EU are signatories to the UNFCCC as well, by virtue of which they 
may assume responsibilities. As to whether there could be any constraints 
on them doing so is a matter of the law on the extent to which international 
obligations may be adopted unilaterally by Member States.42 This brings 
us to (2) regarding minimum contribution. This minimum contribution 
is a distribution of responsibility among Member States; Article 3(1) 
specifies that each Member State must limit its greenhouse gas emissions 
‘at least by the percentage set for by the Member State’ by 2020. The basis 
for such distribution is the ‘relative per capita GDP’43 of Member States. 
41 Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:1994:033: 
FULL&from=EN
42 For some nuance in this regard, see Riccardo Pavoni, ‘Controversial Aspects of the Interaction 
between International and EU Law in Environmental Matters: Direct Effect and Member States’ 
Unilateral Measures’ in Elisa Morgera ed. The External Environmental Policy of the European 
Union : EU and International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: CUP 2012), pp. 347-377.
43 Recital 8 ESD. 
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Such distribution does not say anything about allocation of burdens44 and 
implementation. For that, we turn to (3).
The phrase ‘rules on making the contributions’ could be interpreted to 
mean that all the rules with regard to how Member States make minimum 
contributions are exhaustively covered in the ESD; i.e. all aspects of 
Responsibility Distribution, Burden Allocation and Implementation could 
potentially be covered under the ESD. However, the definition of greenhouse 
gases points both to the fact some aspects are covered, and also to the limits 
of the scope of the ESD. The definition states: ‘Greenhouse gas emissions’ means 
the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6) from the categories listed in Annex I, expressed in terms of tonnes of carbon 
dioxide equivalent, as determined pursuant to Decision No 280/2004/EC, 
excluding greenhouse gases emissions covered under Directive 2003/87/EC.
The ‘categories’ that emit greenhouse gases that are considered for the 
purpose of meeting the required minimum contribution are specified in Annex 
1 of the ESD. Thus, emissions outside the categories mentioned may not be 
accounted for satisfying the responsibility of the Member States in meeting their 
minimum contributions. These ‘categories’ include ‘sectors’: Energy, Industrial 
Processes, Solvent and other product use, Agriculture and Waste. There is no 
explicit mention of ‘housing’ or ‘residence’. However, ‘fuel’ is a category and 
that would include fuels used inside residences. To this extent, the ESD covers 
implementation; it specifies the categories within which sectors and sources are 
situated. Implementation also includes the exclusionary provision contained in 
the definition: greenhouse gas emissions covered under the EU ETS Directive 
are explicitly excluded. This may explain why the ESD may be said to cover all 
emissions that are non-ETS. This leads us to a quandary: if the ESD excludes 
greenhouse gas emissions covered under the EU ETS, then can the reductions 
under the EU ETS Directive contribute to the minimum requirement? 
44 To clarify, there is intuitively an allocation of burden to Member States. However, per the 
conceptual framework discussed earlier, the required minimum contribution is a distribution 
of responsibility. Burden allocation refers to how the burden may be allocated after it has 
been conferred or assumed. Such allocation under the ESD would not have an effect on the 
sanctity of the responsibility of the Member States to meet their minimum contribution. 
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A reading of the Recitals of the ESD demonstrates the compatibility of the 
two Directives. Recital 6 states: Directive 2003/87/EC establishes a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, which covers 
certain sectors of the economy. All sectors of the economy should contribute to emission 
reductions in order to cost-effectively achieve the objective of a 20 % reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. Member States should 
therefore implement additional policies and measures in an effort to further limit 
the greenhouse gas emissions from sources not covered under Directive 2003/87/EC.
From the above we get that the EU ETS Directive covers some ‘sectors’, 
and all sectors need to meet the 20% responsibility assumed by the EU in 
a cost-effective manner. Member States are encouraged to bear the burden 
of implementing ‘additional’ policies and measures for ‘sources’ not covered 
under the EU ETS Directive. With regard to ‘additional’ there appears to be 
an indication that the implementation freedom of Member States is restricted 
to sources not covered under the EU ETS. Thus, there appears to be no 
overlap in the shared competence of the EU and Member States; the ESD 
applies only to non-ETS sources. I do not use the popular term ‘non-ETS 
sectors’ as I think the words ‘sectors’ and ‘sources’ should not be assumed to be 
interchangeable. What is the difference, then, and what do these words mean? 
There is confusion in EU secondary climate law with regard to foundational 
terminology: the words ‘sector’, ‘installation’ and ‘source’ are not clarified. 
However, reading the ESD and the EU ETS Directive together, we can arrive 
at the following framework: Category is the umbrella term used in the ESD 
that includes substances and processes; some of these categories are classified 
into sectors45 by the EU ETS Directive. Each sector has installations, and 
each installation has multiple sources. This is evident from the definition of 
emissions in Article 3(b): ‘emissions means the release of greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere from sources in an installation or the release from an 
aircraft performing an aviation activity listed in Annex I of the gases specified 
in respect of that activity.’ [emphasis added]. This definition suggests that 
a source is identified by the sort of activity it performs.46 However, that is 
45 This assumes that all the EU ETS sectors can be classified into ESD categories. 
46 Annex 1 of the EU ETS Directive.
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not the entire conceptualisation; the ‘activities’ listed in Annex 1 are further 
broken down into components. The identification of these components 
is operationalised through the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
Regulation (MRV Regulation)47 and the Benchmarking Decision (for free 
allowances),48 and it seems to be based on the identification of direct emissions 
and indirect emissions. Thus, a source may be defined as an activity that results 
in direct emissions. With the exception of aviation, such sources are located in 
installations. This can be diagrammatically represented as follows:
Figure 5: Sources of Emissions
47 Commission Regulation (EU) No 601/2012 of 21 June 2012 on the monitoring and 
reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance OJ L 181, 12.7.2012,
48 Commission Decision of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union-wide rules for 
harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (notified under document 
C(2011) 2772) OJ L 130, 17.5.2011
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There could be two possible reasons behind the regulatory categorisation of 
sources: (i) to encourage least cost emissions reductions in the production 
process, and (ii) to facilitate monitoring of emissions from installations to 
meet their cap, and monitoring in turn becomes important to assess emissions 
accurately, and avoid the problem of double counting of emissions.49 From 
the ESD, we can surmise that for purposes other than satisfying their 
minimum contribution, it is possible for Member States to identify other 
sources, installations, sectors. However, it would be difficult to find a source 
of emissions that does not fall into one of the categories mentioned in Annex 
1 of the ESD. If a source (whether covered under a Category or not) coincides 
with a source covered under the EU ETS Directive, it would probably not 
be ‘additional’ and there can be a conflict. In this regard, Article 24 of the 
EU ETS Directive mentions that if Member States seek to ‘apply emission 
allowance trading’ to ‘greenhouse gases’, ‘activities’ and ‘installations’, then 
prior approval from the Commission in required. Thus, any Member State 
measure taken pursuant to the ESD that includes ‘allowance trading’ has to 
be compatible with the EU ETS. Article 24a clarifies that if a Member State 
implements any mitigation project that ‘issues allowances or credits’, then 
the harmonised regulatory procedure would have to be followed. However, 
Article 24a(3) contains an important qualification that ‘A Member State can 
refuse to issue allowances or credits in respect of certain types of projects that reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions on its own territory’. It seems that a Member State can 
choose to opt for implementation mechanisms that do not involve issuance 
of allowances and credits. If methods of implementation of targets other than 
issuance of allowances or credits or allowance trading are applied to ‘activities’ 
or ‘installations’, then it appears that a prior approval from the Commission 
would not be required and Member States have some leeway. This is supported 
by the explanation to Article 24a(1) that Member State measures involving 
allowances and credits ‘shall not result in the double-counting of emission 
reductions nor impede the undertaking of other policy measures to reduce 
emissions not covered by the Community scheme’. The suggestion seems 
to be that a unilateral Member State measure akin to an allowance trading 
49 Articles 11 and 24a of the EU ETS Directive. Thus the costs of monitoring and verification 
can be balanced against the benefit of reducing or avoiding double counting. 
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scheme may result in double counting and also interfere with non-EU ETS 
measures. This reveals that double counting is a problem for any Member State 
measure that involves issuance of allowances and credits, and such measures 
may interfere with other mitigation measures initiated by Member States, in 
addition to possible interference with the EU ETS. 
Admittedly, the ESD has nothing specific to say about responsibilities 
distributed to, burdens allocated to, or any mechanism of implementing 
emissions from individuals or households or the residential sector. This is 
primarily because the ESD does not provide the classificatory tools in identifying 
an individual as a source or a house as an installation or the residential sector as 
a ‘sector’. One inference that can be readily drawn is that to the extent sources 
and sectors are engaged with any of the categories mentioned in Annex 1, 
they could be utilised for meeting the minimum contributions of Member 
States. A clearer picture on distribution, burdens and implementation may be 
obtained by taking a look at the EU ETS Directive. 
ii. The Scope of the EU ETS 
The EU ETS is seen as a means of implementing climate responsibility; it 
is also a tool of burden allocation, and indirectly a tool of responsibility 
distribution as well, primarily with regard to responsibility redistribution. All 
of these traits can be found in the most popular argument in favour of the EU 
ETS: cost-effectiveness and efficiency. I use these terms separately because that 
is the wording of the Directive; Article 1 begins with: This Directive establishes 
a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community 
in order to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and 
economically efficient manner. These two terms may be read eiusdem generis, 
but as Stavins had observed around the time the Kyoto Protocol was signed: 
“From an economic perspective, the first candidate criterion for instrument 
assessment should probably be relative efficiency, that is, the degree to which 
instruments are capable of maximizing net benefits. But the efficiency criterion can 
be problematic, because it requires not only knowledge of the costs of abatement, 
but also knowledge of the benefits of abatement. And the latter requires both an 
understanding of the physical consequences of climate change and the economic 
valuation of those consequences. This information burden is overwhelming in 
many circumstances, as it surely is at present in the global climate context; and 
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so frequently the less ambitious criterion of cost effectiveness has been used, that 
is, seeking a policy instrument that achieves a given target or goal (which may 
or may not represent the efficient level of control) at minimum aggregate cost of 
abatement.”50
I cite the above in full because it shows a clear distinction between cost-
effectiveness and efficiency. It is a matter of interpretation as to whether 
the EU ETS Directive has opted for the ‘ambitious criterion’ of efficiency 
in addition to cost-effectiveness, given that both them are mentioned. 
Based on the interpretation accorded by the CJEU in Iberdrola (discussed 
below), it appears that a more restrictive criterion is preferred; the primary 
benefit sought is the reduction of emissions at a low cost. Other benefits are 
secondary. It may be noted, however, that the reduction of emissions sought is 
not restricted to targets; effectiveness extends beyond the meeting of existing 
targets, as is evident from the second component of Article 1: This Directive 
also provides for the reductions of greenhouse gas emissions to be increased so as to 
contribute to the levels of reductions that are considered scientifically necessary to 
avoid dangerous climate change. Thus, facilitating the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions – even beyond existing targets – is the core objective of the 
Directive. 
Some scholars have compellingly argued in favour of emissions reductions 
being the primary objective of the EU ETS Directive, and other objectives 
such as economic efficiency and energy efficiency being secondary objectives.51 
The fact that emissions reduction is the ‘principal objective’ has been clarified 
by the preliminary opinion issued by the CJEU in Iberdrola52. The Court 
observed: “… it should be noted that the principal objective of Directive 2003/87 
is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions substantially. That objective must be attained 
in compliance with a series of sub-objectives and through recourse to certain 
instruments. The principal instrument for that purpose is the EU scheme for 
50 Robert N. Stavins, ‘Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments 
Address a Global Problem?’ (1997) University of Chicago Legal Forum 293. 
51 Squintani, Holwerda, and Peeters, ‘Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from EU ETS 
Installations’, supra.
52 Cases C-566/11, C-567/11, C-580/11, C-591/11, C-620/11 and C-640/11 Iberdrola and 
Others EU:C:2013:660.
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greenhouse gas emissions trading. As indicated in recitals 5 and 7 to Directive 
2003/87, among the other sub-objectives to be fulfilled by the scheme are the 
safeguarding of economic development and employment and the preservation of 
the integrity of the internal market and of conditions of competition.”53
Thus, all other objectives are secondary objectives. The wording of Article 
1, however, does not bear out a hierarchy between the objectives of emissions 
reduction and cost-effectiveness. However, given that additional reductions are 
contemplated, it seems reasonable to suggest that the goal of cost-effectiveness 
should not retard the achievement of emissions reductions. The ‘benefits’ 
component of efficiency as Stavins notes above is notoriously difficult to 
understand and compute; but it would be safe to say that emissions reduction 
and efficient climate policy are not the sole reasons behind the existence 
of the EU ETS. Recital 20 mentions that the ‘Directive will encourage the 
use of more energy-efficient technologies’ [emphasis added]. This wording 
seems to indicate that energy efficiency is not an obligation enshrined in the 
EU ETS Directive; to that end, encouraging energy efficiency measures by 
Member States or the EU should not interfere with the objective of emissions 
reduction. Encouragement, however, does not extend to the liability of some 
agents to reduce emissions. 
The scope of the EU ETS Directive came to the fore in the Iberdrola 
opinion mentioned above, where a Spanish levy on electricity producers who 
received grandfathered allowances for Phase 1 (and passed-through such costs 
to consumers) was assessed for compatibility with EU law. The Court did 
allow the levy, but not without a detour. With regard to energy efficiency, 
there was a difference between the opinion of Advocate General Kokott and 
the Court. Pointing to Recital 20, AG Kokott observed that energy efficiency 
is an objective of the EU ETS Directive, and the Spanish levy in question was 
incompatible with this objective, given that installations were disincentivised 
to become energy efficient once the levy was imposed.54 Though the Court did 
not explicitly disagree with AG Kokott, it held that the decision to invest in 
53 Ibid, Para 43. 
54 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott EU:C:2013:191, para 93.
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energy efficient technologies is left to the discretion of electricity producers;55 
further, energy efficiency56 was not recognised as an explicit objective of the 
EU ETS.57 Following this line of reasoning, Member States seem to have 
more leeway in adopting energy-efficiency measures without the fear of falling 
foul of the EU ETS Directive. 
It could also be inferred from Iberdrola that the benefits of the efficiency 
component in Article 1 is read narrowly; and emissions reduction is the 
only principal objective. Given this line of reasoning, it seems fair to suggest 
that when the scope of the EU ETS is being considered in relation to the 
freedom of Member States and others stakeholders in adopting measures, the 
only aspect to be kept in mind is the achievement of emissions reductions 
contemplated under the EU ETS. Concomitantly, should any measure add to 
the ‘comprehensive’ reduction of emissions, then some compromises on cost 
effectiveness, and the sub-objectives of functioning of the internal market and 
competition may be subject to tests of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
The EU ETS Directive implements the distribution of liability and 
allocation of burdens primarily through the EU institutional machinery; 
though there is some leeway to Member States as suggested above and 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Further, the Directive 
does also cover distribution of responsibility: firstly, as mentioned earlier, 
Article 1 of the Directive contemplates that additional reductions may be 
attained through the EU ETS. Second, unlike the ESD, direct emissions of 
some activities performed by installations are covered, and so installations 
are made responsible. Per the enforcement mechanism contemplated, 
installations would be fined – and substantially too – should they fail to 
surrender allowances. Thus, installations are liable to cut down on emissions, 
and Member States are responsible for implementing this enforcement 
mechanism. The Iberdrola judgement made another observation that speaks 
55 Iberdrola, para 49. 
56 In this regard, Rodriguez observes that a ‘difference needs to be drawn between promoting 
energy efficient technologies and the promotion of energy efficiency in general terms.’ Daniel 
Perez Rodriguez, ‘Absorbing EU ETS Windfall Profits and the Principle of Free Allowances: 
Iberdrola and Others’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 679, p. 691.
57 Ibid. 
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to the responsibility of stakeholders. The Court noted: “…in order for 
Directive 2003/87 to attain its objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in 
a cost-effective and economically efficient manner, it is not necessary, as was noted 
in paragraph 41 above, for undertakings to pass on in consumer prices the costs 
relating to emission allowances allocated to them free of charge.”58 That does 
not mean that firms are prohibited from passing through costs to consumers: 
“the extent to which electricity producers may pass on in prices the costs associated 
with the use of emission allowances has no impact on the reduction of emissions.”59 
Given that costs of the EU ETS may be passed through to consumers, the EU 
does not make consumers liable, but nonetheless places no restriction on the 
burdens borne by them.60 This is in stark contrast to the federal arrangement in 
China for instance, where costs incurred by installations are prohibited from 
being passed through to consumers.61 Thus, while the Directive distributes 
responsibility to installations by arranging for their liability through the 
imposition of a penalty, it does not distribute responsibility to the final 
consumers. The sources of direct emissions monitored and verified are part 
of installations. Thus, there is no liability imposed on the final consumer for 
their direct emissions. Having said that, the Directive places no restriction 
on Member States or Installations from allocating the burden of bearing 
the costs for climate action to the final consumer. This would apply to the 
achievement of additional emissions as well; measures adopted for attaining 
additional emissions reductions have to satisfy the cost-effectiveness criterion 
of the EU ETS Directive; Article 1 of the EU ETS Directive speaks both of 
cost-effectiveness as well as the applicability of the EU ETS in relation to 
58 Iberdrola, para 56. 
59 Ibid, para 57.
60 It may also be noted that a pass-through could be considered to be a reduction of consumer 
welfare, but this argument was neither mooted nor decided on. Having said that, passing 
through costs to consumers is not a simple process; factors revolve largely around elasticity 
of demand, substitutability of the product and organizational concerns in the supply chain. 
Chukwumerije Okereke and Devin McDaniels, ‘To what extent are EU steel companies 
susceptible to competitive loss due to climate policy?’ (2012) 46 Energy Policy 203, p. 204. 
Thus, firms can pass on a proportion of their carbon prices to consumers. 
61 See ZhongXiang Zhang, ‘Carbon Emissions Trading in China: The Evolution from Pilots to a 
Nationwide Scheme’ (2015) Centre for Climate Economic & Policy Working Paper 1503. I also 
thank Yingying Zeng for bringing this to my attention. 
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additional climate action.62 In this regard, the EU ETS Directive goes a step 
further than the ESD: while the ESD applies only to the 20% reduction 
commitment, the EU ETS contemplates additional emissions. This puts us 
in a quandary. Article 193 TFEU allows for Member States to take additional 
environmental action which may include more sources of emissions such as 
households. However, the EU ETS Directive seems to confine additional 
climate action that Member States may take to the terms provided in the 
Directive. How are we to reconcile Article 193 TFEU and Article 1 of the EU 
ETS Directive? This brings us to Subsidiarity. 
iii. Subsidiarity and the EET
The idea of subsidiarity can be traced to the Catholic idea of decentralisation, 
where governance is best left to the smallest unit, which may well be an 
individual.63 Theoretically, subsidiarity does not need to be restricted to pre-
existing formal institutions (such as State-level and EU-level institutions), and 
could well apply to the creation of new formal institutions at the sub-State 
or supra-State level. It could also apply to the role of non-formal institutions 
such as those that created the material world of the carbon economy, or social 
relations that influence motivation. It would be incorrect, therefore, to think 
about subsidiarity in terms of European supremacy or liberal nationalism.64 The 
62 The applicability of the EU ETS to additional climate action is evident from the second and 
third sentences of Article 1: “This Directive also provides for the reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions to be increased so as to contribute to the levels of reductions that are 
FRQVLGHUHG VFLHQWL¿FDOO\ QHFHVVDU\ WR DYRLG GDQJHURXV FOLPDWH FKDQJH 7KLV'LUHFWLYH
DOVROD\VGRZQSURYLVLRQVIRUDVVHVVLQJDQGLPSOHPHQWLQJDVWULFWHU&RPPXQLW\UHGXFWLRQ
FRPPLWPHQWH[FHHGLQJWREHDSSOLHGXSRQWKHDSSURYDOE\WKH&RPPXQLW\RIDQ
international agreement on climate change leading to greenhouse gas emission reductions 
H[FHHGLQJWKRVHUHTXLUHGLQ$UWLFOHDVUHÀHFWHGLQWKHFRPPLWPHQWHQGRUVHGE\
WKH(XURSHDQ&RXQFLORI0DUFK.”
63 For a discussion, see Nicolas Barber, ‘The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity’ (2005) 11 
European Law Journal 308. 
64 As Schütze puts it, the EU has constitutionalised the philosophy of cooperative federalism 
through the principle of subsidiarity and complementary competences where the Union and 
Member States are complementary parts of a single government mechanism intended to 
realize practical problems. Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The changing 
structure of European Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), pp. 242 – 286.
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incorporation of the principle in European law is an opportunity to consider 
‘relationship between the EU institutions, between the EU institutions and 
Member States, between the EU institutions and citizens, and between the 
European institutions and external parties’65 with a view to ‘better’ achieve 
common objectives. In this regard, I will suggest that unlike PCT scholars 
who assume the value of ‘local governance’ or ‘individual engagement’, the 
achievement of emissions reductions vis-à-vis individuals and households 
requires an understanding of the prevalence of the EU in climate governance 
as well as relaxing a static view of the individual or household as the smallest 
(and therefore the most appropriate) unit in regulating emissions from 
consumption.
A. The Prevalence of the EU in Competence Allocation
i. Institutional Preference for Iterative Governance 
Despite the possibility of restrictions on the nature of climate action Member 
States may take due to the operation of the EU ETS, it would be hasty to 
conclude that there is necessarily a conflict between Article 193 TFEU and 
Article 1 of the EU ETS Directive. The common refrain in the ECP is that the 
EU and Member States need to work together. This is because climate change 
is a strange beast that demands ‘climate exceptionalism’66 in two senses: 
firstly, there is a joint responsibility for the EU and Member States to achieve 
international climate obligations;67 second, it could be argued that given the 
‘super-wicked’ problem68 of climate change, Member States have conferred 
upon EU institutions exceptional powers to look after climate change on 
65 Josephine van Zeben, ‘Subsidiarity in European Environmental Law: A competence allocation 
approach’ (2014) 38 Harvard Environmental Law Review 415, p. 422.
66 See Chris Hilson, ‘It’s All About Climate Change Stupid! Exploring the relationship between 
environmental law and climate law’ (2013) 25:3 Journal of Environmental Law 359. 
67 For a review, see Andre Nolkaemper, ‘Joint Responsibility of EU and Member States for non-
performance of obligations under multilateral environmental agreements’ in Elisa Morgera 
(ed.) The External Environmental Policy of the European Union: EU and International Law 
perspectives (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), p. 304. 
68 Richard J. Lazarus, ‘Super wicked problems and climate change: restraining the present to 
liberate the future’ (2008) 94 Cornell Law Review 1153.
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their behalf.69 Subsequent to such conferral, the EU’s climate package appears 
to be a set of constituent instruments that precludes Member States from 
taking certain actions.70 Such action relates to climate change specifically 
both with respect to distribution and implementation, and in relation to the 
EU legal order generally, as the objectives of preserving the stability of the 
internal market and competition need to be satisfied. This could be viewed as 
a lex specialis argument supported by climate exceptionalism. Thus, ‘working 
together’ has its legal limits. This view predicated on Member States and EU 
institutions as composite and separable entities is a conventional positivist 
view, and does not reflect either the political economy of climate change or the 
way European governance functions. Both EU governance and the political 
economy of climate change could be said to function by way of iteration. 
Iteration in an altruistic experimental sense would mean ‘learning by 
doing’: complex issues demand changes, negotiations and improvements to 
initial allocation and implementation, with constant and periodic input by 
stakeholders. The EU has advertised this mode of administrative governance 
as the preference for experimentalist governance71 and smart regulation. The 
preference for learning by doing is supported by a governance method is best 
articulated by Sabel and Zeitlin: “[autonomous units of implementation] 
must report regularly on their performance, especially as measured by the agreed 
indicators, and participate in a peer review in which their results are compared 
with those pursuing other means to the same general ends. Finally, the framework 
goals, metrics, and procedures themselves are periodically revised by the actors who 
69 This reflects the Razian Normal Justification Thesis discussed in Section III (A), Chapter 3., 
where the Member States have conferred power onto the EU to achieve ends that they have 
comparatively inadequate means to pursue. For a discussion on the use of this thesis in relation 
to international law, see Samantha Besson, ‘The Authority of International Law – Lifting the 
State Veil’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 343. Notwithstanding views on the extent to which 
European Law is a species of international law, the use of the ‘service conception of authority’ 
can be applicable to European Law as well; the exception being that European citizens along 
with Member States have a legitimate claim in deciding on their ends in addition to Member 
States as representative collectives. 
70 This is the corollary to the Razian Pre-emption Thesis discussed in Chapter 3, III (A)., where 
the conferring party is pre-empted from raising some argument against the authority to which 
some powers have been conferred. 
71 For a review, see Sabel and Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference’, supra. 
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initially established them, augmented by such new participants whose views come 
to be seen as indispensable to full and fair deliberation.”72 The EU’s preference 
for handling the technical and administrative complexity of experimental 
governance appears to be rooted in its ‘justificatory capital’; i.e. in the wake of 
several claims regarding the ‘democratic deficit’ of EU institutions, the EU has 
famously adopted governance through reason as ‘a reaction to the destructive 
force of politics’ eroticism.’73 The EU reasons out its use of expertise and has 
several stages of review of expertise; the same cannot be said for all Member 
States of the EU. More than three thousand experts are engaged by the 
Commission – the body that suggests new regulation and collects intelligence 
- that assist with technical inquiries.74 Further, the Commission has attempted 
to reason out its use of expertise. Notably, in a 2001 White Paper on European 
Governance75 followed by a 2002 Communication with Guidelines76 the 
Commission sought to articulate its position on ‘the collection and use of 
expert advice,’ where expertise included ‘in-house’ and ‘external experts.’ 
Moreover, given the several processes of review of the Commission’s output by 
the Council, the Parliament, and the possibility of judicial review, there seems 
to be a robust system of regulatory oversight built into EU decision-making; 
this may mitigate the possibility of discursive capture of expertise discussed 
in Chapter 5. Thus, the EU regulatory architecture seems poised to deal with 
ferreting out the administrative complexities of climate regulation.77
72 Sabel and Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference’, supra, p. 274. 
73 Ulrich Haltern, Pathos and Patina: The Failure and Promise of Constitutionalism in the European 
Imagination (2003) 9 European Law Journal 14, p. 19.
74 The Commission maintains a Register of Expert Groups and Other Similar Entities at http://
ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm. If we consider ‘informal experts’ engaged 
by all Directorates General, then the number may well exceed twelve thousand experts. 
Mark Field, ‘The Anatomy of EU Policy-making: Appointing the experts’ in Ariadna Ripoll 
Servent et. al. (eds.), Agency And Influence Inside The EU Institutions (Vienna: Österreichische 
Gesellschaft für Europaforschung, 2013), pp. 1–19.
75 European Commission, European Governance – A white paper COM(2001) 428
76 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the collection and use of 
expertise by the Commission: Principles and guidelines COM (2002) 713.
77 Climate regulation is one notable instance of the ‘European administrative space’. For a 
general overview, see Herwig C. H. Hoffman, ‘Mapping the European Administrative Space’ 
(2008) 31 West European Politics 662. 
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Iterative experimentalist governance seems to capture the way the EU 
ETS functions; the fact that there are phases of the system, and the fact that 
the method of allocation has changed from grandfathering to auctioning 
clearly seems to suggest that the EU ETS is a good example of learning 
by doing. It is easy to ignore, however, that iteration takes place within 
institutional parameters. The effectiveness of the EU ETS is contingent 
on the free movement of allowances (and related services) that the EU is 
institutionally poised to deal with; the price stability and efficiency of the 
EU ETS could be reasonably safeguarded given such an institutional 
arrangement. Further, given one of the primary components of the ‘command-
without-control’78 nature of the EU ETS is the tradability of allowances in 
primary and secondary markets, the EU’s general regulatory architecture 
towards dealing with economic flows may lend itself towards an enabling 
administrative framework for flexibility mechanisms dealing with climate 
change.79 For iteration to accommodate regulatory innovation, there needs to 
be complementarities with current EU climate governance. This would apply 
to climate regulation irrespective of the level of design and implementation. 
If we were to relax the altruism assumption, the ‘learning by doing’ would 
be premised on the distributive choices that constitute institutional memory. 
Drawing on Chapter 5 and Sections I and II above, EU climate governance 
is premised on the ‘market-based liability’ of some industrial actors, where 
both the preference for a market-based approach as well as inclusion of some 
industries is the result of tussles between different interests. The language 
in which the ‘agreed indicators’ of EU climate regulation is understood and 
improved upon is tethered to such preferences, and the agents who put such 
preferences into effect. Notwithstanding oversight mechanisms that may 
78 This characterisation is because the EU ETS combines the property of regulatory control over 
the emissions quotas that satisfy the ‘cap’ component and the absence of control with regard 
to how parties may satisfy the cap. Stefano Clò, European Emissions Trading in Practice: An 
Economic Analysis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), p. 62.
79 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC 
and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing 
Council Directive 93/22/EEC [2004] OJ L145.
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prevent the prevalence of discursive capture, radical institutional change 
would be difficult.80 It is within such institutional preferences that the EU’s 
smart or better regulation’81 operates; EU institutions seek to adopt regulation 
to relieve Member States of administrative burdens.
It seems likely, therefore, that climate policies at the Member State level 
that are informed by different preferences, interests and indicators would be 
pre-empted due to the high co-ordination costs (or administrative dissonance, 
as it were) with the current EU framework. In other words, it appears that 
the path dependence of EU climate governance to the EU ETS specifically, 
and towards a market mechanism of dealing with industrial emissions 
generally would entail a selective appreciation of ‘externalities, heterogeneity, 
economies of scale and scope’82 in climate regulation. If yes, then perhaps 
in the interest of managing administrative costs, it would make sense for 
Member States to implement non-ETS targets by developing instruments 
that do not conflict too much with the distributive and discursive preferences 
that inform the EU ETS. 
In addition to the above, there is yet another aspect of the European 
polity that bears on any federal arrangement chosen with respect to climate 
regulation, and that is the way aspects such as freedom, privacy and 
responsibility of private parties are legally constructed. Even in the absence 
of the vertical applicability of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) in individual cases, the prevalence of horizontal governance and 
discursive influence plays a role in Member State appreciation of private 
80 Scholars have argued that the use of expertise is moderated by the normative signifier of 
establishing the internal market, the democratic deficit in conducting expert inquiry, and 
the dissonance between expert inquiry and the expressive capacity of civil society. For a full 
discussion, see Roy, ‘Mediators and Moderators of Normative Reductionism’; supra, Section 
II. Thus, the current position seems to be that the EU regulatory architecture is well placed 
to deal with ‘learning by doing’, but the learning operates within institutional and discursive 
constraints. 
81 The Commission’s Smart Regulation or Better Regulation approach can be found at: https://
ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/better-regulation-why-and-how_en
82 These are the primary factors identified by van Zeben with regard to the determinants of 
competence allocation in EU climate regulation. Josephine Van Zeben, The Allocation Of 
Regulatory Competence in the European Emissions Trading Scheme (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), 
p. 90.
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engagement.83 This is discussed more fully with respect to the proportionality 
of EET regulation in Chapter 7. For now, it is sufficient to mention that the 
institutional regulation of private parties in the European polity is not based 
on static normative moderators, but on federal iteration: as Mattias Kumm 
points out, the constitutional structure of European federalism is also based 
on iteration by Member State institutions, primarily domestic courts and 
the parties who negotiate their interests through such courts.84 Some parties 
and courts influence the substance of European law, and this substance 
in turn becomes applicable to all Member States and citizens residing 
therein. Thus, the fabric of European federalism influenced by iteration and 
incremental learning by doing – rather than static claims to centralisation or 
decentralisation –is the base on which new climate regulation will be woven. 
It would be far more cost-effective for any party to transact within such federal 
parameters, unless they have the capacity to bring about fundamentally 
redistributive changes into the federal sphere.85
ii. EU’s Interest in Competition and Leakage 
There is one issue regarding the internal market that features in EU climate 
policy, and which could be said to colour the practice of subsidiarity: 
leakage. 
83 See Discussion in Section IIA, Chapter 7. In Urgenda, the Hague District Court found 
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence to be persuasive without explicitly relying 
on European Convention on Human Rights provisions. For a recent review of the debates in 
which the horizontal effect of the ECHR can be found in European and Member State law, 
see Mary Arden, Human Rights and European Law: Building new legal orders (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 224-225.
84 Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutionalism and Experimentalist Governance’ (2012) 6 Regulation 
and Governance 401. 
85 In the US, the State of California has arguably been able to redistribute the climate regulatory 
framework vis-à-vis the motor vehicles industry, and also being a first mover in a possible 
trade-based federal climate policy. Ann Carlson, ‘Iterative Federalism and Climate Change’ 
(2009) Northwestern University Law Review 1097. As discussed in Chapter 5, the UK – 
and notably some industrial actors within the UK – have had a strong influence on EU 
climate policy. However, it would be presumptuous to say that the UK exclusively mediates 
the iterative regulation of climate change in the EU. The framework of market-oriented 
producer-based liability informed by international regulation would certainly play a part as 
discussed in III.A (iii) below. 
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The idea of leakage assumes centrality in both international and EU 
climate regulation. The IPCC defines carbon leakage as “The increase in CO2 
emissions outside the countries taking domestic mitigation action divided 
by the reduction in the emissions of these countries.” Mitigation regulation 
may lead to high carbon prices; the EU can therefore affect emissions 
globally as industries may relocate to other jurisdictions where there is no 
carbon price. Thus, EU policies may amount to a redistribution of emissions 
among nation-states globally and even internally within Member States of 
the EU. The importance of the effects of leakage internally gains currency 
due to another factor: the competitive edge enjoyed by industries inside and 
among Member States of the EU. This is why the way leakage is understood 
in the EU is inevitably informed by the idea of the economic implications 
for industries; the EU ETS Directive, for instance, mentions that the reason 
why other nation-states should have carbon prices is because if they don’t, 
then “this could lead to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions in third countries 
where industry would not be subject to comparable carbon constraints (carbon 
leakage), and at the same time could put certain energy-intensive sectors and 
subsectors in the Community which are subject to international competition at an 
economic disadvantage.”86 Thus, the concern is as much the risk of relocation of 
production and investment (termed production and investment leakage) as a 
potential increase in global emissions. Integral to production and investment 
leakage are carbon price and carbon costs,87 to which we now turn. 
The carbon price is the EU-level price that needs to be internalised by 
units that are liable for the reduction of emissions; in the EU the carbon 
price is set by the EU ETS. Policies at the EU and Member State Level such 
as energy efficiency standards or fuel standards or additional climate change 
policies may affect the carbon costs of some producers in the Member State. 
This can result in the producers becoming greener and thus reducing the 
demand for allowances. If this happens, then there might be a decline in 
the robustness of the carbon market. This in turn may lead to a drop in the 
carbon price of allowances in the EU ETS. Alternatively, the producer bearing 
86 Recital 24, EU ETS Directive. 
87 For a discussion, see Andrei Marcu, Christian Egerhofer, Susanna Roth and Wijnand Stoefs, 
‘Carbon Leakage: An overview’, CEPS Special Report No. 79, December 2013. 
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higher costs may decide to relocate to another Member State within the EU 
that does not have such stringent climate policies. If this happens, then there 
is the potential for what has been called ‘the waterbed effect’, where emissions 
are displaced from one Member State to another. Notwithstanding arguments 
against Member State climate policies in addition to the EU ETS on the 
ground that the waterbed effect would come into play,88 there is no evidence 
yet to suggest that the waterbed effect would adversely affect the carbon price 
EU ETS or cause carbon leakage.89 Having said that, the EU has an interest 
in maintaining a carbon price that avoids external leakage, as expressed in 
Recital 24 of the EU ETS Directive. This is done through border tax measures. 
Member States that are economically dependent on sectors that have a high 
propensity to leakage would be incentivised to contain leakage within the 
EU or internationally due to the revenue accrued from the industrial actors 
within such sector. Given the history of the EU ETS and challenges made 
by different sectors, it appears that the Commission is not persuaded by the 
competitive disadvantages of leakage.90 The same applies to the CJEU where 
comparative competitive disadvantage of some sectors is not considered to a 
violation of equal treatment.91 It could further be said that the adoption of 
the auctioning of allowances in Phase III was adopted despite a substantially 
enhanced risk of leakage.92 In contrast, grandfathered allowances had the 
88 See for instance Ted Thurlings, ‘Nederland en de EU lopen juist voorop in het reductiebeleid’, 
Volkskrant, June 26, 2015, available at: http://www.volkskrant.nl/opinie/nederland-en-de-eu-
lopen-juist-voorop-in-het-reductiebeleid~a4089206/.
89 “Whether this so-called ‘waterbed effect’ of EU wide emissions trading implies a stimulus 
(the emission-saving Member State can make a financial profit by selling) or even a barrier 
to further going national climate targets remains to be seen. After all, if a Member State with 
a national target which is stricter than the EU sells its emission right to a country which 
then accordingly will have additional emissions, the total EU emissions will not decrease. 
Whether hence the possibility of trading among Member States serves as an incentive or not 
for further going national policies, remains to be seen.” Marjan Peeters, ‘Climate Law in The 
Netherlands: The Search towards a National Legislative Framework for a Global Problem’ 
(2010) 14(3) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1, p. 14. 
90 Okereke and McDaniels, supra. 
91 See the discussion on Arcelor in Chapter 7. 
92 Susanne Dröge, ‘Carbon Pricing and its Future Role for Energy-intensive Industries’, Climate 
Strategies Report, March 2013, p. 10 and p. 17. 
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promise of keeping a check on leakage owing to the possibility of passing 
through costs to consumers; theoretically, if an installation in an industry 
could pass through all its costs to its consumers, then there should not be 
a competitive disadvantage. In other words, a carbon price poses less of a 
leakage threat if the cost burden to meet the carbon price can be shifted. While 
auctioning may lead to an enhanced risk of leakage, it enhances the potential 
for low carbon innovation.93 Thus, the primary objective of the EU ETS in 
reducing emissions cost-effectively – is given priority to secondary objectives, 
including the bearing of additional costs and foregoing the enjoyment of 
additional benefits (as discussed in Section II.B). 
To come back to the Iberdrola judgement, the reasoning of the CJEU that 
pass-through is not prohibited but at the same time not essential for reducing 
emissions indicates that the EU is concerned about competitive concerns, but 
that at the same time does not appear to consider competitive concerns in 
general and leakage in particular as the primary informant of subsidiarity in 
relation to climate change. Rather, subsidiarity is characterised by the liability-
based94 market mechanism of the EU ETS.
iii. The EU Preference for a Producer-Based Model
Steininger et. al. have argued that the difficulty of carbon leakage can be better 
addressed through a ‘consumption-based model’ of carbon accounting and 
carbon responsibility.95 This would imply that the embodied carbon in goods 
would be accounted for if the final consumer is held responsible for the emissions 
incurred along the supply chain. This would also handle the leakage problem as 
93 Ingmar Juergens, Jesús Barreiro-Hurlé, and Alexander Vasa, ‘Identifying carbon leakage 
sectors in the EU ETS and implications of results’ (2013) 13 Climate Policy 89, p. 100. 
Ralf Martin, Mirabelle Muûls and Ulrich Wagner, ‘Climate Change, Investment and Carbon 
Markets and Prices – Evidence from manager interviews’, Climate Strategies, Carbon Pricing 
for Low-Carbon Investment Project, 2011.
94 The quantity-based fixed cap is the moderator that characterises EU climate regulation as 
discussed in Section IIIC of Chapter 3. This fixed cap is implemented by properties that 
amount to a liability mechanism as discussed in Section IV.C (iii) of Chapter 5. 
95 Karl Steininger, Christian Lininger, Susanne Droege, Dominic Roser, Luke Tomlinson and 
Lukas Meyer, ‘Justice and Cost-effectiveness of Consumption-based versus Production-based 
Approaches in the case of Unilateral Climate Policies’ (2014) 24 Global Environmental Change 
75.
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the consumer would not differentiate among producers in relation to the goods 
they consume. Issues such as emissions lost in international transport would 
also be accounted for. This is the theoretical basis for a global carbon tax where 
all individuals would bear equal responsibility against a benchmark. However, 
this is not the way responsibility is understood under the UNFCCC, and this is 
also not the way responsibility is understood by the EU. Importantly, when the 
international architecture on responding to climate change was being put into 
place, emissions were inventoried and ‘fair accounting’96 was done by the IPCC 
with the producer in mind.97 Carbon accounting in the EU – as is manifested in 
carbon inventories for monitoring and reporting – is based on the production 
of goods and energy in Member States98 above a certain threshold: these are 
the ‘direct sources’ of emissions accounted for. The Community Independent 
Transaction Log (CITL) database- the go-to point for transparency regarding 
the units covered, monitored, and allowances transacted - contains information 
only on activities of installations above the threshold mentioned in the EU ETS 
Directive. Smaller installations are excluded for all purposes. Further, the logic 
behind the secondary objective of energy efficiency is that marginal abatement 
costs may be reduced by installations investing in cleaner technologies. The core 
of EU climate regulation – assignment of liability, pricing through a market and 
MRV of installations – is a producer-based territorial model. The territoriality 
is restricted to Member States; this is also why carbon leakage is a problem 
only with respect to production leakage and investment leakage, as that would 
compromise the internal market. This does not mean that consumer-based 
emissions cannot be accommodated: the ‘baseline-and-credit’ mechanisms are 
essentially consumption-based approaches, including the CDM. However, as 
is well known, the inclusion of baseline-and-credit mechanisms are tolerated as 
long as they do not have an adverse effect on carbon pricing, or interfere with 
the fixed cap that moderates climate action. 
96 The idea that carbon accounting is not a technical exercise but qualified by fairness is worth 
noting. Simone Bastianoni, Federico Maria Pulselli and Enzo Tiezzi, ‘The Problem of 
Assigning Responsibility for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (2004) 49 Ecological Economics 253, 
p. 254. 
97 IPCC, Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (London: IPCC, 1996). 
98 Glen P. Peters and Edgar G. Hertwich, ‘Post-Kyoto Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Production 
versus consumption’ (2008) 86 Climatic Change 51. 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   126 10/25/2017   5:13:34 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 251
233
EU Climate Regulation, Subsidiarity and EET
6
The producer-based territorial model of regulating emissions is not 
necessarily damaging to the economic interests of the EU; and this could 
explain why there is an overlap of international carbon accounting models and 
the ‘federal market’99 of the EU. Essentially, higher environmental standards do 
not necessarily lead to economic disadvantages, provided there is a high level of 
economic interdependence.100 Though there might be resistance from individual 
firms or industries (as discussed in Section IV of Chapter 5), there is an incentive 
for affluent countries to require other countries to adopt stringent environmental 
policies to reap competitive advantages.101 A higher level of environmental 
protection and economic advantage is intimately connected to an open economy 
with firms as leading actors. Thus, though there may be opposition by individual 
firms or industries or even countries in adopting mechanisms such as a carbon 
tax, a cap on emissions may work due to the participation of firms in an 
interdependent market without adversely affecting the economy of the EU. This 
also provides the impetus for the EU to influence the creation of an international 
carbon market by linking EU ETS-equivalent systems; which  in turn would 
alleviate the problem of investment and production leakage.
The conclusion we can arrive at in relation to the exercise of powers within 
the EU is – if additional emissions reductions may be achieved by way of an 
alternative that is not only compatible but approaches strict conformity with 
the EU ETS, then such an alternative will be certainly be preferred to one 
that confioms less. The principle of shared competence with respect to climate 
regulation may be described as exhaustion of EU ETS equivalent measures. This 
does not mean that non-EU ETS measures are precluded; we cannot arrive 
at the conclusion that any and all climate measures (that bear the promise of 
additional emissions reductions) that are not compatible with the EU ETS are 
unlawful. This brings us to the question: is an EET equivalent to the EU ETS? 
99 The phrase is borrowed from Schuetze. Robert Schuetze, From International to Federal Market: 
The changing structure of European Law (Oxford: OUP, forthcoming). 
100 See David Vogel, ‘Environmental Regulation and Economic Integration’ (2000) 3 Journal of 
International Economic Law 265. 
101 Ibid. This is only one of the reasons discussed by Vogel as to why stringent environmental 
regulation might coincide with the EU’s aim of creating and maintaining a robust internal 
market. 
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B. Regulating the End-user: Double-Counting, the Polluter 
Pays Principle and the Least Cost Avoider 
From the above, it appears that EU regulation influences all aspects of carbon 
accounting, liability and administration. It was also suggested in Chapter 5 
that there appears to be a ‘desirable path-dependence’ in the EU ETS that 
would be absent in a new mechanism, that involves new stakeholders. This 
is at odds with the common refrain that the individual or household should 
be regulated at a more local level. Further, the EU ETS seems well suited to 
facilitate (and hold liable) installations. How could the end-user fit into this 
framework? I seek to argue in this section that following the distributive and 
efficiency rationale of the EU ETS, the climate end-user is not necessarily an 
individual or a household. To make this point, I need to take several steps back, 
all the way to the first assumption in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the residential sector has substantial untapped 
emissions. And the same may be said for the various activities that I sought to 
introduce within an EET including consumption of food, waste disposal and 
private transport. The need to engage the individual or the household sector 
seems obvious given this requirement. From Fig. 5 on Sources of Emissions 
earlier in this chapter, it appears that all of these are sources of emissions. 
However, all of the activities that are related to the consumption of electricity 
and fuel could be viewed as existing or potential indirect sources of emissions. 
To have an EET together with a system as the ETS would therefore lead to 
a double counting problem. In relation to other activities as well such as the 
consumption of food, there is a choice made to attribute emissions to the 
final consumer; there is in effect an assignment of liability to the consumer for 
the emissions incurred along the supply-chain. The idea of ‘the end-user’ as a 
discrete source in the light of double-counting and assignment of liability 
needs clarification. 
The way Double Counting (‘DC’) has been thought about in relation 
to the PCT by scholars102 as well as by organisations that provided expert 
testimony in the PCT Report is in relation to overlaps in the EU ETS and 
102 Brohe, ‘Personal Carbon Trading in the context of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’, supra, 
p. 173.
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a cap-and-trade system for individuals/households. The Tyndall Centre, for 
instance, is of the opinion that there would be a ‘very considerable degree’ 
of DC.103 This is echoed by Starkey who finds that there would be a ‘very, 
very considerable amount’ of DC given the EU ETS and the possibility of 
developing a policy mechanism in relation to additional emitters such as gas 
suppliers and fuel suppliers.104 Fawcett observed: “I am not entirely clear in my 
own mind how important it [DC] is.”105 After considering the evidence, the 
PCT Report observes that DC is not an insurmountable problem, provided 
that the PCT and EU ETS ‘operate side by side’106 with different currencies.107 
Unless there is clarity on how the two systems can be fused without difficulty 
(and to my mind there seems to be no evidence to that effect), then DC is a 
problem. If the intention is to expand the EU ETS to the household, then DC 
is indeed a serious problem, as the intention behind such expansion is not two 
separate currencies and systems operating ‘side by side’. The practical solution 
advocated by Sorrell to solving the problem of DC – conceptualised as the 
simultaneous operation of a separate trading scheme for the end-user – is to 
institute two separate systems with different currencies and find mechanisms 
for fungibility of the two currencies prevalent in the two systems.108 Sorrell is 
probably the scholar who has investigated the issue of DC most extensively 
among those consulted for the PCT Report. While the EU ETS was being 
conceived in 2003, Sorrell had studied the issue of DC in relation to the 
Renewables Obligation and the Energy Efficiency Commitment that existed 
in the UK prior to the onset of the EU ETS. He had observed that though 
there might be a ‘double crediting’ of an abatement in the three systems, the 
EU ETS cap, the Renewables targets or the energy efficiency target may not be 
103 PCT Report, p. 15.
104 PCT Report, p. 30. It may be noted that Starkey includes ‘suppliers’ as a separate category 
of emitters, thus indicating that various points on the carbon chain are overlooked in the 
concentration on producers and consumers. 
105 PCT Report, p. 69. 
106 Ibid.
107 Testimony of Matt Prescott in this regard is accepted by the House of Commons. PCT 
Report, p. 64. 
108 Sorrell’s uses ‘fungibility’ in the sense of rendering units from different trading systems equivalent. 
It is analogous, for instance, in making CDM credits equivalent to EU ETS allowances. 
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undermined, but concluded that calculating the total abatement of the three 
mechanisms without intersections would probably lead to an overestimation 
of abatement.109 
Welfare would be compromised if a DC translates into a double crediting 
– a consumer may have to pay twice for the same unit of carbon. This would 
of course be in addition to the administrative costs incurred in having 
multiple regulatory mechanisms, or the problem of ‘double regulation’. A yet 
more compelling problem is de facto effectiveness, as DC might inflate actual 
mitigation. The problem with DC, as Sorrell puts it, is if a single abatement 
action is counted more than once. This would be a problem as there would 
potentially be an overestimation of the amount of emissions mitigated. If 
the primary proxy for the effectiveness of a climate policy is the satisfaction 
of climate targets, then the targets would be met sooner with an ‘accounting 
inflation’. In other words, a quantity mechanism proxied through the 
satisfaction of a climate target would not correspond with actual abatement. 
Effectiveness, therefore, may be satisfied through an underestimation of actual 
abatement. 
How are we to deal with the above problem? Practically, a solution would 
lie in devising methods of finding equivalence (similar to Sorrell’s ‘fungibility’) 
between different policies or segments of a policy. Additionally, taking a 
cue from the MRV Requirements of the EU ETS, segregating components 
of emissions at every stage would be an option. In relation to industrial 
activities, installations have to bear the transaction costs of segregating direct 
and indirect emissions sources.110 However, in the event segregation is too 
costly or not possible, then we need to consider whether something like a 
PCT policy needs to be in place at all. If there is indeed a conflict between 
accounting for abatement at different stages of the carbon chain such as an 
109 Steven Sorrell, ‘Who Owns the Carbon? Interactions between the EU emissions trading 
scheme and the UK renewables obligation and energy efficiency commitment’ (2003) 14 
Energy and Environment 677, pp. 692 – 694. 
110 The process of Monitoring Reporting and Verification requires the internalisation of various 
risks by operators such as ‘Detection Risk’ and ‘Verification Risk’, as is evident from the 
Guidance Document. Commission, ‘Guidance Document The Monitoring and Reporting 
Regulation – Data flow activities and control system’, MRR Guidance document No. 6, 17 
October 2012, p. 15. 
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industry and an individual, there needs to be a mechanism for regulatory 
target identification. There should, therefore, be a basis for identifying climate 
regulatory targets. This exercise becomes crucial not only because achieving 
clarity about identification as an end in itself, but identification leads to 
liability for climate change action. And per Calabresi, the assignment of 
liability is an essential component of efficiency. Thus, identification of a ‘source’ 
is integral to distribution of liability for climate action and cost-effectiveness of 
climate regulation. It could be argued that this exercise is not too difficult – 
the individual (and the household) is responsible for emissions, and therefore 
should bear responsibility. However, as indicated in Chapter 1, the structure 
of the carbon economy makes the identification of a source more complex. 
Intuitively, it would make sense to hold all individuals responsible for 
climate change as they are the (final) consumers of energy directly, as well as 
the consumers of products that involve the release of harmful gases into the 
atmosphere. I would, however, like to suggest that this is a compelling view 
of consumption, but not the only view. One of the central insights of BLE 
is that individual behaviour is constrained by factors that are beyond their 
deliberative control.111 Thus, when a consumer makes a decision about what 
to buy, they are subject to influence by producers, the media, pressure groups, 
etc. Drawing on this insight, it could be said that there is no a priori assumed 
responsibility of individuals for their acts of consumption.112 Simply put, the 
formulation of preferences takes place in an institutional context. 
One way of thinking about consumption is the purchase and use of goods 
and services by consumers. Another way of thinking about consumption is 
the totality of processes that involve the exploitation of resources that result 
in their depletion or alteration; or as the biologist Norman Myers puts it, the 
‘human transformation of materials and energy.’113 With regard to the first, 
there is an attribution of responsibility on final consumers for the process of 
consumption. This amounts to a determination of causality and would feed 
111 Sunstein and Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron’, supra. 
112 This is indeed the guiding assumption of the MiFID Directives in the EU post the financial 
crisis. 
113 Norman Myers, ‘Consumption: Challenge to sustainable development…or Distraction?’ 
(1997) 276 Science 53 – 57. 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   131 10/25/2017   5:13:34 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 256
238
Chapter 6
into holding individual consumers negligent or liable for being polluters. With 
respect to the second, there is no pre-determined attribution for the processes 
that are involved in the consumption of resources. This conceptualisation is 
in tune with the picture of carbon history sketched in the initial pages of this 
book: the naturalisation of fossil-fuel lifestyles is informed by the exploitation 
of coal, the related invention of the steam engine, the discovery of oil and 
regulatory incentivisation of the manufacture and enjoyment of fossil fuel-
based products such as private automobiles.114 In this account responsibility 
can be attributed to neither producers nor consumers, but rather the 
institutional structure of the carbon economy as a whole. 
The statement ‘we are all responsible for what we consume’ could equally 
well include the producers of fuel and automobiles, the advertisement 
agencies that have created a fossil fuel economy, or the final consumer. There 
is no undisputed way to define a consumer or unit that is ‘really responsible’ 
for climate change. From this, I suggest that the end-user can therefore be 
any unit that is part of the consumption ecosystem. The end-user is therefore 
a construct that is best placed to deal with climate change. Drawing on the 
taxonomy of direct and indirect sources of all activities, the end-user may 
be conceptualised as follows: First, for emissions that are to be double-
counted, it is the least-cost avoider placed at any point on the carbon chain. 
Secondly, for emissions that are not double-counted – or if is possible to 
perfectly segregate direct and indirect sources – it is the source that directly 
contributes to emissions. Following this reasoning, two possible propositions 
for assignment of liability are: 
1. When there is double counting, the individual or household is not 
liable as they are not the least-cost avoiders. 
2. When there is no double counting, the individual or household may 
be liable as they are direct sources of emissions. 
In relation to the first, the assigx`nment of liability should be on the least-cost 
avoider (per Calabresi) or the ‘most advantaged’ (per Caney). If the least-cost 
avoider (say the producer of fuel) is unwilling to bear all costs, they would 
114 See Chapter 1, Section I. C. 
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pass-through the costs to the consumer. Following Caney, even such costs 
should not be passed through to the ‘least advantaged’.115 Caney’s argument 
may have an effect on efficiency if consumers are unwilling to undertake 
carbon-neutral activities if they are aware of the fact that they are bearing 
burdens on behalf of other agents in the carbon chain. 
Having said that, I would like to put forward three categories of costs: 
(i) The costs of segregating, monitoring, reporting and verifying direct and 
indirect emissions from households, and (ii) the costs of differentiating 
among households (either on the basis of a benchmark or otherwise) for the 
purpose of assigning liability, and (iii) the costs of implementation through 
a bargain-based trading mechanism. The European Environment Agency 
(EEA) Report on End-user Emissions from Energy116 provides a method of 
assessing emissions from households. The assessment is based largely on the 
UK ‘end-user model’117 that makes a distinction between combustion and 
fugitive emissions and identifies the end-user not as an autonomous source, 
but a reallocated source. There is no basis, provided, for how this reallocation 
happens. Drawing on the shift in liability to individuals, this reallocation would 
amount to redistribution, and the basis for undertaking this redistribution 
appears to be political reasons (such as public choice concerns discussed in 
Chapter 5) or a value-based idea of individual responsibility for emissions. 
Following this, I would like to forward a third proposition:
3. The End-user with respect to all sources for the purpose Climate 
Regulation is the Least Cost Avoider and the Most Advantaged. 
I am aware that this categorisation of the ‘end-user’ is at odds with the way the 
end-user is understood in energy-efficiency regulations, or in the assessment 
115 See discussion on Caney and Calabresi in Section I. B. (ii) of this chapter. 
116 European Environment Agency, ‘End-user GHG emissions from Energy: Reallocation of 
emissions from energy industries to end users 2005–2009’, EEA Technical Report Number 19, 
December 2011.
117 The reader may note a practical application of iterative federalism discussed earlier where a 
model of reallocation of emissions developed by a UK agency provides the basis for calculating 
end-user emissions at an EU level, which then becomes the baseline for all Member States. 
See discussion in Section III. A. (i) of this chapter.
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of end-user emissions.118 Such re-categorisation also seems to bring into play 
the possibility of other desirable re-categorisations. Take for instance Michael 
Vandenberg’s re-categorisation of Demand-side Management to Net Demand 
Reduction. Vandenbergh has been a prolific advocate on the need to reduce 
emissions from individuals. Unlike some of the scholars discussed earlier 
(Mitchell, Prinsen) and albeit without addressing the issue of double counting, 
he takes it for granted that the individual is a discrete source of emissions,119 
and therefore sees the need to reduce emissions from individuals. Keeping 
this requirement in mind, Vandenbergh addresses how this could be done, 
and among other proposals such as informational tools to guide behaviour,120 
he (along with Jim Rossi) suggests the need to reduce energy demand. In 
this regard, he studies the American electricity sector and concludes that 
the preference for Demand-side Management as the preferred category of 
attaining energy efficiency provides perverse incentives to distribution 
utilities to not only avoid demand reduction, but also to refrain from taking 
mitigation measures.121 This is because Demand-side Management focuses on 
shifting the timing of the demand from peak to non-peak periods, and not 
on total demand. This “allows utilities to fully deploy their lowest-cost sources of 
power, while under-deploying or under-investing in higher-cost sources, including 
renewable energy…utilities have generating units standing by to provide the 
additional electricity necessary at peak times. These ‘peaker’ units are often natural 
gas turbines that are more expensive to operate than the coal-fired units that supply 
118 The approach taken in the EEA Report discussed above is in conformity with the idea that the 
end-user is the final consumer. The phrase ‘end-use’ is generally associated with ‘residential’ 
or ‘buildings’. See for example, European Commission, Good Practice for Energy Efficiency, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/good_practice_in_ee_-
web.pdf. Other organisations also use the terms similarly: https://www.c2es.org/technology/
factsheet/ResidentialBuildingEnd-Use; http://www1.udel.edu/igert/pbl_course/Team%20
Simple%20Green%20WP%20Problem%201.pdf. 
119 For a snapshot of his work, see Michael Vandenbergh and Benjamin K. Sovacool, ‘Individual 
behaviour, the Social Sciences and Climate Change’ in Daniel Farber and Marjan Peeters eds. 
Climate Change Law (Edward Elgar, 2016), pp. 94. 
120 Michael P. Vandenbergh, ‘From smokestack to SUV: The individual as regulated entity in the 
new era of environmental law’ (2004) 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 515.
121 Michael P. Vandenbergh and Jim Rossi, ‘Good For You, Bad For US: The financial disincentive 
for New Demand Reduction’ (2012) 65 Vanderbilt Law Review 1527. 
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base load electricity.”122 Thus, Demand-side Management has the potential to 
‘increase total carbon emissions from electricity generation.’ The solution, 
therefore, is to shift the focus to incentivising Net Demand Reduction. In 
this regard, Vandenbergh and Rossi observe that the focus of incentives and 
responsibility should be the utilities distributors and not households, the 
reason behind which I need to reproduce at length:
“Retail electric distributors, both public and private, interact regularly 
with consumers, and they control much of the flow of information to and from 
households and the access to opportunities for demand reduction. They can act 
aggressively to induce widespread adoption of new practices and more efficient 
equipment. Or they can conduct widely-publicized programs that comply with 
applicable mandates and generate goodwill without actually generating major 
reductions in demand. In addition, by controlling access to information and 
connection with the grid, they can encourage or discourage other firms from selling 
goods and services that may reduce household demand.”123
From the above, we get that the distributors are best placed to affect the 
situational factors that influence emissions from individuals with respect 
to electricity. Given the utilities distributors bear comparatively lower 
information costs, capital costs as well as costs of bringing about collective 
action, they seem to be the least cost avoiders for emissions from individuals 
for electricity consumption. Assuming that individuals and households are 
discrete direct sources for electricity-related emissions, it would still stand to 
reason to categorise utilities distributors as the end-users for the purpose of 
regulating such emissions. 
Taking into account both accounts of inventorying emissions – the 
producer and consumer models – I would like to guardedly suggest that given 
the burdens that are reallocated, i.e. the costs of identifying, differentiating, 
MRV, there doesn’t appear to be a strong case for an efficiency rationale for 
reassignment of liability to individuals or households. Given these costs 
coupled with the costs of households participating in a trading mechanism, it 
122 Ibid, p. 1533 -1535. 
123 Ibid, p. 1532. 
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seems more reasonable to characterise the climate end-user as a comparatively 
large installation.
iv. Conclusion
The PCT Report, the scholarly literature on PCT and ancillary literature 
looks at regulation in an either-or framework: regulation should happen 
either at the EU or Member State level. Initially, I thought along similar lines 
and felt the need to make an argument for extending the scope of an EET 
beyond the Member State. A preliminary glance at EU climate policy may 
also suggest that for sectors not covered under the EU ETS, Member States 
are completely autonomous in deciding on climate regulation. Familiarity 
with the EU regulatory architecture as well as scholarship on the multi-level 
regulation of climate risk made me realise that this dichotomy is untenable. 
In Chapter 5, I discussed how the EU assumes relevance with regard to the 
political economy of regulating individual climate action. In this chapter, I 
examined the law on climate federalism in the EU and the operation of the 
principle of subsidiarity. From this analysis, the intimate relationship of the 
EU and Member States in relation to any climate regulation became clear. 
The conventionally held view is that the EU ETS pertains only to certain 
‘sectors’ and the ESD applies to non-ETS sectors within which households can 
be potentially included. However, I argued that this is not the case. The EU 
ETS Directive pertains not only to existing climate action but also potential 
climate action, and additional action is shaped by association with the EU 
ETS. This is not only with respect to cost-effectiveness of other policies, but 
also the way climate responsibilities are distributed and burdens are allocated. 
The ‘administrative federalism’ of the EU considers costs such as Monitoring 
Reporting and Verification, endorses experimentation, and deals with the 
problem of leakage centred on a producer-based regulatory model. If that 
is the case, then where would we locate individuals and households within 
the regulatory architecture found in the European legal order? I suggest that 
problematising the category of a ‘sector’ reveals that current regulation deals 
with direct and indirect sources. Most of the literature on PCT and similar 
schemes that attributes emissions for the consumption of energy to individuals 
essentially make a normative judgement for considering the individual 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   136 10/25/2017   5:13:35 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 261
243
EU Climate Regulation, Subsidiarity and EET
6
or a household as a direct source. I show that distributive judgements in 
describing emissions from individuals and households are made with respect 
to calculating, modelling and inventorying direct as well as indirect emissions. 
Given the inevitable normative judgements in attributing responsibility to 
individuals and households for emissions, I draw on Calabresi, Caney and the 
situationist inclination of BLE to make the (somewhat heretical) argument 
that the end-user does not need to be an individual or a household; rather 
the end-user should be conceptualised as the least cost avoider and most 
advantaged agent in relation to climate regulation. 
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PROPORTIONALITY OF AN EET SCHEME*
Along with subsidiarity, proportionality is an explicit tool of decision-
making by institutions in the European legal order. In addition, it is used 
as a pre-eminent interpretative device by the European Court of Human 
Rights. Thus Member States have to demonstrate the proportionality of their 
chosen policies when they seek to deviate from EU law, or when they appear 
to infringe individual rights. In addition, the reasoning toolbox offered by 
proportionality has had a horizontal effect in judicial reasoning in Member 
States.1 It has come to be adopted as the chosen mechanism of conducting a 
* Some of the ideas discussed in this chapter, primarily a ‘precautionary approach to the 
proportionality principle’ have been raised earlier in Suryapratim Roy and Edwin Woerdman, 
‘Situating Urgenda versus the Netherlands within Comparative Climate Change Litigation’ 
(2016) 34 Journal of Energy And Natural Resources Law 165.
1 The effect in replacing or reinforcing earlier standards of review have been different. In the 
UK, the ‘reasonableness’ standard seems to have been altered by allowing for more intensive 
review. Chris Hilson, ‘The Europeanization of English Administrative Law: Judicial review 
and convergence’ (2003) 9 European Public Law 125. It may be noted that the experience in 
jurisdictions such as Ireland shows that the unclear way in which proportionality is used with 
regard to review of administrative action could allow for proportionality to be read into the 
reasonableness standard. For a discussion, see Alan D. P. Brady, ‘Proportionality, Deference 
and Fundamental Rights in Irish Administrative Law: The aftermath of Meadows’ (2010) 32 
Dublin University Law Journal 136.
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means-end rationality review of any administrative mechanism.2 Given the 
importance accorded to proportionality, any assessment of the ‘rationality-
based-legality’ of any regulation would have to satisfy a proportionality test. 
I seek to argue in this chapter that proportionality is a useful tool in 
thinking through the desirability of an EET. My argument consists of two 
parts. The first part seeks to show that though there is an entitlement to be 
free of emissions, there is no entitlement to emit; the exceptionalism of climate 
change assumes a presumption in favour of curbing emissions. This idea can 
be expressed in terms of a ‘precautionary moderation of the proportionality 
principle’, whereby the conventional balancing of individual loss and social 
gain assumes a special flavour with regulators assuming a positive obligation to 
‘take care of citizens’. While it is only a national court; i.e. the Hague District 
Court in Urgenda; that has to date applied a precautionary moderation of 
the proportionality principle,3 I will argue that the ECHR confers a positive 
duty of care onto both Member States as well as the EU legal order due to the 
requirement of equivalent protection. Following this line of reasoning, it may 
be mandatory for any party to subscribe to climate regulation. 
The above, however, does not answer whether it is suitable and necessary 
to involve households, and whether it is suitable and necessary to opt for an 
EET scheme. This brings me to the second part of my argument, where I 
will seek to show that though mandatory engagement with climate regulation 
could be considered legitimate, engaging individuals and households by 
way of an EET would not be suitable or necessary once an intensive ‘means’ 
test is undertaken. In this regard, a fundamental problem lies with the way 
individuals are understood in EU law. There is no critical mass on how the 
‘cognitive load’ of individuals may be assessed in dealing with climate policy. 
Given the recent interest in EU regulation in relaxing the assumption of the 
rational consumer, I argue that it is about time regulators and judges rely 
on situationist inputs to assess the reality of individual behaviour. The first 
2 Paul Craig, ‘Proportionality, Rationality and Review’ (2010) New Zealand Law Review 265. 
Craig demonstrates that proportionality is a general ground of review even in non-rights 
cases, though the intensity of review might vary.
3 Roy and Woerdman, ‘Situating Urgenda versus the Netherlands within Comparative Climate 
Change Litigation’, supra, pp. 180 – 183. 
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step is of course the requirement for an intensive analysis by policymakers as 
well as an intensive review process by judicial bodies. Even if this were done, 
it is doubtful whether the proportionality principle can do the work that is 
required of it. 
In brief, this chapter will suggest that individuals and households have 
no inalienable right to emit, but nor is there any justification for making 
them liable for emissions, or force them to bargain (should the element of 
mandatory engagement not be in issue, then the issue of intervention does 
not arise). To require an individual to participate in a cap-and trade scheme 
would be to require participation despite the costs of doing so. This chapter 
proceeds as follows. Section I provides an introduction to the proportionality 
principle in the European legal order and its relevance for climate law. 
Section II views an EET scheme through a proportionality lens, and Section 
III concludes. 
i. Conceptualising Proportionality in relation 
to EU Climate Regulation
A. Introducing Proportionality
As is well established4 and as Porat and Cohen-Eliya summarise, the 
proportionality test as applied in most jurisdictions broadly consists of three 
sub-tests: first, the purpose of an intervention or policy must be appropriate 
(legitimacy); second, the means adopted to further the governmental end 
must be appropriate for furthering that goal (suitability) and must be those 
that least infringe on the right of the individual (necessity); and third, the 
loss to the individual resulting from the infringement of the right must be 
proportional to the governmental gain in terms of furthering the governmental 
goal (proportionality in the strict sense, often characterised as balancing).5 
The test adopted by EU courts includes these components, with the exception 
that a difference in intensity of review has been chalked out, with Member 
4 Jan Jans et al, Europeanisation of Public Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2007) 148. 
5 Iddo Porat and Moshe Cohen-Eliya, ‘American Balancing and German Proportionality: The 
historical origins’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 263.
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State laws subject to a higher intensity review, or proportionality in the strict 
sense.6 Further, a higher intensity review appears to be a way of acknowledging 
constitutional protections; what may be characterised as inalienable 
entitlements seem to be subject to a higher standard of review. It may seem 
odd that inalienable entitlements are subject to compromise, but the EU does 
not seem to make a strict distinction between alienability and inalienability, 
which has troubled deontologically minded scholars.7 We will return to 
this issue shortly. It may also seem odd that proportionality cuts across all 
fields of law irrespective of how they may be categorised. The omnipresence 
of proportionality has historical backing: Aristotle found proportionality to 
be a principle of ‘justice as proportion’, or one where a ‘rational principle’ 
determines the distribution of shares apportioned to individuals in society.8 
The application of this abstract idea into concrete and diverse areas of law 
was articulated by Aquinas and Grotius; Aquinas developed the necessity and 
suitability components in the context of self-defense, and Grotius developed 
the idea of balancing conflicting interests in dispute resolution.9 The idea of 
appropriateness of means to ends – or the avoidance of ‘shooting sparrows 
with cannons’ – pervaded different legal systems, primarily with respect to 
the proportionality of actions taken by the police. There was a difference, 
however, in the areas of law that the proportionality principle was applied in 
different jurisdictions: in Germany, it was administrative law as the Supreme 
Administrative Court in Germany developed the principle,10 as against 
general courts in common law jurisdictions that considered variations of 
means-end reasoning. The initiative of the administrative judges to chart out 
their own path perhaps explains why Germany would have such a prominent 
6 See for instance Wolf Sauter, ‘Proportionality in EU Law: A balancing act?’ TILEC Discussion 
Paper DP 2013-003.
7 Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality’, supra. The opposition in American law with regard to balancing 
is more intense. 
8 Eric Engle, ‘The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An overview’ (2002) 10 
The Dartmouth Law Journal 1, pp. 3 – 4. 
9 Ibid, p. 5. 
10 Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Review in Administrative Law’, Available at: https://
www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/conference/compadmin/compadmin16_mathews_
proportionality.pdf. 
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role in developing proportionality as a principle of administrative review. The 
origins and development of administrative review fused with constitutional 
review due to yet another institutional initiative when the newly formed 
German Constitutional Court in postwar Germany broke new ground by 
characterising proportionality as a constitutional principle.11 This unique 
trajectory of an administrative principle that developed into a constitutional 
principle eventually heavily informed the substance of the proportionality 
principle as a general principle of review in the European legal order. 
B. Proportionality as a Tool of Reasoning about EU Climate 
Regulation
Proportionality operates as a reasoning tool in legislative and executive action; 
irrespective of the institution that employs the principle, it serves as a heuristic 
device in balancing individual and social interests. Much like its operation in 
institutional reasoning, it may serve as a way to address the central concern of 
L&E – how to think about the relationship between individual entitlements 
and social outcomes. In this regard, it is perhaps important to clarify that 
proportionality serves to facilitate or constrain redistribution by a legislative 
or regulatory intervention. Given its relevance in examining regulatory 
intervention against existing individual entitlements, the principle derives 
legitimacy from justifying the validity of distribution. To clarify, guarding 
against the infringement of a pre-determined right or a freedom by regulation 
is essentially an injunction against redistribution, as the entitlements 
recognised in the status quo remains intact. However, proportionality 
also serves to reconstruct regulatory questions in terms of entitlements; 
stakeholders seeking to challenge regulatory interventions may frame such 
interventions in the language of rights and freedoms, thus reconstituting 
11 Cohen-Eliya and Porat, supra, pp. 284 – 285. Following Dieter Grimm, Cohen-Eliya and 
Porat suggest that the Court could not have predicted the importance of this move. However, 
drawing on the narrative presented by Cohen-Eliya and Porat, it may be suggested that 
the Court in postwar Germany was responding to a political situation similar to the final 
years of the eighteenth century, that of the move away from the government being the sole 
source of authority to that of a state ruled by law. Prussian law drafted in the twilight of the 
eighteenth century also incorporated a requirement that the police take ‘necessary measures’ 
in maintaining peace, thus incorporating a proportionality principle. 
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regulatory action as distributive choices. This does not mean, however, that 
such choices would necessarily pre-empt efficiency considerations. This 
would be the case if all rights and freedoms were characterised as inalienable 
entitlements. To the contrary, by subjecting rights and freedoms to balancing 
exercises, proportionality provides a mechanism for introducing efficiency 
analyses,12 leading some scholars to brand proportionality as ‘assault[s] on 
human rights’ by reconstituting entitlements through mathematical exercises.13 
Given this tension, though there could be an incentive by reviewing bodies 
to be innovative about balancing exercises, such exercises need to be 
conducted within the language of entitlements for the reviewing bodies to 
enjoy legitimacy. At the same time, if overturning through review provides a 
credible threat, then the regulators of the first instance would be incentivised 
to (i) provide reasons behind their decisions, and (ii) shape their reasoning in 
the language of entitlements. In the EU legal order, given that the power to 
interpret the contours of such entitlements are distributed in favour of rights 
and freedoms recognised under EU law, national regulators are ‘threatened’ to 
reason within such contours. These contours have more force with respect to 
private parties. As the Arcelor case discussed below demonstrates, entitlements 
such as the ‘freedom to trade’ and ‘the right against non-discrimination’ are 
not inalienable. 
Accounts of the relationship between proportionality and climate change 
in case law and other institutional speech-acts in the EU have been unusually 
taciturn and narrow. This is despite the fact that both the CJEU and the 
Commission have repeatedly referred to proportionality in relation to climate 
change concerns, including a stated preference for relying on proportionality 
rather than subsidiarity in assessing EU legislative acts on climate change.14 
12 Aurlien Portuese, ‘Principle of Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency’ (2013) 19 
European Law Journal 612. 
13 Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality’, supra.
14 Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 98/70/EC as regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and 
introducing a mechanism to monitor and the introduction of a mechanism to monitor and 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the use of road transport fuels and amending Council 
Directive 1999/32/EC, as regards the specification of fuel used by inland waterway vessels 
and repealing Directive 93/12/EEC, COM(2007) 18 final, para 9; Commission’s Proposal for 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   144 10/25/2017   5:13:35 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 269
251
Proportionality of an EET Scheme
7
Specifically, as Croquet observes,15 the suitability test has been curiously absent in 
any discussion on EU climate law. The closest the CJEU has come is its reasoning 
in the Arcelor cases regarding the legality of the EU ETS and whether it infringes 
on industries’ freedom to trade, and amounts to discrimination among private 
parties by requiring some industries to participate while exempting others. 
In Arcelor SA,16 the General Court explicitly mentioned that the EU ETS 
needs to satisfy the requirements of proportionality and equal treatment of 
private parties. Though Arcelor was not granted standing as a private party 
before the Court, determining such standing based on ‘direct and individual 
concern’ required an examination of whether infringements of the right to 
property and freedom to pursue an economic activity were proportional, 
and whether there was any specific discrimination of the claimant. Arcelor 
contested the inclusion of installations for the production of pig-iron and 
steel, and if such installations could not be excluded, then the procedure 
of including installations devised under the EU ETS Directive was faulty 
and hence the Directive itself should be annulled. Arcelor claimed that 
the Directive “infringed the applicant’s right of property, its freedom of 
establishment and its freedom to pursue an economic activity as well as the 
principle of proportionality by failing to take account of the technical and 
economic impossibility for steel producers to reduce CO2 emissions any 
further.”17 Proportionality in general was found to have been satisfied as 
the Commission had ‘broad discretion’ and it was not established how the 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the geological storage of carbon 
dioxide and amending Council Directives 85/337/EEC, 96/61/EC, Directives 2000/60/EC, 
2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, COM(2008) 
18 final, paras 6-7; Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on energy efficiency and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/
EC, COM(2011) 370 final, para 6; Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable energy 
sources, COM(2008) 19 final, para 10. For a discussion, see Nicholas A.J. Croquet, European 
Climate Change Law: EU Courts’ difficult relation with proportionality, University of Oxford 
EU Law Discussion Group, Oxford, 17 October 2012. Copy on file with the author.
15 Ibid. 
16 Case T-16/04 Arcelor v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2010] ECR 
II-211.
17 Case T-16/04, para 175. 
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EU ETS was ‘manifestly inappropriate to achieve the goal of reducing CO2 
emissions.’ The General Court rejected Arcelor’s claims; with regard to right 
to property as well as the right to conduct economic activity, the Court found 
that the contested provisions do not result in ‘substantial negative economic 
consequences’18 or ‘unfavourable consequences’ as the applicant ‘failed to 
produce precise figures in relation to the profitability of those installations.’ 
Importantly, proportionality was used to understand the relationship between 
the specific concerns of a private party and the generality of the EU ETS as a 
preferred regulatory mechanism, as is clearly brought out in its discussion of 
equal treatment. In this regard, the General Court deferred to the reasoning 
by the CJEU in Arcelor Atlantique regarding whether there was a ‘sufficiently 
serious breach of equal treatment’ when pig iron was a sector covered under 
the EU ETS, while chemical was not. It classified its understanding of equal 
treatment into ‘unequal treatment of comparable situations’ and ‘equal 
treatment of dissimilar situations.’19 
While finding that there is a different treatment accorded to the chemical 
and steel sectors, such treatment will not be considered to be unequal if 
justified. Different treatment, in turn, may be justified if it ‘is based on an 
objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a legally 
permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and it is proportionate 
to the aim pursued by the treatment.’20 The ‘objective and reasonable criterion’ 
to gauge the ‘appropriateness of Community legislative action’ in this case was 
‘administrative feasibility’ and ‘administrative complexity’ of the EU ETS that 
is ‘novel and complex’: the Court felt that based on administrative concerns, 
for the purpose of the implementation of the EU ETS, it is necessary to ‘attain 
the critical mass of participants necessary for the scheme to be set up’21 in a 
step-by-step manner. Thus, there was no unequal treatment as the difference 
in treatment was justified owing to the administrative necessity of a nascent 
scheme. In both the Arcelor judgements, the Courts defer to the ‘objective 
and reasonable’ assessments of the Community institutions regarding the 
18 Case T-16/04, para 168. 
19 Case T-16/04, para 167. 
20 Case C-127/07, para 47. 
21 Case C-127/07, para 60.
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   146 10/25/2017   5:13:35 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 271
253
Proportionality of an EET Scheme
7
administrative complexity of a chosen climate instrument, and constitutional 
principles such as equal treatment were brought in line via proportionality 
to enable administrative feasibility. If the Courts looked for a ‘least cost 
alternative’ then perhaps the assessment of proportionality may have included 
a deeper analysis of suitability and necessity. 
It is important to note that despite being a private undertaking, Arcelor 
does not claim entitlements that may be equated to individuals; rather, what 
is at stake is economic freedom. Economic freedom is at the heart of the 
European legal order, not only because the free movement of goods and 
services is considered a value in itself, but also because economic freedom 
underpins the possibility of ‘undistorted competition’, which at the very least 
is an intermediary objective of EU climate regulation.22 The assessment of 
costs is intimately connected to the moderators of the European legal order, 
namely vulnerability to competition distortions and functioning in the 
common market. This logic, therefore, is primarily applicable to firms. From 
Arcelor it is clear that the pursuit of competition does not entail unfettered 
economic freedoms.
Thus, the proportionality of climate regulation in the EU has been 
articulated with respect to firms. Having said that, the observation that 
the proportionality of climate policy requires the assessment of compliance 
costs incurred by private parties is instructive for individuals as well. The 
Court’s reasoning that the EU ETS should not result in ‘substantial negative 
economic consequences’ allows the Court to conclude that it does not 
disproportionately affect the freedom of private undertakings to engage in 
economic activities. The use of the term ‘substantial’ suggests that some 
consequences are legitimate.23 Should the applicant have been an individual, 
then the way freedom and equality have been reasoned may have been 
22 For a review, see Vedder, ‘The Formalities and Substance of EU External Environmental 
Competence’, supra.
23 Some commentators have critiqued the proportionality principle on this ground, arguing 
that some rights are absolute and should not be subject to any qualification. See for instance 
Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality – An assault on human rights?’ (2009) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 1. 
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different as the entitlement would not be restricted to the performance and 
engagement with economic activities. 
ii. Proportionality and EET
A. Legitimacy of Climate Regulation
It was suggested above that perhaps climate change cases such as Arcelor are 
not valid precedents for assessing the proportionality of a climate change 
measure with respect to individuals and households. In this section, I seek 
to argue that individuals have no inalienable entitlement to emit; rather, 
individuals could be said to possess an inalienable entitlement to be free of 
emissions. 
The argument that a citizen of a Member State has a right, or an entitlement 
to be free of emissions was suggested, though not endorsed, in Urgenda. The 
primary argument the Court relied on to chalk out an obligation of the State 
to take higher climate measures was that it owed a ‘duty of care’ to its citizens. 
This duty of care was found in Dutch civil law rather than in human rights law, 
or with regard to fundamental rights of citizens found in EU law. Having said 
that, the Court referred to the persuasive value of the European Convention 
of Human Rights, primarily Articles 2 and 8: “Although Urgenda cannot 
directly derive rights from Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, these regulations still hold 
meaning, namely in the question discussed below whether the State has failed 
to meet its duty of care towards Urgenda.”24 To clarify, when the Court refers 
to ‘Urgenda’, it refers to the Urgenda Foundation that filed a public interest 
lawsuit in the Hague District Court. The Court observed that the Urgenda 
Foundation itself is not a ‘victim’ within the meaning of Article 34 of ECHR25 
and therefore could not directly rely on the provisions of the ECHR. This 
could explain the reasoning as to why the Court thinks that Articles 2 and 
8 are not directly applicable. Strangely, the Court was silent as to whether 
individuals could derive their rights from the ECHR; this is a question that is 
24 Urgenda, para 4.52
25 Article 34 allows victims of the breach of the Convention to directly file claims before the 
ECtHR provided she is affected by an action or omission of a contracting party to the 
Convention and has not gained sufficient redress yet. 
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still unresolved. In any event, it may be useful to understand how Articles 2 
and 8 may ‘hold meaning’ with respect to climate change. 
Article 2 of the ECHR provides a ‘Right to Life’ entitlement and Article 
8 of the ECHR provides a ‘Right to Respect for Private and Family Life’. 
Article 8(2) clarifies that “There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The extent of interference 
is in essence a question of proportionality,26 and that too involves intensive 
review. In the context of climate change, it may flow from this provision 
that proportionality would allow the State to interfere with one’s privacy for 
environmental considerations, but it would need to justify this interference. 
Further – and this is where the petitioners in Urgenda make an innovative 
argument27 – the fundamental right to a private and family life confers a 
positive obligation on the State to take reasonable and appropriate measures 
to protect such a right.28 Given the hazards posed by climate change, the 
State needs to demonstrate that its limited action on climate change is 
justified given its positive obligation to secure the substantive right to a 
private life. The tables are turned, as it were, with the State being required 
to demonstrate why it is not doing more, rather than keeping from unduly 
26 See Daniel Thym, ‘Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration 
Cases: A human right to regularize illegal stay?’ (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 87, pp. 91 – 93. 
27 Summons, paras 243–257. A translation of the Summons is available at: http://www.urgenda.
nl/documents/FINAL-DRAFT-Translation-
 Summons-in-case-Urgenda-v-Dutch-State-v.25.06.10.pdf. 
28 A similar argument has been made in the context of Italian constitutional law, where a positive 
right to be free of environmental harm has been read into Article 2 of the Italian Constitution 
that ‘recognises and guarantees the inviolable rights of the person, both as an individual and 
in the social groups where human personality is expressed.’ (The English translation of the 
Italian constitution is available at: https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/
costituzione_inglese.pdf ). Salvatore Patti, La Tutela Civile dell’ambiente, (Padova: CEDAM, 
1979). Whether this argument may be applicable to climate change in Italy needs further 
investigation.
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interfering with the right of individuals to pursue their lives. Thus, the use 
of human rights to prompt regulatory action on climate change, found to 
be an ‘elusive remedy’29 in other jurisdictions and legal systems, appears to 
shape state liability on climate change in the European legal order by virtue 
of the ‘a precautionary moderation of the proportionality principle’30 applied 
to Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The implications of the above line of reasoning would be profound for 
the various legal concerns that animate EU and national climate regulation. 
In effect, there is a reversal of the burden of proving comparatively lesser 
action on climate change. Further, the State is liable for bearing the costs 
of protecting individuals and families from climate risk by virtue of this 
positive obligation. For instance, arguments regarding interference with 
economic freedom would be reframed as interference with private and family 
life. Should the above interpretation be accepted, there is an entitlement 
to be free of hazardous climate change rather than an entitlement to be free of 
climate regulation. Accordingly, the proportionality test would be reversed: 
there would no longer be a presumption of freedom from climate regulation 
unless proved otherwise. Recall Arcelor’s argument discussed above that the 
EU ETS Directive ‘infringed the applicant’s right of property, its freedom of 
establishment and its freedom to pursue an economic activity as well as the 
principle of proportionality’. The Court did not feel the Directive amounted 
to such infringement. Drawing on the above, I would like to suggest that if a 
regulation (or the absence of one, or unsuitability) allegedly interferes with a 
right to life or the right to respect for a private and family life, then that would 
prompt a more intensive review. Per this account, there appears to be a relative 
weighting of entitlements with ‘right to property’ and the ‘freedom to pursue 
an economic activity’ on one hand, and ‘right to life’ and ‘respect for private 
and family life’ on the other. The way this can be justified is by taking a leaf 
out of Arcelor: the infringement of property and pursuit of economic activities 
can be made commensurable across different actors by examining the costs of 
engaging with the EU ETS, and finding them to be not punishing. The costs 
29 Pamela Stephens, ‘Applying Human Rights Norms to Climate Change: The Elusive Remedy’ 
(2010) 21 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 49.
30 Roy and Woerdman, supra, pp. 181 – 183. 
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of finding a yardstick of commensurability for ‘life’ and ‘private and family 
life’ seem infinite. Given the interest in reducing the risk from climate harm, 
the necessity and suitability of measures would need to be examined to assess 
whether the State is appropriately pursing its obligation to keep individuals 
and households free of climate risk. 
B. Necessity and Suitability of EET
It was suggested above that a climate policy on mandatory engagement of 
individuals may be considered legitimate if such a measure can be presumed 
to protect individuals from climate risk. The mandatory engagement of 
individuals can take different forms: an individual can bear the burdens of 
climate action without liability (such as additional costs passed through down 
the carbon chain) or may be required to be liable (such as carbon tax, or an 
EET with a liability mechanism such as a penalty). The nature of mandatory 
engagement would have to be justified once we probe deeper into the 
necessity and suitability of an EET as the appropriate regulatory framework 
for engagement. In Chapter 6, it was shown that a distinction could be 
maintained between direct and indirect emissions from individuals. It was 
also argued that given the complexity of causal responsibility, as well as the 
possibility of identifying the end-user as the unit that can reduce emissions at 
the lowest cost and the most advantaged, an individual does not necessarily 
need to be categorised as an end-user. In this section, I will argue that the 
proportionality test would provide a mechanism in identifying a comparative 
assessment of the ‘advantage’ enjoyed by an individual. Following this, I will 
argue that the individual or the household should not be characterised as the 
end-user for the purpose of assignment of liability. Having said that, I will 
(guardedly) suggest that a pass-through of costs may be warranted to meet 
the primary objective of emissions reduction, even if such practice may be 
comparatively inferior in meeting the secondary objectives of energy efficiency 
and reducing competitive disadvantage.
i. Costs of Individual Engagement 
It was suggested above that the ‘costs and benefits’ for an individual is 
different from the costs and benefits of a private undertaking. While all of 
a firm’s freedoms can be encapsulated in its liberty to carry out economic 
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activities (and the instrumental connection with EU protection against 
competitive vulnerability), the same cannot be said for an individual.31 For 
firms, there is an assumption of rational behaviour, manifested in economic 
activity. However, for individuals, acting rationally despite one’s cognitive 
load is a transaction cost. This cost is borne by individuals engaging with a 
complex policy mechanism. How to assess the cognitive load is a complex 
issue as discussed in Chapter 4, and would involve a host of methodologies 
to identify a situated individual participating in collective action, of which 
laboratory experiments constitute only one component. In the event such 
transaction costs taking into account one’s cognitive load and the capability to 
be ‘climate rational’ are higher for an EET than other mechanisms to engage 
the individual, then it cannot be deemed to be the ‘least-cost alternative’ or 
the ‘least infringing’ policy mechanism. In such case, other forms of indirect 
or direct mechanisms may be adopted.
In Chapter 2, I limited my understanding of costs to administrative costs. 
Much like other L&E scholars, I viewed climate regulation in Stiglerian terms; 
i.e. once transactions costs are removed, then the market will work things 
out. To begin with, conflating administrative costs and transaction costs is 
incorrect; administrative costs constitute only one component. There are 
more fundamental costs that are papered over in a rhetorical use of the phrase 
‘transaction cost’. If one reads the literature on engaging individuals in climate 
regulation,32 more foundational issues become clear: no answer is given as 
to whether penalties should be imposed on individuals, no answer is given 
about whether children should be allocated allowances, no answer is given 
as to how double counting can be avoided. My response would be that no 
answer is given because much like the normative issues that make it difficult 
to quantify a social cost of carbon33 these questions elude quantification or 
31 The distinction between the rationality of organisations and the rationality of individuals 
was clearly made by Simon to argue that if organisations pursue a satisficing rather than 
maximizing rate of profit, then individuals would be able to approximate this reality. Reva 
Brown, ‘Consideration of the Origin of Herbert Simon’s Theory of Satisficing’ (2004) 42 
Management Decision 1240, p. 1245. 
32 See the discussion in Chapter 2 on PCT, TEQ and other analogous regulatory proposals. 
33 Per Masur & Posner, computing the social costs of carbon entails political questions that 
‘cost-benefit analysis cannot answer’. Masur and Posner, ‘Climate Regulation and the Limits 
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even a common language of analysis;34 but concentrating on administrative 
costs without sorting these issues out amounts to making a distributive choice 
regarding unquantified costs. From the discussions in this book, the primary 
costs can be grouped as follows: 
Abridgement of Entitlements and Costs of Equivalence: In Section IIA, it 
was suggested that there is no entitlement to emit; rather, following Article 8 
of the ECHR there seems to be an entitlement to be free from emissions, and 
a corresponding duty on Member States to protect citizens from climate risk. 
This does not, however, address the issue of how much other entitlements may 
be compromised without being ‘assaulted’. In the reasoning on Arcelor, the 
costs of the EU ETS on a cement company’s freedom to trade and restrictions 
on property may be computed, and the costs on all installations may be made 
commensurable through quantification of expenditure, or ‘negative economic 
consequences’ that affect profitability.35 The same cannot be said for privacy 
of a home, or the costs of engaging with the technologies of an EET by ‘a 
mother with failing eyesight’.36 Myriad facets of an individual or a household 
cannot be commensurably categorised; a firm can: the primary raison d’etre of 
a firm is maximising profits on behalf of its shareholders. Commensuration 
is particularly problematic if such facets lend themselves to the language of 
entitlements, as is evident from the successful right to privacy challenge to 
the proposed mandatory installation of smart meters in Dutch households in 
2009.37 The example may not be completely analogous to an EET, as a primary 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis’, supra, p. 1597. 
34 Refer to the discussion on the incompatibility of sociological and psychological studies on 
the individual and climate change in Chapter III; see also the seemingly insurmountable 
difficulties in reconciling efficiency and justice discussed in Chapter V. 
35 Case T-16/04, para 168. Though the CJEU in Arcelor – or in any climate change case for 
that matter – did not detail what expenditure that might affect profitability entails, the 
proportionality of expenditure could be said to entail the monetisation of costs of purchasing 
allowances (in case of auctioning), Monitoring Reporting and Verification costs, costs of 
participating in primary and secondary markets after subtracting the costs passed through as 
well as derivative financial gains from various markets. These costs would then be weighed 
against the annual revenues generated by the installation. 
36 Response 6 to Pilot Survey discussed in Chapter V.
37 Influential in this regard is the Tilburg report commissioned by the Dutch Consumers 
Association that played a significant role in the 2009 decision against compulsory smart-
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concern was with regard to data privacy in releasing household consumption 
data to suppliers and third parties, for which a revised requirement for 
obtaining explicit consent has been made. Having said that, one of the other 
concerns mooted was the inviolability of the privacy of the family, and in an 
interesting twist, the primary provision relied on was Article 8 of the ECHR. 
So we have a situation whereby the same provision may be used to support 
a requirement for individuals and households to bear burdens to be free of 
risk, as well as support the freedom of individuals and households to be free 
of interference from risk regulation. How could we deal with this issue? One 
way out is to create a priority or a hierarchy of concerns. It could be argued 
that ‘Climate Armageddon’ assumes priority, and much like an emergency 
situation requires the relaxation of other rights.38 This is a problematic way to 
assess the situation, as there is no reliable way to answer how much and what 
infringement is enough. Much like the discussion in Chapter 5 on conflicting 
ideas of justice, there appears to be a stalemate that cannot be resolved. We 
may refer to this problem as the incommensurability of entitlements. Indeed, 
resolving this problem is not simple, but if I may request the reader to find 
her way back to Chapter 3, and eventually all the way back to Chapter 1, BLE 
could provide a hint at making entitlements compatible. 
I suggested in Chapter 3 that a ‘right’ could be seen as a mediator, or a 
legal device that reconciles means and ends, and that could be moderated. 
Indeed, if a right is seen as an inviolable category, then there is no scope for 
such reasoning. Going back to Chapter 1, it was shown that the primary 
thrust of BLE is that much like any other preference, a legal category is 
situated rather than assumed. It was suggested that the reliance on fossil-
fuels that appears to be the tabula rasa situation in which households make 
‘private’ choices is very much situated; it owes as much to the interaction 
of multiple agents that created the dependence on fossil fuels as well as the 
meters in Dutch homes. See Colette Cuijpers and Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The ‘Smart Meters’ 
Bill: A privacy test based on Article 8 of the ECHR’. Available at: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/
files/1477311/CPDP_final_Cuijper_Koops_springer_1_.pdf.. 
38 For an argument along such lines, see Han Somsen, ‘When Regulators Mean Business: 
Regulation in the shadow of environmental armageddon’ (2011) 4 Rechtsfilosofie & 
Rechtstheorie 47. 
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operation of the endowment effect where individuals are hesitant to let go of 
what they’ve become accustomed to. Thus, the entitlement to make private 
decisions regarding energy use is effectively a normalisation of distributed 
situational factors that is subsequently recognised, rather than a natural right. 
The categorisation of a bundle of situated energy habits that may be found 
inside the walls of a household as an inviolable entitlement is amenable to 
re-categorisation. Analogously, Holmes and Sunstein categorise any right as 
interests that may be instrumentally achieved through the State, and which 
necessarily entails budgetary costs.39 In this way, negative rights (or those rights 
that entail freedom from interference, conventionally categorised as civil & 
political rights) and positive rights (or those rights that entail an obligation on 
the State, conventionally categorised as social & economic rights) are made 
equivalent by re-categorising rights as interests. This equivalence appears to be 
assumed by the ECtHR in Hatton v. UK,40 where the Grand Chamber felt that 
it is not required to decide ‘whether the present case falls into one category or 
the other’41 given that ‘in both contexts fair balance has to be struck between 
the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole’.42 
Thus, following all three categorisations of rights: recognition of distributed 
situational factors, interests that entail budgetary costs and interests that 
need to be balanced, the right to privacy (among others) can be brought into 
equivalence with the right to be free of emissions. It could be argued that a 
claim to a life free from climate risk and the accompanying inability to assess 
one’s fallibility in discounting provides a justification for abridging privacy, 
thereby bringing about compatibility without engaging in commensurability.
Having said the above, the proportionality principle does not accommodate 
a presumption of abridging entitlements, and therefore the process of 
achieving equivalence of interests is costly. There could be a presumption in 
favour of regulation to protect people from climate risk. However, there is no 
39 Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1999), p. 16. 
40 ECtHR, Hatton and others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) (2003) 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2003:0708JUD003602297. 
41 Ibid, para 119. 
42 Ibid, para 98. 
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presumption regarding the necessity and suitability of a regulation that abridges 
rights.43 As discussed above, the proportionality test applies to situations where 
there is an abridgement of rights, and it applies in non-rights cases as well. 
Given the presumption in favour of rights, in the event there is an alternative to 
abridging rights to secure the same ends, then such a measure will be preferred.44 
Briefly put, though any complaint regarding infringement of energy and 
emissions related rights could be categorised as an interest that needs to be 
weighed and balanced against the aim of reducing emissions, in the absence 
of commensurability of costs that may be achieved with respect to firms in the 
EU ETS but not so with respect to individuals and households, the costs of 
arriving at – and predicting judgements on – equivalence are high. This could 
be explained in terms of BLE as well. Conventional microeconomic theory 
gets over the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and equivalence 
by positing that individual preferences may be made commensurable through 
their utility functions.; consumers seek to obtain the highest mathematical 
score on a single utility function.45 A social planner would seek to identify a 
set of util numbers for possible objects of choice, and make regulatory choices 
‘as if ’ people maximise the mathematical total of utils. The set of assumptions 
behind this constitute the rational actor axiom; sophisticated methods are in 
service of this axiom. Properties of the rational actor axiom include continuity 
of preferences, including predictable discount rates. The primary thrust of 
43 In the Hatton case that involved a conflict between the rights of citizens living near Heathrow 
airport to be free of noise by night flights and the freedom of airlines to earn revenue, 
the first Chamber of the ECtHR ruled that Article 8 imposes a duty on the State to ‘find 
alternative solutions’ (to the preferred adoption of ‘noise quotas’) and by ‘seeking to achieve 
their aims in the least onerous way’. ECtHR, Hatton and others v United Kingdom (2001) 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2001:1002JUD003602297, para 106. The Grand Chamber subsequently 
overturned the judgement but on the grounds of the margin of appreciation of the State to 
decide on the issue, and no ‘special status’ in this regard may be accorded to ‘environmental 
human rights’. ECtHR, Hatton and others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) (2003) 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2003:0708JUD003602297, para. 122. It may be noted that the Grand 
Chamber delivered its majority judgement by 12 votes to 5 with a strongly worded dissent, 
thus revealing the uncertainty of arriving at an equivalence of different rights. 
44 In this regard, the reasoning of the first Chamber in Hatton was not reversed by the Grand 
Chamber that the ‘least onerous’ means has to be identified. 
45 See Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 
(Oxford: OUP, 1995), pp. 46 – 47. 
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behavioural economics is to demonstrate how individuals depart from their 
expected utility behaviour: this is the axiological concentration of behavioural 
economics. As discussed in Chapters 1, 3 and 4, behavioural economics does 
not go the next step of making people rational; i.e. behaving in accordance with 
modelled utils. Thus, the thrust of BLE is that since people are not rational, 
there is a need for some form of paternalism, or alternative arrangements for 
looking after individual interests. This line of reasoning is compatible with the 
discussion above that climate and energy choices and habits are situated within 
institutional and social arrangements. The same could be said for – drawing on 
the introduction to ‘situated motivation’ in Chapter 1 and the discussion on 
social norms in Chapter 4’ – the difficulties in assuming that individuals can 
change their behaviour by responding to incentives the way rational agents are 
expected to do.46 Thus, though there is no inalienable entitlement to pollute, 
there is no low-cost way of making equivalent individual choices that may 
affect climate change. 
Enforcement Costs: What is remarkable about the EU ETS (as compared 
to other environmental regulations within the EU) is the high level of 
compliance.47 It is difficult to differentiate between the reasons as to why 
compliance is high. But four reasons may be forwarded: (a) the robust market 
for allowances allows participants to bargain, (b) the threat of a carbon tax 
(the ‘opportunity benefit’ issue discussed in Chapter 5) is high, (c) the large 
penalty (as discussed earlier, the assessment costs in deciding on a penalty 
are very low) is too forbidding, (d) regular checks through comprehensive 
MRV mechanisms.48 None of these components would feasibly characterise 
46 See the discussion on ‘as-if ’ behavioural economics and ‘as-if ’ BLE in Chapter 1 Section II.
47 Floor Fleurke and Jonathan Verschuuren, ‘Enforcing the European Emissions Trading 
System within the EU Member States: a Procrustean bed?’, p. 19 [forthcoming chapter; pre-
print available at: http://entracte-project.eu/fileadmin/entracte/downloads/Floor_Fleurke_
Jonathan_Verschuuren.pdf ]. Fleurke and Verschuuren qualify their observation by pointing 
out that there are some lapses of enforcement within Member States for non-complying 
operators. 
48 As Weishaar notes, compliance with the EU ETS ‘necessitates a system that may perhaps be 
even more stringent than in the case under comparable command and control instruments’. 
Stefan Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design: A Critical Overview (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2014), p. 150.
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an EET where the individual or the household is the end-user. It may be 
suggested that there is no real need for an EET to mimic the enforcement 
mechanisms of the EU ETS; in fact, one of the attractions of a system that 
facilitates individual engagement with climate change is the possibility of a 
different paradigm, or one where incentives and a top-down system would 
not be necessary. In the event all individuals and households were motivated 
to participate, then enforcement costs would be low. This would require a very 
high level of public responsiveness. However, we have found no argument 
in this book to that effect. To begin with, there is no closure on how such 
responsiveness may be garnered through association with an incentive. Even 
if the experiment conducted in Chapter 4 yielded more conclusive results, it 
would be a very small piece of the regulatory costs incurred in understanding 
how the biases of individuals such as loss aversion could be harnessed 
practically through designing appropriate incentives. These regulatory costs, 
in turn, would be a small part of the larger picture of what motivates desirable 
behaviour, or the ‘dimensionality’ problem discussed earlier.49 Given the high 
level of compliance in the EU ETS and the difficulties of understanding 
and influencing individual motivation that leads to effective climate action, 
it would be wise to account for emissions from individuals and households 
indirectly following a similar system through a reconceptualised end-user,50 
one which would be equivalent with the EU ETS.51
Bargaining Costs: Some leading commentators on climate policy – 
including Robert Stavins – are of the opinion that Coase suggests that a 
misallocation of climate responsibility would be irrelevant. Any misallocation 
would be corrected by the market; this is the ‘independence property.’52 I 
would strongly submit that this is a fundamental misreading of Coase, as 
the independence property would hold only when transaction costs are zero.53 
49 See Chapter 4, Part III. 
50 See Chapter 6, Part III B. 
51 See Chapter 6, Part III A. 
52 Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, ‘The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-
Trade System Performance’, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper, March 24, 2010. 
53 As Daniel Cole explains, “Markets often do manage to reallocate entitlements to more highly 
valued uses. But – and this cannot be over-stressed – that has nothing to do with the ‘Coase 
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Taking into account both the existence of transaction costs and the strength 
of the market, Calabresi argued that in the event it is difficult to identify the 
least cost avoider and thereby misallocate, the market will be best utilised by 
‘the best briber’, and therefore allocation of costs should be made to such a 
party.54 As to how the ‘best briber’ may be identified, Calabresi suggests that 
it is the party who has a higher awareness of risks and ease of conducting 
transactions (including identifying who to transact with and bribe). Thus, 
allocation of costs and responsibility should be done to those who are more 
rational in terms of having internalised a discounting rate in keeping with 
legal obligations, and those who can strategise better in the act of bargaining. 
As I argued in Chapter 4, experimental work on biases does not illuminate 
how individuals or households can behave like firms. It stands to reason that 
the bargaining costs of individuals and households in any market mechanism 
will be higher. This is more so because the absence of restrictions on the 
transferability of allowances brings in the prospect of financialisation. Though 
there is a dearth of studies on the distribution of financial literacy across 
Member States in the EU, financial literacy itself is a problem, as was brought 
to light after the recent recession.55 This has resulted in several regulations that 
shift the onus of liability from the consumer to providers of financial goods 
and services. To reiterate a point made in Chapter 4, behavioural economics 
and behavioural finance point to flaws in the rational actor model, and using 
these disciplines within regulatory frameworks is to introduce top-down 
assistance to shape desirable behaviour. They do not, however, lend themselves 
to making people more rational market players. Regulatory interventions 
Theorem.’ As Coase himself has noted time and time again, the assumptions behind that theorem, 
including most importantly the assumption of zero transaction costs, never hold in the real world. 
When market reallocations improve efficiency, it is not because of the ‘independence property’ of the 
‘Coase Theorem’; it is in spite of the existence of positive transaction costs and other impediments to 
transacting. Always.” Available at: http://cyclingprof.blogspot.nl/2010/03/hahn-and-stavins-
are-pushing-my-buttons.html. Cole does not have a more formal critique of Stavins, but 
for a similar argument, see Daniel A. Farber, ‘Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The ironic 
history of the Coase theorem’ (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review 397. 
54 Calabresi. The Costs of Accidents, supra, pp. 150 – 152. 
55 See for instance, Jana Valent, ‘Improving the Financial Literacy of European Consumers’, 
European Parliament Briefing, May 2015. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/557020/EPRS_BRI(2015)557020_EN.pdf. 
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relying on behavioural economics do not have the power to create ‘procedural 
rationality’ to use Herbert Simon’s memorable phrase.56 However, should the 
mechanics of the market be viewed as the sole incentive, then we must assume 
strategic procedural rationality (as economics conventionally dies). Given 
BLE problematises but does not provide a practical replacement for rational 
self-regulation or provide guidance on how to instil procedural rationality, it 
is difficult to accept the independence property of an EET.
ii. Benefits of Individual Engagement 
Three primary benefits of an EET scheme were listed in Chapter 2: Regulating 
Sustainable Engagement, Capping Uncapped Sectors and achieving Energy 
Efficiency through the backdoor. There is another one that may be added to 
this list from Chapter 6: Reducing Production and Investment Leakage. To 
begin with, other than ‘Capping Uncapped Sectors’, all of these benefits can 
be said to be ‘secondary objectives’. I will first address the issue of uncapped 
sectors and then proceed to the other benefits. 
Capping Uncapped Sectors: It seemed intuitively reasonable in Chapter 
2 to suggest that much like the EU ETS, an EET would provide a 
mechanism to limit the quantity of emissions in other sectors. Following 
the discussions in Chapters 5 and 6 this intuition has been problematised. 
To begin with, the category of a ‘sector’ has been sought to be explained. 
What was assumed to be a sector in Chapter 2 such as the household sector 
was shown to be a collection of activities with direct and indirect sources 
(see Figure 5). Accordingly, the activities in the household sector can be 
inventoried into direct and indirect sources. Indirect sources either already 
fall within the activities covered under the EU ETS (such as electricity), 
or measures that are currently underway or proposed. With respect to 
emissions, private transport can be categorised as the manufacture and 
sale of automobiles. It can also be categorised as the emissions from fuel 
56 Per Simon, an account of rationality must not only include ‘substantive rationality’ or ‘the 
extent to which appropriate courses of action are chosen’ but also ‘procedural rationality’ or 
‘the effectiveness, in the light of human cognitive powers and limitations, of the procedures 
used to choose actions’. Herbert A. Simon, ‘Rationality as Process and a Product of Thought’ 
in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.) Decision Making: Descriptive, 
Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions (Cambridge: CUP, 1988), pp. 66 – 69. 
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used in automobiles. On a more practical note, accounting for emissions 
from an indirect source raises a double counting problem. The double 
counting problem is not a mere administrative issue, as there is a potential 
to overestimate mitigation of emissions, and this would frustrate the 
whole idea of a cap. Further, the category of a ‘source’ was also subject to 
evaluation from a L&E perspective. The identification of a ‘direct’ source 
attributed to the consumer requires a redistributive reallocation through a 
different carbon accounting principle. As discussed, this is not a technical 
issue. Even if such identification were possible, there would need to be 
institutional backing for enforcing a cap, and implementing it through a 
cap-and-trade mechanism. This issue cannot be resolved without addressing 
all the costs discussed in the earlier section. It would be difficult to find 
an equivalent for the elegant Calabresian set-up of the EU ETS, where 
liability is imposed on installations and the price of allowances discovered 
through a market of firms. Thus, ‘capping an uncapped sector’ is not really 
a feasible benefit that an EET can offer, unless of course the end-user is 
conceptualised in a manner that does not necessarily mean individual or 
consumer or household. 
Energy Efficiency: Now onto the secondary objectives. As discussed 
earlier, attaining energy security is a political objective that influences energy 
efficiency regulation, and this objective is not necessarily directed at reducing 
emissions.57 Further, the choice of energy efficiency policies (such as Demand-
side Management) can have negative emissions externalities.58 Having said 
that, as the EU ETS Directive shows, it is likely that a mitigation policy would 
have a positive effect on energy efficiency. The focus on an EET is demand-side 
energy efficiency and the focus of the EU ETS is supply-side energy efficiency. 
The question for both is whether the schemes provide an adequate incentive 
for energy efficiency in order to save the maximum amount of energy at the 
lowest cost. For the EU ETS, the potential for energy efficiency lies primarily 
in the investment by installations in low-carbon technologies to bring down 
the amount of emissions in the production process. If producers are able 
57 See the arguments made by Anatole Boute, Chapter 5, Part IV.
58 See the arguments made by Michael Vandenbergh and Jim Rossi, Chapter 6, Part V. 
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to substantially pass-through electricity and fuel costs, then there might be 
an incentive for different consumers down the carbon chain to reduce their 
demand or switch to renewable sources of energy. Whether consumers would 
prefer to switch to other sources or reduce their consumption depends on 
other incentives such as subsidies, and is a question that demands situational 
investigation; or one that needs inputs from various social sciences to answer. 
To recall Vandenbergh & Rossi’s analysis, if the intention is to achieve energy 
efficiency in the electricity supply chain, the inclination of households is heavily 
mediated by the inclination of distributors; and categorising distributors as 
end-users for the purpose of mitigation regulation may be more suitable than 
categorising households as the end-user.59 There is yet another factor that 
must be noted: Article 10(3) of the EU ETS Directive provides that at least 
50% of the revenue from auctioning of allowances would need to be utilised 
for energy efficiency measures. Thus, if an EET has a substitutive effect on 
the EU ETS, then that would affect energy efficiency as well. Concomitantly, 
if the revenues generated from the EU ETS are effective in contributing to 
energy efficiency, then it would make sense to extend the EU ETS even to 
sectors proposed to be covered by an EET.60 In any event, there seems to be no 
compelling argument for achieving energy efficiency through a cap-and-trade 
system for individuals. 
Regulating Sustainable Engagement: In the literature on PCT and TEQ, one 
of the primary benefits often highlighted is that such an instrument will make 
individual emissions more visible,61 and this would lead to more awareness. 
Some reports mention the benefit of raising ‘carbon consciousness.’62 DEFRA, 
in fact, observes that this may lead to a ‘stop and think’ system.63 In Chapter 
2, drawing on Mr. Beavan’s potentially ineffective or even ill-advised actions 
to reduce household emissions, I took this a step further and suggested that 
59 Vandenbergh and Jim Rossi, ‘Good For You, Bad For US’, supra. See discussion in Chapter 
6, Section III.B. 
60 See discussion in Chapter 5 on how an EET could substitute potential measures. 
61 Yael Parag and Deborah Strickland, ‘Personal Carbon Budgeting’, Oxford Environment 
Change Institute Working Paper UKERC/WP/DR/2009/014, June 2009, p. 5. 
62 Starkey, ‘Personal Carbon Trading’, supra, p. 24. 
63 DEFRA, ‘Synthesis Report’, supra, pp. 8 – 9. 
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perhaps an EET would rationalise sustainable engagement. I had made one 
qualification and one argument in this regard: I had pointed out that ‘conscious 
cognition’ may not be brought about by information alone, but I had referred 
to the Carbon Rationing Action Groups to show that there seems to be a 
learning curve among voluntary groups that organise themselves in dealing 
with transaction costs such as accounting. The two intuitions - (i) awareness is 
always helpful, and (ii) consciousness would lead to behavioural change – are 
not supported by BLE. In relation to the first, the way information is framed,64 
the ‘contextual acceptability’,65 the reference group that appreciates the 
information moderate the perception of an information mediator. In relation 
to the second, there is an inference that consciousness will lead to desirable 
behaviour. Unfortunately, as with the relationship between an incentive and 
behaviour, this inference cannot be drawn.66 Somewhat worryingly – and this 
is partly why I have argued that BLE lacks a theory of agency67 – we may have 
a ‘sense of agency’ when we deliberate on an issue, but such deliberation does 
not correspond with actual behaviour.68 Needless to say, the translation of 
deliberation into behaviour is an area that demands a great deal of research. 
The reason why CRAGs may exhibit positive climate behaviour is that 
they were already motivated and voluntarily engaged in collective action;69 
a regulatory framework is inapplicable in their case. Thus, it is difficult to 
arrive at a conclusion as to how an EET scheme may regulate sustainable 
engagement. 
Carbon Leakage: Three aspects of carbon leakage may be filtered from the 
discussion on the subject in Chapter 6, namely: (a) the international problem 
64 As Matthews notes, the way a climate instrument involving individuals is framed is crucial; 
‘a single word can make a difference’. Laurence Matthews, ‘Upstream, Downstream: The 
importance of psychological framing for carbon emissions reduction policies.’ (2010) Climate 
Policy 477, p. 479. 
65 See Chapter 5, Part I. 
66 See discussion in Chapter 4, Part III, Section D. 
67 Roy, ‘Agency as Responsiveness’, supra. 
68 Ibid, pp. 16 – 17. 
69 This of course assumes that CRAGs have sorted out thorny intra-group issues, and it also 
assumes that their motivated behaviour actually results in effective action in the absence of 
external Monitoring Reporting and Verification requirements. 
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of carbon leakage is distinct from the EU and Member State problems of 
production and investment leakage, (b) some concessions on carbon leakage 
appear to have been made in the shift to auctioning in the EU ETS in favour 
of achieving dynamic effectiveness and incentivising the use of low carbon 
technology, and (c) measures such as border-tax adjustments have been 
made to deal with the problem of leakage. It stands to reason that an EET 
mechanism that targets individuals and households would be comparatively 
advantageous with regard to the problem of carbon leakage as consumers 
would not discriminate among products based on where they are produced 
as long as they veer towards carbon neutrality. Thus, it would appear that 
countries would have to compulsorily accommodate a carbon price in their 
production process for goods and services that are consumed within the EU. 
There could, theoretically, be a global carbon price on commodities. Further, 
this would not disadvantage producers within the EU as the carbon price would 
not contribute to their competitive disadvantage. With regard to production 
and investment leakage, this account assumes parity between the products 
that are susceptible to leakage and the products that may be included within 
an EET scheme. For instance, currently, one of the industries that is highly 
susceptible to production leakage is cement, while there is uncertain evidence 
on electricity. For the sectors covered under the EU ETS, measures such as 
border tax adjustments are made. There would undoubtedly be a reduction 
of the administrative costs incurred to thwart the potential of production and 
investment leakage through such measures. However, there is an assumption 
that there would be a replacement of the EU ETS by the EET; if not, then such 
expenditure would have to be incurred. The benefit of reducing the potential 
of carbon leakage arises only when the activities inventoried in the EET are 
not covered by the EU ETS; for activities inventoried in the EU ETS, the 
administrative costs of inventorying emissions from individual and households 
must be accounted for. Such costs point to a more fundamental issue: to put a 
price on commodities depending on the countries in which they are produced 
amounts to a redistribution of international responsibility for internalising a 
carbon price. As the aviation case70 demonstrated, implementing unilateral 
70 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:864. 
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measures entails the risk of a veto supported by the claim that nation-states are 
entitled to price carbon in any manner they please unless they are mandated 
to do so under international law. In fact, the EU intervention with respect 
to global aviation emissions is in effect a nudge: a default carbon price under 
the EU ETS that performed an information forcing role on nation-states to 
identify an appropriate carbon price. This nudge, however, does not amount 
to implementing and enforcing a cap or a price. Rather, as suggested in 
Chapter 6, there is an incentive for the EU to require other countries to adopt 
stringent climate regulation to reap competitive advantages. Should this result 
the adoption of EU ETS equivalent regulation in other countries, then that 
would reduce the possibility of leakage.
The approach adopted above is to qualitatively assess the cost-effectiveness 
of an EET. As would be obvious to the reader, I do not engage in an attempt 
at comprehensive quantification, but engage in a Benjamin Franklin style of 
qualitative assessment.71 This may seem journalistic or un-economic, but I 
hope I have been able to show why the concerns pertaining to a cap-and-trade 
system for individuals do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis. Though 
the Court in Arcelor did not engage in a quantitative CBA with respect to firms 
engaging in the EU ETS, I have argued above that there is greater potential 
for doing so as costs may be characterised as expenditure by firms. The burden 
borne by consumers by way of a pass-through can also be quantified. This 
is however not the case for an EET: comparing entitlements, the cognitive 
load in bargaining, the comparative costs of implementation and enforcement 
including alternatives to the extensive Monitoring Reporting and Verification 
that the producer-based EU ETS system includes and importantly the 
combination of a high penalty threat and potential to benefit from a robust 
market. In the event there could be a behavioural ‘silver bullet’ for inspiring 
motivation through regulation, then several of these costs may have been 
offset. However, there is no evidence to that effect. On the other hand, it was 
argued that the benefits that an EET seemed to offer could be met using other 
alternatives. Given the difficulty in quantifying the net benefits of climate 
71 Franklin famously liked to put down words representing costs and benefits in two columns 
and pondering over them over a few days. Cass Sunstein, Valuing Life: Humanizing the 
Regulatory State (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2014), p. 1. 
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regulation, if an alternative to achieving similar benefits could be achieved 
without incurring high – and incommensurable – costs, then such a policy 
should be preferred.72 Further, as I have argued (in Chapters 5 and 6), an 
EET for households could adversely affect the functioning of existing climate 
regulation, and crowd-out potential climate regulation regarding emissions 
not yet covered. Thus, an EET – conceptualised as a cap-and-trade scheme 
for individuals and households – does not seem to be necessary or suitable. 
iii. Conclusion
“There comes a point where the costs of subclassification [of an activity] is 
greater than the worth of the choice offered, and that in practice it is possible 
to find that point…were there no costs involved in subclassifying activities, 
it would be best to put the accident cost of an activity on the smallest 
subcategory.”73 The costs of classification of the interests and choices of 
individuals and households for participating in a mandatory EET scheme are 
very high.
It may be tempting to identify an individual as the ‘smallest subcategory’ 
and ‘put the accident cost of an activity’ on her, but it needs to be clarified 
that an individual is not a category. The ethical intuition behind this 
statement could be expressed in economic language as well: the individual is 
an incommensurable entity, and interpersonal comparisons are possible only 
in relation to some activities. An ‘emitter’ is a category identified by virtue 
of the price and quantity of emissions; to subclassify emitters on the basis 
of historical emissions of nation-states (as preferred in the UN framework), 
the economic strength of nation-states (as preferred by the ESD), or by the 
proportionality of operational costs of industrial units (as clarified by the 
CJEU with respect to the EU ETS) is how it is currently done in practice. 
The category of an emitter is also intimately linked to how emissions may be 
reduced; in the current framework, the reduction of emissions is associated 
with the liability of industrial actors, and their ability as organised economic 
72 This is in keeping with the ‘cost-effectiveness’ rather than ‘efficiency’ interpretation provided 
to existing and potential targets in the EU ETS Directive. 
73 Calabresi, ‘The Decision for Accidents’, supra, pp. 733 – 734. 
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actors to respond to external economic incentives. A cap-and-trade system 
for households would not be subject to such associations. There seems to be 
no convincing reason to categorise an individual as an emitter or end-user for 
the purpose of climate regulation if other options are available – and evidence 
regarding their effectiveness discernible – for arresting direct and indirect 
emissions that seem attributable to her. 
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In the initial pages of this book, it was suggested that the behavioural choices 
of an individual or a household do not operate in vacuum. Thus, though 
voluntary climate action does not have a liability component, it is shaped 
by institutional choices, including historically relaxed regulation of fossil 
fuels. And an incentive mechanism interacts with internal motivation as 
well as other institutional factors. To examine the desirability and viability 
of an EET as a discrete policy mechanism without these factors would not 
be realistic, though it makes its study a lot easier. This has been a common 
refrain throughout: the way a discrete policy mechanism is examined informs 
the inferences and conclusions that may be drawn. The introductory pages 
clarified that the research objective is to appreciate the desirability of an EET 
in the light of BLE; and in the process the potential and constraints of BLE 
itself would have to be examined, as it has no coherent method. This is why 
this book has sought the indulgence of the reader to go on a tedious and 
meandering exploration of methods used, and the dissection of assumed 
analytical categories. Perhaps the day will come when such axiological inquiry 
through reflections while conducting research will become commonplace in 
BLE scholarship, but it is unusual at the time of writing these pages. The 
book may also be unsatisfying owing to its somewhat measured conclusion: 
given the institutional context and evidentiary inconclusiveness regarding 
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the potential of a cap-and-trade mechanism to bring about motivational 
change, the individual or the household is unlikely to be the best possible 
unit for arresting indirect or even direct emissions. I hope, however, that 
the reader agrees with my primary conclusion: should the science of climate 
change require the capturing of emissions by individuals and households, 
then they should be required to bear burdens. However, the individual or 
the household is not the most-advantaged or the least-cost bearing unit 
for a discrete mandatory cap-and-trade regulatory mechanism for arresting 
emissions. Further, such a mechanism may redistribute existing and potential 
responsibility of more-advantaged and lesser-cost bearing units such as firms 
or distributors along the supply-chain. This would be an outcome that should 
surely be avoided if we were to take the objective of substantial reduction of 
emissions seriously. While this conclusion seems intuitive, I did not arrive 
at it lightly. There is a temptation to inventory emissions by attributing it to 
households (as the European Environment Agency does), it seems morally 
right to take individual responsibility for climate action (as the PCT scholars 
assume), it is easy to overlook processes such as Monitoring Reporting and 
Verification in thinking about the level at which climate regulation needs to 
be adopted, and finally, there is a temptation to give short-shrift to the process 
of drawing inferences from empirical work. In the scholarship on EET-like 
mechanisms or in behavioural economics, it appears to me that scholars have 
given in to these temptations. I did too when I wrote Chapter 2 and reviewed 
the specific literature on the subject; this is why I had to ‘turn against myself ’ 
to some extent, as described below.
i. Revisiting Assumptions
I commenced writing this book with the review in Chapter 2. There are 
several aspects of the chapter that I think are informative and instructive. 
With respect to policy interest and scholarly suggestions on how to engage 
individuals in a mandatory trading scheme to mitigate climate change, I have 
tried to provide an exhaustive account. Further, issues of public acceptability, 
political acceptability, scope of an EET, fairness concerns were culled from 
the literature that have been explored throughout the book. Other than re-
thinking and reconceptualising these issues, I made several assumptions and 
have been revisiting them throughout the book. The most explicit revisionary 
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exercise is re-examining the benefits and burdens of a mandatory cap-and-
trade scheme for individuals and households undertaken in Chapter 7, where 
I revise some of the suggestions made in Chapter 2. In addition, there are 
three substantial assumptions I had made based on the literature I had read; 
to revisit these assumptions is to also interrogate the sources that informed 
these suggestions: 
Assumption 1: The individual or the household is the end-user for emissions 
regulation. This was based on EEA categorisation of the residential sector as 
a discrete category of direct emissions, as well as the literature surrounding 
PCT schemes. Following this assumption, it seemed unproblematic that 
emissions from individuals and households need to be regulated. The reason I 
had decided to use the phrase end-user in Chapter 2 is not to establish it as an 
emissions category separate from individuals and households, but to extend 
the sectoral and geographical scope of a PCT. In effect, this assumption 
attributed causality and responsibility to the individual. It was only after I 
understood that consumption is situated within the entire complex of agents 
and processes of the carbon economy, that double counting is a compelling 
problem, and that regulation is not just administration but also involves 
questions of distribution of liability and cost-effectiveness that I realised that 
the end-user can indeed be a legal fiction: a constructed regulatory category. 
Studying the inventorying and accounting of emissions by the IPCC and MRV 
Regulation in the EU (discussed in Chapter 6) allows an appreciation of the 
institutional set-up to account for direct emissions, and how administration 
and attribution of responsibility are linked to the producer-based model. 
Assumption 2: Once administration and transaction costs are reduced we 
can have an efficient emissions trading scheme for individuals. Reading 
Coase and Calabresi, and the several debates and commentaries around 
their work opened my eyes to what they wanted to say: the real world has 
costs that can’t always be modelled or even identified by a social planner, 
let alone reduced. Rather than working towards a zero transaction cost 
world where rational actors can be efficient, it is better to concentrate on 
solutions in a non-ideal world. The fundamentally different analytical route 
taken by Richard Posner and George Stigler in rejecting initial distributive 
situations and working towards a normative model of efficiency became 
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clear to me when Coase likened Posner’s understanding of Coasean L&E as 
‘a boa-constrictor that slobbered over its victim before swallowing it’,1 and 
when Calabresi showed the serious constraints of defining efficiency on one 
hand, and the futility of spending intellectual energy in defining transaction 
costs. As Calabresi clarified, ‘the essence of Coase’s insight is that transaction 
costs are no different from any other cost’;2 they are ‘impediments to a 
better life’.3 Oddly, it was in a footnote that Calabresi provided the clearest 
taxonomy of what such impediments could be: “…the cost of information to 
each party, the absence of psychological or other impediments to acting on the 
basis of available information, the administrative costs of shifting losses, and the 
extent to which parties actually bear the costs which the particular tests impose 
on them.”4 The fact that such overwhelming multifarious costs exist is far 
more important than categorizing such costs into different boxes such as 
administrative costs and transactions costs. As both Coase and Calabresi have 
argued, it is completely possible to think reasonably about reducing costs 
in a world where such impediments cannot be overcome, or where they do 
not become zero. This is why Coase in The Nature of the Firm advocated 
forming a firm to deal with impediments in the market, and in The Problem 
of Social Cost stressed on the comparative cost-effectiveness of markets, given 
the irregularity and uncertainty of top-down judgements on nuisance. It was 
Calabresi who showed that it is perfectly possible for markets to function in a 
world of positive transaction costs. Rather than stressing on how transaction 
costs can be reduced, Calabresi concentrated on distribution of entitlements 
to agents in a manner that would allow those agents with comparatively 
lower transaction costs to participate in the market. Such distribution is 
done through assignments and allocation thus rendering the ‘independence 
condition’ of irrelevance of allocation unhelpful.
1 Ronald Coase, ‘Coase on Posner on Coase’ (1993) 149 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 96. 
2 Calabresi, ‘The Pointlessness of Pareto’, supra, p. 1218. 
3 Ibid, p. 1219. 
4 Guido Calabresi and Jon Hirschoff, ‘Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Torts’ (1972) 81 
Yale Law Journal 1055, p. 1059, fn 17. 
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Assumption 3: Behavioural Law & Economics is about identifying 
psychological obstacles to rational behaviour, and once we know about 
them, then we can behave rationally. This line of thinking (similar to efficient 
behaviour in a zero transaction cost world above) was intuitively appealing 
to me. When I started my PhD, I loved the idea of being able to overcome 
my constraints, be a successful market participant, and reduce my emissions 
in a rational manner. Unfortunately, the epistemic methods and theoretical 
outlook of behavioural economics do not match this desire. Experiments on 
biases do not constitute a science on ‘how to become rational’. It took me 
quite a while to come to terms with this, I had to see what psychological 
experiments can demonstrate (and what they cannot), how psychology is used 
in economics and then for regulatory choices. I understood why BLE scholars 
have a profound interest in epistemology and questions on agency and 
autonomy that are usually reserved for philosophers. It is because they’re trying 
to grapple with a situation where there is evidence of irrationality, but there 
are no direct inferences for regulation that can be made from such evidence. It 
shouldn’t come as a surprise that negotiating shades of paternalism is integral 
to BLE scholarship. The thrust of BLE is essentially to find alternatives to 
markets, or make life easier for people interacting in markets. In a sentence, 
BLE cannot make an individual into a firm. In this respect, it does not displace 
the institutional focus of Coase or the organisational focus of Herbert Simon. 
Simply put, behavioural economics provides further evidence of the problems 
inherent in the Stigler-Posner economic analyses of law, and adds support to 
the Coase-Calabresi way of doing L&E. 
Revisiting the above assumptions allowed for some of analytical moves in 
this book to come to the fore. Firstly, interdisciplinarity is not ‘let’s do more 
science’, but is an analytical process of categorisation and recategorisation 
(Chapter 1), testimonial exchange and reductionism in legal decision-making 
(Chapter 3) and drawing inferences (Chapter 4). The behavioural axiology 
that I adopt in the book allows me to re-think the framing of the key challenges 
of EET as well. ‘Public acceptability’ (studied through the examination of 
preferences) is rethought as ‘public responsiveness’ (studied through the 
examination of behaviour). ‘Political acceptability’ studied through the 
preferences of regulators is partially defended owing to the anchoring provided 
by reason (unlike individuals, regulatory opinion does amount to regulatory 
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behaviour). However, ‘political behaviour’ may also be analysed by examining 
political economy concerns following a public choice approach. The BLE 
inclination to relax the rational actor axiom may be extended to public choice 
inquiry by relaxing the rationality assumption of strategic political behaviour 
and introducing the (albeit speculative5) suggestion of discursive capture. 
Second, thinking about regulation as a mechanism of shaping behaviour 
rather than just facilitating market exchanges through economic incentives 
or imposing constraints through liability allows for a re-think of how we view 
regulation. If we view climate liability as playing a corrective and deterrent 
role6 and climate regulation as a collection of cost-effective mechanisms of 
shaping behaviour given institutional constraints (Chapter 6), we can think 
about the EU ETS as a liability rule (a fixed cap, a hard penalty and reparation 
rule) coupled with a market mechanism for price-discovery (Chapter 5). 
More importantly, following Calabresi, identifying the least cost avoider for 
complying with liability and the market-based implementation mechanism is 
itself a cost that cannot be ignored. I have tried to show in this book how the EU 
ETS reconciles distribution and implementation while allowing transaction 
costs to be commensurable. The same cannot be said for a cap-and-trade 
system for individuals. The institutional arrangement of the EU ETS may 
be said to have set in a ‘desirable path-dependence’ of iterative governance, 
following which it may be practical to distribute additional responsibility to 
industrial actors even for the activities of individuals and households. Should 
some other actors such as utilities distributors be at a distributional and cost 
advantage to arrest direct and indirect emissions, then they should be the 
5 This book is admittedly replete with unusual speculative analytical exercises. It does not have 
an overarching organising principle and though engages in empirical inquiry, does not claim 
to be a collection of empirical findings. Given the increased specialised technicality of both 
legal scholarship and publishable economic studies, it is easy to question whether speculative 
analytical inquiry is real work. I have found solace in Coase: ‘Faced with a choice between 
a theory that predicts well but gives us little insight into how the system works and one 
which gives us insight but predicts badly, I would choose the latter.’ Coase, ‘How Should 
Economists Choose?’, supra, p. 6. Coase also presciently notes that any measurement using 
quantitative and qualitative studies ‘perform a function similar to that of advertising’; one 
must not lose sight of the fact that they are in the service of ‘competing theories’. Ibid, p. 17. 
6 Michael Faure and Marjan Peeters, ‘Concluding Remarks’ in Climate Change Liability 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011), p. 258. 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   174 10/25/2017   5:13:37 PM
514920-L-bw-roy




focus of regulation. Third, incurring the administrative costs of identifying 
appropriate units of regulation and assignment of liability saves on the costs 
of determining a carbon price as well implementation and enforcement costs 
by identifying parties who can effectively bargain in a market system (and 
thus avoid liability). The so-called independence condition or the irrelevance 
of assignment of liability is not only inapplicable in a world of positive 
transaction costs, but may well be a costly principle to adopt. Admittedly, 
the Coasean suspicion of governmental failure may hold true in the event a 
regulator is called upon to deal with complex issues such as calculating the 
price of carbon. However, as Calabresi clarified, the assignment of liability 
does not need to mirror a price. The administrative costs of regulated 
liability do not need to be high. Fourth, mandating individuals to engage in 
climate policy involves tricky negotiations of means and ends; much like the 
ethical inquiries undertaken by BLE scholars, questions regarding freedom 
are inescapable. In this regard, the heuristic device of proportionality was 
found to be useful in thinking through the balancing of deontological and 
consequential concerns. Following the BLE interest in situated choices and 
public interventions in looking after individual interests, I argue that there 
is no inalienable entitlement to pollute, but an entitlement to be free from 
climate harm. To this end, individuals may be required to bear burdens such 
as costs that are passed through, but may not be required to bear the brunt of 
liability, or be required to behave like firms, given that BLE provides limited 
guidance in developing agency (Chapter 7). 
ii. scope for further research and recent 
scholarship
There are admittedly several unresolved issues in the thesis, some fundamental, 
and some more practical. Compatibility of a deontologically focused ‘most 
advantaged agent’ (per Caney) and consequentialist least cost-avoider (per 
Calabresi) can be established by concentrating on the role of industrial actors 
with respect to a producer-based territorial regulatory framework. Once the 
process of consumption is viewed as the transformation of materials and 
energy, it is not necessary to point fingers at or find a way to motivate the 
individual or household. However, from a strictly deontological perspective, 
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the producer-based territorial model embraced by the IPCC in itself is also 
subject to critique, given the historical global inequality of benefits reaped 
by some industrial actors in collusion with some States.7 The same argument 
may be made with respect to agents within the EU. It should come as no 
surprise that after all these years the distribution of burdens through Common 
but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) at the international level, and 
effort-sharing at the EU level are hotly contested, primarily because there 
is no apolitical answer. Among more micro issues are whether there could 
indeed be a solution to the Double Counting problem in the event Direct 
Emissions from households could be measured. I have argued that given 
the end-user could be viewed as a legal construct, it does not really matter. 
Further with respect to the liability component of a cap-and-trade mechanism 
and enforcement issue, I have argued that there does not seem to be any 
compelling justification for directly engaging individuals in an EET policy. 
But assume for political economy reasons (such as the ability of influential 
actors to negotiate the distribution of liability and burdens), the future of the 
planet rests with direct involvement of individuals. In such a case, the Double 
Counting problem would have to resolved. Similarly, the question of what 
motivates individuals and households to be climate rational would have to 
be understood better: especially given that piecemeal experiments shed sparse 
light on how to make individuals rationally engage with climate regulation. 
That the assessment and responsiveness to risk has multiple informants and 
mediators is not news, but should the need arise to shape the responsiveness 
of individuals through regulation, my inclination is that studies that do not 
encounter difficulties in translating into policy would be the way forward. 
Further, though I have pointed to the necessity of a proportionality analysis, 
I have not addressed whether a mechanism such as the EU ETS or a gasoline 
tax would be more desirable in relation to the distribution of benefits and 
burdens. In fact, if we were to take the BLE axiom that behaviour is not 
explained by quantitative rationality seriously, then it makes sense to ask 
distribution of what? A nuanced taxonomy of the distribution of burdens, 
7 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History: Four Theses’ (2009) 35 Critical Inquiry 
197.
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   176 10/25/2017   5:13:37 PM
514920-L-bw-roy




benefits and capabilities that could assist with appreciating the actual impacts 
of policy instruments is much needed. 
Having said the above, there is a modest but compelling body of 
scholarship on the issues discussed in this book that emerged while it was 
being written. I take the liberty to discuss some of them below, and in the 
process clarify some of the arguments mooted. 
Vihersalo examines the EU ‘You Control Climate Change’ campaign8 
through the ‘analytical tools’ of the consumer and citizen.9 She first makes 
a distinction between the consumer and the citizen as the subject of climate 
regulation, arguing that it would be myopic to consider the individual as 
a mere consumer. Rather ‘citizenship’ could be seen as an ‘analytical tool’ 
(methodologically somewhat similar to the analytical category of an ‘end-user’ 
used in this book) for thinking about the relationship between climate change 
and the individual. The idea of the citizen is amenable to be viewed in terms 
of duty; she argues that the EU’s campaign is much like a state-level campaign 
to make individuals view themselves and act in a certain way: they should be 
morally motivated to look out for their personal economic benefit, reduce 
emissions in the context of their lifestyles, and conserve nature.10 Viewed 
in this way, the ‘CO2 citizen’ is an apolitical private individual endorsing 
frugality when she achieves a minor economic benefit such as saving on an 
electricity bill11 (or in the case of a PCT, a minor possible economic gain). 
This would go against an idea of a citizen as a political creature who has the 
agency to pursue the ends that she considers valuable, or participate in the life 
of the law; the concentration on being environmentally conscious endorses 
the assumption that personal responsibility is a good regulatory choice. This 
deflects from the idea of a citizen as having a role in politically deciding on 
‘the preconditions for responsibility’, i.e. whether actors have the ‘ability, 
8 Commission, ‘Climate Change Campaign “You control climate change”’, Memo/06/218, 
Brussels, 29 May 2006. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-06-218_
en.htm. 
9 Mirja Vihersalo, ‘Climate Citizenship in the European Union: Environmental citizenship as 
an analytical concept’ (2017) 26 Environmental Politics 343. 
10 Ibid, p. 349. 
11 Ibid, pp. 355 – 357. 
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purpose, and opportunity’ to be responsible,12 and it serves as a ‘diversion 
from the responsibility of others.’13 
The constant (and admittedly repetitive) use of the word ‘situated’ in 
this book is an attempt to avoid the danger of looking at agents involved in 
climate regulation as atomised apolitical individuals. Moreover, in keeping 
with Vihersalo, a practical example of how responsibility could remain 
unquestioned and deflected was provided in Chapter 5: the focus was brought 
to climate regulation as a mechanism for the distribution of responsibility, 
and the possibility of an emissions trading scheme for households was shown 
to be a mechanism that seeks to either shift (for existing mechanisms) or avoid 
(for potential mechanisms) climate liability. Yet more specifically, in Chapter 
6, the assessment of the contribution of households to total emissions by 
the European Environment Agency was questioned. Further, it was argued 
that the producer-based territorial accounting model was suitable for climate 
governance, especially in the context of a quantity-based cap-and-trade 
mechanism. 
Vihersalo does not analyse the mechanisms of assessing household 
contribution to total emissions,14and her article does not go into specifics of 
accounting mechanisms and governance of households or individuals. This 
is done by Afionis and others, where production-based and consumption-
based accounting mechanisms are compared,15 with the conclusion that the 
consumption-based accounting method is ‘unlikely’ to displace the producer-
based model, and the desirability of the consumer-based model is contingent 
on further research on issues such as shared responsibility.16 In this book, 
it has been argued that the idea of causal responsibility is contestable, and 
consumption habits and preferences of individuals and households are 
12 Ibid, pp. 349. 
13 Ibid, p. 358. 
14 She does, however, question the assumption of causal responsibility for emissions from 
households and private vehicles in the calculations used in the EU Climate Campaign. Ibid, 
p. 348. 
15 Stavros Afionis, Marco Sakai, Kate Scott, John Barrett and Andy Goulson, ‘Consumption-
based Carbon Accounting: Does it have a future?’ (2017) 8 WIREs Climate Change 1. 
16 Ibid, pp. 14 – 15. 
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contextually situated. This is why a fictional though practical ‘least-cost 
avoider’ and ‘most advantaged’ perspective of the end-user was adopted, and 
this perspective does not support a shift to individual responsibility or the 
replacement of the producer-based territorial model with a consumer-based 
model. Can the two models be compatible? In this book it has been argued 
that politically a focus on individuals and households could substitute existing 
and potential climate regulation designed to assign responsibility according to 
the producer-based territorial model. Further, issues such as double counting 
seem almost impossible to resolve if both systems are in place. 
Heindl and Kanschik argue that there would be a ‘strong interaction’ 
between a quantity-based mechanism such as the EU ETS and individual 
mechanisms based on ‘sufficiency’,17 defined as ‘the reduction of consumption 
on an individual level in order to contribute to ecological sustainability.’18 
Heindl and Kanschik argue that when sufficiency is voluntary, then there 
might be a case for curtailing the negative effects of quantity-based policy 
mechanisms on voluntary sufficiency. This is contingent on whether ‘ancillary 
ecological benefits from individual sufficiency beyond the existing standard 
policy will be effective’.19 However, ‘non-voluntary sufficiency’ would have 
‘limited relevance for policy-making, or it is incompatible with the values 
of a liberal and pluralist society.’20 In Chapter 7, I try to tease out the 
intuition that a ‘non-voluntary’ mechanism for involving individuals and 
households can be disproportionally restrictive. I conclude that the demands 
of climate change may require individuals to adopt burdens, but it is not 
necessary to impose a mandatory cap if the direct or indirect emissions can be 
arrested using other mechanisms. Regarding voluntary sufficiency, Vihersalo 
(mentioned above) argues that the benefits from a citizen-centred mitigation 
policy are ‘superficial’;21 accordingly, it may be unwise to give up the benefits 
17 Peter Heindl and Philipp Kanschik, ‘Ecological Sufficiency, Individual Liberties, and 
Distributive Justice: Implications for policy making’ ZEW Discussion Papers No. 16-023, 
2016, p. 14. 
18 Ibid, p. 2. 
19 Ibid, p. 16. 
20 Ibid, p. 15. 
21 Vihersalo, ‘Climate Citizenship in the European Union’, p. 351. 
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of a standard quantity-based policy mechanism for the sake of ecological 
sufficiency. Finally – in keeping with the value of voluntariness – can we not 
contemplate a discrete voluntary cap-and-trade mechanism for individuals 
and households? Rather than the liability-based market mechanism that 
characterises the EU ETS?
In a recent paper, Spash and Theine emphatically conclude: ‘Despite 
their fast growth, voluntary carbon markets appear at best a dubious means 
for addressing human induced climate change, even if purely a supplement 
to government policy.’22 They critique the operation of carbon markets in 
general, and show that a voluntary individual market would operate like 
an offset market (in the absence of a mandatory cap). Offset markets are 
characterised by the primary problems of information and validity; given 
that information about determining the quality of the offset is private, there 
is an incentive to relax environmental integrity.23 Extending offset markets 
to individuals is especially problematic: participants in such a market will 
have to assess all relevant information, can lead to motivational crowding-
out and thus do more harm than good,24 in addition to several ethical 
and distributional issues.25 In several respects, Spash and Theine arrive at 
similar conclusion as this book, though they reason differently. The primary 
difference being I do not necessarily see something intrinsically wrong with 
carbon markets, especially something like the EU ETS that has a liability 
mechanism built into it. In some respects, Spash and Heine are more brazen 
about the difficulties of individual emissions trading than I am: the point of 
participating in such schemes could be to ‘clear one’s conscience’ without 
an eye for actual environmental consequences.26 Other than that, there are 
several substantive points of agreement. In Chapters 1 and 2, I expressed 
hesitation in endorsing a voluntary emissions trading scheme. Essentially, I 
argued that all ‘voluntary’ action has a contextual background, and a ‘cowboy 
22 Clive Spash and Hendrik Theine, ‘Voluntary Individual Carbon Trading’ SRE-Discussion 
Paper 2016/04, 2016, p. 36. 
23 Ibid, p. 20. 
24 Ibid, pp. 20 – 29.
25 Ibid, pp. 29 – 36.
26 Ibid, pp. 23 - 24. 
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market’ of allowances for household emissions is not desirable. In Chapters 
3, 5 and 6, I show that an emissions trading scheme such as the EU ETS 
is moderated by a quantity-based cap, enforced by way of a high penalty 
and requirement for reparations; thus a voluntary ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme is a 
contradiction. An equivalent to enforcement in a voluntary scheme may be 
found in individual choices and social norms. In Chapter 4, I suggested that 
social norms shape individual preferences and choices, and accordingly the 
effectiveness of a voluntary scheme would depend on conformity with social 
norms.27 The nature of social norms, and conformity of individual choices 
with social norms cannot be assumed. Methodologically, Spash and Heine are 
measured in making regulatory inferences from experimental studies. They 
question the relevance of psychological studies on household metering for 
understanding the responsiveness of households to a trading system.28 Most 
of this book has focused on this point of assessing the suitability of empirical 
work for regulatory inference.
iii. Parting thoughts
There are two popular BLE jokes: 
One behavioural psychologist stops another for a chat and asks: 
‘Hello. How am I doing?’ The other psychologist answers confidently: 
‘You are doing well. How am I doing?’ 
There are these two young fish swimming along, and they happen 
to meet an older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them 
and says, “Morning, boys. How’s the water?” And the two young fish 
swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the 
other and goes, “What the hell is water?”29
The point of the first joke is obvious: we do not know ourselves, so we 
need an observer to tell us. And yet it is funny because there is an irreverent 
undercurrent to it: can it really be that we do not know ourselves at all? The 
27 So would a non-voluntary scheme; and my study suggested that it is not easy to infer the 
extent a policy intervention such as an incentive can displace or shape social norms. 
28 Spash and Heine, ‘Voulntary Individual Carbon Trading’, pp. 21 - 22. 
29 David Foster Wallace, ‘This is Water’, Kenyon College, Commencement Speech, 2005. 
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second joke has been used by Sunstein to argue that we are oblivious to the 
forces that shape us, and this calls for intervention to look after us;30 in effect 
the basis of libertarian paternalism. The potential of these jokes on the way 
economic analysis of law is thought about is profound: we cannot take the 
rationality-based strategic agent for granted. And this in turn leads to a deeper 
problem: economic studies premised on individuals behaving strategically 
in response to incentives and conducting exercises in aggregation based on 
microeconomic equilibrium analyses are now up for questioning. The very 
possibility of measuring a Pareto superior move as a situation where everyone 
gains financially is also in question: is a financial gain equivalent to any other 
form of loss? If we take these ideas seriously, then the economic analysis of law 
is no longer the same. It could be suggested that this critique does not need to 
be radical. If behavioural economics can systematically identify biases, and if 
we can model these biases, then we can ‘account’ for them, and once we account 
for them, then we can complete a previously incomplete model of the rational 
actor. A more practical version of this suggestion could be: once we know 
about biases and we remove them, then the rational actor can compete and 
look out for her interests again. Unfortunately both versions of this suggestion 
are fundamentally incorrect. In relation to the suggestion regarding an ideal 
model, Kahneman & Tversky pointed out replicable instances of deviations 
from the rational actor model. They did not endeavour to provide a model of 
irrationality that can be completely accounted for. The second suggestion is 
yet more problematic. Behavioural economics is a fundamentally descriptive 
exercise and no direct inference on how to become rational can be drawn 
from it. This is why the solution has been to put in place nudge-like devices 
where a benevolent regulator who has knowledge of biases makes regulations 
that shape behaviour. This is why Sunstein takes pains to keep clarifying that 
regulation premised on behavioural economics does not erode autonomy 
too much, and also why his critics insist that it inevitably does. Knowing 
about the findings of behavioural economics does not enable individuals 
to overcome them and become rational. Hence the importance of ‘choice 
30 ‘As water is to the young fish, choice architecture is to human beings. People may not notice 
it, but it’s nonetheless there.’ Cass Sunstein, ‘Choosing Not to Choose: Understanding the 
value of choice’ (Oxford: OUP, 2015), pp. 5 – 6. 
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architecture’. This raises the obvious question: if people are not rational, then 
how can we expect regulators to be? If I am oblivious to water, how can my 
fellow regulator-fish (wise and old though she may be) know about it? In a 
brief section towards the end of About Behaviorism, B.F. Skinner, the father 
of behavioural psychology, wondered about ‘the behaviorist’s own behavior’.31 
He asks rhetorically: ‘has he not decided to write a book…does he not urge 
his readers to adopt a behavioristic point of view?’[emphases in original]32 
To these questions he responds ‘according to traditional definitions of self-
control, happiness, decision, responsibility, and urging, the behaviourist is 
indeed inconsistent, but according to his definitions he is not.’33 Skinner did 
not tell us what these ‘definitions’ or categories could be that would free the 
expert from being determined by unconscious forces. Neither does Sunstein. 
The identification of individual biases based on laboratory experiments 
would not either. I have suggested that this is not a reason to despair: if we 
truly uphold the situationist axiology of BLE; i.e. there are forces other than 
rational thought that shape actions and we need to understand them, then 
we could begin to explore phenomena such as expert inquiry or political 
decision-making without relying on the rational actor axiom. Much like 
L&E embraced cognitive and social psychology to understand and shape 
behaviour, it is entirely possible for BLE to embrace other epistemologies of 
analysing situations. In this vein, my suggestion has been that the behavioural 
bias of regulators and experts could be ‘discursive capture’. I have also tried to 
articulate an analytical tool of meta-expertise as a way of avoiding regulatory 
bias, and concentrated on introducing some deliberative sophistication in 
drawing inferences about people from experiments. 
Picking up on the idea of biases of experts, I come back to where I started. 
I mentioned in the introduction that climate change does not feature in my 
list of priorities. And it seems I conclude by being mostly against an EET that 
would make me directly liable for my emissions. Does that mean that this 
entire book has been an exercise in self-validation, or an example in having a 
confirmation bias as an anchor (in Kahnemanian terms)? 
31 B.F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1974), pp. 246 – 248. 
32 Ibid, p. 247. 
33 Ibid. 
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Suppose I waste too much water and consume too much gas while taking 
long showers that help me start my day. Suppose it becomes necessary for the 
planet to give up meat, and it even becomes reasonable to do so as vegetarian 
food might contain all required nutrients. I don’t think I’ll be happy if bacon 
and eggs are taken away from me while writing this book; it might have an 
absolutely detrimental effect, as they may help me remember my childhood, 
and provide me comfort during these lonely nights. It is not easy for someone 
to predict my preference formation.34 The solution then seems to be to have 
a market: I would choose what dirty activities to perform and what not to 
perform. But in this regard I might have a problem with the scope of the 
market, how I am compared to other households35 as well as the demands of a 
market. For instance, having a baby is one of worst carbon choices a household 
can make. As Berners-Lee puts it, ‘Unless you will ever contemplate lighting a 
bushfire, the decision to reproduce is probably the biggest carbon choice you 
will ever make.’36 I don’t have a baby, so I would very much want a system that 
has every household with babies buy extra allowances. I don’t think everyone 
will be happy with a carbon liability imposed on babies. Imagine also I live 
in a shared house where I feel socially inadequate or marginalised, it would 
not be easy for me to negotiate household chores, let alone participate on 
equal footing in collective decisions on carbon allowances.37 With regard to 
the market itself, if I have to even think of approaching a broker or a bank to 
34 Hence, Schlag: “It [Sunstein’s approach] does not go very far in acknowledging the social character 
of preference formation, the effects of the market on social construction, or the importance of class or 
social groups in the construction and maintenance of law and world. Methodological individualism 
remains in the driver’s seat and the market remains the default position.” Pierre Schlag, ‘Four 
Conceptualizations of the Relations of Law to Economics (Tribulations of a Positivist Social 
Science)’ (2012) 33 Cardozo Law Review 2357, p. 2370.
35 This difficulty of equivalence between individuals, households and members of householdshave 
been plaguing PCT scholars; in Chapter 7 I argue that this difficulty is one of the reasons why 
an end-user is better conceptualised as a legal construct that is more advantaged and can avoid 
costs better. 
36 Mike Berners-Lee, How Bad Are Bananas: The carbon footprint of everything (London: Profile 
Books, 2011), p. 151. 
37 BLE points to the need to revisit the Ellicksonian household, where rational individuals 
compete to secure what they want, and efficient organisation is achieved without any 
institutional intervention. Ellickson, ‘Unpacking the Household’, supra.
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financialise my carbon engagement, I would immediately give up and start 
writing another article on the credit crisis! So what then? Do we let my banal 
concerns destroy the planet? 
As I write this conclusion late into the night, I sincerely hope that I will 
not be bothered by other inconveniences. I hope that my health does not 
fail, that my diet gives me enough energy, that the people who matter to 
me remain safe during this time. I want to essentially delegate my choices 
about everything other than writing my thesis to someone else, or hope that 
I function in auto-pilot mode with respect to the responsibilities of life. This, 
in essence, is Sunstein’s archetype – that of the flustered academic who doesn’t 
have time to think about her pension, and the university should make default 
rules to relieve her of the banal matters that don’t interest her but have the potential 
to affect her, so she can pursue the issues that actually interest her. She can, in 
brief, ‘choose not to choose.’38 In the course of this book, I found no evidence 
to require or successfully fashion a mandatorily engaged individual, operating 
under the threat of carbon liability. This does not take away from – but rather 
makes the case stronger for – the robust engagement of (some) private and 
public actors for directly bearing the burden of taking action in response to 
climate change. Individuals may be required to indirectly bear some of this 
burden – such as the pass-through of costs by producers in moving away from 
a fossil-fuel economy – owing to the unwillingness and political power of 
privileged private and public actors. Should the least cost avoiding and most 
advantaged private and public actors refuse to take more robust action, then 
that is a distributive issue simpliciter; it is a microcosm of the difficulties in 
reaching a universal consensus on the appropriate amount of climate action, 
how liability for satisfying this amount may be distributed, and how such 
distributed liability may be cost-effectively complied with. It is not because 
of the failures of individuals to overcome their biases, or some administrative 
complexity in formulating an incentive-based scheme for households. In the 
EU we now take a cap-and-trade system for industrial actors for granted, 
but its adoption has not been an easy political process. If we cannot avoid 
the system from being gamed, or are reticent in extending liability to similar 
38 Sunstein, ‘Choosing Not to Choose’, supra. 
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actors to account for emissions not yet covered, then that will be the failure of 
a political system that does not distribute burdens to the least cost avoider and 
the most advantaged agent. From my analysis, the individual does not seem 
to satisfy these criteria. 
I hope that my reasons convince despite any confirmation bias that I 
have. Should they still amount to little more than rationalisation of my biases, 
all I can say is that I have tried to prevent ‘discursive capture’ by writing for 
and speaking in front of different communities while writing my book. In 
fact, negotiating different points of view became my book.
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: TCV
Type III 
Sum of Partial Eta
Source Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. Squared
Corrected Model 64,769a 3 21,590 1,344 ,264 ,034
Intercept 151,589 1 151,589 9,437 ,003 ,077
GreenValueFraction 1,012 1 1,012 ,063 ,802 ,001
EgoValueFraction 18,150 1 18,150 1,130 ,290 ,010
Carbondummy ,285 1 ,285 ,018 ,894 ,000
Error 1815,095 113 16,063
Total 58684,000 117
Corrected Total 1879,863 116
a. R Squared = ,034 (Adjusted R Squared = ,009)
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ANNEXURE 1.2: SUBSEQUENT CORRELATIONS




Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 172,971 1 172,971 9,271 ,003b
Residual 2089,661 112 18,658
Total 2262,632 113
a. Dependent Variable: TCV
b. Predictors: (Constant), Sex
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF BIOSPHERIC VALUES, GENDER 
AND TOTAL CARBON VALUE CONSUMED
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: TCV
Type III 
Sum of Partial Eta
Source Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. Squared
Corrected Model 231,692a 3 77,231 5,344 ,002 ,131
Intercept 171,521 1 171,521 11,869 ,001 ,101
GreenValueFraction ,078 1 ,078 ,005 ,941 ,000
EgoValueFraction 3,462 1 3,462 ,240 ,626 ,002
Sex 168,722 1 168,722 11,676 ,001 ,099
Error 1531,771 106 14,451
Total 54433,000 110
Corrected Total 1763,464 109
a. R Squared = ,131 (Adjusted R Squared = ,107)
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ANNEXURE II: SURVEY
ANNEXURE 2.1: PILOT SURVEY
List of Pilot Survey Participants (19 out of 50 respondents)
A. Participants who filled up the survey
1. Oscar Couwenberg (Professor, RUG)
2. Edwin Woerdman (Associate Professor, RUG)
3. Thijs Jong (PhD candidate, RUG)
4. Fitsum Tiche (PhD candidate, RUG)
5. Charis van den Berg (PhD candidate, RUG)
6. Lorenzo Squintani (Associate Professor, RUG)
7. Stefan Weishaar (Associate Professor, RUG)
8. Hans Vedder (Professor, RUG)
9. Goda Petrovic (Postdoc in Social Psychology, RUG)
10. Jan Willem Bolderdijk (Assistant Professor, RUG)
11. Sanja Bogojevic (Associate Professor, Lund)
12. Josephine van Zeben (Lecturer, University of Oxford)
13. Shaun Chamberlin (Managing Director, Fleming Policy Centre)
14. Aaron Maltais (Postdoctoral Fellow, Stockholm University)
B. Participants who provided comments (and reasons for 
declining to fill up survey)
1. Tina Fawcett (Researcher, Oxford)
2. Daniel Cole (Professor, Indiana University)
3. Åsa Knaggård (Senior Lecturer, Political Science, Lund)
4. Leonie Venhoeven (PhD, RUG)
5. Sarah Royston (Senior Research Fellow, University of Sussex)
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ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR END-USER EMISSIONS TRADING
1. Professional details
1) Professional Position:
2) Are you professionally engaged with any of the following (please tick):
EU ETS
Policy measures regarding individual engagement with climate 
change




The idea of an end-user emissions trading (EET) scheme is that each year every 
person in the EU is given the same number of emissions allowances for free. These 
received allowances would then need to be used for activities which result in carbon 
emissions. People who emit more than what they have received in allowances 
would have to buy extra allowances, and individuals who emit less would be able 
to sell any spare allowances.






Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   192 10/25/2017   5:13:38 PM
514920-L-bw-roy




1.  Sectoral Scope: Which of the following activities in your opinion should 
be brought within an EET scheme?
Fuel consumption for private vehicles
Electricity consumption
Gas consumption




2.  Spatial Scope: While the EU ETS operates at a supranational level, proposals 
to cap individual emissions are till now limited to the national level. Some 
have proposed that it should be at an even lower level of government. What 
is your opinion regarding the spatial scope of the EET?
EU National Municipal/ Provincial
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1. Should participation of every EU citizen in an EET 
scheme be mandatory?
2. Should every EU citizen receive an equal number of 
allowances?
3. Should allowances be distributed to children?
4. Should people be allowed to buy/sell allowances?
5.  It is unclear whether the EET may be better for some groups of people 
than others. In the table below, we mention particular groups, and give a 
reason as to why it may be fair or unfair. Do you agree or disagree?
Groups of people Agree Disagree
i. It is fair towards lower income groups as they 
can sell their allowances
ii. It is fair towards higher income groups as they 
can always buy allowances to keep emitting
iii. It is fair towards people who are not financially 
literate, as they can always voluntarily find 
means to engage meaningfully
iv. It is fair towards people who have inefficient 
energy appliances as they can shift to energy-
efficient appliances, and claim the difference 
through selling allowances
v. It is fair towards people who live in rural areas 
as they have more opportunities for reducing 
emissions
vi. It is fair towards people who live in cold areas 
as they have less opportunities for reducing 
emissions
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6. One suggestion that has been made is to have a 
judicial body allocate more allowances on a case-by-
case basis if complaints are brought. Do you think 
this is a good idea?
7. Do you think a personal carbon tax would be more 
equitable than EET?
8. Do you think putting in place energy efficiency 
standards would be more equitable than EET?
9. Do you think offering renewable energy subsidies 
would be more equitable than EET?
V. EU ETS questions
1.  Do you think the EU ETS is an effective policy instrument in dealing with 
carbon emissions? Yes/No:
2.  We want to assess the arguments for and against making the EET a part 
of the EU ETS. Please let us know whether you agree or disagree with the 
following:
Arguments Agree Disagree
i. As the institutions are already in place, there 
would be lower administrative costs if the EET 
is part of the EU ETS
ii. There would be high administrative costs, as an 
EET scheme should be governed at a more local 
level
iii. EU ETS markets are too complex for lay people, 
and hence the two schemes should remain 
separate
iv. People would have more choices if the EET is 
part of the EU ETS as the market would be 
more robust
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v. Sectors for an EET scheme are different from 
the sectors covered under the EU ETS, so 
compatibility would be difficult
vi. The EET covers sectors which are not covered 
under the EU ETS, and hence there would be 
no conflict
3.  Do you think the EET should be made a part of the EU ETS? Yes/No:
VI. System Design
1.  Allocation: Which of the following mechanisms do you think would work 
best? Please tick the chosen option.
i) An allowance account per individual where a fixed number of allowances 
will be put in. These allowances would be deducted periodically for some 
activities (such as along with electricity bills) and automatically when 
transactions are carried out (such as fuel purchase). Individuals could 
either top-up or sell allowances depending on usage. 
ii) The only requirement would be an annual surrender of allowances, 
and a penalty or tax imposed if a fixed number of allowances are 
not surrendered. It would be up to individuals to decide how they 
regulate it. 
iii) Any other? Please feel free to specify
2.  Non-compliance: In your opinion, what measure must be implemented in 
case of non-compliance with EET?:
Compliance options Yes No
Individuals should be allowed to opt-out to a carbon tax 
mechanism
There should be a default carbon tax imposed if there is 
annual non-compliance to the extent of default
There should be a high penalty to deter non-compliance
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Individuals would not be able to purchase certain products 
unless they are able to surrender the corresponding allowances
Any other (either a combination of the options above  
or some other option; please feel free to specify)
3.  Administrative Costs: What do you think are the primary concerns in 
















ii. The cost of 
monitoring 
such a scheme
iii. The cost of 
enforcement 
and compliance
iv. The cost of 
having an opt-
out carbon tax 
mechanism
Any other:
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ii. The spatial 
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1.  What do you think are the main concerns in relation to public participation 
















i. People are 
sceptical about 
climate change, 
or think it is 
too remote a 
problem
ii. It seems like 
rationing











v. People may 
be suspicious 
of a trading 
mechanism
vi. Uncertainty of 
prices
Any other:
2.  Would you consider an EET scheme to be an effective proposal? Yes/No:
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ANNEXURE 2.2: IDENTIFICATION OF  
RESPONDENTS FOR SURVEY
The identification of regulators and experts requires addressal of the issue 
of representation. As far as regulators are concerned, the scope has been the 
EU. Thus, it is regulators at an EU level and a Member-State level who have 
been identified, and an attempt made to include all Member-States. A mixed-
method selection technique has been applied for the selection of experts. The 
method of selection for the three sample groups is specified below:
EU Regulators
The first point of reference in selecting regulatory experts was to list the 
members of the Directorate General of Climate Change of the European 
Commission (DG Clima) listed on their official website.1 The next point was 
to find members of the European Commission in other departments who 
work on climate change issues. For this purpose, departments in other areas 
of regulation with overlapping concerns, such as the Directorate General 
of Energy and the Directorate General of Transport were studied to find 
members who may be in position to contribute. Third, members engaged 
in regulatory impact assessment of climate change were identified. Fourth, 
the official directory of the staff-members of the EU was used to identify 
personnel engaged in different aspects of climate change regulation.2 Finally, 
participants of the EU in the 19th Conference of Parties3 engaged in policy-
making were contacted.
National Regulators
This list compiles regulators and officials responsible for climate change action 
in the Member States of the European Union. The method adopted for the 
selection of respondents is as follows:
1)  The websites of national competent authorities responsible for climate 
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there was no specific department responsible for climate change action, 
members of authorities responsible for ancillary or broader actions, such as 
environment ministries were identified. When email addresses of members 
identified were unavailable, the different departments were individually 
contacted, and the email addresses requested. 
2)  The National Focal Points4 and Competent Authorities identified by the 
UNFCCC are identified. Specifically, the list of participants at the COP 
19 is consulted as this is the most recent list available.5 As this list includes 
a large number of actors, including scientists and industry interests, not all 
of them are surveyed. The selected respondents are those officials who are 
responsible for climate change action, environmental policy, and relations 
with the EU. 
3)  A specific list has been released by DG Clima of national competent 
authorities dealing with aviation.6 Given our project is also interested in 
exploring the expansion of emissions trading to other sectors, we found 
that it would be useful to survey these members. 
Experts
Though we initially considered grouping experts according to their different 
disciplinary orientations and subject of expertise, our selection bias prompted 
us to opt for a different approach. The steps followed for our compilation is 
as follows:
1)  We first use listings in Google Scholar to filter the experts we use in our 
survey. The following search strings have been used in Google Scholar in 
order to arrive at our list of experts:
  a. “personal carbon trading”
  b. “personal carbon allowances”
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d. “climate change law” AROUND “individual emissions”
e. “EU law” AROUND “individual emissions”
From the search strings provided above, the first twenty results from each 
search string was first taken into account. In the event there were co-authors 
for a publication, the first author was taken into account.
2)  We list the authors who contributed to the Climate Policy Special Edition 
on Personal Carbon Trading, and who have not been covered in the 
above list.
3)  We use the same search strings in (1) and perform a WESTLAW search to 
ensure that we have sufficient representation from legal scholars.
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Over the last few decades, an academic consensus on the science behind 
anthropogenic climate change has been reached. At the same time, there is 
no political consensus on how such science can be put into effect. Within the 
European Union (EU), there is an impetus to take more action on climate 
change. This impetus could be attributed to political commitments in the 
international sphere, the pro-active role played by the European Commission, 
national pressure from some political parties and non-governmental 
organisations, and increasingly, even the judiciary. The EU has had the 
first-mover advantage in developing the world’s most robust cap-and-trade 
system for greenhouse gases, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS), and would seek to extend it both internationally and possibly to 
sources of emissions not yet included. The EU ETS has been refined over the 
years through different phases, and has also received its fair share of critique, 
primarily due to concerns regarding the price of the so-called ‘allowances’ that 
represent slices of the quantity of emissions sought to be reduced. This price 
has been rather low over the last few years, and could be attributed to several 
reasons, such as a surfeit of allowances freely allocated in the first phase, the 
after-effects of the economic recession and the lack of political agreement in 
adopting an EU-wide price floor. 
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There is also a concern that though the inclusion of sources and sectors 
has been somewhat expanded over the years, there is a significant amount of 
emissions that is not included within the scheme itself. Notwithstanding, cap-
and-trade seems to be the regulatory choice that will prevail for some time, and 
some academic and political efforts are being made to explore an extension of 
the EU ETS into sectors and sources not yet included. Among these sources 
and sectors is the household, and given the household is made up of discrete 
individuals, the individual. Appreciating the individual is not easy: unlike 
a firm where an individual operates in a formalised organisational setting, 
an individual or a household comprising individuals has myriad situational 
factors that inform his engagement with a regulatory initiative. Having said 
that, activities considered to be excluded from the EU ETS such as private 
transport, waste disposal and emissions from food seem to hinge on including 
the energy end-user. Can and should the end-user be included in a cap-and-
trade system, and specifically the EU ETS? Along with the development of the 
EU ETS, there has been a parallel innovation in legal scholarship: the rise of 
Behavioural Law and Economics (BLE) as an analytical tool. Given that BLE 
focuses on providing better insight on the relationship between regulatory 
choices and individual behaviour, it seemed natural to use BLE as a preferred 
analytical tool to explore the possibility of including the individual in a cap-
and-trade scheme like the EU ETS. These two concerns – the possibility of 
including the individual in a cap-and-trade scheme like the EU ETS, and 
the potential of BLE as a preferred lens to examine this regulatory option – 
animate the dissertation. The central question may therefore be formulated as: 
is it desirable to have an end-user emissions trading scheme in the EU from 
the perspective of BLE?
To begin addressing these concerns, it is important to review both the 
existing literature related to end-user emissions trading (EET), as well as the 
potential of BLE as a preferred analytical tool. Some research gaps emerged 
from the literature surveyed on EET, primarily work on Personal Carbon 
Trading in the UK and variants such as Tradeable Energy Quotas, notably: 
(i) public acceptability, (ii) political acceptability, (iii) the institutional 
framework within which the upstream and downstream emissions are 
regulated (primarily the problem of double counting), (iv) how such a scheme 
may be enforced, and (v) fairness considerations of including individuals. The 
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first two require empirical work, and the other three require an appreciation 
of regulatory tools (and empirical work on preferred regulatory tools), within 
the legal context of the EU regulatory framework. These are dealt with in 
turn. But before doing so, BLE is itself interrogated by describing the process 
of translating social science expertise into legal inquiry. BLE scholarship can 
be conducted not only by incorporating secondary literature on psychology 
into Law & Economics, but also by querying and developing analytical 
categories such as the famous Thaler-Sunstein invention of the Nudge. The 
motivation behind this choice of querying and developing analytical categories 
is primarily because BLE is not yet a coherent discipline and does not have a 
central axiomatic tenet. Rather, what we have instead is the development of 
an axiology of the non-rational actor. This requires a revision not only of the 
concepts used to describe behaviour in Law & Economics, but also of what 
constitutes relevant theoretical and empirical work. It is for these two reasons – 
the interest in the axiology of BLE and interrogating the way expert inquiry 
is used in regulatory decision-making – that the dissertation moves beyond 
a mere viability assessment of emissions trading for individuals, primarily 
by revisiting economic assumptions, analysing the meanings attributed to 
phrases, and concentrating on the legal inferences drawn from empirical work. 
Using BLE to query analytical categories in the context of an EET allows 
for a re-conceptualisation of public acceptability as public responsiveness, 
political acceptability as political behaviour, and the end-user itself as the 
least-cost avoider and most-advantaged agent. The motivation behind the 
examination of public acceptability is to understand implementation of an 
EET, since direct individual engagement is essential for the success of such a 
scheme. The dissertation suggests that there is a difference between opinion-
based public acceptability and behaviour-based public responsiveness to 
a policy instrument, where the latter can be examined by the experimental 
method. Although field experiments, economic experiments and psychological 
experiments can and have been employed to understand policy interventions, 
an inquiry into the properties of an incentive mechanism like the EET 
would profit from laboratory experiments. The experiment conducted was 
in relation to the specific question of whether the method of allocation of 
limited allowances in a cap-and-trade scheme for individuals would make a 
difference on rational decisions surrounding the use of such allowances for 
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activities that involve emissions. The explanatory power of this experiment 
for policy conclusions involves inquiry about drawing inferences, notably 
what can and cannot be inferred as well as the tensions and costs of drawing 
inferences. The particular experiment conducted yielded inconclusive results; 
and the only inference that can be drawn is that it fails to confirm whether 
loss aversion plays a role in relation to a climate change incentive. 
Unlike public acceptability, it could be argued that stated preferences and 
opinions are important for assessing political acceptability, as reason-giving 
and arriving at policy positions is regulatory behavior. For this purpose, a 
survey (preceded by a pilot survey) of the acceptability of an EET among 
regulators was conducted, with a control group of experts to contrast regulatory 
opinion. Though the response-rate was low, both the pilot survey and the 
final survey yielded foundational and substantive responses. Substantively, 
(i) the properties of mandatory participation coupled with the trade of 
allowances seem essential for an EET to function, (ii) fuel, electricity and gas 
consumption were identified as preferred activities for inclusion, (iii) there 
was a general apprehension that an EET is unfair, and (iv) the need to ferret 
out the complex association of an EET with the EU ETS was highlighted. 
This final point was not dissimilar to a suggestion made in response to the 
pilot survey on whether it was desirable to impose the additional regulatory 
burden of working out an EET when the EU ETS was still being perfected. 
The pilot survey had yielded a foundational observation that could not be 
accommodated in the survey itself: political interests cannot be revealed in a 
survey, but need to be analytically ascertained following a political economy 
approach. Such an approach was subsequently adopted to think through the 
issues of relationship with the EU ETS, fairness concerns, and some important 
unexamined properties of the EET raised in the survey. The dissertation 
argues that the political economy of the EU ETS and other potential climate 
regulation would be particularly relevant in relation to the distribution of 
burdens: as it would be unlikely for disparate individuals and households to 
constitute a compelling lobby group, agents vested in the EU ETS, as well 
as agents seeking to avoid regulation in relation to sectors not covered by 
the EU ETS, would most likely try to shape the contours of an EET. To the 
extent the EET serves as a substitute to the EU ETS and for possible non-
EU ETS regulation, agents may prefer an EET if it provides an ‘opportunity 
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benefit’. This suggests that there may well be a disconnect between stated 
preferences and political choices made by regulators. However, in such an 
analysis, BLE seems to play no role as it is premised on rational strategic 
behaviour of interested agents. In this regard, it is argued that institutions and 
regulators could ‘irrationally’ assume a privileged discourse in analysis and 
decision-making without strategically reasoning in a particular way owing to 
embedded social and cultural forces; this phenomenon of ‘discursive capture’ 
is something that BLE might illuminate. 
Moving on to the institutional framework within which an EET 
policy could operate, including the related concerns of enforcement and 
implementation, a subsidiarity analysis was conducted to facilitate an 
understanding of the competence allocation between EU institutions, 
Member States, citizens, and external parties in relation to the achievement of 
climate objectives. The legally-facilitated realisation of including fairly large 
installations in a cap-and-trade scheme points to the feasibility of putting in 
place regulation that is equivalent to the EU ETS. The core of EU climate 
regulation – assignment of liability to industrial units, pricing through a 
market and the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of installations – is a 
‘producer-based territorial’ model. To replace this with a ‘consumption-based 
model’ of carbon accounting and carbon responsibility would not only require 
a completely different regulatory framework from the one we have in the 
EU involving EU institutions, Member States and private parties, but would 
also lead to the double counting of emissions in relation to activities such as 
fuel consumption already covered in the producer-based territorial model. 
This does not necessarily render the objective of arresting end-user emissions 
problematic. Rather, if the end-user is conceptualised as a legal construct 
best placed to deal with climate change, it is not necessary to attribute the 
responsibility of reducing emissions to the individual or household. In fact, 
the commonly accepted understanding of the final consumer or household as 
the end-user is not an objective choice once we think of consumption as the 
transformation of materials and energy. Any agent could be considered the 
end-user for the purpose of attributing responsibility for reducing emissions; 
specifically, it is argued that the end-user with respect to climate regulation is 
the least cost avoider and the most advantaged agent. For instance, if electricity 
distribution utilities bear comparatively low information costs, capital costs 
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as well as costs of bringing about collective action, they seem to be the Least 
Cost Avoiders of emissions from individuals for electricity consumption. 
In this case, it would make sense, therefore, to categorise such distribution 
utilities as the end-users for emissions regulation. 
Next to the above-mentioned subsidiarity analysis, the legality of a 
mandatory EET scheme for individuals and households was also analysed by 
examining whether the constraints on individuals placed by such a scheme 
are proportional to the objective of reducing emissions. Though individuals 
and households have no inalienable right to emit, they have a right to be free 
of harmful emissions. Being free of such emissions entails putting in place 
a necessary and suitable policy mechanism. After conducting a qualitative 
cost-benefit analysis, it is demonstrated that there does not appear to be a 
convincing justification for making individuals and households liable for 
emissions, or force them to bargain in a market framework. More suitable 
alternatives for arresting direct and indirect emissions may be found, primarily 
by re-thinking the category of the end-user, and allocating responsibility 
accordingly. In the event there could be a behavioural ‘silver bullet’ for 
inspiring motivation through regulation, then several of the costs of imposing 
a mandatory cap-and-trade scheme on individuals may have been offset by 
its benefits. However, the dissertation (primarily in Chapter 4) found no 
evidence to that effect. Rather, it was argued (in Chapters 5 and 6), that an 
EET for households could adversely affect the functioning of existing climate 
regulation, and crowd-out potential climate regulation regarding emissions 
not yet covered.
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In de afgelopen decennia is een academische consensus ontstaan over 
de wetenschap achter door de mens veroorzaakte klimaatverandering. 
Tegelijkertijd is er geen politieke consensus over de manier waarop deze 
wetenschap kan worden toegepast. Binnen de Europese Unie (EU) bestaat 
niettemin de wens om meer actie te ondernemen om klimaatverandering tegen 
te gaan. Deze wens kan worden toegeschreven aan politieke verplichtingen op 
het internationale vlak, de proactieve rol van de Europese Commissie, nationale 
druk van sommige politieke partijen en niet-gouvernementele organisaties, en 
in toenemende mate zelfs de rechterlijke macht. De EU heeft een first-mover 
advantage gehad bij het ontwikkelen van ‘s werelds meest robuuste cap-and-
trade-systeem voor broeikasgassen, het EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS), en streeft ernaar om dit systeem uit te breiden, zowel internationaal 
als met emissies die nu nog niet zijn inbegrepen. Het EU-ETS is door de 
jaren heen in verschillende fasen verfijnd maar heeft ook flinke kritiek moeten 
incasseren, voornamelijk door zorgen over de prijs van de verhandelbare 
emissierechten die “allowances” worden genoemd. De prijs van deze rechten 
is de afgelopen jaren vrij laag geweest hetgeen kan worden toegeschreven aan 
een aantal factoren, zoals een overallocatie van gratis emissierechten in de 
eerste fase van het systeem, de nawerking van de economische recessie en het 
ontbreken van politieke overeenstemming over een EU-brede prijsvloer.
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   261 10/25/2017   5:14:02 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 386
Nederlandse Samenvatting
368
Hoewel het aantal bronnen en sectoren in het EU-ETS in de loop der 
jaren enigszins werd uitgebreid, is er nog steeds een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid 
emissies dat er niet in opgenomen is. Niettemin lijkt cap-and-trade een 
regelgevende keuze te zijn die voor enige tijd zal blijven gelden en worden 
er diverse academische en politieke inspanningen gedaan om  uitbreiding van 
het EU-ETS te onderzoeken naar sectoren en bronnen die er nog  niet in 
zijn opgenomen. Onder deze bronnen en sectoren vallen de hui s houdens 
en, aangezien ieder huishouden bestaat uit een of meer personen, tevens het 
individu. Het benaderen van het individu is niet eenvoudig: in tegenstelling 
tot een bedrijf, waar een individu werkzaam is in een geform a liseerde 
organisatie, is een individu - of een huishouden bestaande u i t meerdere 
individuen - op vele manieren betrokken bij een regelgevend initiatief om 
klimaatverandering tegen te gaan. Bij activiteiten die nu worden uitgesloten 
van het EU-ETS, zoals privévervoer, afvalverwerking en emissies gerelateerd 
aan de consumptie van levensmiddelen, speelt de eindgebruiker van energie 
een cruciale rol. Is het mogelijk en wenselijk om die eindge b ruiker op te 
nemen in een cap-and-trade-systeem, en in het bijzonder in he t EU-ETS? 
Samen met de ontwikkeling van het EU-ETS is er een parallelle innovatie in 
de rechtswetenschap geweest: de opkomst van Behavioural Law and Economics 
(BLE) - de gedragseconomische bestudering van het recht - als een analytisch 
instrument. Aangezien BLE zich richt op het verbeteren van het inzicht in de 
relatie tussen keuzes voor regelgeving en individueel gedrag, leek het voor de 
hand te liggen om BLE te gebruiken als het geprefereerde instrument om de 
mogelijkheid te onderzoeken het individu in een cap-and-trade-systeem zoals 
het EU-ETS op te nemen. Deze twee overwegingen - de mogelijkheid om het 
individu in een cap-and-trade-regeling, zoals het EU-ETS, te  integreren en 
het potentieel van BLE als voorkeursbenadering om deze regelgevende optie 
te onderzoeken - creëren dit proefschrift. De centrale vraag kan daarom als 
volgt worden geformuleerd: is het wenselijk, vanuit het perspectief van BLE, 
om een  emissiehandelssysteem voor eindgebruikers op te zetten in de EU?
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden is het belangrijk om zowel de bestaande 
literatu u r over de handel in eindgebruikersemissies te beoor d elen, in 
het proe f schrift End-user Emissions Trading (EET) genoemd, a l sook het 
potentieel van BLE als te prefereren benadering. Uit studies die onderzocht 
werden i n  relatie tot EET, vooral inzake Personal Carbon Tra d ing in het 
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Verenigd  Koninkrijk en varianten zoals Tradeable Energy Quota s, kwamen 
diverse leemtes in de literatuur naar voren met betrekking tot: i) publieke 
acceptat i e, ii) politieke acceptatie, iii) het institutionele  kader waarbinnen 
downstream en upstream emissies gereguleerd worden (vooral aangaande het 
probleem van dubbeltelling, ‘double counting’ genoemd), (iv) de manier van 
handhaving van dergelijke regulering, en (v) rechtvaardigheidsoverwegingen 
om individuen bij een emissiehandelssysteem te betrekken. De eerste twee 
vereisen  empirisch onderzoek, en de andere drie vereisen een  analyse van 
regelgevende instrumenten (en empirisch onderzoek naar de te  prefereren 
instrumenten), binnen de juridische context van de EU. Deze worden stuk 
voor stuk in het proefschrift behandeld. Daarnaast wordt BLE zelf bestudeerd 
door het proces te beschrijven van het gebruik van sociaal-wetenschappelijke 
expertise in juridisch onderzoek. Onderzoek op basis van BLE kan niet alleen 
worden toepast door secundaire literatuur over psychologie op te nemen in een 
rechtseconomische analyse, maar ook door het bekritiseren en ontwikkelen 
van analytische categorieën, zoals de bekende Thaler-Sunstein-uitvinding van 
de Nudge. De motivatie achter het bekritiseren en ontwikkelen van analytische 
categorieën is vooral omdat BLE nog geen coherente discipline is en geen 
centraal axiomatisch uitgangspunt heeft. Wat vooral lijkt plaats te vinden is 
de ontwikkeling van een axiologie van de niet-rationele speler. Dit vereist een 
herziening niet alleen van de concepten die traditioneel gebruikt worden om 
gedrag in de rechtseconomie te beschrijven, maar ook van wat beschouwd 
moet worden als relevant theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek. Het is om deze 
twee redenen - de belangstelling voor de axiologie van BLE en de vraag hoe 
kennis van experts wordt gebruikt bij regelgevende besluitvorming - dat het 
proefschrift verder gaat dan slechts een analyse van de uitvoerbaarheid van 
emissiehandel voor individuen, namelijk door het herzien van economische 
aannames, het analyseren van de betekenissen toegeschreven aan zinnen, en 
het overwegen van de juridische gevolgen van empirisch onderzoek.
Door BLE te gebruiken bij het bestuderen van analytische categorieën in 
het kader van EET is een herconceptualisering mogelijk van publieke acceptatie 
als publ i eke responsiviteit, van politieke acceptatie als p o litiek gedrag, en 
van de eindgebruiker zelf als de least-cost avoider en most-advantaged agent. 
De motivatie achter het bestuderen van publieke acceptatie is het begrijpen 
van de implementatie van EET, omdat directe individuele bet rokkenheid 
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essentiee l is voor het succes van een dergelijk instrument.  Dit proefschrift 
suggeree r t dat er een verschil is tussen publieke acceptati e  op basis van 
opinies en publieke responsiviteit op basis van gedrag naar aanleiding van een 
beleidsinstrument, waarbij responsiviteit met behulp van de experimentele 
methode kan worden onderzocht. Hoewel veldexperimenten, economische 
experimenten en psychologische experimenten kunnen en zijn ingezet om 
beleidsinterventies te begrijpen, is onderzoek naar de eigenschappen van een 
incentive-instrument zoals EET gebaat bij laboratoriumexperimenten. Om 
die reden is een experiment uitgevoerd naar de specifieke vraag of de methode 
van toewijzing van “allowances” in een cap-and-trade-systeem voor individuen 
een verschil zou maken bij rationele besluiten over het gebruik van dergelijke 
emissier e chten voor activiteiten die emissies met zich mee b rengen. De 
verklarende kracht van dit experiment voor beleidsconclusies vereist dat men 
nadenkt over wat uit een experiment kan worden afgeleid, vooral over wat wel 
en niet kan worden afgeleid, evenals de problemen en kosten van dergelijke 
gevolgtrekkingen. Het uitgevoerde experiment leverde geen doorslaggevende 
resultaten op; de enige conclusie die kan worden getrokken is dat het niet kan 
bevestigen of loss aversion (aversie tegen verlies) een rol speelt bij een incentive-
instrument in relatie tot klimaatverandering.
Anders dan bij publieke acceptatie zou men kunnen stellen dat geuite 
voorkeuren en opinies wel degelijk belangrijk zijn om politieke acceptatie te 
beoordelen, omdat het beargumenteren en het bereiken van beleidsposities 
zelf als regulerend gedrag moet worden beschouwd. Hiertoe is een onderzoek 
uitgevoerd (voorafgegaan door een proefonderzoek) naar de aanvaardbaarheid 
van EET onder beleidsambtenaren, met een controlegroep van deskundigen 
om de regelgevende opinie mee te kunnen vergelijken. Hoewel de respons 
laag was ,  leverden zowel het proefonderzoek als het eindonderzoek diverse 
fundamentele en inhoudelijke reacties op. Wat betreft de inhoud (i) lijken 
de eigen s chappen van verplichte deelname gekoppeld aan de handel in 
emissierechten essentieel voor het functioneren van EET, (ii) werden brandstof-, 
elektric i teits- en gasverbruik geïdentificeerd als voorkeursactiviteiten voor 
opname in  EET, (iii) was er een algemene bezorgdheid dat EET oneerlijk 
uitpakt,  en (iv) werd de noodzaak benadrukt om goed na te denken over 
de complexe associatie van EET met het EU-ETS. Dit laatste punt kwam 
overeen met een eerdere suggestie uit het proefonderzoek over de vraag of 
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het wenselijk is om EET als extra regelgevende last op te leggen, terwijl het 
EU-ETS steeds verder wordt geperfectioneerd. Het proefonderzoek had een 
fundamentele waarneming opgeleverd die niet met behulp van de enquête 
zelf kon worden geadresseerd: politieke belangen kunnen niet door middel 
van een enquête worden onthuld, maar moeten analytisch worden vastgesteld 
op basis  van een political economy-benadering. Een dergelijke benadering 
werd vervolgens genomen om na te denken over de relaties met het EU-ETS, 
rechtvaardigheidsproblemen en enkele belangrijke eigenschappen van de EET 
die nog niet waren bestudeerd maar wel in de enquête waren opgeworpen. 
In het proefschrift wordt gesteld dat de politieke economie van het EU-ETS 
en van a n dere mogelijke klimaatregulering bijzonder relevant is voor de 
verdeling van de lasten: zelfs als individuen en huishoudens een overtuigende 
lobbygroep kunnen vormen, zullen agenten met belangen in het EU-ETS, 
evenals agenten die regulering willen vermijden met betrekking tot sectoren 
die niet  onder het EU-ETS vallen, waarschijnlijk proberen de contouren 
van een EET te vormen. Voor zover EET als vervanging van het EU-ETS en 
voor mogelijke niet-EU-ETS regelgeving kan dienen, kunnen agenten EET 
verkiezen als het een ‘opportunity benefit’ biedt. Dit suggereert dat er wellicht 
een verschil kan bestaan  tussen geuite voorkeuren en de politieke keuzes die 
door besluitvormers zijn gemaakt. In een dergelijke analyse lijkt BLE echter 
geen rol te spelen aangezien het is gebaseerd op rationeel strategisch gedrag van 
belanghebbende agenten. In dit opzicht wordt beargumenteerd dat instituties 
en besluitvormers op ‘irrationele’ wijze een privileged discourse in analyse en 
besluitvorming kunnen aannemen zonder op een bepaalde manier strategisch 
te reden e ren als gevolg va n  verankerde sociale en culturele krachten; dit 
fenomeen van ‘discursive capture’ is iets dat BLE zou kunnen benadrukken.
Met het oog op het institutionele kader waarin een EET-beleid zou kunnen 
functioneren, met inbegrip van de daarmee verband houdende zorgen omtrent 
handhaving en implementatie, is een subsidiariteitsanalyse uitgevoerd om de 
bevoegdheidsverdeling tussen EU-instellingen, lidstaten, burgers en externe 
partijen  te begrijpen in r e latie tot het bereiken van klimaatdoelstellingen. 
De wette l ijk verankerde opname van vrij grote installaties in een cap-and-
trade-sy s teem wijst op de h aalbaarheid van de invoering van regelgeving 
die gelijkwaardig is aan het EU-ETS. De kern van EU-klimaatregulering - 
toewijzi n g van aansprakeli j kheid aan industriële eenheden, prijsbepaling 
Situating the Individual_Chap_4-End_2 .indd   265 10/25/2017   5:14:03 PM
514920-L-bw-roy
Processed on: 27-10-2017 PDF page: 390
Nederlandse Samenvatting
372
door een markt en het monitoren, rapporteren en verifiëren van installaties 
- is een  ‘producent-gebase e rd territoriaal’ model. Om dit te vervangen 
door een  ‘consumptie-gebas e erd model’ van koolstofberekening en 
koolstofverantwoordelijkheid zou niet alleen een volledig ander regelgevend 
kader ve r eisen dan die we i n de EU hebben met betrekking tot EU-
instellingen, lidstaten en particuliere partijen, maar zou ook leiden tot het 
dubbel tellen van emissies in relatie tot activiteiten zoals brandstofverbruik 
die al in het producent-gebaseerde territoriale model zijn gedekt. Dit maakt 
het niet  noodzakelijkerwij s  problematisch om het doel van het beperken 
van de emissies van eindgebruikers te behalen. Als de eindgebruiker wordt 
geconceptualiseerd als een  juridisch construct dat het beste in staat is om 
klimaatverandering tegen te gaan, is het daarentegen niet noodzakelijk om 
de veran t woordelijkheid om  emissies te reduceren toe te kennen aan het 
individu of het huishouden. In feite is het algemeen aanvaarde begrip van de 
eindgebruiker of het huishouden als de eindgebruiker geen objectieve keuze 
wanneer we consumptie zien als de transformatie van materialen en energie. Elk 
agent kan worden beschouwd als de eindgebruiker om de verantwoordelijkheid 
toe te wijzen voor het verminderen van emissies; specifiek wordt aangevoerd 
dat de eindgebruiker met betrekking tot klimaatregulering de least-cost avoider 
en de most advantaged is. Als bijvoorbeeld energiedistributeurs relatief lage 
informatiekosten, kapitaalkosten en collectieve-actiekosten hebben, lijken ze 
de goedkoopste kosten-vermijders te zijn van emissies van individuen inzake 
elektriciteitsverbruik. In dit geval zou het dan ook zin hebben om dergelijke 
nutsbedrijven als eindgebruikers te classificeren voor emissieregulering.
Naast de bovengenoemde subsidiariteitsanalyse werd ook de legaliteit van 
een verp l ichte EET-regeling  voor individuen en huishoudens geanalyseerd 
door te onderzoeken of de beperkingen op individuen die door een dergelijk 
stelsel z ijn opgelegd wel proportioneel zijn aan de doelstelling om emissies 
te reduc e ren. Hoewel indiv i duen en huishoudens geen onvervreemdbaar 
recht he b ben om te emitter e n, hebben zij het recht om vrij te zijn van 
schadelijke uitstoot. Om vrij te zijn van zulke emissies is het nodig om een 
noodzakelijk en passend beleidsmechanisme te kiezen. Na het uitvoeren van 
een kwalitatieve kosten-batenanalyse wordt aannemelijk gemaakt dat er geen 
overtuig e nde rechtvaardigi n g lijkt te zijn om individuen en huishoudens 
aansprakelijk te maken voor emissies, of hen te dwingen om op een markt te 
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onderhandelen. Meer geschikte alternatieven voor het aanpakken van directe 
en indir e cte emissies kunn e n worden gevonden, vooral door de categorie 
van de ‘eindgebruiker’ opnieuw te doordenken en de verantwoordelijkheid 
dienovereenkomstig te verdelen. Mocht er sprake zijn van een behavioural 
‘silver bullet’ voor het inspireren van motivatie door middel van regelgeving, 
dan zouden verschillende kosten van het opleggen van een verplichte cap-and-
trade-regeling voor individuen gecompenseerd kunnen worden door de baten 
ervan. Het proefschrift (vooral hoofdstuk 4) vond hier echter geen bewijs 
voor. Er werd eerder beargumenteerd (in hoofdstukken 5 en 6) dat een EET-
systeem voor huishoudens de  werking van de bestaande klimaatregulering 
negatief zou kunnen beïnvloeden en mogelijke klimaatregulering ten aanzien 
van de n o g niet gedekte em i ssies via een crowding-out effect zou kunnen 
ondermijnen. 
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